GMF - The German Marshall Fund of the United States - Strengthening Transatlantic Cooperation

Below is an English translation of the original article as published in German, available online here.

Germany should not become dependent on Russian Gas

Gerhard Schröder — a board member of the Gazprom consortium for the Baltic Sea pipeline. This news raises the question of ethical rules of conduct for politicians who retire from office. And rightly so! This, however, is only one question. Another, more important, one should be: does this pipeline really serve Germany’s geopolitical interests? It is in Russia’s interest that the pipeline circumvents the Baltic States, Ukraine, and Poland, but can the same be said for Germany? It seems as if German foreign policy does not take the fundamental question of a geopolitical interest in energy policy into account.

This shortcoming certainly has its reasons: for many governing politicians and political scientists, the pursuit of geopolitical interests has a negative tinge. Germany and Europe are, after all, civil powers, whose foreign policy is guided by the values of freedom and democracy, but not by tangible interests — this at least is the message that German foreign policy has enjoyed conveying for years. Some graying academics, wailing in yesteryear’s nostalgia for Russia, are content to point out that "geopolitical drivel" is an American matter, hoping to discredit geopolitics entirely. Incidentally, some among the political elite like to believe that in Germany providing energy is only a concern of private energy companies. This is, however, far off!

Securing the long-term provision of energy, despite China’s and India’s exploding needs for energy, should be the state’s task, and here we are confronted with two different problems.

Firstly, more than 70% of the world’s energy resources are located in the Middle and Near East, in Russia, and in Central Asia — the latter is a crisis-ridden region marked by instability and a lack of democracy. A change in the near future seems unrealistic.

Secondly, Russia, China, Central Asia, Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan are employing state-owned companies in the "Great Game" for global gas and oil shares. Simultaneously, these companies are foreign policy tools of their governments, designed to create dependence and shape interests in foreign policy by consciously steering energy provisions, demands, and transport routes. Therefore, the German side needs a state-supported contractual framework within which private energy providers are then safe to design contracts about energy deliveries. This was the case with the Baltic Sea pipeline. With governmental treaties setting the framework, the German government pointed the way for private energy companies. In turn, the risk-averse companies are then happily walking the government’s path, enticed by the absence of political risks. In short, energy security and policy are not merely economic activities of businesses.

Only by diversifying its energy provisions can German foreign policy confront these two problems for the security of German energy. Russia is already Germany’s most important supplier, delivering more than 35% of Germany’s energy imports. The Baltic Sea pipeline is going to increase this dependence. Having other European energy companies as partners of the Gazprom consortium might aid in diversifying Germany’s dependence, just as pipeline tracts to Poland and Ukraine would.

Furthermore, it would be advisable to participate in considerations about new and direct pipeline routes from Central Asia over the Caspian Sea and the Southern Caucasus to Europe to avoid the growing dependence on Russia and to open new transport routes to energy suppliers. Recently the new pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan, to the Turkish port Ceyhan in the Mediterranean has opened and will be supplemented by an almost parallel-running pipeline, to be finished next year. Due to a lack of German political interest, German companies did not participate in these two projects. Currently, there are first negotiations with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to deliver energy resources by pipeline to the Caspian Sea and Western markets. This time, Germany should participate. It could open an important pipeline route independent of Russia. This would most certainly be in Germany’s geopolitical interest. Considerations like these obviously did not play a role for the German side when Schröder signed the contracts framing the Baltic Sea pipeline.

The author is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow of the German Marshall Fund in Berlin.