GMF - The German Marshall Fund of the United States - Strengthening Transatlantic Cooperation

George W. Bush's memoir has ignited a dispute between him and former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Bush claims in his book that at a meeting at the White House on January 31, 2002, Schroeder confirmed  his full support for American policy in Iraq. According to Bush, he made it clear to the German leader that he would, as a last option, use military force against the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Schroeder then replied: "What is true of Afghanistan is true of Iraq. Nations that sponsor terror must face consequences. If you make it fast and make it decisive, I will be with you." Bush continued: "This I took as a sign of support." During the election campaign, Schröder had backed away from that commitment. Bush writes, “But when the German election arrived later that year, Schroeder had a different take. He denounced the possibility of force against Iraq.”

Schroeder denies the accusation and accuses Bush of not telling the truth: "As for my later meetings with the U.S. President at that time I made it clear that should Iraq as before in Afghanistan act effectively as a shelter and sanctuary for Al-Qaeda Germany would reliably stand beside the United States." This connection, "however, as it became clear during 2002, was false and constructed.”

Who is telling the truth? And what this episode tells us about the differences between Germany and America? Were they the result of a personal dispute or a harbinger of a deeper rift between the two countries?

It is unlikely that either one of them is lying. Bush and Schroeder interpreted what was expressed during their conversations in different ways – and both were ambiguous in what they said. Both heard what they wanted to hear. Bush told Schroeder that there were “no war plans on his desk.” Schroeder told Bush that he had four conditions for German support, and wanted to signal that there were high hurdles for his support.  German diplomats later said it was a critical error that Schroeder did not manage to say clearly that this was basically a German No.

Both Bush and Schroeder are politicians - both trying to ensure that their room for  maneuver was as large as possible. This was the basis for the misunderstanding. "No one", said the then German ambassador in Washington, Ischinger, recently, "could interpret this conversation as a German blank check for military action against Iraq." However, Ischinger  has said on other occasions that there had been too many ambiguities on both sides during the talks.

For example, when Bush and Schroeder met again in May 2002 in Berlin,  Bush again told Schroeder that he had no war plans on his desk - which, as we now know was not true. He may not have had plans for a war on the desk, but they were in it or close by. The President and Chancellor agreed that during the German election campaign, nothing would happen. Bush promised Schröder, he would consult him before a final decision about war was taken.  Schroeder said: "This is all I need to know." Bush believed that Schroeder stood by his side, but neither knew what that meant.

Schroeder was afraid he was going to lose the election. He led a red-green coalition, whose supporters vehemently rejected Bush. He used explosive language ("Adventure", "dangerous war games") and orchestrated the Iraq issue during the election campaign. In this sense, he did not stick to his (implicit) agreement with Bush on Iraq not to make it an election issue. And he went further: he made the German relationship with the United States the issue and kept referring to Germany's independence and sovereignty. He, said he would “not click my heels” to Bush.  Other SPD leaders chose more drastic words.

It was when, a few days before the German election in September 2002,  Schroeder’s  Justice Minister, Daeubler-Gmelin, compared Bush with Hitler that prompted National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to speak of  "poisoned" US-German relations and the split became irrevocable. An unconvincing letter Schroeder wrote to Bush explaining what he thought had happened led a staff member of the National Security Council to call Ambassador Ischinger and to tell him: "Now the glass has overflowed." Bush believed Schroeder was behind the Hitler comparison or at least tolerated it.  From then on he froze Schroeder out.

One should not over personalize the relationship between states. The relationship between President Obama and Chancellor Merkel's is better than that between Bush and Schroeder, but what is essential to German-American relations are long-term structural changes and interests. In its security interests the two countries are not as close as before. The same is true for foreign economic policy, as Obama recently had to learn to his sorrow in Seoul.

The author is executive director of the Transatlantic Academy in Washington and the author of a history of the German-American split over the Iraq war, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations.

Original German Language Article Attached.