The massive rise in oil prices that preceded the current recession coupled with the January 2009 interruption in gas supplies through Ukraine to a number of countries in Europe have exposed the vulnerabilities of dependence on imported sources of energy.

Who is to blame? From an insatiable American appetite for energy in general—and cheap gasoline in particular—to the refusal of certain countries to embrace the benefits of nuclear energy, from the environmental obstacles to the development of more diversified sources of fossil fuels, from the supposed desires of supplier countries to use energy as a foreign policy tool to the inability of EU members to develop a common energy supply policy based on solidarity, all have had an effect, and all are to blame.

In reality, energy suppliers are also dependent on their customers for their income; democracies must respect the deeply held convictions of their citizens. Geography cannot be eliminated. Unless an understanding can be reached that suppliers and consumers have a common interest in developing a new paradigm, it is not clear that the building of more pipelines, the opening up of more oil and gas fields, and a push into renewable energies will lead to a more predictable and secure future. What would this entail?

Guiding Questions

• Can there be energy security guarantees?
  
  
• Is solidarity within the EU possible while respecting a variety of political choices?
  
  
• Can the proposed Energy Charter be revived?n What role should the International Energy Agency play?
  
  
• Can the extension of long-term contracts, perhaps with prices linked to overall economic developments, be helpful?
  
  
• How can mutual trust between suppliers and consumers be established?
  
  

Israel’s relationship with the transatlantic community has undergone an important shift in recent years. For its part, Israel has realized that it needs a better European anchor along with an American one during these times of trouble and radicalization in the Middle East and a looming Iranian nuclear threat. The European Union and NATO have not only responded to that desire to expand cooperation but are also benefitting from cooperation with Israel as they struggle to build stability in the Middle East and fight a counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Whereas five years ago Israeli-European relations were troubled, European leaders last year, at the 60th anniversary of the state of Israel, strongly reiterated their commitment to Israel’s security.

In June 2008, the EU and Israel decided to launch a process to upgrade their relations. That process reached interim results at the end of the French EU Presidency in December. The Czechs have made this work a priority during their presidency and hope to possibly organize the first EU-Israel summit. However, Israel’s recent “Cast Lead” operation in Gaza has raised questions from some EU members over the prospect of such an upgrade at this point in time. Public skepticism, if not hostility, toward Israel and Israeli policies in some EU members can be a factor limiting future cooperation.

Israel and NATO have also sought to improve cooperation. Only recently, NATO and Israel signed an enhanced Individual Cooperation Program under the 1994 Mediterranean Dialogue. At times, however, when Israel and NATO share common security challenges such as combating terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, both sides recognize that the potential for deeper cooperation is there. Calls to upgrade Israel’s relations with NATO to partnership or membership levels have been the subject of much debate in Israel as well as in Congressional testimony in the United States.

Guiding Questions

• What does Israel want to achieve from upgraded relations with the EU and NATO, and vice versa?
  
  
• Are European countries prepared to deepen relations with Israel via the EU or NATO separate from progress in the peace process?
  
  
• What roles do the EU and NATO think they could play in facilitating peace and stability in the Middle East?
  
  
• On what terms would the EU and NATO be willing to lead international mediation efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
  
  
• Will NATO’s new strategic concept and an expanded understanding of partnerships enable Israel to have closer relations with the alliance?
  
  
• How supportive—or opposed—are European publics likely to be of expanded relations between Israel and the EU and NATO?
  
  
• How supportive is the United States of such cooperation?
  
  

As the likelihood of a concerted global response to the threat of climate change grows, so too does the effort of industry to develop and commercialize the technologies that will be needed to respond to the signals likely to come from government incentives and market forces. Rising energy prices, the expansion of carbon emissions cap-and-trade systems, government assistance to new forms of energy generation, and growing consumer attention to carbon footprints are all driving this potential change.

Responses have varied from massive growth in wind- and solar-generated electricity to a new interest in high-yield but high-cost plants using wave, tide, and geothermal energy. From new forms of cleaner-burning coal plants to experiments with carbon capture and storage, cities are responding with programs to reduce the energy used by transport. Islands are driving toward complete independence from fossil fuels. And there is a new debate on the potential role of nuclear power as a potentially low-carbon source of electricity generation, although it remains controversial due to problems of waste, cost, and its link to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Are sufficient raw materials available for a massive expansion of non-carbon energy sources, e.g. silicon for photovoltaic solar, lithium for batteries, and uranium for nuclear energy?n How do we get our citizens to accept the changes needed in their lifestyles? How do we make them politically acceptable in a democracy?

Guiding Questions

• What are the technologies that can power the world and still allow it to lower carbon emissions?
  
  
• What can government do to facilitate the transition to a new energy economy?
  
  
• Will the current economic crisis and the low price of conventional fossil fuel prices drive producers using new energy sources out of business?
  
  
• Or does it create an opportunity for new green growth?
  
  
• Are sufficient raw materials available for a massive expansion of non-carbon energy sources, e.g. silicon for photovoltaic solar, lithium for batteries, and uranium for nuclear energy?
  
  
• How do we get our citizens to accept the changes needed in their lifestyles? How do we make them politically acceptable in a democracy?
  
  

The United States and Europe are grappling with the implications of the rise of Asia and how this trend will impact the spectrum of foreign policy, economic, and domestic challenges facing the transatlantic community. Policymakers in Washington, Brussels, and European capitals face problems and issues that can no longer be successfully addressed without involving key Asian powers. China and India have joined Japan as Asian states with global reach. Similarly, the major Asian powers have an interest in deepening their connection to the transatlantic world in ways that go beyond traditional bilateral ties with the United States and Europe.

The growing focus on Asia also places pressure on the primacy of transatlantic ties. The EU, in its efforts to lift its arms embargo on China, brought attention to the ensuing risks that may arise in its relationship with the United States as Europe deepens its ties with the major Asian powers. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made Asia, rather than traditional allies in Europe or the Middle East, the destination of her first overseas visit. The gap between the strategic responsibilities that the United States has in the region and what many believe to be a Europe without a strategic approach to Asia could lead to transatlantic divisions in the years ahead. Others argue that it is essential for Europe and the United States to work together in order to retain their power to shape the international structures that face Asia’s rising powers.

But many of the most important trends are being driven out of the region itself. The rivalries between the major powers in Asia, their strategies toward the region, and how they position themselves vis-a-vis the United States and the West, will do much to shape the geopolitical order in the coming decades, whether it is Japan’s evolution as a “normal” power, India’s new U.S. tilt, the ties developing between democracies in the region, or China’s efforts to shape the multilateral institutions in Asia. There are also more immediate concerns to address as the world’s second- and third-largest economies go through the turmoil of the global financial crisis, posing questions over how quickly Asia’s rise will continue.

Guiding Questions

• How do the Asian powers see the future of the transatlantic alliance?
  
  
• What approach will Asian powers take in the future toward the Western-led international order?
  
  
• How will Asia weather the global economic crisis and with what implications for the United States and Europe?
  
  
• How do the Chinese, Japanese, and Indian visions of the future of Asia differ?
  
  
  

Relations between Moscow and the West appear to be experiencing a mini-thaw since the advent of a new administration in Washington. The Obama administration has promised to recalibrate its relations with Russia, and a smiling U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pressing the “reset button” with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made front-page news around the world.
Is this change just atmospheric or is it real? Can the gap between Russia and the West be closed? Have the differences that divided us on past issues—the war in Georgia, NATO enlargement, missile defense, and energy security—really narrowed? And is talk about greater cooperation in the wider Middle East and on issues ranging from Iran to Afghanistan to be taken seriously? President Medvedev has called for a new European security charter. Is that proposal simply intended to update the rules of the game in Europe and Eurasia for the better—or to get the West to endorse a new Russian sphere of privileged interest?

And can EU members with diverging interests and perceptions agree on answers to these questions and be part of a transatlantic consensus on them? Eight EU members are enjoying a new sense of nationhood and reveling in freedom after decades of being part of the Soviet empire. For others this freedom is only one of the many aspects of a long period of peace and increasing prosperity. Some EU member states have worked hard to reduce their energy dependence by embracing nuclear or renewable energies, others have bet on the reliability of a network of natural gas pipelines largely controlled by Russia. And the economic crisis is exacerbating these differences.

This conversation will explore how Russia sees the future development of its relations with Europe and the United States.

Guiding Questions

• How does Russia see its relations with the transatlantic partners?
  
  
• Does Russia want to return to an era of balance-of-power politics and spheres of influence or forge a new Eurasian entente?
  
  
• What would a new European security charter look like? How would it co-exist with NATO?
  
  
• Is there room to build on the NATO/Russia Partnership for Peace in order to deal with problems like Afghanistan?
  
  
• Can Russia and the transatlantic partners make common cause to deal with the nuclear ambitions of Iran? What role could missile defense play in this?
  
  
• Is Russia a reliable long-term source of energy for Europe or will it use energy as a political lever?
  
  
• Can the EU overcome the diverging situations of its member states sufficiently to adopt a common stance in its dealings with Russia on energy?
  
  
• How can the Helsinki achievements on human rights in Russia be safeguarded?
  
  
• Is further NATO enlargement essential to peace and long-term stability in Europe?
  
  

Since the beginning of the financial crisis in the fall of 2008, the world economy has deteriorated at an alarming rate. In the United States and Europe, the world’s economic engines, growth has turned negative and unemployment soared to highs not seen in decades. Companies across a wide range of industries face insolvency, stock markets are plummeting, and for the first time since the great depression, the World Bank predicts both global trade and the global economy to shrink.

Transatlantic cooperation aimed at stemming the economic crisis has been fairly limited thus far. Following the last International Monetary Fund (IMF) meeting in October 2008, U.S. and EU leaders announced some coordinated policy responses, including policy on interest rates, partial nationalization of banks, and inter-bank lending. And more recently, governments on both sides of the Atlantic have proceeded unilaterally to fashion stimulus packages, bank rescues, and trade policy measures. Some of these actions, such as the “Buy America” provision in the U.S. stimulus bill, have degenerated into minor transatlantic tussles. Furthermore, the United States and the EU, traditionally staunch defenders of the world trading system, have done little to address the seeming spread of trade protectionism around the world —including by their main trading partners—let alone to finalize the Doha Development Round. Furthermore, there are transatlantic differences—and differences even within the EU—on ways to best address the economic collapse of countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Transatlantic leadership at the end of the World War II was key to setting the world on a path of economic growth and free markets. As the world struggles with a financial crisis comparable to the dark years of the early 1930s, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic should come together and show similar resolve and cooperation as they have demonstrated in the several key junctures of the global economic history of the past 60 years. The U.S. and European governments must reassess the role of the transatlantic partnership in the global economy and re-ignite it as a catalyst of global economic recovery.

Guiding Questions

• The current crisis takes place in a different, more multipolar world economy than the Great Depression did. What should the role of the United States and the EU be in fashioning policies and measures conducive to global economic recovery in this setting? Should the transatlantic partnership be “rebooted” and revised so as to better jointly address the crisis? What should the United States and the EU do together so as to bring all the main players —particularly the G20 members—in the world economy to cooperate in fashioning policy solutions?
  
  
• Many governments are putting together stimulus packages to shore up domestic markets. How effective will these efforts be in spurring growth in the world economy? Will some of the stimulus measures, such as subsidies, be only counterproductive to the fair play in global trading and financial systems, and over time do more harm than good? What should the transatlantic community do to ensure that the stimulus packages around the world, including the United States and Europe, are most constructive to the recovery and least damaging to free markets?
  
  
• What is the role of international trade as an engine for economic growth? What is the importance of the Doha Round? What, in essence, is at stake? What should transatlantic partners do to spur trade cooperation?
  
  
• Are existing multilateral organizations equipped to address global challenges or is a new global economic architecture needed? Do the IMF, the World Bank, and other institutions have the means and institutional frameworks that are best equipped to deal with the current situation? What does the financial crisis and its response say about the usefulness and functions of these bodies? What kinds of common policies should the United States and Europe pursue to harness the global institutions to propel global recovery?
  
  
• What are the priority areas where developing countries need immediate assistance? How do they relate to a longer-term development agenda? Given limited financial resources, how can aid donors improve effectiveness of aid? Should there be larger efforts akin to the Vulnerability Fund?
  
  
• More generally, what should be done, including by the United States and the EU, so as to avert a backlash against globalization and free markets that now risks spreading, particularly in the developing world?
  
  
• What should the EU and the United States do domestically and in the long term in order to reduce the sense of precariousness, accentuated due to the crisis, among blue- and white-collar workers about globalization, which risks protectionist policies that can harm economic recovery?

The Obama administration has declared Afghanistan the “right” war and has made success in it one of the president’s top priorities. Washington is actively engaged in a major review of the current strategy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is urging its allies to step up their civilian and military efforts to match its own. The security situation in Afghanistan as well as neighboring Pakistan has deteriorated nonetheless. Suicide attacks, once almost nonexistent in Afghanistan, are on the rise. According to the UN, civilian deaths increased 40 percent in 2007. Opium production is also up. The capacity and capability of the nascent Afghan police and military is insufficient to respond adequately. Corruption continues to thrive, warlords have held on to positions of power in the governing structures, and, despite improvements in infrastructure, low economic growth and development have hindered progress. The insurgency’s ability to use the bordering region with Pakistan as a safe haven is not only a major problem for Afghanistan but also poses a considerable threat to the government in Islamabad as well.

A number of factors have limited the ability of the UN-led international effort—including NATO’s own International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) effort—to work with the Afghan government to respond effectively to these challenges and threats. Our ability to bring together our civilian reconstruction and military efforts remains limited. An insufficient military presence has threatened progress as it struggles to retain territory once taken from the Taliban. Tensions between Afghans and international forces have grown with increased civilian casualties. Support for the U.S. and ISAF efforts has steadily decreased as security declines and living standards remain stagnant. And, while relations with Pakistan have improved with a new civilian Pakistani government taking power in February 2008, the inability of the Pakistan military to shut down safe havens in its territory have made it that much harder to respond to the militant threat in the east and south.

The new Obama administration has made clear its intent to refocus U.S. attention on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such a strategy will need the input from and support of NATO, regional actors, and Afghanistan in order to have a chance of success.

Guiding Questions

• What are realistic goals for the international community in Afghanistan, and how should progress in achieving them be measured? What is success?
  
  
• Are key international actors willing to increase their civilian and military contribution to the UN-led effort? Can EU and NATO members provide the increases in military and financial assistance that are needed to help Afghanistan regain a positive trajectory?
  
  
• What kind of government should we expect to emerge from Afghanistan’s elections in August?
  
  
• How stable is the rapprochement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and how can the EU and NATO better combine their efforts to support both countries?
  
  
• How can other regional players constructively be brought into efforts to stabilize this region?
  
  
• What are the consequences of failure in Afghanistan for the region as well as for the UN, the EU, and NATO?
  

In 1944, delegates from 44 countries met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to rebuild the international economic system, even as World War II was still raging. In setting up a system of rules, institutions, and procedures for regulating the international monetary order, those who gathered at Bretton Woods chose multilateral solutions over national approaches to future economic challenges. This commitment to multilateralism was strengthened with the creation of the G7 in 1976, meant to promote greater economic cooperation between the major industrial countries, at that time Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Many of these multilateral organizations have served us well over the past 60 years. But these are different times. New economic powers, such as China and India, have become stakeholders in the global system. Rising developing economies, such as some countries in sub-Saharan Africa, offer untapped talents and energies. International institutions need to better align governance with the realities of the 21st century. At the same time, the international architecture has proved insufficient to address global economic challenges—the breakdown in agricultural markets, stalemates in the World Trade Organization around the Doha Development Round, a pessimistic outlook for the upcoming UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and now a global financial crisis. We need a new multilateral approach for these global problems.

Guiding Questions

• What is the role of established industrial economies in the multilateral system of the future?
  
  
• How do we best integrate emerging economies into the system?
  
  
• What is the role of international trade as an engine for economic growth? What is the importance of the Doha Round? What, in essence, is at stake? What should transatlantic partners do to spur trade cooperation?
  
  
• In which policy areas is multilateral cooperation most needed? What will be the priorities on a new economic agenda?
  
  
• How can the different institutions best coordinate their actions?
  
  
• What is the balance between respecting national sovereignty and tackling cross-border challenges?

Twenty years have passed since the collapse of communism and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The epochal changes that led to the largely peaceful end of the Cold War also opened the door for the unification of Germany. At the same time, it anchored Central and Eastern Europe—from the Baltic to the Black Sea—to the West in the EU and NATO. While the challenge of integrating and anchoring the Balkans remains incomplete, the historic accomplishment and step toward the vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace is widely seen as a tremendous success story. It has arguably made the continent today more peaceful and secure than in any time in the last century. Above all, this was a transatlantic success story as this project generated some of the closest and far-reaching cooperation between the two sides of the Atlantic in recent decades.

At the same time, there are major questions as we look toward the future. The stability, resilience, and solidarity of a unified Europe is being tested in the current economic and financial crisis. Central and Eastern Europe is looking for strategic reassurance from a resurgent Russia. Western liberal democracy is no longer necessarily seen as the only option in countries on the periphery of Europe and Eurasia. The United States and Europe face the challenge of pursuing further democratic enlargement in the European neighborhood of an enlarged EU and NATO. Turkey’s future EU membership prospects and anchoring in the West seem uncertain. Is there a new historical and strategic narrative to again mobilize the West to reach out to and embrace countries like Ukraine and Georgia—or has the window of opportunity for enlargement closed? Above all, how do we deal with a Russia that today seems further from the West in terms of values and seems determined to roll back democratic breakthrough on its periphery but whose support we need on a range of issues from energy to Iran to Afghanistan?

Guiding Questions

• Looking back, where did we succeed and where did we fail?n Can the populism and protectionism today in Central and Eastern Europe call into question the post-1989 democratic transitions of which we are so proud?
  
  
• Is the vision of Europe whole and free complete? Apart from the perspective of the Balkans being integrated into the EU and NATO, has the process of the unification of Europe stalled? Is the window closing?
  
  
• Does the enlargement paradigm that led to the anchoring of Central and Eastern Europe even work when it comes to countries like Ukraine or those in the Southern Caucasus?
  
  
• How do we reconcile the impulse for strategic reassurance from Russia with the desire to work with Russia on issues ranging from Afghanistan to Iran?
  

Six months ago, Georgia and Russia fought a five-day war that would push Russia and the West on the brink of their biggest crisis since communism’s collapse 20 years earlier. The origins of the war continue to be fiercely debated. The EU has launched a commission to investigate what happened and why, and several books on the conflict are already being written. Russia today has not fulfilled all of the conditions of the Sarkozy-mediated ceasefire, and it shows no intention of doing so. Support for Georgia in the West has eroded due to doubts over the wisdom of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvilli’s decision to fight this war. Speculation over the future stability of the Saakashvilli government continues as Georgia has been hard-hit by the fallout from the conflict and by the financial crisis. More recently, there has been speculation in both the Western and Russian press over a possible further move by Moscow against Georgia this spring.

Have prospects for closer ties between Georgia and the EU and NATO gone up or down since the war? Will Tbilisi redouble its effort to go West or will it abandon that effort?n Is U.S. policy toward Georgia likely to change under the Obama administration?

Guiding Questions

• What has been the domestic political and economic fallout of the war in Georgia?
  
  
• What are the future prospects for fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire agreement mediated between Georgia and Russia by France under the auspices of the EU presidency?
  
• Georgia is calling upon its partners to pursue a long-term policy of non-recognition toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia? Is that realistic? What would it look like in practice?
  
  
• What is the best way forward more generally with Abkhazia and South Ossetia? Some commentators have suggested looking to the example of how West Germany and East Germany handled their relations as a model. Is that realistic? Should the international community support such a process?
  
  
• Have prospects for closer ties between Georgia and the EU and NATO gone up or down since the war? Will Tbilisi redouble its effort to go West or will it abandon that effort?
  
  
• Is U.S. policy toward Georgia likely to change under the Obama administration?
  

The financial meltdown that began in the United States and continues to spread across Europe, into Asia, and beyond, has led to a global economic crisis with unprecedented consequences. In order to stem the tide and avoid serious solvency issues for the banking sector, many governments are taking a variety of emergency steps to support market confidence, including through widespread financial support to major industries and, in some cases, bank nationalization.

In addition to an uncertainty of whether these steps can restabilize financial markets, there is also an emerging political backlash against the perceived excesses of these markets in recent years. These excesses contributed to the current situation—the lax credit standards that lie at the heart of the sub-prime mortgage crisis, the financial innovation that led to complex new financial instruments that dispersed this risk throughout the system, and the regulatory regimes that allowed the situation to develop. Some form of regulatory response—a tightening of standards—is both necessary and beyond doubt, but there are also political calls for much tougher restrictions. German Finance Minister Peer Steinbruck, in a speech given in the fall of 2008, predicted “the U.S. will lose its status as the superpower of the global financial system” and called for limits on loan securitizations and a global ban on short-selling.

While policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have outlined a number of different policy responses to the recent financial meltdown, both former U.S. President George W. Bush and French President Nicolas Sarkozy stressed that the current financial crisis is a global crisis that needs a global response.

Guiding Questions

• Are there noticeable differences between European and U.S. policy responses to the financial crisis? What have we learned from each other? What has been the response in other major economies?
  
  
• What can European and American policymakers do to ensure that government responses do not lead to transatlantic friction? Is there a need for more transatlantic coordination in response to problems in what are, largely, borderless markets?
  
  
• What does financial market turmoil mean for the transatlantic marketplace and, in particular, efforts to integrate transatlantic capital markets more closely?
  
  
• What would a long-term global response to the financial crisis look like? Which economies and institutions need a seat at the table? What could the role of the International Monetary Fund be?
  
  
• What will the financial markets of the future look like? In Europe? In the United States? Globally?
  
  
• Given the variations in the impact of the crisis among States in the US and among Member States in Europe, what mechanisms are available to maintain solidarity?
  
  
• Does the financial crisis in Europe support the case for a pan-European capital market? Europe has a single currency but no single pan-European capital market. Is the time right to fully integrate Europe's banking sector?
  
  
• Does the crisis threaten the achievements of the European enlargements since 2004?
  
  
• Does the financial crisis that has engulfed the transatlantic economy signal a seismic shift in the global economic order? Does it confirm China's status as the next and new economic superpower?
  
• Is this the end of highly liberal financial markets?
  

During the 2008 U.S. presidential election, candidate Barack Obama opened the door to criticism by suggesting that if he won, his administration would initiate dialogue with Iran. The ensuing debate raised the question of how to deal with difficult actors in the Middle East. Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah all provide serious challenges, if not concrete obstacles, to security and stability in that region.

Iran will be a critical testing ground for a new style of engagement in the Middle East. As Iran continues to pursue its nuclear program and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad carries on with aggressive rhetoric, it is essential that the proposed direct diplomacy approach helps to ratchet down tension in the region, although critics of opening a dialogue would say this is far from a guarantee. Syria is also an important challenge for external actors. Syria’s support of militant groups in Lebanon and Palestine has been a central factor in poor relations with external actors. However, recent developments such as improving relations with Turkey and cracking down on border security are hopeful signs for constructive dialogue.

Opening a diplomatic channel of communication with unfriendly states may be productive, but engaging with internationally recognized terrorist groups is much more uncertain. Hamas has defied conventional categorization of a terrorist group by coupling a campaign of violence with investing heavily in social and political work. Its leaders have stridently declared an opposition to negotiating and recognizing Israel. Hamas’ dominant role in the Palestinian Authority and widespread popularity in Gaza clearly makes it a stakeholder in the process, but its tactics and goals make it virtually impossible to engage with Hamas on any level. Similar to Hamas, Hezbollah enjoys political power and popular support in Lebanon. However, its unyielding use of force, as we saw in May 2008 when it took control of western Beirut, may have eroded its popularity. The deep complexity and fragile relations between the ruling and opposition parties in Lebanon create an environment that is not conducive to productive engagement with Hezbollah, and it could potentially do more harm than good.

Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah pose a serious threat to stability and security both inside and outside the Middle East. Supporters of opening dialogue believe that there are opportunities to help understand common interests with rational actors while detractors believe dialogue is a risky concession to violent adversaries.

Guiding Questions

• Will an open dialogue with Iran and Syria help to ease tensions in the region or exacerbate them?
  
  
• Can there ever be a dialogue with Hamas and Hezbollah? Can progress be made without them? Will leaving these types of actors out risk further radicalization?
  
  
• Once a decision has been reached to engage with certain difficult actors, what will be the most effective way to proceed?
  

As new players appear in global markets, the comparative advantage of trading partners begins to shift. The economies of Brazil, Russia, India and Brazil (BRIC) are producing more products at higher standards and lower prices. Prices that undercut traditional production based in the high-wage economies of Europe and the United States are allowing the BRIC economies to take a greater share of world trade. Classic examples are found in basic industries like steel, textiles, and shipbuilding.

These traditional sectors have fought back by innovating and developing specialized niches in old products and new goods and services. Production has been transformed with new techniques, often based on the integration of new systems and software. The watchword is innovation, without which companies will succumb to those in emerging economies. This puts a premium on the development of innovation through research, human capital, and the acquisition of more sophisticated skills.

Guiding Questions

• Can this process continue? How can American and European companies maintain an edge in innovative products and technologies?
  
  
• Are the world’s universities up to the task of producing graduates who will command the highest salaries because they have better skills? Do we need elite educational institutions or better basic education? Is a university curriculum still appropriate?
  
  
• Can government research programs give a boost to private sector innovation? Should there be more transatlantic cooperation on research?
  
  
• Do global companies have a better chance to remain ahead in the global race? From where will they recruit their staff and where will they locate their facilities?
  
  
• How can the intellectual property from innovation be protected?
  
  
• Will the standard of living in Europe and the United States inevitably decline as globalization continues?
  
  
• Can jobs in the transatlantic economies be successfully protected from global competition?
  

As NATO enters its seventh decade, questions loom large about its relevance in today’s world. In April, alliance leaders will gather in France and Germany to discuss current challenges and to name the next Secretary General. While most would say that it is the most successful collective security alliance in the history of the world, the new Secretary General will face a myriad of challenges. Among the most critical of these are Afghanistan, NATO-Russia relations, enlargement, NATO-EU relations, and defining a new strategic concept. Further complicating matters, the global economic crisis continues to squeeze NATO countries, constraining both the political will and available finances of member and partner countries.

The new Secretary General will face a number of specific challenges, all of which are combined with the overarching dilemma of internal cooperation among allies. The mission in Afghanistan is a prime example. In October 2009, the mission in Afghanistan will hit its eight-year mark, and success is nowhere in sight. While the political will of the alliance is tested in European and North American capitals, the expeditionary capacity of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is being tested in Afghanistan. Cooperation among allies in Afghanistan remains a critical and contentious issue.

NATO-Russia relations are also divisive. The August 2008 Russia-Georgia War and the January 2009 gas crisis in Eastern Europe demonstrated Russia’s willingness to assert its power in the region. These events have exacerbated an already complicated relationship between Russia and NATO. A constructive relationship with Russia remains elusive. Enlargement is often considered one of the great success stories of NATO, but some allies suggest further enlargement will strain relations with Moscow and might not be worth the effort. A priority is for alliance leaders to assess the costs and benefits of further expansion in today’s environment. Finally, while the EU is committed to developing an autonomous security force, technical concerns continue to accumulate regarding institutional overlap between NATO and the EU. These questions must be clarified to optimize the functioning relationship between the two Brussels-based institutions.

The Secretary General and alliance leaders must develop and implement a new comprehensive strategic concept in order to alleviate these internal differences and prepare for new threats to the alliance. A new strategic concept should unite allies, justify NATO’s role in the world today, and make them more prepared to handle current and future challenges.

Guiding Questions

• What is the biggest challenge facing NATO? What are today’s threats?
  
  
• Is NATO relevant in today’s world? Why or why not?
  
  
• What should the new strategic concept of NATO be?
  

The global financial crisis has resulted in capitals around the world adopting sizeable fiscal stimulus packages to cushion its impact. On the European side, in December 2008, the governments of the EU called for a sizeable fiscal stimulus package of 200 billion euros in response to the crisis, and it is estimated that EU package will amount to roughly 1 percent of Europe’s GDP in 2009. On the other side of the Atlantic, in February 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama signed a stimulus package that amounted to nearly $800 billion over two years, or roughly 2 percent of the United States’ GDP in 2009. And, in light of China’s heavy exposure to falling trade and investment volumes, the Chinese government is also expected to implement an even bigger fiscal stimulus package amounting to roughly 7 percent of its GDP for 2009. These packages clearly serve to cushion the impact of the present crisis.

However, there are rising fears regarding fiscal sustainability. The reason is that the fiscal situation in many countries is already stretched due to the automatic stabilizers—falling tax revenues and rising expenditures stemming from lower corporate profits and rising unemployment. On top of this are the costs of the financial sector bailout packages that may, judging from past experience, exceed 10 percent of GDP in a number of countries. A number of emerging economies have already been forced to ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for support, and financial markets no longer regard the possibility of a number of core industrialized countries facing a fiscal crisis as an altogether remote prospect.

Guiding Questions

• Are the fiscal stimulus packages big enough, and is more international coordination needed among countries?n Is the money being spent on the right things? Should there be more or less emphasis on investment versus tax cuts? Should there be more or less investment on helping the poor, greening the economy, and building infrastructure?
  
  
• What is the best way for governments to commit to bringing down the deficits again to sustainable levels?
  
  
• How can vulnerable countries decrease their risk of a fiscal crisis?n How can countries facing an acute fiscal crisis best be rescued? Is the IMF well-prepared to deal with all cases? Does the EU need its own IMF? Are supplementary regional arrangements desirable, for example within the EU?
  
  
• How should governments commit to fiscal sustainability in bringing down deficit levels?