GMF - The German Marshall Fund of the United States - Strengthening Transatlantic Cooperation

President Putin's recent visit to Germany was overshadowed by the murder of Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya of just a few days before. In the subsequent press conference, after only a few opening remarks, Chancellor Merkel demanded an explanation for the killing. Putin's cynical assertion that the murderous act damaged Russia more than the supposedly unimportant work of the journalist horrified the German media. At state visits in Dresden and Munich, German protesters waved banners depicting President Putin as a murderer.

The killing of Anna Politkovskaya, a vehement critic of both the war in Chechnya and Putin's ‘Demokratur', constitutes a paradigm shift in the suppression of freedom of the press and speech in Russia. Henceforth no one in Russia, who dares to criticize the regime, including those, who had previously been protected by their international stature, is safe. Furthermore, this suppression of the press has been accompanied by the persecution of Georgians living in Russia following the arrest of four Russian KGB officers in Georgia, who have since been handed back to Russia.

These most recent developments in Russia will have an impact on German - Russian relations. The relationship will enter a new phase, perhaps not on the inter-governmental level, but rather in the public perception, and, as we all know, this is very important in any democracy. Under Chancellor Kohl's foreign policy, German- Russian relations were seen in political terms. The reunification of Germany and the withdrawal of Russian troops managed in conjunction with Russia, and the latter, by the way in coordination with Poland and the other Eastern European neighbours, were the key elements, whereas in the following years German-Russian relations have been seen mostly in economic terms.

Most recently, there is the perception that, especially in the area of energy, Russia is instrumentalizing its economic leverage to exert political pressure on smaller third party states of Russia's "Near Abroad", as witnessed by its interruption of gas supplies to Ukraine in January 2006 and its economic boycott of Georgia.

At the moment, Berlin seems to be rather at a loss on whether and how to adjust German foreign policy to the most recent developments in Russia.

Initially, Germany was obliged to minimize its energy dependence on Russia by diversifying its energy suppliers regionally, thus including Central Asia and Algeria as potential suppliers more than before, even when German energy and business connections are so profitable with Russia and it lies within Putin's interest to extend them. Putin has allegedly also offered to increase the trade in gas supplies with Germany too, but in light of the past events, this has received little political backing. Another matter is the facilitation of the transport of gas supplies to other EU states such as Great Britain or the Netherlands, in which case Germany, as well as Poland, would act as transit lands. According to a Foreign Office strategy paper studying the security of the energy supply, Berlin intends to deepen its integration with its Eastern European neighbours and Russia. Eventually, it will have to be discussed what mechanisms within the EU and with its European neighbours, could be developed to deal with future energy supply shortages or breakdowns. The Baltic Sea pipeline project had advanced too far for Chancellor Merkel to cancel it. And in the meantime, other European firms have participated in it and Chancellor Merkel has offered to work together with Warsaw to give Poland access to the pipeline.

A German "Strategic Partnership" or "Rapprochement through Integration" with Russia, both of whom profess a similar understanding of democracy, civil society, and human rights, can hardly, in light of the most recent developments, be pursued. The differences in the understanding of their most basic tenets are too large, given that actual democracy and respect for human rights is more of a hope than a reality in Russia. The credibility of Germany's Russia policy is based on Russia's commitment to the promotion of the reform and democratic process. President Putin's policies must be judged on his actions, not on his words. The lack of commitment to basic human rights forces Germany to take a more level headed approach to its Russia policy, and according to the Russian opposition, this would be for Russia's own good .The expanding centralization of power in the Kremlin and the suppression of democracy, coupled with an economy built on a single energy export industry does not bode well. Also, the German government should revaluate its approach to working with companies such as Gazprom, which are in state hands, have political goals, and do not follow the rules of the free market. Under false pretences, the Russian state once again nationalized parts of companies that western companies such as Shell and BP had invested in. Furthermore, Gazprom plays German companies, who would like to acquire a interest in the gas delivery business, off against each other to see who will pay for a greater portion of the German distribution network. The Russian state also denies any foreign investment in the 100% state owned distribution network "Transneft".

The integration of the Eastern European Neighbourhood (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldau) and the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) will be of a particular significance during the German EU Presidency, even if an eventual membership in the EU is not supported by the majority. In any case, through an improved Neighbourhood Programme (ENP) regional cooperation will be encouraged. Because of Poland's close political, cultural, and economic bonds with its Eastern European neighbours and its successful accession to the EU, it has a particularly important role in this respect. Due to its relationship with its Eastern European neighbours and its large weight within the EU, it will be able to act as a spokesperson for these nations.

This integration process is in stark contrast - and this is sometimes overlooked- with the EU's integration process with Russia. Russia does not and will not become a member of the EU. And even if Russia will not facilitate the integration of future EU states, Germany and the EU must not give Russia a veto and, to the contrary, must promote their integration. In this respect, the EU should help stabilize Georgia, especially by playing an active role in resolving the conflict in South Ossetia that Georgia and Russia have been unable to settle. Poland could also play an important role here. In any case, in regard to German-Russian relations "the days of business as usual" of the last few years seem to be long past.