During the 1990s, NATO's new partnerships were a key component of the alliance's post-Cold War transformation. They allowed NATO to build relationships with countries that were strategically important but not candidates for membership, and they facilitated the creation of NATO-led coalitions that helped keep peace in the Balkans.
Today, partnerships are again at the center of the debate over NATO's further transformation as it faces new challenges that extend beyond Europe. The debate focuses on three broad strategic questions. The first is the future role of NATO partnerships. While many of the more committed Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) members have joined the alliance, Russia has become more assertive and anti-Western, and countries in Central Asia seem less interested in their relationships with NATO.
The second question is the future role of NATO in the wider Middle East. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) suffer from a lack of strategic clarity over NATO's objectives in the region. NATO has not been able to capitalize on strategic openings with some countries in the wider Middle East that seek closer ties with the alliance.
The third question is NATO's global partnerships. NATO operations in Afghanistan, for example, require the alliance to attract non-European contributors for burden-sharing reasons. Are partnerships with Australia or Japan really just about squeezing more troops and money out of them for NATO-led missions? Or should they also be about building strategic relationships in new and important regions? Is this a burden-sharing exercise or is NATO trying to shape new security dynamics in important regions?
What do NATO members today seek to accomplish with partnerships?
Why do democratically governed countries outside NATO's borders seek closer ties to NATO?
Do NATO's current partnerships need to be strengthened?s NATO's stated goal for engagement in Afghanistan—a representative government and self-sustaining peace and security—attainable, or will the winning scenario need to be redefined?
How will NATO allies overcome the effects of national caveats for ISAF and the alliance itself?
What would be the consequences of failure in Afghanistan for NATO and the Western alliance?