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GMF celebrates its 40 year history and Founder and Chairman, Dr. Guido Goldman at Gala Dinner May 09, 2013 / Washington, DC

GMF held a celebratory gala dinner at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, Wednesday May 8.

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Deal Between Kosovo, Serbia is a European Solution to a European Problem May 13, 2013

In this podcast, GMF Vice President of Programs Ivan Vejvoda discusses last month's historic agreement to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia.

Andrew Small on China’s Influence in the Middle East Peace Process May 10, 2013

Anchor Elaine Reyes speaks with Andrew Small, Transatlantic Fellow of the Asia Program for the German Marshall Fund, about Beijing's potential role in brokering peace between Israel and Palestine

The implications of Hatoyama’s downfall for the U.S.-Japan alliance June 02, 2010 / Daniel Twining
Foreign Policy


A new year, another new Japanese prime minister. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's resignation makes him the fourth Japanese leader in four years to fall from power. What are the implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance?

First, Hatoyama misread the domestic politics of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which polling shows to have stronger support in Japan than at almost any time in the past. Hatoyama's decline and fall were due in large measure to the crisis in U.S.-Japan relations he helped create by opposing a carefully negotiated plan for the redeployment of American forces on Okinawa. His missteps in first blowing up the deal -- then after nine painful months coming around to embrace it after inflating the expectations of the Okinawan people and his own party -- put him on the opposite side of both the United States and a still pro-American Japanese public. The good news is that the political logic of maintaining strong U.S.-Japan ties overcame that of running against the U.S. for political gain.

Second, in a perverse way we may have Kim Jong-Il to thank for this turn of events. North Korea's sinking of the South Korean destroyer Cheonan and ensuing threats to bring war to East Asia should South Korea retaliate reminded Japan's leaders and people that they continue to live in a very dangerous neighborhood. Aggressive Chinese naval maneuvers in waters near Japan have also reminded Tokyo that Hatoyama's lofty rhetoric about "East Asian fraternity" has its limits. North Korean and Chinese bullying underscored how potentially risky Japan's alliance dispute with America was, and how necessary it was to move rapidly to repair it by agreeing to the U.S. troop realignment on Okinawa. But Hatoyama's abrupt about-face in securing it only hastened his political downfall.

Third, of greater importance to alliance solidarity going forward may be the resignation not of Prime Minister Hatoyama but of Ichiro Ozawa, the shadowy leader of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) whose Machiavellian political instincts and alleged corruption challenged the DPJ's reformist ambitions. How could the party achieve its goals of increasing transparency and accountability in Japanese politics when it was led by the ultimate political insider? Ozawa's role as the power behind the throne did much to undermine Hatoyama by intensifying perceptions of the prime minister's weakness and indecisiveness. Ozawa has also long been viewed as belonging to the "China school" in Japan that sees relations with Beijing, not Washington, as ultimately more important to Japan's future. Last year, he led the largest delegation of parliamentarians ever to Beijing in what looked uncomfortably like the deferential tributary missions of the pre-modern era. Ozawa is a political survivor so it is too early to count him out. Nevertheless, his departure as party leader bodes well for both Japanese politics and relations with Washington.

Fourth, while Hatoyama's resignation may not herald a more pro-American successor, it should elevate one that can more effectively implement the DPJ's campaign promise to reform Japanese politics and restore Japanese economic growth. Leadership favorite and current Finance Minister Naoto Kan was an alliance skeptic when he served as DPJ leader earlier in the decade. Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, once more of an alliance skeptic before his dealings with Washington in his current post reinforced his support for better U.S. relations, is also a prime ministerial contender. Both may well judge, following the Hatoyama fiasco, that the domestic politics of picking fights with America are fraught -- and that the powers of the prime minister's office should therefore be directed toward other issue areas. These include compelling needs for financial and economic liberalization and domestic reforms to empower women, improve education, and broadly revitalize Japanese competitiveness for the 21st century. Such an accomplishment manifestly would be in America's interest.

And that is ultimately the point: Washington needs a vibrant Japan as an alliance partner in a region of tectonic power shifts -- and in a world where global governance requires all the responsible, capable, like-minded partners we can find. The DPJ's historic ascension to power last year brought with it the promise of a more equal alliance with the United States. The U.S. should welcome the greater equality in alliance relations that would follow from the restoration of Japanese growth and vitality. Prime Minister Hatoyama did not succeed in inducing it. The U.S. should endeavor to help his successor do so. A stronger and healthier alliance relationship would surely follow.

This essay was originally published in Foreign Policy. It can be found here in its original form.