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On October 13, to continue marking the 20th anniversary of German unification, GMF hosted a discussion of the prize-winning new book 1989: The Struggle to Create Post Cold-War Europe, with author Mary Elise Sarotte of the University of Southern California.   After an introduction by GMF Executive Vice President Karen Donfried, Sarotte outlined her motivation for writing the book before going on to describe its key ideas.  
Sarotte said the book arose from the fact that when the Berlin Wall fell, several diplomatic conversations emerged on the appropriate political architecture for the region. While today we are familiar with the unified Germany that resulted, Sarotte noted that initially there was little agreement between key powers on how to proceed. Indeed, she reminded the audience that, had different proposals been adopted, very different outcomes may have resulted. But instead, she suggested Cold War thinking managed to prevail post-1989 – visible in the expansion of NATO and the European community to include a unified Germany based on West German law and a Russia that emerged on the periphery, rather than being part, of wider Europe.
Because of the uncertain geopolitical dynamic when the Berlin Wall fell, Sarotte explained that many questions arose regarding the emerging regional architecture -- would Germany actually unify; could China’s Tiananmen Square response be replicated in Eastern Europe; would the Soviet Union integrate into Europe; and what would happen to NATO?  With answers to these questions far from clear, Sarotte suggested that four models surfaced in a form of “architectural competition” that would put key actors against each other in a battle to shape the future of the region. But as she went on to explain, from the outset it was clear that these four typologies would not necessarily have an equal chance of succeeding.
Using subject-relevant terminology, Sarotte outlined the first potential model as representing a form of architectural “restoration.” This model represented the Soviet plan to restore the quad-partite 1945 mechanism that had originally managed Berlin after World War II. However, she said that Helmut Kohl detested the idea and was instrumental in seeing its early downfall, instead putting forward his own “revivalist” alternative.
Kohl’s “revivalist” model consisted of an earlier attempt to confederate Germany – splitting the country into semi-autonomous political and economic zones, albeit unified under one “German” roof.  But with the Soviets realizing this idea had undermined their own proposals, Moscow was not supportive. Nor was the United States, which was eager to retain strong influence over Germany. As a result of these disparities, Gorbachev would subsequently put forward an alternate “heroic” vision of architecture for the region.
According to Sarotte, Gorbachev’s “heroic” model, not unlike the genre of architecture of the same name, consisted of an ambitious and ultimately unrealistic idea that would create a new European security structure -- stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific (including the Soviet Union). But with Washington cognizant that such a model would diminish American dominance in European security, it responded by lobbying Kohl to consider a fourth plan – architectural “prefabrication.”
Under the “prefab model,” the tried and tested ways of the West would be moved into the East. Pushed strongly by President George H.W. Bush, sustainable ideas and institutions such as West German Common Law would prevail in the unified Germany – a country quickly integrated into Europe and NATO. These ideas had the added benefit of appearing to have popular legitimacy in East Germany while allowing for the United States to remain dominant with the Soviet Union on the periphery. However, Sarotte noted that for the vision to ever have emerged into reality, Washington had to first “bribe the Soviets out” – through President Bush’s successful negotiation with Gorbachev on the withdrawal of 380,000 Soviet troops from East Germany.
With Washington’s “prefab model” ultimately finding most success, the result of 1989 was a unified Germany, an Eastern Europe that rejected Tiananmen Square-style responses, the perpetuation and expansion of Cold War institutions like NATO, and the expansion of the European community – with Russia eventually having no defined place in these institutions. The divisions of the Cold War had managed to prevail, even after 1989.
While suggesting the victory of the “prefab” model was not necessarily a bad outcome for Europe, Sarotte ended by pointing out that it was not necessarily the perfect fit for the conditions that surfaced in 1989. But with Kohl being such a strong Atlanticist, Sarotte said that had there been a non-Western chancellor in Germany at the time, things may have been very different today.