GMF - The German Marshall Fund of the United States - Strengthening Transatlantic Cooperation

Germany has been celebrating Europe's 50th birthday, and itself: Hooray, we're a normal country again, with a normal foreign policy! Indeed, Germany has come a long way in this half century. And Angela Merkel has done much to reestablish it in its old role as a balancer and mediator in Europe, as well as within the transatlantic relationship.

On the other hand, the public hysteria over missile defence in Germany begs the question of just how deep-rooted this maturity really is. But then all of the players in this game - the Americans, the Russians, and the Europeans - are either being disingenuous, or are suffering from collective amnesia.

Even friends of America were taken aback when the superpower recently announced rather casually that it was planning to install 10 interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. Could Washington have forgotten that only a few years ago, the notion of a European-based missile defence was seen as part of a U.S. "disaggregation strategy" towards the EU: New Europe under the missile umbrella, and Old Europe left outside in the rain?

The reality was much more banal. The State Department, being really, really busy, left it to the Pentagon, who, being really, really busy too, left it to the Missile Defence Agency to explain the latest plans. That, as we know now, was a bad idea. There is a reason why it's not called the Missile Diplomacy Agency.

Had anyone still needed proof that things had gone badly wrong, they would have found it in Poland. Former defence minister Radek Sikorski lambasted the U.S. proposals in a Washington Post OpEd as "crass", adding a passionate paean to the European Union. Perhaps the State Department should introduce a "Sikorski Test": If your staunchest ally becomes a fan of the EU, chances are you misstepped.

Over here, we seem to have erased any memory of the fact that it was our favorite President, Bill Clinton, who announced at NATO in the late 1990's that the U.S. was planning to build a shield against intercontinental ballistic missiles from "rogue states". When the Europeans countered that this would create a "zone of divided security", Washington offered to extend the shield to Europe. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright remarked pointedly that after all we here had more to worry about from Iranian missile plans than the United States.

The prize for coming down firmly on both sides of the fence at the same time went to Gerhard Schröder. Germany's then-Chancellor sonorously inveighed against missile defence. But, he added, German firms were definitely interested in any related technology contracts.

Meanwhile, back at the White House, the Bush administration has been downsizing its original grandiose missile defence blueprint ever since it took office in 2001. Costs have skyrocketed, compounded by test failures; the system has yet to be tested realistically.

"NATO consultations", under the circumstances, probably looked like this: the Americans explained as little of their plans as they could get away with - whereas the Europeans smiled thinly and rolled their eyes, hoping it would all go away if they only ignored it long enough. And of course everyone became distracted by what the British premier Harold MacMillan once famously called "events, dear boy, events": 9-11, Afghanistan, Iraq.

Fast-forward to 2007. Iran doesn't have the missiles or the warheads yet, but it's working on them. The missile defence element the Americans want to build in Eastern Europe would destroy 3 to 5 incoming rockets at most. Assuming it works, that is. But given how unattractive all the offensive options against Iran are, investing in a bit of deterrence suddenly seems very sensible.

Those 10 small (75 kg) and unarmed American missiles would not be remotely capable of undermining Russia's nuclear deterrent (at least 2000 intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads) - Vladimir Putin's Munich tantrum notwithstanding. The emotion is worth taking seriously; the accusation is not.

Germany's Social Democrats, in deep gloom because of plummeting polls, "pounced like a tiger and landed like a bedrug", as a German saying goes: they promptly charged Washington of starting an arms race and destabilizing Russia. Yet Angela Merkel has also been noticeably circumspect in her response. Perhaps that's because she too has noted public opinion surveys which have large majorities agreeing with Putin. None of this is reassuring, and it's certainly not "normal".

All this tells us that the recent transatlantic entente remains fragile; our strategic communities are understaffed, distracted and overwhelmed.

Yet a constructive approach to missile defence is possible. It would begin with a serious intellectual debate among NATO allies on the threat, necessary responses, and technical feasibility. The Americans should consult fully - not only with Europeans, but also with the Russians. The Europeans, for their part, need to make up their minds: if they want the protection, and some control, they will also have to bear some of the costs. Now that would be a "normal" security policy.

Click here for the original article in Polish.