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On February 17, GMF hosted Serge Michailof, lecturer at Sciences Po, Paris, and former executive director of operations at the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) for a discussion on his policy brief entitled, "The Seven Capital Sins of the Donor Community in Afghanistan - What Went Wrong in the Security Development Nexus, and What Should be the Lessons for U.S. Foreign Assistance?"

Michailof was joined by Patrick C. Fine, senior vice president and director of the global education center at the Academy for Educational Development, and former USAID mission director in Afghanistan. Fine offered his reactions to Michailof's insights and recommendations, as he extracted potential lessons to be learned for the broader development and donor communities. This exchange was opened and moderated by GMF senior director for Wider Europe Peter Van Praagh.

A podcast interview with Serge Michailof is available for download beloe:

Serge Michailof: seven capital sins of the donor community in Afghanistan

Serge Michailof began the dialogue by presenting his key findings on what he characterized as a "pattern of mistakes" by the donor community, specifically in Afghanistan. These findings included:

• The international community has displayed an unwillingness to address the security issue in Afghanistan
• There has been a lack of a coherent strategy to link the related spheres of security and development
• The aid system in Afghanistan has had no "pilot" to strategically manage foreign assistance
• The donor community has been pressured to focus on delivering quick results, to the detriment of ensuring the long-term sustainability of Afghan institutions
• Donors have failed to attend to the critical reconstruction of the state apparatus
• Donors have fallen victim to the "technical assistance trap," inefficiently providing technical assistance instead of building long-term solutions
• The aid effort in Afghanistan has been run along a "business-as-usual" approach that consistently fails to devote the necessary resources and attract the top people

Having outlined the situation in detail, Michailof went on to say that time is running out for the international community to address these problems. Restoring security, he argued, is the critical issue: a strong military presence is needed on the ground, combined with an effective police force and massive aid campaign targeted toward instable rural areas. Focus should be placed on improving Afghanistan's institutions with the clear involvement of Afghan leadership, and donors need to instill the discipline to implement the strategic distribution of aid in Afghanistan. Simply devoting aid without a strategic direction is not sufficient, he argued, as certain greater systemic problems must be addressed. Such problems include nepotism and the lack of institutional capacity.

Patrick Fine responded to the points raised in Michailof's paper, commenting on a number of the lessons, observations and dilemmas it provokes. A central lesson identified by Fine was that establishing security and the rule of law must be a prerequisite for the reconstruction of a fragile state. He argued for a distinction to be made between civilian programs that are aimed at restabilization versus reconstruction, so that they could more effectively be put to use. He also noted the imbalance that exists between spending on security and civilian programs, explaining that rectifying this would require an increase in resources on the civilian side. This resource issue was a common theme in Fine's commentary, as he stated that the international community must establish a means to fund the recurrent costs that are inherent to increasing the police and security forces across the country. There needs to be an honest conversation with the public in donor countries about the costs involved.

Mr. Fine also echoed the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan, highlighting the tension between the need to empower local authorities while at the same time producing quick results. Pointing to a potential lesson, he proposed that a balance needs to be struck between building long-term capacities without compromising immediate progress. This tension speaks to the potential problem of creating parallel systems instead of investing in a strong civil service. Michailof and Fine were in agreement that the international community needs to have a sustained commitment to devoting the time and resources necessary to strategically empower local institutions and build human capacities in Afghanistan.   

Following these remarks, the discussion opened to comments and questions from around the table. Key issues raised by participants included the role of the private sector, and specifically, unlocking the potential for capital growth through market-oriented solutions. On this point, participants touched on the need to balance government-based solutions with non-conventional, private sector support (e.g., to find non-bureaucratic ways to create jobs and tap the country's potential for capital growth). The matter of "managing expectations" was raised, as the situation in Afghanistan will realistically take years to improve. The role of Pakistan was also explored, with participants stressing the need for a regional approach to security and development in Afghanistan. A consensus was reached about the necessity of first providing for security so that development can take root; the more the security situation is allowed to deteriorate, the more difficult development will become as the international community becomes cut off from the situation on the ground. Development practitioners are not able to outside of their Embassies or compounds to talk with the locals and meet their leaders to better understand local conditions. In hostile environments, they essentially operate with "blinders on" when programming aid.

Both Michailof and Fine concluded the discussion by stressing that it is critically important that the international community remain engaged in Afghanistan. The need for a collective approach was once again emphasized, as actions that may have been rational on the part of individual actors have been seen to lead to sub-optimal outcomes for the people of Afghanistan.