The White House’s three worst assumptions on Libya
March 21, 2011
Foreign Policy
Now that the United States has joined the French and British in attacking Qaddafi's forces in Libya, the Obama administration merits our support. I believe that this military intervention is the right thing to do, although I share the worries of many that it might have come too late. The White House's weeks of vacillations emboldened Qaddafi, dispirited the Libyan rebels, vexed our allies, and lost valuable strategic ground in the fight for Libya's future. Now the endgame is less certain. One hopes that the administration's own contradictory messages on its strategic goals for the Libya campaign -- is the goal just to protect civilians? strengthen the rebel forces? remove Qaddafi from power? preserve a unified Libya? protect a secessionist branch? -- will be resolved soon, with a clear alignment of military and political objectives.
Meanwhile, when the administration's senior team members get a much-needed moment to collect their breath and their thoughts, I hope they will reflect on some of their strategic and policy assumptions that preceded the Libya crisis. Three assumptions in particular stand out, each of which the White House appeared to embrace in its first two years, and each of which is flawed.For the full article, please see Foreign Policy magazine.



