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On Defense, France Bites the Bullet, But Avoids Strategic Insolvency May 7, 2013

Iceland’s Recovery Saga Presents Opportunities for Brussels, Washington—and Beijing May 6, 2013

Which Way Forward for Europe’s Hybrid Regimes? May 2, 2013

The Arab Revolts and the Liberal Order May 2, 2013

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GMF celebrates its 40 year history and Founder and Chairman, Dr. Guido Goldman at Gala Dinner May 09, 2013 / Washington, DC

GMF held a celebratory gala dinner at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, Wednesday May 8.

Audio
Deal Between Kosovo, Serbia is a European Solution to a European Problem May 13, 2013

In this podcast, GMF Vice President of Programs Ivan Vejvoda discusses last month's historic agreement to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia.

Andrew Small on China’s Influence in the Middle East Peace Process May 10, 2013

Anchor Elaine Reyes speaks with Andrew Small, Transatlantic Fellow of the Asia Program for the German Marshall Fund, about Beijing's potential role in brokering peace between Israel and Palestine

Commentary on “Yet NATO remains central to Turkey?s wider regional role” June 23, 2011 / Emiliano Alessandri

Related Regions: Mediterranean
Related Program: Mediterranean
Sinan Ülgen’s argument that Turkey is ‘broadening its reach’ as opposed to ‘turning its back on the West’ is a welcome distinction, and one which helps us more accurately to grasp the new trends in Turkish foreign policy while refocusing the debate away from ideology towards strategy. Turkey’s multidirectional foreign policy – which is largely the product of structural changes within Turkey, and throughout the region after the end of the Cold War – is nurturing in Ankara a new strategic ambition that sometimes expresses itself in stances that diverge from those of Turkey’s European allies and the United States. This growing assertiveness, as Ülgenpoints out, is testing NATO’s cohesion.
 
That said, Ülgen could have acknowledged more fully that tensions between loyalty to the alliance and the pursuit of national interests is, in varying degrees, common to all the Western allies. In all these countries – including Germany, for instance – autonomist impulses have been reinforced, so they are certainly not peculiar to Turkey. Turkey has traditionally been very conservative in its attitude towards NATO when compared to its other areas of international engagement. This remains largely true today and Ülgen cites a number of recent disagreements between the transatlantic partners and Turkey. And he might even have emphasised that, where NATO was concerned the majority of these disagreements ended with Turkey once again aligning its policies with those of the alliance.
 
This was certainly the case with NATO’s missile defence plans, around which a lively debate had arisen in the run-up to last November’s Lisbon summit. Turkey initially raised a set of technical and strategic issues that had to do with the relationship between the missile defence system and the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the extent to which its territory would be covered under the new arrangements and the underlying issue of threat assessment. Seen by some as a sign of its defiance, Turkey’s insistence that Iran should not be explicitly identified as the target was actually in line with NATO’s longstanding presentation of itself as an ‘alliance for peace’ rather than against a specific country or bloc.

For the full article, please see :
http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21849/language/en-US/Default.aspx