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On Defense, France Bites the Bullet, But Avoids Strategic Insolvency May 7, 2013
Iceland’s Recovery Saga Presents Opportunities for Brussels, Washington—and Beijing May 6, 2013
Which Way Forward for Europe’s Hybrid Regimes? May 2, 2013
The Arab Revolts and the Liberal Order May 2, 2013
Events
GMF celebrates its 40 year history and Founder and Chairman, Dr. Guido Goldman at Gala Dinner May 09, 2013 / Washington, DCGMF held a celebratory gala dinner at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, Wednesday May 8.
In this podcast, GMF Vice President of Programs Ivan Vejvoda discusses last month's historic agreement to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia.
Anchor Elaine Reyes speaks with Andrew Small, Transatlantic Fellow of the Asia Program for the German Marshall Fund, about Beijing's potential role in brokering peace between Israel and Palestine
Quitting Isn’t An Option
February 09, 2010 / Daniel Twining
Times of India
World leaders meeting in London recently to discuss Afghanistan's future have dealt themselves a weak hand. The principal obstacles to success in Afghanistan have not been the adversary's strength or any lack of support for the international mission by the Afghan public. Rather, the primary obstacles to victory have been western temporising, irresolution and planned force reductions on a timeline that better suits the Taliban's strategic objectives than our own. The weakness of the Afghan government, a critical handicap, is itself partly a by-product of these broader strategic failures that have incentivised Afghan leaders to hedge against international abandonment in ways detrimental to state-building and development.
The litany of western strategic errors in Afghanistan spans multiple administrations of different political stripes on both sides of the Atlantic. Chief among them have been the chronic underinvestment in building up the Afghan security forces; the deployment of insufficient international forces, many with caveats constraining effective military action; the lack of an international civilian development footprint commensurate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) military role; the failure to "Afghanise" massive aid flows in ways that have hollowed out rather than built Afghan capacity; an over-investment in relations with Afghanistan's central government at the expense of connecting Afghans to provincial and local institutions of governance; the lack of any concerted strategy to strengthen liberal forces in neighbouring Pakistan; and the absence of Pakistani military pressure until recently on terrorist sanctuaries along the Afghan border.
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