The Bucharest Conference

 

THE BUCHAREST CONFERENCE - NATO in Afghanistan: Success not in Sight, Failure not an Option

(Check against delivery)

KENNEDY (?):  Now, before our next session, we have just a quick set
change.  As you can imagine, this next session has generated tremendous
interest.  It’s going to be broadcast live on three or four different
networks, including Back to Canada.  We have a real packed house to
watch this, I hope, very, very interesting discussion on Afghanistan.

     We’re also very pleased that we have eight students from
Afghanistan with us today who are here as part of through the NATO
secretary general’s office.

     (APPLAUSE)

     And we’re very pleased to welcome you to this meeting today.

     This session is also historic for other reasons.  As I said
yesterday, GMF tries very much to think about North America and European
cooperation.  And I think this is the first panel we’ve ever done where
half of the participants are from Canada.  I won’t tell you which ones,
but you can guess.

     I would now like to ask Prime Minister Harper, President Karzai and
our moderator, Lyse Doucet, to come forward and join the secretary
general.  Thank you very much.  We’re looking forward to a very
interesting discussion.

DOUCET:  Hello, and welcome to this panel that’s been organized by the
German Marshall Fund and also the Chatham (ph) House International Oral
Institute of International Affairs of Britain.  My name is Lyse Doucet.
  I am a council member of Chatham (ph) House.  I’m a BBC presenter and
correspondent.  And I am a Canadian.

     (APPLAUSE)

     Yes, it’s my biggest achievement in just being born.  Why have we
gathered here today?  To consider a critical question, NATO in
Afghanistan.  Success not in sight, failure is not an option.

     Now, yesterday Craig Kennedy when he opened this Bucharest
conference said we have to succeed in Afghanistan, we have to.  Is that
an article of faith?  As U.S. military generals like to say, hope is not
a strategy.  What does success mean?

     Well, for NATO, it’s being described as nothing less as a critical
test, if not the test, of NATO resolve, if not its relevance as a 21st
century fighting force.  It is, as many of you know, the alliance’s
biggest ground operation in its history.  And in 2001 when NATO invoked
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, it was the first time it had done
so.  All for one, and one for all.

     2008 – it’s the United States, Canada, and Europe still fighting
the same war in Afghanistan.  What does success mean?  What does success
mean for Afghans?  What does success mean for the president of
Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai?

     Welcome to the Bucharest conference.

KARZAI:  Thank you very much.

(APPLAUSE)

DOUCET:  President Karzai knows a lot, perhaps too much, about the
successes and failures in his country.  He was part of the Muja Hadine
(ph) war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.  He was a deputy
foreign minister in the Muja Hadine (ph) government that came to power.
  He has led Afghanistan since 2001 and the ousting of the Taliban.  And
since 2004 he is an elected president.

     What does that mean?  It means he has to be accountable to these
students who came all the way from Afghanistan if they are of voting
age.  He has to face his defense minister, his national security advisor
and his foreign minister and his economic advisor, all of whom have come
here.  So he also wants to know whether or not this mission is going to
succeed and what Afghans have to do to help it succeed.

     Prime Minister Harper also knows about winning.  He likes to win.
I’m told that when he graduated from high school in Canada, his grade
point average was 95.7.  Well, unfortunately the arithmetic in the
Canadian Parliament isn’t quite so good.

     He came to power in 2006 and has been heading a minority government
in Canada.  And I think it’s fair to say you have sometimes gambled your
career and your party’s political standing on the mission in
Afghanistan.  The Canadian Parliament has just said Canadian troops,
more than 2,500, can stay until 2011, as long as they get support.  But
will they get this support?

     Jaap de Hoop Scheffer – well, in 2003 in September I had the good
fortune to be outside the U.N. headquarters in New York, and I got a
call from the BBC.  And they said they just appointed the new secretary
general for NATO.  And I said, well, who is it.  And they said Jaap, the
Dutch foreign minister.  I said, yes.

     Well, I turned around and I said, well, he’s just standing right
next to me here in New York.  So I went up and interviewed him as the
Dutch foreign minister.  And I said, well, what will be your priorities
when you take over as NATO secretary general.  And he said, the success
of the mission in Afghanistan will be the litmus test for the success of
NATO.  And he says that to this day.

     Now, I’m told also that you’re not a silent audience.  You haven’t
come here just to hear from our illustrious group of panelists, that
you’re going to have lots of questions.  Why don’t we nail our colors to
the mast?  How many of you sitting here today believe that the NATO
mission in Afghanistan is actually winning, is succeeding?

     How many of you think it’s losing?  How many of you think, as some
do, that actually it’s not winning, but it’s not losing, either?  Great.

     Well, we can’t guarantee the success of the mission in Afghanistan,
but let’s hope at least for a successful panel discussion today.  Let me
begin with you, President Karzai.

     2001 – world leaders stood beside you and said we will stand
shoulder to shoulder with Afghanistan.  We are with you for the long
run.  You come to Bucharest.  They’re worried about 100 troops here, 100
troops there, how long will they stay, well, I’m worried about my
government.  Are you worried?  Does it leave you uneasy that the resolve
may not be enough to tackle the formidable problems in your country?

KARZAI:  Thank you, my friend, Lyse.  Thank you very much.  I’m glad you
took a vote here.  And it demonstrated once again that success is there.
  So according to this vote, I would change the heading.  I would say
success is in sight.  Of course, failure is not an option.

     Saying this, in 2001 when the international community came to
Afghanistan and liberated Afghanistan, I don’t know if it sends you the
message that I have, the liberation of Afghanistan.  Afghanistan was a
country that was no longer in the hands of its people.  Afghanistan was
ruled from the railroading (ph) of Afghanistan.  Afghanistan was in the
hands of terrorists.  Afghanistan was in the hands of tyranny, worst of all.

     Now, the arrival of the international community, led by the United
States and helped by the countries around Afghanistan as well, brought
liberation to Afghanistan.  That is a major great success.

     After liberation, the international community began to rebuild
Afghanistan, rebuild the state of Afghanistan, rebuild the political
institutions of Afghanistan, rebuild the economy of Afghanistan, rebuild
the infrastructure of Afghanistan, rebuild the security institutions of
Afghanistan.  Let’s count as to which one of these have we achieved.

DOUCET:  Well, let’s not.  Let’s first get to the question, which is are
you worried about the continuing resolve.

KARZAI:  I’m coming to that.

DOUCET:  We’re going to get to the successes in a minute.

KARZAI:  No, I have to be fair to the international community.

DOUCET:  Yes.

KARZAI:  So I’ll have to come to that response.

DOUCET:  Yes, but we have lots of challenges (ph).  Yes, but have you
come here an uneasy president?

KARZAI:  Fine, fine.  Now, since you all know what we have achieved, now
I come to the (inaudible).

DOUCET:  Yes, we’ll come to the achievements later.

KARZAI:  We in Afghanistan are very grateful to the international
community for having brought us liberation first and then for having
helped us build all those institutions and have reconstruction and have
roads and schools and return for half million refugees and countless
other achievements.  I’m very grateful, and I’m sure they will stay with
us because the tough part is over.  The next is the continuation of the
journey, which we will complete together.

DOUCET:  And you’re sure Afghans want them to stay?

KARZAI:  Absolutely.

DOUCET:  OK.

     Prime Minister Harper, you threw down the gauntlet.  You said
Canadians would stay, but we need help.  So you come to Bucharest.
You’re hoping to get a commitment of 1,000 troops, a battle group, plus
some aerial drones, some helicopters, some vehicles as well,
light-armored vehicles.

     You thought you had it.  Nicolas Sarkozy announced in London that
there would be 1,000 troops going to Afghanistan.  His prime minister
yesterday said, well, actually it’ll be a few hundred, and most of them
will be in Kabul.

     Are you a worried prime minister now?

HARPER:  No, I’m not worried.  I am very optimistic that we’ll achieve
our objectives.  When we had the last summit at Riga, it was, you know,
widely declared afterwards a failure because we and other countries --
secretary general had gone and said we needed greater troop commitments.
  Well, we didn’t have greater troop commitments at the summit.  But if
you look at the two years following the summit, we got significantly
enhanced troop commitments in the South.  By our calculations, we have
twice as many countries now supplying twice as many troops as we did in
2006.

     Now, obviously our timelines are shorter.

DOUCET:  You’ve got a year.  You’ve got a year.

HARPER:  Our timelines are shorter.  We need a partner in Afghanistan
that will deliver, you know, around about 1,000 troops.  And we need to
procure the equipment, which is ultimately our responsibility.  Although
we need some help to get it on the timelines we need it on.

     I’m very optimistic.  Whether we achieve it at this summit or in
the weeks to come, we’ve had good discussions with our allies.  And
let’s remember here, our agenda…

DOUCET:  But how can you be optimistic if the French…

HARPER:  No, but if I can be clear here for a second, if I can be clear
here for a second.  Our objective is not simply to procure these troops
for ourselves.  It’s to also make sure there continues to be enhanced
NATO participation so that we are successful across Afghanistan.

     So, you know, whether the French send troops to a particular
province or whether the French send troops, more troops that allows
other troops to be deployed to help us, it’s all the same to us.  What
we want to make sure is that we get our partner and also that the
overall NATO mission is enhanced, not detracted by our demands.

DOUCET:  But it’s not very encouraging, is it, if there’s already a
French wobble in the course of less than a week?  Sarkozy says one thing
in London, and another thing is said in the French Parliament.

HARPER:  Well, we’ll see what the French ultimately decide.  But in
fairness, the French have made no commitment to us.

DOUCET:  But they told you.

HARPER:  No, they have made no commitment to us.  And Mr. Sarkozy has
made no iron-clad commitment to NATO.  I think anything that France does
over and beyond what it’s already doing is a victory.  And it’s a
significant step forward.  And I think increased French engagement of
any number in any province is a good development at this summit.

DOUCET:  We understand that George Bush has told you personally that
they will help you either way.  Wherever the French go, the Americans
will send some troops down to the South to help you in Kandahar.  Do you
have what’s being reported as an iron-clad commitment from Washington?

HARPER:  Well, I make it a habit never to speak on behalf of other people.

DOUCET:  But for you.

HARPER:  We’ve had good discussions with our allies.  And I am convinced
that…

Community Began rebuild Afghanistan, rebuild the state of Afghanistan,
rebuild the political institutions of Afghanistan, rebuild the economy
of Afghanistan, rebuild the infrastructure of Afghanistan, rebuild the
security institutions of Afghanistan.  Let's count as to which one of
these have we achieved?

DOUCET:  Well, let's first get to the question, which is, are you
worried about the continuing results?

KARZAI:  I am coming to that.

DOUCET:  We are going to get to the successes in a minute.

KARZAI:  No, I have to be fair to the international community.

DOUCET:  Yes, (INAUDIBLE).

KARZAI:  OK.

DOUCET:  Have you come here in uneasy presence?

KARZAI:  Fine, fine.  Now, since you all know what we have achieved;
now I will come to the (achievements).

DOUCET:  Yes.  We will come to the achievements.

KARZAI:  We in Afghanistan are very grateful to the international
community for having brought us liberation first.  And then for having
helped us build all those institutions and have reconstruction and
have roads and schools in return of – for half a million refuges and
countless other issues.  I am very grateful and I am sure they will
stay with us, because the tough part is over, the next is the
continuation of this journey which we will complete together.

DOUCET:  And you are sure Afghanis want them to stay?

KARZAI:  Absolutely.

DOUCET:  OK.  Prime Minister, Harper, you threw down the gauntlet.
You said Canadians would stay but we need help.  So you come to
Bucharest, you are hoping to get a commitment of a thousand troops, a
battle group, plus aerial drones, some helicopters, some vehicles as
well, light-armored vehicles.  You thought you had it; Nicolas Sarkozy
announced in London that there would be 1,000 troops going to
Afghanistan.  His Prime Minister yesterday said, "Well, actually, it
will be a few hundred and most of them will be in Kabul." Are you
worried Prime Minister now?

HARPER:  No, I'm not worried.  I am very optimistic that we will
achieve our objectives.  When we had the last summit at Riga, it was
widely declared afterwards a failure because and other countries,
Secretary General had gone and said we needed greater troop
commitments.  While we didn't have greater troop commitments at the
summit, but if you look at the two years following the summit, we got
significantly enhanced troop commitments in the South.  By our
calculations, we have twice as many countries now supplying twice as
many troops as we did in 2006.  Now, obviously, our timelines are
shorter.

DOUCET:  You got a year.

HARPER:  Our timelines are shorter.  We need a partner in Afghanistan
that will deliver round about a thousand troops and we need procure
the equipment which is ultimately our responsibility, although we need
some help to get it on the timelines we need it on.  I'm very
optimistic.  Whether we achieve it at this summit or in the weeks to
come, we've had good discussions with our allies.  And let's remember
here – if I can be clear here for a second, our objective is not
simply to procure these troops for ourselves.  It is also make sure
there continues to be enhanced NATO participation, so that we are
successful across Afghanistan.  So, whether the French sent troops to
a particular province or whether the French send troops, more troops
that allow other troops to be deployed to help us, it is all the same
to us.  What we want to make sure is that we get our partner and also
that the overall NATO mission is enhanced, not detracted by our
demands.

DOUCET:  But, it is not very encouraging, isn't it, there is already a
French wobble in the course of less than week.  Sarkozy says one thing
in London and another thing is said in the French Parliament.

HARPER:  We'll see what the French ultimately decide, but in fairness,
the French have made no commitment to us.

DOUCET:  But they told you?

HARPER:  No, they have made no commitment to us and Mr. Sarkozy has
made no ironclad commitment to NATO.  I think anything that France
does over and beyond what it is already doing is a victory and it is a
significant step forward.  And I think increased French engagement of
any number in any province is a good development at this summit.

DOUCET:  We understand that George Bush has told you personally that
they will help you either way, wherever the French go, the Americans
will send some troops down to the (INAUDIBLE) in Kandahar.  Do you
have what's being reported as an ironclad commitment from Washington?

HARPER:  Well, I make it a habit never to speak on behalf of other
people.  We've had good discussions with our allies and I'm convinced
that we will achieve our objectives and achieve it in a way that
causes the overall level of troop commitment to Afghanistan to be
increased, not merely shifted laterally.

DOUCET:  Has George Bush promised you that whatever happens…

HARPER:  You'll have to ask Mr. Bush what his position is.

DOUCET:  But, you actually feel now you will get a commitment?

HARPER:  We are very confident, yes.

DOUCET:  What does this show you, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the U.S.
Defense Secretary Mr. Gates warned that NATO is becoming a two-tier
alliance.  He said we must not develop in that way.  Many are saying,
actually, it is to all the case and purposes a two-tier alliance.
But, the whole idea that everything has to be on consensus doesn't
work when you come to Afghanistan because in fact, many of the NATO
members have different ideas about what the mission is about and what
they are ready to commit for political, legislative reasons.

SCHEFFER:  I don't think that the consensus principle has ever harmed
NATO or prevented NATO from acting.  I mean consensus is a sacred
principle in NATO and we should keep it.  That's remark number one.
Remark number two is that, and I side with Prime Minister Harper, if
you see that that now, for instance in the south where the going gets
very tough and the Canadian contingent which is doing a great job in
Kandahar Province knows all about it with all the fatalities involved,
that we have 14 nations in the south, that we have all the 26 NATO
allies in Afghanistan, I do not see a two-tier alliance to be quite
honest.  I do see from time to time and I have to be a realistic from
time to time, not always, I do see that certain elements are bound as
you say by parliamentary mandates which create lines which are
difficult to cross.  I think, let me say this also (INAUDIBLE) it is a
bit unfair always to discuss Germany.  Germany is a major troop
contributor and I am a realistic; as NATO Secretary General, I have to
be.  If I want to have the forces, with the limitations, with the
caveats or no forces at all, my choice is for through forces.  But, as
long as I am NATO Secretary General, and I have often discussed this
with Prime Minister Harper and President Karzai, I will make my
continued pleas, "We should get rid of our caveats," because it is
necessary that we all share the same burden.  But, given the fact that
we have 47,000 troops in Afghanistan, 40 nations in the south, all of
them actively involved, some in a very active way if you look at their
– at the number of their population, then I do not see a two-tier
alliance.  I don't.

DOUCET:  Do you actually see that it is a possibility that those
caveats, I understand there is about 50 caveats that are now operating
in Afghanistan and they don't operate in other places I understand,
including Kosovo.  Do you ever foresee that they would ever be
eliminated or it is a fact of life in NATO?

SCHEFFER:  There has never been a military operation in history
without caveats; never.  But, we can do with less caveats in
Afghanistan, I mean that has been my mantra; it still is.  I'm going
to continue to make pleas for less limitations and less caveats, how
complicated that politically might be for nations, because the less
caveats we have, the more efficient and effective a military commander
can be and I add that it is an important element, political solidarity
in the alliance.  What is at the heart of the debate with Prime
Minister Harper in Canada is this element.  It is a nation which has
suffered a lot of fatalities.  We all have to fight from time to time
critical public opinion, so I will fight that fight in the
bureaucratic political sense with Prime Minister Harper; I do with
President Karzai and with others.  But, I do not see a two-tier
alliance.  That is really not the case.

DOUCET:  But, there is – it is not just a caveat problem, it is also a
political problem.  When Nicolas Sarkozy came back from London, he
faced the wrath of the Socialists who said "We don't be part of an
American agenda.  We don't want to be in a war that seems unpopular
because it is fought, as they would see it, with American tactics.  We
don't want to send more troops." It is a bit – Angela Merkel doesn't
actually want to have a debate in Germany about this because she also
worries about her Leftist rivals in the German parliament.  She
worries about members of our own coalition because they actually have
a culture in Germany that does not want to be putting its troops on
the frontline.

SCHEFFER:  Now, that's again --

DOUCET:  Very different to what the Americans are discussing which is
part of their global War on Terror.

SCHEFFER:  That is a bit unfair.  Of course, there is a distinction to
be made between the United States of America as a global power and
Germany as a very important power, but not a global one.  But, it is
not true.  Germany has also suffered fatalities in Afghanistan.

DOUCET:  Yes.

SCHEFFER:  What is important is that political leaders and we are of
that type, as we're sitting here on stage, that goes for President
Karzai, for Prime Minister Harper, who has finally realized in Canada,
against the very critical public opinion and the same goes for
Chancellor Merkel that there are thousands of German forces in
Afghanistan, that there is an enormous Canadian presence in
Afghanistan, so those political leaders show that they lead and they
have to lead because public opinion from time to time, you are right,
is critical.  But, that is a reason to give up and I'm telling you,
"No ally is giving up."

DOUCET:  But, that's not the point because, of course, they are there,
and many other nations are there.  But, the disagreement is on what
they will do in Afghanistan and if the need now is for more fighting
troops, if that is one of the critical after – this is what Mr. Harper
would like more fighting troops down in the south, then you do have a
two-tier arrangement because certain countries will do certain things.
  We are not questioning their commitments to be in Afghanistan, we are
questioning what they are willing to do there.

SCHEFFER:  I still don't agree with you, Lyse.  I still don't agree
for the simple reason that, first of all, the answer in Afghanistan at
the end of the day is not a military one.  It is called development;
it is called reconstruction.  For development and reconstruction to
take place, we need military force.  And unfortunately, we need
combats from time to time because there are spoilers as the President
and I used to call them.  They don't want to see reconstruction.  So
we need military forces, yes, and I won't be happy and satisfied until
we have filled for the full 100 percent what our military advisors
tell us and tell the nations to deliver, and we have not yet delivered
that.  I think we are going to make progress in due course, but we
have not delivered that.  But, let us realize and that is the reason
that tomorrow, we will see President Karzai, Secretary Ban Ki-moon and
all the others.  The final answer is not a military one, it is a
long-term commitment by the international communities spearheaded by
the United Nations, the European Union, the G8, major donors under
Afghan ownership and under Afghan leadership; that is the question.

DOUCET:  President Karzai, do you think there needs to be more NATO
troops in Afghanistan, that the military side of it has to be boosted
if there is to be success?

KARZAI:  Well, first of all, since you spoke about Canada and Canada's
presence in Afghanistan, let me, and in front of the Canadian
audience, thank the people of Canada for all that they have done for
us.  A lot of us can't imagine what is it that Canada has achieved in
Afghanistan, (INAUDIBLE) their men and women in service with million
of dollars of Canadian resources coming to Afghanistan.  So, as Prime
Minister, once again, I am very, very grateful for what you have done.
  Having said this, Afghanistan needs to keep growing in development.
Afghanistan needs to complete the rebuilding of its institutions,
including the security institutions, the military and the police.
Afghanistan needs to continue to reform its judiciary; Afghanistan
needs to raise its capacity; Afghanistan needs to raise the standard
of living of its people; Afghanistan needs to do a lot of things that
you can't imagine in the rest of the world.  In other words, we have
started from scratch, from zero, and we have moved six years on.  We
need years to move ahead.  In order for us to achieve that, we need
the continuous presence and support and backing and scaling it up – of
the international community in Afghanistan.  That would require a
military presence in order, for today, to fight against terrorism and
in order for that security presence to boost the Afghan security
institutions and it also needs an economic side for Afghanistan to
develop through the help of the international community.  So, for some
time to come, Afghanistan will depend on the international community
for all that it needs to achieve.  For us, of course, as the Afghan
people, and also for the larger interests – security interest of the
international community.  So, yes to your question.

DOUCET:  And what do you say to governments in NATO, non-NATO members,
who you are helping your country, who say, "President Karzai, we want
very much to help Afghanistan but we need a more effective government,
we need you to cut down on corruption, we need you to put better
governors, we feel that it is not working the way it should." What do
you say to them as they are saying that?

KARZAI:  That's very true.  That's exactly also the demand of Afghan
people.  That's exactly the need of the hour in Afghanistan.  As I
mentioned earlier, we started from nothing and we have grown in six
years beyond our imaginations, in real terms, from that point of
having nothing.  Therefore, Afghanistan needs to raise its capacity
both in civilian and military side; Afghanistan needs to deliver all
the services that any normal society would need it, a clean
government, an efficient government, a clean judiciary, an efficient
judiciary, the provision of proper services, justice, human rights,
the promotion and strengthening of democracy, the building of the
institutions.  Until Afghanistan is properly entrenched and in the
objectives that it has and the issues that it has, that's the right
demand and that's what we should (INAUDIBLE) be doing for Afghanistan.

DOUCET:  And not succeeding so far.  Is that a capacity problem?  You
don't have the resources, the country emerging from 25 years of war,
one of the poorest countries in the world still, or is it a political
problem that there are people that you can't move against for
political reasons?  You are, I understand, a man who wants to be
elected President again when the elections take place, I think at the
end of this year, or is it a political problem that your hands are
tied?

KARZAI:  It continues to be more of a capacity problem, less of a
political problem.  When we started, it was both a political problem
and a capacity problem.  As we have moved on for the past six years,
we have reduced the political handicaps that we had, we have added to
the political strength of the (INAUDIBLE) the legitimacy of the state,
it is more now a question of capacity and the more we act to that, the
more out ability to address the difficulties of the Afghan people.

DOUCET:  Prime Minister Harper, I know Canada has been a leader in
this post-development, which is the three Ds, defense, diplomacy, and
development.  But, your critics in Canada say, actually it has stilted
too much.  You look at Kandahar, you look at your Provincial
Reconstruction Team, the PRT, there is 350 military, five foreign
affairs, six from the Canadian Development Agency and ten from other
civilian agencies.  So, the critics say, it is stilted.  Are you –
does this need to be addressed?  Is there lessened now for your
involvement?

KARZAI:  Well, we have accepted the judgment for sometime that we
would like to tilt it more towards development and governance.  That
all said, first of all, I'm not sure you would measure that by the
number of personnel, by definition, military …

DOUCET:  What indications?

HARPER:  Military engagement is labor intensive.  But, look, I think
the most important thing is you have to take a holistic approach.  You
can't actually support these – separate these things, you can't say
one day in a place like Kandahar, which has a difficult security
environment, we are going to do more in development so we are going to
send a bunch of (INAUDIBLE) workers into a dangerous area.  That's not
– that's simply not an option.  But, obviously, we do want to, as we
are going forward, have more and more emphasis on development.

The way we need to achieve that is by having success on the military
side.  What is success on the military side?  I think it's important
that we understand what this is.  You ask the Secretary General about
increasing troop levels, yes, we need increasing troop levels, but we
don't – we do not believe that the ultimate success on the military
side is that NATO will increase troop levels until the point where we
snuff out the resistance.  That's not realistic.

What success is realistically is, yes, we'll build up our troop
levels, but we will also mentor and train the Afghan forces so they
are ultimately able to manage the security environment going forward.
Manage it, not necessarily eliminate the insurgency.  And Afghanistan
has had – that country as you know has had civil war for 30 years.
So, I think it is unrealistic to think we are going to eliminate all
violent conflict of all kinds in the space of two or three years.

But, if we can mentor the Afghan forces so they can increasingly take
the lead and then allow the international community to focus on
development and allow of course the Afghan government to improve
governance.  I think that's our definition of mid-term success.

DOUCET:  Do you think that will be achieved by 2011, which is your –
do you wish …

HARPER:  That is our objective.  That was part of the resolution we
passed in Parliament.  We always start these things with determination
that we will meet – we will meet our benchmarks.  President Karzai has
told me he believes this can be done in Kandahar.  That's what we are
working towards.  And look, I think part of the problem with any
military operation, especially difficult one as we have in Kandahar
and as NATO has throughout Afghanistan, unless at some point you
establish some timelines and some objectives, you are not going to
meet them.  We all know that these military engagements by definition
tend to have mission creep (ph) that just go on and on and on.  So, we
have set some defined benchmarks that we will do our best to achieve
those at least to show substantial progress in relatively short order.

DOUCET:  But, there are some leaders, including former Prime Minister
Tony Blair of Britain, your own military chief, General Javier (ph)
has basically come out and said bluntly it will take a generation,
let's be honest.  But you actually put Afghanistan to right after 25
years of war, it will take a generation.  It won't be the exit date of
the (INAUDIBLE) the British have put on it.  It will actually take the
long run.

HARPER:  Well, I think …

DOUCET:  Do you think that seems to be happening either in Canada or
other countries, just what is involved?

HARPER:  I think it depends on what you mean by success.  Let's say,
if you took the definition of success, which would be Afghan forces
able to ensure a Western equivalent security environment, maybe that's
a 20, 25 year task.  If you are saying Afghan forces able to manage
the day-to-day security in most of the country, we think that is an
objective that if we put our focus and determination towards it, is
achievable in much shorter time frame.  That would – you would still
have Western troops in the country, you would still have a security
situation to manage.  But, it would be different than now.

We've seen – we are not pulling these objectives out of mid-air.  We
have seen in our sector significant improvements in the size and
fighting capacity of the Afghan forces over the past couple of years.

DOUCET:  Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, are we going to see at one point it
will be made public your new military political document, a new
strategy for Afghanistan that is now an internal document, will we
find out what your benchmarks are?  What actually – what is your new
strategy if this is going to start having greater traction, greater
success.

SCHEFFER:  I don't know.  We are going to find out what all the
benchmarks are.  I very much doubt that.  But, what we are doing here
at the Bucharest summit is first of all agree on what we call that
vision document as I mentioned in my short speech, which is a sort of
commitment because that is very much supported by the non-NATO troop
contributors and I know for instance from my talks with President
Karzai that he also considers this a useful and good document.  We
have an underlying document, which is an internal document, which in
Prime Minister Harper's words tells us what we have to do, what we
have to achieve, but let's not make – let us despite criticism, if you
allow me, I had your analysis, it will take I think even more than a
generation to bring a nation, which the Taliban had brought back to
the Middle Ages in 2001, the Middle Ages, I think Mr. President, I am
not exaggerating, apart from being the worst human rights violators,
to the Middle Ages.

If you look at Afghanistan in '01, you look at Afghanistan in 2008, I
don't hesitate to say that we have made remarkable progress.  It
doesn't mean that the challenges are huge, because it is a big nation,
it is as far as infrastructure is concerned today, stunningly
beautiful but complicated.  Because if a farmer wants to bring his
products to the market, you need the roads and we have to build roads
and there are no roads everywhere.  And so, it is a huge challenge.

Development cooperation, I think, as we know from Africa and elsewhere
takes more than a generation.  But, what we are – what we are aiming
of course to achieve is that we come slowly and I say this will not
happen overnight, we come slowly, build a situation where we have to
rely less on military force, more on the Afghan National Army, with
the international community in a supporting and supportive role.  I
can tell you, (INAUDIBLE) correct me if I am wrong, that we see a big
number of operations going on in Afghanistan where the Afghan army is
in the lead.  (INAUDIBLE) I was there a few weeks ago is one of the
examples.

So, the more successful we are in training and equipping the Afghan
National Army, the more you will see us gradually in a supporting
role.  But, developing a nation, rebuilding a nation from the Middle
Ages will take perhaps more than a generation.  It might take two
generations.

DOUCET:  But, President Karzai, do you think they are actually
involving your government, your security forces at the pace and at the
level they should be?  General Wardak, your Defense Minister who is
here has been saying you need to involve us more, we need more
equipment, we need to be really – better training, more quick
training, more of it, do you think actually that as we were saying,
when the Afghans are actually in the driving seat, but not as a taxi
driver taking directions from the person sitting behind them?

KARZAI:  Well, the international community has helped us rebuild
ourselves.  In the particular case of the security forces, the army
and the police, the army began to have attention in 2003.  That
attention has been steadily building up.  The police was late in
getting attention and the police as such has a longer journey to
complete.  While we are asking for more support to Afghan security
institutions and the proper training and the proper numbers and the
proper equipment, we are extremely grateful for what has already been
delivered to Afghanistan.  So, thank you very much, give us more.

DOUCET:  Do they treat you as a sovereign government?  There has been
tensions between Afghanistan – Afghan government and the international
community about where the – who should be running it, who gives the
orders, who is doing a good job or a bad job?

KARZAI:  Well, as far as the political sovereignty of Afghanistan is
concerned, it is absolute as any other nation.  As far as the
partnership of Afghanistan in day-to-day affairs is concerned,
Afghanistan lacks capacity, the international community has capacity.
This relationship is increasingly a balanced relationship.  We have
our faults (ph), we have our concerns, we have our demands, the
international community has their concerns, their issues, and their
demands and there is a proper constructive engagement on this.

HARPER:  If I could just maybe, Lyse, add on the three Ds that you
talk about, on the defense side, the security side, obviously NATO's
presence is critical today.  We hope it will be less critical in the
near future.  In the case of development, I think the international
presence will be critical ongoing.  But, all along, I think we start
with the premise, all NATO countries, that only Afghanistan can govern
itself, we can't provide governance.  And I think one of the things we
are going to have to wrestle with as we go forward, when we talk about
issues that you talked a moment ago both issues of politics kind of in
a derogatory way, Afghanistan is going to have its politics just like
the rest of us have our politics.  And we are going to have to get
used to the fact, particularly if we have a democratic system there,
it is going to be messy, it is going to be vibrant, and it is going to
produce decisions from time to time that we don't agree with and are
not comfortable with.  And we are nevertheless going to have to work
with the government of Afghanistan to manage those situation going
forward and that is just the reality and I think it is a reality we
are already starting to see in a few fronts.

SCHEFFER:  I will say very true.

HARPER:  Thank you.

DOUCET:  Do you have (INAUDIBLE) thought of three key players when it
comes to the NATO mission in Afghanistan.  Let's just also remind us
folks, put a bit more context into this discussion.  Last year, three
major reports came out from the United States, including one from the
Atlantic Council, who is headed by none other than the former Supreme
Commander of NATO that is known quite well here, General Jim Jones who
said, make no mistake about it, NATO is failing in Afghanistan.  And
if something isn't done quickly, if it isn't urgent action, the
relevance, the future of the NATO mission is at stake.  And he warned
about the possibility of a failed state in Afghanistan itself.

There is also been recently a report that was issued by 90
non-governmental agencies working in Afghanistan in the aid sector,
who said that $25 billion had been committed to Afghanistan, but only
$15 billion of that had actually been given to Afghanistan and that 40
percent of the money actually went back to the donor country because
it had been either sent on consultant salaries or went into profits.
And on the ground, last year was the worst year of violence in
Afghanistan.  Depending on who's (INAUDIBLE) you look at, anywhere
from 6500 to 8000, but a third of those were civilians.

Suicide bombings in Afghanistan, which was zero in 2002, were actually
228 last year and as President Karzai and the students and the other
Afghans who have come here, they occur with all too much frequency.
There are a whole number of issues that we can go in.  I want to bring
this issue of Pakistan, there is the issue of drugs, there is the
issue of coordination between the international community, both
military, civilian and the Afghan government and we are going to have
to touch on those as we continue with our debate.

And I'm going to open it now to some of your questions, so please say
who you are and who you would like to address your question to.  No
long statements please.  The gentlemen raising his hand.

UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT:  I have a question for the Secretary General
and also for Prime Minister Harper.  Secretary General, you have
talked about the reluctance of the public opinion in Germany and in
Canada and very likely in some other nations.  Is it a question of, A,
the public doesn't understand why are we there, it's a question of B,
it is such a complicated mission that we then – we don't see the end
of the road or is it C, the question of the fact that the public is
not informed on what are we doing in Afghanistan?  Which answer from
all these three is probably the most important issue for the public,
what we can – what can we do more to educate our public in order that
the reluctance of the public opinion is not translated into the
reluctance of putting more resources into this operation?

SCHEFFER:  (INAUDIBLE) for politics is from time to time too
complicated for multiple choice.  But, I'll answer you seriously of
course.  I think first of all, it is not easy to bring the notion that
we in the NATO alliance are defending what we consider our core
values, not anymore in the Fulda Gap when I grew up to keep the Soviet
Union out of Europe, but at the Hindukush that is more complicated
than it was when I grew up.  Why is it more complicated?  Perhaps
because there is a certain, how shall I phrase this, certain easy
feeling in many of our allied nations that the major conflicts the
world has seen will never return and that it is not anymore necessary
to defend those core values.

Point number one, I think we should watch against relativism in this
regard.  Secondly, and that is something I should and we should do
better, we should in this regard, try to bring this discussion from
the conference table to the kitchen table.  I am quoting Kai Eide
known to you and to me, and Kai is now, to my great joy, the higher
representative of the United Nations in Kabul.  And Kai Eide has said
that he is right, if we do not succeed in bringing this discussion to
the kitchen table and is definitely not here, I say with all due
respect for ourselves as we are sitting here, but to bring it to the
kitchen table really to try to explain to people and that I think we
could do better, Ambassador, quite honestly.

What is at stake in Afghanistan?  That if we fail there, and we are
not failing, we are prevailing at least, because the fact that you
mentioned suicide attacks and IEDs, that's fine.  But, that's not the
signal of strength of our opponents.  And a large majority of those
IEDs and suicide attacks occurs on a relatively small part of Afghan
territory.  I see the President is nodding in the affirmative.

KARZAI:  Absolutely.

SCHEFFER:  So, that is point number one.  Also, let me be a bit more
frank.  The fact that many of our nations are not used to it anymore
that their boys and their girls are dying for this cause.  That is a
shock in public opinion every time and quite rightly.  It is not easy
for Prime Minister Harper or for the Dutch Prime Minister or for the
President to go to Parliament, to go to public opinion and explain why
Canada has suffered so many fatalities, for what?

For the president to go to parliament, to go to public opinion and explain why
Canada has suffered so many fatalities for what?  For defending those
universal values.  For realizing that, if we can't get this right, they'll
come to us.  And they have come to us.

       So Afghanistan is a matter of helping the Afghan people but we are also
on one of the front lines in a fight against terrorism.  And perhaps that
notion is not strong enough, that second part.

        Having said that, we should not make it too easy for ourselves.  It is
a matter for national leaders like President Karzai, Prime Minister Harper.
It's a matter for the NATO allies and for the NATO secretary general as well
to explain this.  And I think we have to do a better job.  But it will not
convince me that the alternative is in any way viable, because it is not.

        QUESTION: And this vision statement that you're going to put out you
talked about, that is meant to convince a skeptical public about the mission
in Afghanistan, then to argue what is the case for Afghanistan?  The case
documents?

        Scheffer: Yes indeed.  Such a document supported by NATO allies, by
NATO partners, supported by the Afghan government will not do the trick, I
have not that delusion.  But it is a reconfirmation of what is at stake for
the international community.

        HARPER: I'll answer the question as well, but before I begin Lisa,
I'll just also add to what the secretary general said about the statistic on
IEDs and suicide bombings.  This is worrisome.

       That said, the comparison we make in Kandahar is that in 2006 we were
in conventional fire fights with the Taliban.  Now they wouldn't dare risk
that situation, they have been so weakened they are actually resorting to an
increasing number of asymmetrical attacks.  Not good, but an indication,
actually, that the security situation from our point of view is actually
improved or at least our control of the situation has improved.

        If I can answer the question about public opinion, first of all I
think what was interesting is we went through the debate in Canada about
public opinion as there was an assumption that public opinion was very split
between those who were for the mission and those were against the mission.  In
fact I think as the debate unfolded and we drilled down to that public
opinion, we found it was a little bit more complicated than that.

        It was divided between those who were largely for the mission,
believed it was succeeding and would succeed, and those who in the most cases
were also for the mission in principal but were doubting whether it would be
successful and whether it was worth the cost.

       That's a big difference than if people were actually opposed on
principal or morally to what we were doing.  I don't think there are very many
people in Canada, or in fact in the Western countries, who think that the
Taliban alternative to the Karzai government is desirable for anybody, for us,
for the Afghan people, anyone else.

        Yes, we need to do a better job of communicating our successes.  It's
hard when you're suffering casualties, that's the headline.  You know, it's
not as sexy to report that there have been hundreds of local development
councils start projects or there is irrigation operations or more and more
girls are going to school.  Those are not headline stories everyday and we
have to do better jobs of communicating those things.

        But that said, what I was encouraged by in Canadian public opinion is
we've actually found that, when you argue our self interest, that we have a
vested interest in ensuring a strong interest, nationally and globally, in
ensuring that Afghanistan does not revert to the kind of failed state that
launches 9/11 attacks.  That's actually less appealing to Canadian public
opinion than the argument that we actually are concretely helping the Afghan
people with their lives.

        That's actually something that Canadians and I think members of other
NATO democracies respond to quite positively.  So I think we just have to, as
our troops are daily slogging it out in the field, we have to keep trying to
slog it out in the communications media to make sure the bigger picture is
being told.

        KARZAI: Please, I have something to add.  Adding to the secretary
general's and the prime minister's very good remarks on the issue, sir,
another problem here is that we, meaning the Afghan government and our
partners in the international community, are not really capably, effectively
communicating the achievements in Afghanistan on a daily basis to the rest of
the world, even to the Afghan people.

       All that we have gone through in terms of successes in the past six
years, little of that, very little of that is known to the rest of the world,
other than the big headlines of the president's election, the parliament's
election and the likes of it.

        For example, how many of us in this room know, let alone when you go
into the larger society across the west and the rest of the world, how many
people know that we had a cabinet meeting yesterday and the northern city of
Mazari Sharif where the German PRTs have the main responsibility.  And after
having done the cabinet meeting we went and inaugurated the paving of the
road, asphalting of the road that would connect eventually northern
Afghanistan to southern Afghanistan to the city of Kandahar.

        We yesterday inaugurated the 140 kilometers length of that road.  How
many people know that?  Very, very few and I don't think they would ever come
to know about that if we don't talk about it.  So I think it's upon us, the
Afghan government, more, and our friends, to communicate better with the rest
of the world on what has been achieved and what cost have we paid for it.
That is very important.

        QUESTION: Thank you, sir.  Gentlemen here in the blue shirt?

        QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) general, especially to you about the NATO
council.  During your recent visit to Warsaw you had about eight questions and
only one was about Afghanistan, so there is not that we worry.  But later we
had a discussion and it concentrated on the military-civilian reconstruction
aspect.  And we worry, and this feeling of insecurity whether we are winning
or not, is a result of a situation that we observe progress but then it's
reverted by the security situation.

        That means some people rule during the day, some people rule during
the night, kill local supporters of central government and the situation is
very unstable.          How can we expect our societies, our and yours (ph),
to send civilian reconstruction teams if we can not at the same time safeguard
their safety?

        QUESTION: Thank you.

        KARZAI: That might still be true in a few parts of Afghanistan.  But
if you take the country as a whole that analysis is simply wrong, it is simply
wrong.  Go there, see for yourself.  It is not true.  Indeed there are signs
of weakness.  And let me say, IEDs and suicide attacks, what do they do?  They
of course are killing the most innocent Afghan civilians.  And as President
Karzai told us a few weeks ago, (inaudible) more hated than feared by the
Afghan people themselves.  So that's a sign of weakness.

        It is true that the going is tough from time to time.  But it is
untrue and I simply do not share that analysis that in greater parts of
Afghanistan there is relative security and stability that, again, you cannot
bring a country in the state it was in 2001 in seven or eight years, into
making it like Poland or the Netherlands or Canada for that matter.  That is
simply impossible.

       And for that we need, and I think there we should do better, we need
better civil-military integration.  Kai Edie is going of course in close
cooperation with the Afghan government going to look after that.

        I think there is still too much of a disconnect between the civil and
the military.  That is one of the elements I would like to see in the EU-NATO
relationship, but that is not this afternoon's subject but there we could, I
think, create a lot of added value between NATO and the European Union.

       But that aside, I think if we look at Afghanistan now, and I'm a
regular visitor, you see -- go to the Canadian PRT in Kandahar, you see what
has been achieved there.  You see the Canadian's training policemen and you
see the results of that.

        I mean there is a lot going well but good news, as was said before,
unfortunately, the opening of a school where 500 girls go to school is not
news.  I'll say it a bit more cynical.  There was one journalist who told me
when I wanted (ph) Afghanistan secretary general, that school is only of
interest to my camera when it burns.  That is cynicism at the core, that makes
me extremely angry, extremely angry because there's a lot at stake.  But a lot
has been achieved.  Not denying that the challenges are still huge.

        QUESTION: The gentlemen here?

        JENKINS: Bernard Jenkins, MP from the United Kingdom, may ask
President Karzai whom I had the pleasure of meeting in Kabul last year, why
did you veto the appointment of Lord Ashdown as the UN coordinator?

        KARZAI: Sir, I did not veto the appointment of Lord Ashdown.  I met
with Mr. Ashdown in Kuwait.  I knew him as a younger student when he was -- I
mean I knew him in absence, not that I had met with him, I knew of him as the
leader of the Liberal Party and I was familiar with his name.

       And I met with him then when he was proposed as the SRSG in Kuwait,
liked him very much, a very capable man, a very sound man, a man who would
have definitely been of great help to Afghanistan and agreed with the
appointment, worked out the terms of reference for his appointment and waited
for the secretary general of the United Nations to meet with him.

        That meeting took place a month after we met.  We spoke the next day
on telephone and I invited him to come to Kabul or meet with me before that in
Davos where I was going to attend the conference, the Economic Forum.
Unfortunately stories appeared in the press, in London Times an article
appeared in which the article spoke of Afghanistan in extremely ethnic terms,
especially the government of Afghanistan was referred to in extremely ethnic
terms.

        First of all, that was not true.  Even if it is true, it is not the
business of the International Press to play it up and use it as if it's
something that an outsider can fix.  So in the interest of Afghanistan and in
the interest of rejecting that perception, that notion, with a lot of, how
should I put it, with a very heavy heart, something that I did not want to do,
I decided to decline for that moment.

        And I'm very sorry for that.  He's a good man.  Being British of
course is all the more important because there's tremendous admiration
personally that I have, I am a product of English education, so I'm sorry that
he's not there, something that I had to do without my liking.

        QUESTION: How would you define the mission of the new coordinator Kai
Edie?  What do you think his job is?  What has to be done?

        KARZAI: Mr. Kai Edie is the new secretary general representative, a
man of admirable qualities.  I've met with him already, he's worked with
Afghanistan.  His job is to work with us to improve the standards of the
Afghan government to do what's needed in Afghanistan as Afghans, through the
help of the United Nations, and also to cause coordination between the
international community, especially on aspects of development in coordination
between countries, and collect that international coordination to Afghanistan
and coordinate that way.  So a three-way thing.

        QUESTION: Tall order.  The gentlemen behind you actually had his hand
up first, the gentlemen with the red tie.

        QUESTION: This is for President Karzai, my name is Dan Rundy (ph), I'm
formerly with the U.S. Agency for International Development so I'm a U.S.
citizen.  Too often we hear in the press about all the negative stories that
come out of Afghanistan, I wanted to ask you and to give you a clear
opportunity to talk about all the progress that's been made in the last couple
years.

       Could you please elaborate a little bit about the progress that's been
made in the last six years and then talk about what you would consider a
success over the next 24 to 36 months?  Thank you.

        QUESTION: Oh dear, that's going to take up the rest of the panel.  Is
there one sector in particular that interests you?

        KARZAI: I'll be short, I'll be short, I'll be short.

        QUESTION: No, no.  We don't want to give scripts (inaudible).

        KARZAI: Right, I'll be short.  First of all, I'm beginning to see the
references (ph) in the press at times to Afghanistan as having been a failed
state and going to be a failed state.  And I would quote here the president of
Slovenia who was talking to our Foreign Minister Dr. Spanta a month ago and
who told him that actually, "It's not right to refer to Afghanistan as having
been a failed state."

        Afghanistan was not a failed state.  Afghanistan was a destroyed
state, completely destroyed state, from the institutions to the physical
infrastructure to all other things that matters in a state.  Therefore, we
have done two things together with the international community.  Now I must
say it clearly here once again, without the presence of all of you in
Afghanistan, the international community, none would have been possible for us
what we have today.

        First, the liberation of Afghanistan.  Second, the rebuilding of the
Afghan state, the rebuilding of the Afghan state where 45 percent to 30
percent of the population of the country were refugees in neighboring
countries, of which nearly 5 billion have already returned to Afghanistan.

        Second, where health services were available only to 9 percent of the
Afghan population which is now available to more than 85 percent of the
population.  We even have health services in parts of the country that never
in the life of our nation had a health service, the parmeat (ph) areas of
Afghanistan where have now sent mobile clinics and schools.  We never had in
the past, as a consequence of the past 30 years of destruction, any diagnostic
and curative services in Afghanistan.

        Thousands and thousands of Afghans had to go Pakistan or Iran or the
richer ones to the rest of the world to get some form of treatment, even the
basic ones, treatment for a common cold.  Today we have for 40 percent of our
people possibilities of diagnostic and curative services in our hospitals.

        Schools, millions of children, only this year for the summer schools
of Afghanistan, Afghanistan has two timings for schools, the winter and the
summer.  The summer is for the places that are cold and the winter is for the
places that are warmer.  Only for the summer-time schooling, we have 500,000
new enrolments of kids attending for the first time the primary schooling, 6
million going to school.  Universities, the 80 (ph) students that you see here
are the product of this new opening, this opportunity that Afghanistan has
been given.

        Business, economic growth, 2007 13.5 percent of economic growth and
likewise the GDP.  The economy has grown twice from 2002 to today, from the
legitimate part I mean, the legitimate part, from $4 billion to today's $9.5
billion.  Roads, 4,000 kilometers.  We had not a single kilometer of paved
road left, it was all destroyed.  Now we have 4,000 kilometers.  The Ring Road
of the country is going to be completed where it links to all our neighbors
already in massive transportation.

        Yesterday the Russian ambassador was with me and I was surprised.  He
told me that trade with Russia in 2002 was $30 million.  Today that trade
stands at nearly $319 million with Russia alone.  With Pakistan $600 million,
with Iran $400 million, with Kazakhstan, with the rest of the world, China,
with the United States.  It's a country that is again there among all of you.
That's what matters most.

        QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. President, thank you.  A student of
Afghanistan would like to ask a question actually.

        QUESTION: Thank you very much.  I don't have a question but I have a
suggestion and I hope you find it interesting.  As it is mentioned that here
in Afghanistan 40 percent of the money contributed to us is taken back by the
foreigners.  So I as an Afghan suggest for NATO members not to forget us but
support us further in terms of giving more scholarships for the young
generation to work hard for their country for a better future.  Thank you very
much.

        KARZAI: Wonderful.  Good idea.

        QUESTION:  I know Mr. Scheffer has to leave.  I just want to raise a
question that figures more and more in the discussions about what will it mean
to actually succeed in Afghanistan.  What about the involvement of neighboring
Pakistan?  There are those who say the time has come to consider this as one
strategic theater, what's happening in the tribal areas of Pakistan, in
Pakistan proper and in Afghanistan, yet there have really not been regular
NATO-Pakistan meetings, discussions on this.  Is this going to change?

        Scheffer: It should.  I must answer your question by saying first that
the military-to-military contacts with Pakistan are very good.  Tripartite,
that means Afghanistan, Pakistan, ISAF and NATO, that works well.  What we now
have to do is to complement this military dialog with political one and this
is one of the subjects I discussed with President Karzai this morning, or he
with me.  I asked him about his analysis about the new government of Pakistan.

        I do think that NATO-ISAF needs a political dialog with Pakistan
because it's crystal clear that instability there, instability in the tribal
areas, will lead to instability in Afghanistan.  And the two nations are
linked in that regard.  But I must also admit that there is, of course, a
limit to what NATO as such can do in this regard.  But I do think that apart
from the military dialog we need a political one as well.

        And I'm looking forward, as soon as the new government in Pakistan has
settled, to go to Islamabad again, I was there before, that also never
happened of course in NATO's history, to go again and to see how we can build
up a more intensive political dialog on our common fight against terrorism.
And I heard the first remarks by the Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani in this
regard and his commitment to the fight against terrorism, and I think that's a
good start.

        QUESTION: But they say they want to talk to the militants.  This may
create a whole new set of issues now.  How do you deal with the democratic
reelected government and their desire for --.

        (CROSSTALK)

        Scheffer: Exactly, but let us go from the starting point that Pakistan
is part of the solution and not qualify at the beginning immediately Pakistan
is part of the problem, because I think it is not very helpful.

        QUESTION: You could just stay for one -- Bill Mal (ph) you have a
question here?

        Scheffer: There's another prime minister waiting for me so I apologize
before hand that I have to leave the stage in a moment.

        QUESTION: Yes I suppose my question follows on from the question that
Lisa's just raised, which is whether Pakistan really is part of the solution
rather than part of the problem.  Perhaps it's both.  And perhaps in dealing
with Pakistan we do need recognition that there has been a lot of quiet
diplomacy over a very large number of years with Pakistan which has not
actually delivered all that much.

        We have in August last year the admission by President Musharraf that
there is a problem in southern Afghanistan because of support being provided
to the Taliban from Pakistan's side of the border.  And if Pakistan is indeed
a sovereign state then surely it has responsibilities as well as simply
rights.

        And one of the responsibilities is to prevent its territory from being
used by anyone for hostile acts against the government of Afghanistan.  And
therefore my question would be what kind of measures can the NATO states draw
to Pakistan's attention that might be taken towards it, in the event that it
is not prepared to act forcefully to address the problems of sanctuaries from
within its territory?

        QUESTION: We'll get a brief comment from --.

        (CROSSTALK)

        Scheffer: Well very brief because I think this is a question which
President Karzai is in a better position to answer than I am, but it has
relevance of course for the NATO-ISAF forces.  I think what we should do, I
mean NATO -- we must realize NATO not only does not own Afghanistan but NATO
also cannot take responsibility for everything in the region.  NATO is a
political military alliance.

        What we need is a political dialog.  What I need, but I think that
should be a process steered and guided by President Karzai and the prime
minister and president in Pakistan, we need a political process which will
make it possible to address the, admittedly, serious problems and problem at
the border, which is basically making a passive Afghanistan more unstable than
President Karzai, Prime Minister Harper and I would like to see it.  But you
need a political dialog before you can seriously start to address the problem.

        QUESTION: President Karzai?

        KARZAI: Sir, I agree with all that you analyzed, it's exactly the way
it is.  For that reason we have been engaged constantly with our brothers and
sisters in Pakistan.  For that reason we initiated a process called the
Afghanistan-Pakistan Joint Jirga, which had its first meeting in Kabul last
summer, a meeting of Afghan and Pakistan civil society representatives and
nearly 700 of all of us.

        We have, as a result of that, appointed sub commissions of 25 each.
The new government in place is of the same view on matters of extremism and
terrorism as we are.  There is a lot of hope that together we'll follow.  We
recognize in Afghanistan that without a constructive relationship with
Pakistan in all aspects, security, economic, movement of people, Afghanistan
will not be a prosperous country or a peaceful country as we desire it, as
NATO desires it, as the countries helping Afghanistan desire it.

        Therefore we will continue that engagement.  I am more hopeful today
than I was some time back.  Let's think this a good beginning and keep the
efforts on.

        QUESTION: (CROSSTALK)

        HARPER: Yes if I can just maybe given a note of optimism on that, and
this has been a very difficult problem for countries in the south, the Afghan-
Pakistan border.  That said, you know we were all told not too long ago that
if we had democracy in Pakistan we'd set these extremists loose.  What we
observed as having was the previous government of Pakistan was actually
cracking down on democratic elements not on the extremist elements, and we
started to see the extremist elements growing in Pakistan itself.

        What we've seen since now, I think it's been a reaction and in the
election we saw those elements thoroughly rejected in the very areas, the
border areas of the country, that we're worried about.  So I think we have
reason for optimism on that front if we can build on that.

        QUESTION: Okay.

        Scheffer: Wonderful.

        QUESTION: (inaudible) you have to -- good to see you, thank you very
much.

        KARZAI: You're leaving?

        QUESTION: The NATO secretary now has to leave.  Please do remain in
your seats because we're going to continue our discussions with President
Karzai and Prime Minister Harper.  He's not escaping the heat, he just has to
meet another prime minister.  Gentlemen here?

        DROZDIAK: Bill Drozdiak, American Council on Germany, President
Karzai, you've had some bitter differences of opinion with your western
partners about what to do in terms of trying to split, perhaps, the Taliban
and it's Al Qaeda alibis and secondly what to do about the record opium
production in your country, which ahs funded a lot of the Taliban insurgency.
Can you explain today what you hope to achieve in terms of these two areas?
Are you getting more support now from your western allies?

        KARZAI: Right sir, on the question of what we term as reconciliation
or the peace process, our mind is very clear and straight.  And that is also
recognized, understood and supported by our allies.  We consider those Taliban
who are Afghans, who are not part of Al Qaeda or the other terrorist networks,
whoever they are, and who have been driven out of Afghanistan for fear or
confusion, and who are willing to come back to Afghanistan and participate in
accordance with the constitution of Afghanistan in life, in social and
political and economic activities, they are welcome.

        Our doors are open.  They're Afghans and they have a place in their
country.  That is the objective of the peace process.  And there is more and
more understanding and recognition of, by the rest of the world, with
Asaldicush (ph).

        And narcotics, it's sinister, menacing problem for Afghanistan.  It
affects us really, really seriously.  More and more we see that that those are
for refugees returning from our neighbors and those within the country are
affected by addiction of heroin and other substances is becoming a serious
social problem for us, as it also is already a problem of an illegitimate
economy, running shoulder to shoulder with the terrorist networks, with those
that prevent the working of a legitimate government and the delivery of
services to the Afghan people and trying to prevent peace for that reason.

        So it is primarily an Afghan struggle.  It is our responsibility.  But
the magnitude of the problem is beyond the abilities of Afghanistan.  They
have tentacles beyond Afghanistan.  They have links with international mafia.
They have links in the region.  They have immense illegitimate sources at
their hands.  And our farmers are in their debt in lots of ways.

        So that is the reason that Afghanistan, together with the
international community, will need much longer than we were previously
thinking in handling the problem.  Perhaps we need a period of 5 to 10 years
to gradually reduce poppy cultivation in the country, reduce the number of
provinces producing poppy, which we already have, the provinces are now about
16 who have no poppy cultivation at all.

        The three biggest provinces that were producing poppies, two of them
have declined considerably so it's a journey that only is showing signs of
success but it needs patience, dedicated work, good governance, security and
economic alternatives.

        QUESTION: Two very important issues, the Taliban, what to do about the
Taliban and what to do about the growing drug problem.  And in fact many
people see them as linked.  It's a pity Minister Scheffer had to leave because
that is one of the issues, is they're going to be a coordinated approach to
these.  Because different governments seem to have different views on what
should be done.  The Dutch are doing it their way, Enrud (ph) is gone, the
British in Heldant (ph) and the Canadians in Kandahar.

        Mr. Harper, does your government with your military discuss should
there be talks with the Taliban?  I know your national Democratic Party -- new
Democratic Party critic in Canada said from the beginning you should be
talking to the Taliban not fighting against them.

        HARPER: Well I would agree with the position that President Karzai
just laid out.  You know in a country like Afghanistan part of long-run peace
is not simply effective security against the insurgency.  But it is bringing
more people into the democratic process.

        And you know, they're not going to see -- I think once again we have
to be realistic here, people who have strong or fundamentalist Muslim views
are not going to cease to be fundamentalist Muslims, but what we want them to
do is lay down arms and participate through the democratic process.  You know
I've seen incidents myself in Kandahar where that has actually occurred,
that's a good thing.

        But I think that's different than a naive view that we would just say
bring your guns and we'll kind of lay down arms, which as you know is a view
of the element you talk about in Canada.  That's not realistic.  What
President Karzai said is not only realistic but I think is absolutely
desirable.

        On the drug issue, you know I think this is probably an issue where
there just is going to be a divergence of opinion.  I think Canada's probably
in the majority view among our allies that we don't participate directly in
eradication efforts because these have enormous political consequences within
Afghanistan.  It's essentially a governance issue.

        Our job on that front is to try and, through development, to try and
provide alternatives for farmers to make a living through legitimate crops.
And I think that's the best we can do and obviously we'll take on drug
traffickers when they contribute to the insecurity or instability in the
country.  But I think ultimately I think we believe strongly it's a mistake
for NATO countries to engage directly in eradication without the cooperation
of Afghan authorities.

        QUESTION: Thank you.  Gentlemen in the back with the tie, or did he
leave?

DOUCET:  Mr. Harper, does your government, with your military,
discuss should there be talks with the Taliban?  I know one of your New
Democratic Party critic in Canada said from the beginning you should be
talking to the Taliban, not fighting against them.

 

       HARPER:  Well, I would agree with the position that President
Karzai just laid out.  In a country like Afghanistan, part of long-run
peace is not simply effective security against the insurgency, but it is
bringing more people into the democratic process.

 

       And they're not going to cease.  I think, once again, we have to
be realistic here.  People who have a strong or fundamentalist Muslim
views are not going to cease to be fundamentalist Muslims.  But what we
want them to do is lay down arms and participate through the democratic
process.

 

       I've seen incidents myself in Kandahar where that has actually
occurred.  That's a good thing.  But I think that's different than a
naive view that we would just say, you know, bring your guns and we'll
kind of lay down our arms, which, as you know, is a view of the element
you talk about in Canada.  That's not realistic.

 

       What President Karzai said is not only realistic, but I think is
absolutely desirable.

 

       On the drug issue, I think this is probably an issue where there
just is going to be a divergence of opinion.  I think Canada is probably
in the majority view among our allies that we don't participate directly
in eradication efforts because these have enormous political
consequences within Afghanistan.  It's essentially a governance issue.

 

       Our job on that front is to try and, through development, to try
and provide alternatives for farmers to make a living through legitimate
crops.  And I think that's the best we can do.  And, obviously, we'll
take on drug traffickers when they're involved -- when they contribute
to the insecurity or instability in the country.

 

       But I think, ultimately, I think we believe strongly it's a
mistake for NATO countries to engage directly in eradication without the
cooperation of the Afghan authorities.

 

       DOUCET:  Thank you.

 

       The gentleman in the back with the tie.  Or did he leave?

 

       Ah, this gentleman here.

 

       QUESTION:  Thank you.  I'm Colin Scan (ph), NATO Defense College,
Rome.

 

       Apparently we have different views on the situation in
Afghanistan.  General Jones says we are losing.  The panel says we are
making progress, more girls in schools or more streets are built.  Some
say that the Taliban are back.

 

       So apparently NATO does not have a NATO-wide accepted assessment
of the situation, of the state of play.  So two questions perhaps to
Prime Minister Harper.

 

       First, how can we fine-tune our measures if we don't agree,
completely agree on what the situation is?  And, second, wouldn't it
take some kind of a Baker Commission in Iraq, so some kind of a group
which provides us with an accepted assessment on which we then can build
our measures?

 

       Thank you.

 

       HARPER:  Well, we're all sovereign countries.  We're all going to
have our different takes.

 

       What I found interesting about the last NATO summit was it seemed
to me that the evaluations were more pessimistic from those countries
that were doing less rather than those countries that were in the more
difficult areas.

 

       I think -- if I were to assess the current situation, I think you
would find most people would agree with an assessment along these lines,
that we are making progress, but we have not yet made progress to the
point where the situation would be irreversible if we were suddenly out.

 

       And I think that's the situation.  Yes, we are making progress,
but we have not passed the tipping point where the cycle of security,
development and governance really has a momentum of its own.  And that's
something that we believe we can achieve in the years to come, not too
distant future, but we clearly have work to do to achieve that.

 

       DOUCET:  President Karzai, what would you define as success?

 

       KARZAI:  I guess we spoke about that earlier.  We need to
continue and keep adding to what we have achieved and complete the
process.  That's what it will take:  more time, continuation of effort.

 

       And we resemble a tree that has blossomed, and you have to wait
for it to give you the fruit.  The blossoming has arrived.  The fruit is
yet to come.  So wait for this summer, and you will have the fruits.

 

       HARPER:  Let me just add one thing, in terms of the area where I
think we have had the least success, where success, more success is
critical, and that is in the area of justice, in the rule of law.

 

       We tend, as Western nations, to put an enormous emphasis when we
go into failed states or destroyed states, as President Karzai would
say, an enormous emphasis on democracy, on creating elections, elected
officials, political parties, legislatures.  But I think there's a lot
of data out there to suggest that real long-run stability is probably
enhanced much more by the rule of law, per se, than by just democratic
institutions.

 

       And as President Karzai says, the police have been way behind the
army.  The court system is farther behind.  The training of judges,
these are the things that are really critical to secure good governance
in the country in the years to come.

 

       And I do believe it's a capacity problem more than anything.  We
cannot forget -- we have young Afghan students with us today -- we
cannot forget this is a country that had over a generation no educated
people.  All educated people left, and no new ones were created, and
it's still hard to pull educated people back, given our situation.

 

       So you have in technocratic and judicial and other functions, you
have an extremely small population to draw from to build up this
capacity.  And that is the generational challenge.

 

       DOUCET:  Gentleman in the back?  This gentleman, yes.

 

       QUESTION:  Yes, I'm Steven Flannigan (ph) from the United States.
  This is a question both for the prime minister and the president.
Even some of the discussion this afternoon I think has illustrated that,
well, NATO heads of state and government may agree on the rationale and
goals of the NATO presence there.  There does not seem to be still a
clear acceptance of a common strategy.

 

       In the run-up to the Defense Ministers meeting in Vilnius,
Secretary Gates raised some questions about whether or not some of the
other allies other than those in the south (ph) were fully committed to
the notion that this was a classic counterinsurgency mission, rather
than a robust peace-support mission.  There's the whole question about
how NATO strategy meshes with that of the Afghan National Army and the
police.

 

       And I wonder, since Vilnius and even in the run-up now to the
summit, whether you gentlemen see any narrowing of differences over
strategy and whether, in addition to this agreement on the longer-term
goals, there is some narrowing of approach, including on this whole
question -- now that Ambassador Eide is in place -- on further
advancement of this so-called comprehensive approach?

 

       HARPER:  Well, I think there is some narrowing.  As the secretary
general said, there is at this conference, there's been the preparation
of a strategic document, a vision document, which I think will
ultimately be approved and released.  And I think we've made significant
ground on that.

 

       In terms of -- if I could just return indirectly to something
that was said earlier just relevant to your question, that's this whole
notion of two-tier, that some countries are pulling their weight and
others are not.

 

       I think if there really has been one NATO failure in Afghanistan
-- and I'm supposing this, because this is before my time, 2001, 2002,
2003 -- it appears to me that early on NATO concluded the job was much
easier than it was actually going to be.

 

       We threw out the Taliban, we secured Kabul, and we established a
very nominal presence in the countryside.  And then it was only I think
really 2005 on that we fully grasped the nature of the security problem
and the problem that it would present in terms of developing governance
and other economic development.  And I think we were slow in
understanding that.

 

       Now, some nations -- Canada and others -- have put more into
those efforts than others.  But I think it's unfair to call it two-tier,
in the sense that we're saying that any other nations didn't do what
they initially committed to do.  You know, I think NATO allies have been
pretty good at fulfilling their commitments.

 

       The fact of the matter is that we all undercommitted and we all
underestimated the task, and we've been compensating ever since.  And so
I think that's the reality, but I do think that, broadly speaking, I
think we are narrowing the differences on what needs to be done.  And I
think there's an overwhelming view that the approach has to be
comprehensive, that what we termed the 3-D approach, Canadians termed
the 3-D approach some years ago, would now be widely accepted as gospel.

 

       DOUCET:  We're coming to a close soon.  The gentleman there and
the gentleman here, as well, take two.  And then we'll...

 

       KENNEDY:  There's a lady asking for a question.

 

       QUESTION:  Thank you.  My name is Kyo Komoto (ph), and I'm from
Japan.  I have a question for President Karzai.

 

       Our military contribution to Afghanistan has been so far modest,
limited to sending just two ships to the Indian Ocean as a part of OEF.
  But there is a widespread recognition that we have to do much, much
more on land, especially in the field of economic reconstruction.  But
sometimes our policymakers lose track of economic priorities in
Afghanistan, should it be agriculture, medication, education, demining.

 

       Well, Mr. President, can you share us your present thought today
as to how you envision your roadmap to your economic recovery?  Thank you.

 

       DOUCET:  OK.  We're going to take another question first here.  A
microphone down here, please.

 

       And then a lady, as well.

 

       I think we've done quite a bit on the economic side, but we'll
let the president address that about the Japanese contribution, I
understand, yes.

 

       KARZAI:  I'd like to address the Japanese contribution.

 

       DOUCET:  Yes, yes.

 

       QUESTION:  My name is Misha Glenny.  I've just published a book
called "McMafia: Crime Without Frontiers," which looks at the nexus
between conflict and the narcotics trade in a number of places,
including Afghanistan.

 

       The war on drugs is one which invests in poppy a value which is
astronomical compared to commodities which operate in legal markets.
One of the reasons why we have been having such difficulty militarily
since 2003 is because the Taliban has gathered a huge revenue stream,
almost exclusively from the sale of narcotics.  This is hundreds of
millions of dollars every year which are being used to kill NATO
servicemen and women.

 

       And I wonder -- and I address this in particular to Prime
Minister Harper -- whether we will start to address the issue of a
demand-driven economy in narcotics which our law enforcement agencies in
the West are completely unable to control?  Because at the moment, the
Taliban -- and I know this from conversations with them and their
narcotics distributors -- are the biggest backers of the war on drugs.

 

       DOUCET:  And just -- that's a very complex -- would you just pass
the microphone along to this lady here with the blue?  Yes.

 

       QUESTION:  Hi, my name is Adina Postanico (ph), and I am an
independent consultant from Romania.  I have two questions for President
Karzai.

 

       Mr. President, it's a very straightforward question, and kind of
with a personal touch.  When you look back at the things that have been
-- that you personally and your country has been going through in the
last six years, what is your worst fear when you think about the future
of your country?

 

       And the second question is, I would like to hear more about your
efforts and the resources that you are putting in the state-building
process?  Thank you very much.

 

       DOUCET:  OK, Japanese first.

 

       KARZAI:  I'd like to address the Japanese and, Prime Minister
Harper, you'll take the narcotics one.  OK.

 

       Sir, with regard to Japan's contribution to Afghanistan, Japan is
in the front line of the countries helping Afghanistan financially, in
addition to the maritime shipping assistance that you're giving to the
NATO forces.

 

       Japan has also been involved in the GDR process (ph).  That's the
collection of illegal arms from armed groups.  Now it's working on
another part of this process.

 

       Yesterday, as a matter of fact, before flying towards Bucharest,
I visited the airport in Kabul that Japan is building for us, a very
nice one, that will have the capacity of receiving, handling almost a
million passengers a year.  Japan is involved in schools; Japan is
involved in construction of roads; Japan is involved in construction of
other assistance to Afghanistan.

 

       Afghanistan's priorities today are the same as they were six
years ago, with one addition of emphasis today on irrigation,
agriculture, and the provision of energy, electricity to the Afghan people.

 

       DOUCET:  OK, sir?

 

       HARPER:  I'll just talk quickly on the nexus of the insurgency
and the drug trade, which I agree is a serious and growing problem.  But
I also would put in this context:  I think it's a problem likely to be
with us for some time.

 

       You know, where we have drug trades and insurgencies linked to
drug trades in other parts of the world, we've seen that's a persistent
phenomenon, one that in and of itself need not lead to a failed state or
a kind of state that backs terrorism.

 

       And I do think that -- and I'm not trying to say it's a silver
lining, but I do think it's significant to see the evolution of the
insurgency from an ideologically inspired terrorist insurgency to one
that is increasingly a commercial or narcotic-based insurgency.  Still
problematic, but, in the sense of the global strategic issues that led
us to Afghanistan, actually an improvement over the situation.

 

       Now, I would agree with what you seem to assert in your question,
that ultimately the problem is not in Afghanistan as much as the problem
is elsewhere, in terms of the demand.  You know, I'm a believer that
anti-drug strategies have to address both the supply and the demand.

 

       And I don't think you can address it only through demand-based
strategies.  I think part of the reason you have high prices for drugs
and such violent economics around drugs is the nature of addiction
itself and the nature of the demand that creates.

 

       But that said, we have to have both strategies.  A pure war on
the supply of drugs is not and will not be successful, so we have to
have demand strategies.

 

       And that goes beyond -- I've spoken about this before in Canada.
  I think that goes beyond merely discouraging the use of drugs or
pointing out the bad use of drugs.  I think it is to some degree still
part of an element of our culture, from the '60s on, that has glorified
or romanticized the use of drugs.

 

       And it's still very prevalent, less so than it was maybe 20 or 30
years ago, but one that still nevertheless exists.  It still
nevertheless is very prevalent in youth culture and one that I think we
should take seriously.

 

       KARZAI:  Ma'am, my worst fear is leaving the job half-done.  That
applies to both the international community and Afghanistan and not
bringing to the Afghan people justice as they expected and allowing
extremists and terrorists to continue without a firm, committed struggle
against them by all of us, including the neighbors of Afghanistan.

 

       These concerns addressed, we'll be on a very safe journey to a
better future in Afghanistan.

 

       DOUCET:  Well, on that note, a positive note -- I know the press
has got a very bad reputation, from all the criticisms in this panel --
but perhaps it is in the nature of the whole mission in Afghanistan that
there is a true division of opinion.

 

       To use that well-worn cliche, for some people, it's a glass
half-empty.  For other people, it is a glass half-full.  And some, of
course, would say, "Well, just kick the table over that the glass is on,
because we need a whole new glass in order to look at this.  We need a
new strategy."

 

       I think what is absolutely clear to our participants and to all
of you here in the room is that it's undeniable that Afghanistan is a
different place than it was in 2001 when the Taliban were toppled.  It
is also undeniably clear that there is a lot of work to be done and not
only is it clear to the international community and to the Afghans that
it is perhaps far more complicated and dangerous than people thought in
2001, but in some areas it's going ahead, and in some areas it's
slipping again.

 

       And, therefore, the relationships both among Afghans, the
relationship between the international community and Afghanistan, and
the relationship that has been discussed here and will be discussed, of
course, at the NATO summit, the relationship between the military and
the civilian and other actors is absolutely crucial, as well.

 

       So the debate will have to continue.  We started off by asking,
"Success is not in sight, failure is not an option."  Perhaps we'll
still go away with that article of faith.  But, of course, the debate
will go on.

 

       Thank you very much for joining us here.

 

       (APPLAUSE)

 

       Mr. President, it's a pleasure.

 

       KENNEDY:  And I want to thank our two panelists.  President
Karzai, great to have you here.

 

       Prime Minister Harper, wonderful.

 

       I want to make a special thanks to Chatham House.  They've done a
lot of good things for us as part of this partnership.  But giving us a
terrific new moderator to use is a really special treat.  And thank you
so much.  That was really a great...

 

       (APPLAUSE)

 

       DOUCET:  Yes.  Actually...

 

       KENNEDY:  OK, so we're going to take a coffee break downstairs.
Come on back at about 4:15 or so, and we're going to talk about Article
5.  Thank you.

 

       END

 

        XXX ... and the Canadians in Kandahar.

        DOUCET:  Mr. Harper, does your government, with your military, discuss
should there be talks with the Taliban?  I know one of your New
Democratic Party critic in Canada said from the beginning you should be
talking to the Taliban, not fighting against them.

        HARPER:  Well, I would agree with the position that President Karzai
just laid out.  In a country like Afghanistan, part of long-run peace is
not simply effective security against the insurgency, but it is bringing
more people into the democratic process.

        And they're not going to cease.  I think, once again, we have to be
realistic here.  People who have a strong or fundamentalist Muslim views
are not going to cease to be fundamentalist Muslims.  But what we want
them to do is lay down arms and participate through the democratic process.

        I've seen incidents myself in Kandahar where that has actually
occurred.  That's a good thing.  But I think that's different than a
naive view that we would just say, you know, bring your guns and we'll
kind of lay down our arms, which, as you know, is a view of the element
you talk about in Canada.  That's not realistic.

        What President Karzai said is not only realistic, but I think is
absolutely desirable.

        On the drug issue, I think this is probably an issue where there just
is going to be a divergence of opinion.  I think Canada is probably in
the majority view among our allies that we don't participate directly in
eradication efforts because these have enormous political consequences
within Afghanistan.  It's essentially a governance issue.

        Our job on that front is to try and, through development, to try and
provide alternatives for farmers to make a living through legitimate
crops.  And I think that's the best we can do.  And, obviously, we'll
take on drug traffickers when they're involved -- when they contribute
to the insecurity or instability in the country.

        But I think, ultimately, I think we believe strongly it's a mistake for
NATO countries to engage directly in eradication without the cooperation
of the Afghan authorities.

        DOUCET:  Thank you.

        The gentleman in the back with the tie.  Or did he leave?

        Ah, this gentleman here.

        QUESTION:  Thank you.  I'm Colin Scan (ph), NATO Defense College, Rome.

        Apparently we have different views on the situation in Afghanistan.
General Jones says we are losing.  The panel says we are making
progress, more girls in schools or more streets are built.  Some say
that the Taliban are back.

        So apparently NATO does not have a NATO-wide accepted assessment of the
situation, of the state of play.  So two questions perhaps to Prime
Minister Harper.

        First, how can we fine-tune our measures if we don't agree, completely
agree on what the situation is?  And, second, wouldn't it take some kind
of a Baker Commission in Iraq, so some kind of a group which provides us
with an accepted assessment on which we then can build our measures?

        Thank you.

        HARPER:  Well, we're all sovereign countries.  We're all going to have
our different takes.

        What I found interesting about the last NATO summit was it seemed to me
that the evaluations were more pessimistic from those countries that
were doing less rather than those countries that were in the more
difficult areas.

        I think -- if I were to assess the current situation, I think you would
find most people would agree with an assessment along these lines, that
we are making progress, but we have not yet made progress to the point
where the situation would be irreversible if we were suddenly out.

        And I think that's the situation.  Yes, we are making progress, but we
have not passed the tipping point where the cycle of security,
development and governance really has a momentum of its own.  And that's
something that we believe we can achieve in the years to come, not too
distant future, but we clearly have work to do to achieve that.

        DOUCET:  President Karzai, what would you define as success?

        KARZAI:  I guess we spoke about that earlier.  We need to continue and
keep adding to what we have achieved and complete the process.  That's
what it will take:  more time, continuation of effort.

        And we resemble a tree that has blossomed, and you have to wait for it
to give you the fruit.  The blossoming has arrived.  The fruit is yet to
come.  So wait for this summer, and you will have the fruits.

        HARPER:  Let me just add one thing, in terms of the area where I think
we have had the least success, where success, more success is critical,
and that is in the area of justice, in the rule of law.

        We tend, as Western nations, to put an enormous emphasis when we go
into failed states or destroyed states, as President Karzai would say,
an enormous emphasis on democracy, on creating elections, elected
officials, political parties, legislatures.  But I think there's a lot
of data out there to suggest that real long-run stability is probably
enhanced much more by the rule of law, per se, than by just democratic
institutions.

        And as President Karzai says, the police have been way behind the army.
  The court system is farther behind.  The training of judges, these are
the things that are really critical to secure good governance in the
country in the years to come.

        And I do believe it's a capacity problem more than anything.  We cannot
forget -- we have young Afghan students with us today -- we cannot
forget this is a country that had over a generation no educated people.
  All educated people left, and no new ones were created, and it's still
hard to pull educated people back, given our situation.

        So you have in technocratic and judicial and other functions, you have
an extremely small population to draw from to build up this capacity.
And that is the generational challenge.

        DOUCET:  Gentleman in the back?  This gentleman, yes.

        QUESTION:  Yes, I'm Steven Flannigan (ph) from the United States.  This
is a question both for the prime minister and the president.  Even some
of the discussion this afternoon I think has illustrated that, well,
NATO heads of state and government may agree on the rationale and goals
of the NATO presence there.  There does not seem to be still a clear
acceptance of a common strategy.

        In the run-up to the Defense Ministers meeting in Vilnius, Secretary
Gates raised some questions about whether or not some of the other
allies other than those in the south (ph) were fully committed to the
notion that this was a classic counterinsurgency mission, rather than a
robust peace-support mission.  There's the whole question about how NATO
strategy meshes with that of the Afghan National Army and the police.

        And I wonder, since Vilnius and even in the run-up now to the summit,
whether you gentlemen see any narrowing of differences over strategy and
whether, in addition to this agreement on the longer-term goals, there
is some narrowing of approach, including on this whole question -- now
that Ambassador Eide is in place -- on further advancement of this
so-called comprehensive approach?

        HARPER:  Well, I think there is some narrowing.  As the secretary
general said, there is at this conference, there's been the preparation
of a strategic document, a vision document, which I think will
ultimately be approved and released.  And I think we've made significant
ground on that.

        In terms of -- if I could just return indirectly to something that was
said earlier just relevant to your question, that's this whole notion of
two-tier, that some countries are pulling their weight and others are not.

        I think if there really has been one NATO failure in Afghanistan -- and
I'm supposing this, because this is before my time, 2001, 2002, 2003 --
it appears to me that early on NATO concluded the job was much easier
than it was actually going to be.

        We threw out the Taliban, we secured Kabul, and we established a very
nominal presence in the countryside.  And then it was only I think
really 2005 on that we fully grasped the nature of the security problem
and the problem that it would present in terms of developing governance
and other economic development.  And I think we were slow in
understanding that.

        Now, some nations -- Canada and others -- have put more into those
efforts than others.  But I think it's unfair to call it two-tier, in
the sense that we're saying that any other nations didn't do what they
initially committed to do.  You know, I think NATO allies have been
pretty good at fulfilling their commitments.

        The fact of the matter is that we all undercommitted and we all
underestimated the task, and we've been compensating ever since.  And so
I think that's the reality, but I do think that, broadly speaking, I
think we are narrowing the differences on what needs to be done.  And I
think there's an overwhelming view that the approach has to be
comprehensive, that what we termed the 3-D approach, Canadians termed
the 3-D approach some years ago, would now be widely accepted as gospel.

        DOUCET:  We're coming to a close soon.  The gentleman there and the
gentleman here, as well, take two.  And then we'll...

        KENNEDY:  There's a lady asking for a question.

        QUESTION:  Thank you.  My name is Kyo Komoto (ph), and I'm from Japan.
  I have a question for President Karzai.

        Our military contribution to Afghanistan has been so far modest,
limited to sending just two ships to the Indian Ocean as a part of OEF.
  But there is a widespread recognition that we have to do much, much
more on land, especially in the field of economic reconstruction.  But
sometimes our policymakers lose track of economic priorities in
Afghanistan, should it be agriculture, medication, education, demining.

        Well, Mr. President, can you share us your present thought today as to
how you envision your roadmap to your economic recovery?  Thank you.

        DOUCET:  OK.  We're going to take another question first here.  A
microphone down here, please.

        And then a lady, as well.

        I think we've done quite a bit on the economic side, but we'll let the
president address that about the Japanese contribution, I understand, yes.

        KARZAI:  I'd like to address the Japanese contribution.

        DOUCET:  Yes, yes.

        QUESTION:  My name is Misha Glenny.  I've just published a book called
"McMafia: Crime Without Frontiers," which looks at the nexus between
conflict and the narcotics trade in a number of places, including
Afghanistan.

        The war on drugs is one which invests in poppy a value which is
astronomical compared to commodities which operate in legal markets.
One of the reasons why we have been having such difficulty militarily
since 2003 is because the Taliban has gathered a huge revenue stream,
almost exclusively from the sale of narcotics.  This is hundreds of
millions of dollars every year which are being used to kill NATO
servicemen and women.

        And I wonder -- and I address this in particular to Prime Minister
Harper -- whether we will start to address the issue of a demand-driven
economy in narcotics which our law enforcement agencies in the West are
completely unable to control?  Because at the moment, the Taliban -- and
I know this from conversations with them and their narcotics
distributors -- are the biggest backers of the war on drugs.

        DOUCET:  And just -- that's a very complex -- would you just pass the
microphone along to this lady here with the blue?  Yes.

        QUESTION:  Hi, my name is Adina Postanico (ph), and I am an independent
consultant from Romania.  I have two questions for President Karzai.

        Mr. President, it's a very straightforward question, and kind of with a
personal touch.  When you look back at the things that have been -- that
you personally and your country has been going through in the last six
years, what is your worst fear when you think about the future of your
country?

        And the second question is, I would like to hear more about your
efforts and the resources that you are putting in the state-building
process?  Thank you very much.

        DOUCET:  OK, Japanese first.

        KARZAI:  I'd like to address the Japanese and, Prime Minister Harper,
you'll take the narcotics one.  OK.

        Sir, with regard to Japan's contribution to Afghanistan, Japan is in
the front line of the countries helping Afghanistan financially, in
addition to the maritime shipping assistance that you're giving to the
NATO forces.

        Japan has also been involved in the GDR process (ph).  That's the
collection of illegal arms from armed groups.  Now it's working on
another part of this process.

        Yesterday, as a matter of fact, before flying towards Bucharest, I
visited the airport in Kabul that Japan is building for us, a very nice
one, that will have the capacity of receiving, handling almost a million
passengers a year.  Japan is involved in schools; Japan is involved in
construction of roads; Japan is involved in construction of other
assistance to Afghanistan.

        Afghanistan's priorities today are the same as they were six years ago,
with one addition of emphasis today on irrigation, agriculture, and the
provision of energy, electricity to the Afghan people.

        DOUCET:  OK, sir?

        HARPER:  I'll just talk quickly on the nexus of the insurgency and the
drug trade, which I agree is a serious and growing problem.  But I also
would put in this context:  I think it's a problem likely to be with us
for some time.

        You know, where we have drug trades and insurgencies linked to drug
trades in other parts of the world, we've seen that's a persistent
phenomenon, one that in and of itself need not lead to a failed state or
a kind of state that backs terrorism.

        And I do think that -- and I'm not trying to say it's a silver lining,
but I do think it's significant to see the evolution of the insurgency
from an ideologically inspired terrorist insurgency to one that is
increasingly a commercial or narcotic-based insurgency.  Still
problematic, but, in the sense of the global strategic issues that led
us to Afghanistan, actually an improvement over the situation.

        Now, I would agree with what you seem to assert in your question, that
ultimately the problem is not in Afghanistan as much as the problem is
elsewhere, in terms of the demand.  You know, I'm a believer that
anti-drug strategies have to address both the supply and the demand.

        And I don't think you can address it only through demand-based
strategies.  I think part of the reason you have high prices for drugs
and such violent economics around drugs is the nature of addiction
itself and the nature of the demand that creates.

        But that said, we have to have both strategies.  A pure war on the
supply of drugs is not and will not be successful, so we have to have
demand strategies.

        And that goes beyond -- I've spoken about this before in Canada.  I
think that goes beyond merely discouraging the use of drugs or pointing
out the bad use of drugs.  I think it is to some degree still part of an
element of our culture, from the '60s on, that has glorified or
romanticized the use of drugs.

        And it's still very prevalent, less so than it was maybe 20 or 30 years
ago, but one that still nevertheless exists.  It still nevertheless is
very prevalent in youth culture and one that I think we should take
seriously.

        KARZAI:  Ma'am, my worst fear is leaving the job half-done.  That
applies to both the international community and Afghanistan and not
bringing to the Afghan people justice as they expected and allowing
extremists and terrorists to continue without a firm, committed struggle
against them by all of us, including the neighbors of Afghanistan.

        These concerns addressed, we'll be on a very safe journey to a better
future in Afghanistan.

        DOUCET:  Well, on that note, a positive note -- I know the press has
got a very bad reputation, from all the criticisms in this panel -- but
perhaps it is in the nature of the whole mission in Afghanistan that
there is a true division of opinion.

        To use that well-worn cliche, for some people, it's a glass half-empty.
  For other people, it is a glass half-full.  And some, of course, would
say, "Well, just kick the table over that the glass is on, because we
need a whole new glass in order to look at this.  We need a new strategy."

        I think what is absolutely clear to our participants and to all of you
here in the room is that it's undeniable that Afghanistan is a different
place than it was in 2001 when the Taliban were toppled.  It is also
undeniably clear that there is a lot of work to be done and not only is
it clear to the international community and to the Afghans that it is
perhaps far more complicated and dangerous than people thought in 2001,
but in some areas it's going ahead, and in some areas it's slipping again.

        And, therefore, the relationships both among Afghans, the relationship
between the international community and Afghanistan, and the
relationship that has been discussed here and will be discussed, of
course, at the NATO summit, the relationship between the military and
the civilian and other actors is absolutely crucial, as well.

        So the debate will have to continue.  We started off by asking,
"Success is not in sight, failure is not an option."  Perhaps we'll
still go away with that article of faith.  But, of course, the debate
will go on.

        Thank you very much for joining us here.

        (APPLAUSE)

        Mr. President, it's a pleasure.

        KENNEDY:  And I want to thank our two panelists.  President Karzai,
great to have you here.

        Prime Minister Harper, wonderful.

        I want to make a special thanks to Chatham House.  They've done a lot
of good things for us as part of this partnership.  But giving us a
terrific new moderator to use is a really special treat.  And thank you
so much.  That was really a great...

        (APPLAUSE)

        DOUCET:  Yes.  Actually...

        KENNEDY:  OK, so we're going to take a coffee break downstairs.  Come
on back at about 4:15 or so, and we're going to talk about Article 5.
Thank you.