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On October 1, in partnership with the Congressional Study Group on Germany and the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, GMF hosted a discussion with World Bank President Robert Zoellick to reflect on the 20th anniversary of German reunification. After an introduction by GMF Co-Chair Marc Leland, GMF Senior Director for Policy Programs Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff interviewed Zoellick, who was a U.S. representative to the “Two-plus-Four” process in 1990.

Kleine-Brockhoff started off by asking what could be learnt about diplomatic anticipation in unpredictable times as a result of the German unification process. Zoellick said that while it is always extremely difficult to predict events in times of rapid change, one can nonetheless observe trends that are forming and make preparations for likely eventualities. He suggested that, prior to unification, George H.W. Bush performed well in this context by facilitating the environment for unification in a number of ways.

When Zoellick was asked how U.S. plans had slowly changed from encouraging German self-determination to later actually promoting unification, he explained that despite differences in rhetoric, unification had always been the primary goal of U.S. foreign policy. However, he added that unlike the Soviet policy, the United States early on wanted to ensure unification took place within the wider context of a European unification process.

Zoellick suggested the rapid design of the post-Cold War order, between the signing of the “Two-plus-Four” treaty and actual unification, was principally down to the significant impetus for change found on the ground in Germany at the time. Despite the public urge for unification, he explained that the United States was trying to build political structures for Europe and Germany that would stand the test of time.

Kleine-Brockhoff asked whether at the time there was a “Plan B” to the U.S. ideal of creating a Europe that would be whole and free, or whether Zoellick had any doubts that it could even be realized. He responded that the United States was anxious that things could go wrong, so it developed tactics with Germany to overcome hurdles when they would arise to minimize the need for a “Plan B” strategy.

Zoellick went on to say that without the sentiment of the American people, who were keen for Germany to unify and democratize, it may have been difficult for Article 23 to work out as a model for institutional integration in Germany. He added that, unlike some observers at the time, he had no problem with West German democracy taking over as the system of choice, as it had previously worked well and he thought it could continue to do so. Explaining how the Soviets came around to the idea, Zoellick suggested that Gorbachev would not have wanted to stymie his country’s ever-warming relations with both the United States and Europe. With regards to getting other allies on board, he noted that while there was an early unease from some quarters, it was quickly overcome by having several key players in Europe who were in favor German-unification provide support.

Ending the discussion, Kleine-Brockhoff asked Zoellick whether some of the ideas then-French President Francois Mitterand and then-British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had about a unified Germany becoming overpowering were starting to come true, particularly in the context of the effects of the economic crisis in Europe. He responded by pointing out that the original logic of unification was to draw Germany into Europe and that this had succeeded. He added that, while Germany remains ever-committed to Europe, it is now understandable that it wants to exert influence there, too, especially in the context of recent economic support for Greece.

To watch video of the event, please click here.