THE BUCHAREST CONFERENCE - Arms Control Endangered: The Future of Missile Defense
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CRAIG KENNEDY, PRESIDENT, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND: Good morning. I want
to welcome you all back to this final day of the Bucharest conference.
We hope you had a very enjoyable and early evening. Well, we hope
you had a very enjoyable evening. I know there were some very rich
discussions going on, gee, still at 2.33 a.m. in the morning. But,
the good thing is that everybody that I saw part of those discussions
showed up this morning, so that's a positive sign. What we want to do
today before we start this first session is to begin today the way the
Secretary General began the summit this morning by standing and just a
moment of silence for soldiers and civilians who died in the past year
for the cause of peace and freedom.
Thank you. Now, we are going to have a terrific session. We have got
a new fill-in moderator, Mr. Fidler from the Financial Times, and I am
going to turn it over to you to set the stage today.
STEPHEN FIDLER, FINANCIAL TIMES: Thank you very much. The session
since you here, as you probably know, is entitled ArmsControl
((inaudible)) future of missile defense and the CFE Treaty. Missile
defense, as you know, has quite a history, a descendent in many ways
of the discussions we are having today in some ways is descending from
Ronald Reagan's Star Wars project. The issue of missile defense was
included in ((inaudible)) contract for America in the mid-1990s and I
asked him about that a few years ago, "Why he included it in the
contract for America?" And what he said was, "This is something we
Republicans think of, we want scientists and technologies to defend
America rather than lawyers, so if a few treaties have to go, so what,
the scientists and technologists and are going to do the job." And I
think it became something of an article of faith for Republicans and
the Republicans who came into the Bush Administration certainly. And
I suppose one of the questions that I have is, particularly with
Presidential elections going on now, to what extent is it a national
project or is it still a Republican project. Now, with two new – with
the prospect of a new President or certainty of a new President in the
White House and the prospect of Democratic President in the White
House next year, to what extent is this missile defense, the emphasis
that we have seen, to what extent is it going to continue under
Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama?
A few years ago, also the discussion was relating to the ABM Treaty
and the Bush Administration walked away from the ABM Treaty, and the
idea which was often called a cornerstone of strategic stability, and
it seemed for a while, after they walked away from it, that nothing
happened. But, in the last year or so, have we seen the other shoe
drop? Have we seen in the suspension by the Russians of the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, have we seen, if you like, a
consequence of ABM, and discussion about the INF Treaty as well. For
years also, there has been skepticism about whether missile defense
would work, the technology famously described as a bullet hitting a
bullet. How far has it advanced in the last few years? How reliable
will it be? What have we got for the agreement, for the ABM treaty
that has been – that is torn up? How many here in the audience are
convinced that the system technologically is capable, that it will
work? Could I ask you to raise your hands if you think it is
technologically a capable system?
And how many, OK, and how many are skeptical of the system, think
technologically it is a very – it is not going to work? Well, that's
completely indecisive. I think there is probably 50/50. But, as you
know, the latest discussions are centered around the negotiations with
the Poland – with Poland and Czech Republic, Poland to replace – to
place – for the U.S. to place ten missile interceptors into Poland and
a high-technology X-band radar into the Czech Republic. What are the
issues around these facilities? What do they raise for the two
countries and what about public opinion there? What are the issues
too that remain to be negotiated? Also at some point in the last two
years, it seems to me the system that seemed to be conceived for U.S.
defense is now being talked off – seems to have migrated to become one
of a defense of NATO, what was behind that? Why has that been done?
Was it a diplomatic convenience or is it something more fundamental
there? And what does it mean in practical terms? How is the system
going to be integrated into the theater system that would be needed to
defend Turkey and parts of the Balkans? And does the rest of NATO
really agree with this?
The European allies, do they agree with it? And more to the point,
will they still agree that it is a good idea if they are asked to pay
for part of it? And the Russian, I mean, why should they worry? Ten
interceptors in Poland, how much of a difference can that really make
for the Russian strategic arsenal? Mr. Putin has offered the use of
Russian facilities in Azerbaijan and in Southern Russia, but was it a
genuine offer or a diplomatic gambit? And now, U.S. officials say,
"Russian facilities actually can be useful and incorporated fully into
this system." But, do we believe it will ever be?
Finally, can Russia be reassured. U.S. officials are trying to
address three issues, I am told, three technical issues, one is
concerning the number of interceptors, is there a way to reach an
agreement about whether the number of interceptors can be capped or at
ten or whether there should be discussions about if they should
increase beyond ten, or issues related to the direction of the –
directions of the facility. I mean, can the Russians be reassured
into believing that the facility is not directed towards them and
instead directed towards the perceived threats in Iran? And what
about the threat, how can they sort of reach agreement on the nature
of the threat and discussions of the threat? Russia seems to send
contradictory signals about that, about its views on the threat, so
where are we?
And finally, before I go move to the panel which we are here for, can
all this be made and to fit into some kind of strategic agreement,
such that one we expect President Bush and President Putin to discuss
in Sochi. Can the CFE be resurrected and what issues must be brought
into that? And what about a replacement for START, will that happen?
So, that's a very broad introduction enough of me, but I just would
like now to bring in the panel and to start with J.D. Crouch. J.D.
Crouch is now a Senior Scholar at the National Institute for Public
Policy, having formerly been Deputy National Security Advisor to
President Bush. I would like to ask you to start off with, so what –
the question I started with earlier, to what extent is missile defense
now a national project in the U.S., to what extent will it continue to
be an important issue even if Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama become
President.
J.D. CROUCH II, SENIOR SCHOLAR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY:
Well, if national – you mean by national and a political setting, I
think – I thought very interesting that Congresswoman Tauscher's
comments earlier in this forum, where she talked about the need to
deploy missile defense to NATO, talked about her concepts for
NATO-ising the third site concept, which the Bush administration has
put forward. And in fact, I think you find on both sides of the
aisles, appropriators up in Congress as well as authorizes, a lot of
support for missile defense. And to look at last year's budget, which
was passed by Democratic majorities in the Congress.
Now, I know that any new administration is going to come in and take a
look at projects and they are going to – but I think this particular
project that is to say the Poland deployment and the Czech Republic
deployments, I think, have got not unanimous, but bipartisan support.
Again, I haven't talked to them directly, but I saw Tony Lake quoted
in the press, the advisor to Barack Obama, saying that they support
the third site.
So, I think there is sufficient momentum behind this concept for it to
move forward, whether or not it would continue in this vein beyond
this initial deployment, I think, would be open to questions.
FIDLER: OK, thank you. ((inaudible)) Eckart von Klaeden, who is a
member of the Bundestag and foreign policy speaker of the CDU/CSU
parliamentary group. Is missile defense something that Germany really
believes has value, is it something that is valuable enough for the
German government to pay for, should it be asked to do that, and is it
worth upsetting Russia to do?
ECKART VON KLAEDEN, MEMBER, DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: It is my personal
view that this program is necessary and it remains as a national
program because then the alliance don't has to contribute and the main
misunderstanding of those who oppose this system is only in my
assessment is that they think the system, the national means something
under the alliance. And I think here we have to see that national
means also global, because we have said states have security
guarantees not only for Europe but also for other areas, for instance,
in Asia. And a country like Japan, I think, would be nuclear state
now if it wouldn't be under the nuclear umbrella of United States.
So, in that way, national means global.
And the second thing is, we underestimated the threat coming with the
proliferation of missile programs. We focused regarding Iran on the
enrichment program ((inaudible)) program, but not enough on the
missile program. And so, I think there is an upcoming threat we have
to be prepared for. And there are some quotes by Ahmadinejad where he
announces for a possible conflict between Iran and Israel. He wants
to take European states as hostages. And so, we still have from him
these quotes and so we have to be prepared for.
And regarding Russia, at the end, I think we share the same threats,
and regarding Iran, we share the same security and so, I think it is
in our common interest and this is also the idea of our common
engagement in the United Nations to be prepared for nuclear Iran even
if we say that we don't want a military solution of the Iranian
problem, we have to think about a Plan B and then a missile defense
program that has to be a part of this.
FIDLER: And you think deterrents in the conventional sense in the way
is not something that you can do with Iran, I mean, deterrents is it
would be ineffective with Iran, well, is it really an irrational
power, would it not be sort of susceptible to conventional deterrents?
KLAEDEN: I think deterrents wouldn't workout this missile defense
program. And so, if you can take European states hostage and you
limit the ability, for instance, of the United States to defend Israel
or you limit the ability of the European states to give missile
defense weapons to Israel, we had such a situation in the Second Gulf
War, when Iraq attached Kuwait and the alliance – the international
alliance liberated Kuwait. Then, Germany (ph), we sent Patriot
missiles to Israel to defend Israel from Iraqi missiles. And so, if
we have the same situation in the Iranian-Israelian conflict, then of
course Iran could say, defending Israel in that way is a hostile act
against Iran, and so we are also part of this conflict. And so,
deterrents just works if you have also this missile defense program.
FIDLER: OK, because the Patriot missile system necessarily work
terribly well when it was deployed in the Negev. But, --
KLAEDEN: But, that's the point, isn't it? I mean, the point is, is
that if you have – you increase your deterrent capability by being
able to deny the other guy the ability to attack you with the missile
defense. But, if deterrents fails nonetheless, you then have some
defensive capability against it. And you also – you give the alliance
a choice of being able to do things short of offensive retaliation,
which is not going to be a very attractive proposition vis-à-vis Iran.
FIDLER: Bogdan Klich is the Minister of National Defense of Poland.
Agreements between Poland and the U.S. seems close now. What are the
outstanding issues and what is the state of public opinion in Poland
relating to the site of the interceptors? And is there public concern
about Poland becoming a target because of these facilities?
BOGDAN KLICH, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, REP. OF POLAND: First of
all, I wouldn't say that we are close to the final agreement. We are
during the negotiations, we shall see what will be the result of those
negotiations, and right now, it is difficult to predict what will be
the conclusion of our talks with our allies, with Americans. But,
basically, I would say that public opinion in my country would support
the final positive agreement with the American side because of the
feeling of insecurity.
It means that, in my country, there is an impression that the process
of – the enlargement of the Western Hemisphere, I would say, not only
alliance of the European Union, but Western Hemisphere and embracing
Central Europe should be concluded. And the right conclusion of that
process it is to institutionalize the presence of international
organizations, but also installations of our allies in – on the
territories of Central European countries.
And with – from this perspective, we are looking at the positive
results of American proposals. So, this is the value of this proposal
to make installations of the site in our country.
FIDLER: And can I ask the same question to Alexander Vondra, Deputy
Prime Minister of European Affairs, The Czech Republic? So, I am
going to question, how close is the agreement with the U.S., what
issues remain and how supportive is public opinion, is it worried
about the targeting issue?
ALEXANDER VONDRA, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, THE CZECH REPUBLIC: First of
all, we are, let's say, more advanced in our negotiations with the
United States, so we just will make some announcements right today in
Bucharest. So, the Czech delegation is meeting United States
Secretary of State, Condi Rice, to make an announcement that on the
main agreement we have concluded the talks and that the agreement is
prepared to be signed. It's a matter of weeks, maybe early May.
So, why we are doing that? It's simple. It is because, and I think
we must tell this here in Bucharest, we simply believe in NATO. We
are convinced that the Transatlantic ((inaudible)) must remain strong
and you were asking about the situation in the United States, and I am
far from interfering in that. But, I was the Czech Ambassador in
Washington from '97 to 2001, and remember well that it was Bill
Clinton, not George W. Bush who signed the law on the missile defense
in the present.
FIDLER: Under pressure from the Republican Congress.
VONDRA: But, the U.S. President signed. But, it was a national
brochure and I think what is really important is, to extend this
national umbrella to become the transatlantic umbrella. I understand
NATO is a marriage, marriage between the United States and Europe, and
if you have a rainy weather, and we all agree that there is a real
threat by ballistic missile. So, if there is a danger of the rainy
weather and if husband goes with the umbrella, if wife does not have
an umbrella, I think you would have divorce very soon. So, but I am
convinced and that's why the Czechs and Poles I guess too are going in
favor of that. It's that we believe that both Europe and the U.S.
must be protected that umbrella.
FIDLER: Let's not go too far into that matter at all. But, can I
bring in now Konstantin Kosachev, Member of the Russian State Duma and
Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Duma. Simple
question to start with for you. Can Russia's fears about the missile
defense system be assuaged? Can Russia be reconciled to it? And what
will that require?
KONSTANTIN KOSACHEV, MEMBER, RUSSIAN STATE DUMA, CHAIRMAN, INTL.
AFFAIR COMMITTEE: Well, first of all, I would like to stress that I
definitely agree with my colleague and friend. We do share threats
and challenges, and this is why Russia opposes the idea of developing
a defense system without cooperation with Russia. As far as I can
see, right now, Russia is the only country with ballistic missiles
within the reach of this missile system. So to start to develop that
system without any consultations with Russia, without any attempts to
reach an agreement in advance, is of course a matter of great concern
for us because with START, Putin is asking questions, what is it all
about. Secondly, to my mind, I think that this is a replica, kind of
a repeat situation, is a replica of a formula which existed when NATO
was established. You remember, to keep Americans in, to keep Russians
out and keep Germany down – Soviet at that time, Soviet, OK. But,
this time, it is more or less the same, because it is again about keep
America in, to keep Russia out and sorry to ((inaudible)) to keep the
European Union out because when Alexander speaks about believing in
NATO it is not a NATO project, it was a bilateral project between the
United States and the Czech Republic, between the United States and
Poland, without any consultation with NATO, for the second time. The
first time was about the secret detention centers in Europe; the
second time is about the missile systems. And now, answer for – on
your question. We have a maximum and a minimum program, the maximum
program for us is of course to create some common system which would
defend us all against the challenges and threats, and we are ready to
participate in that system, and Mr. Putin's proposal about Gabala was
our contribution to that possible development. And as far as I
understand, right now, it is not possible because United States still
continue to make bilateral agreements with Poland and the Czech
Republic. The minimum program is to be assured that the developing,
this system which is under development can, in technological terms,
can never be used against Russia. As far as I understand, this kind
of agreement is rather close and I might tell you quite frankly that
the agreement became possible thanks to a great extent to our Polish
friends here, the government in Poland, the new government in Poland
acted in a much more constructive way than the previous government and
unfortunately, we could not use the same good assistance from our
friends in the Czech Republic. But, Mr. Donald Tusk personally did
play a very significant role in making some slight progress in our
talks with Americans.
FIDLER: But, what I don't quite understand is why the – you seem to
saying that the agreement with the Czech Republic – between the Czech
Republic and the U.S. would somehow stand in the way of a kind of
mutual system that would include Russia and the U.S. Is that – am I…
KOSACHEV: Not the agreement itself, but the format when the United
States deploy their own system and just invite us, Russians, to be
there and to serve that system, it will never function like the NATO
duration in Afghanistan, without involvement of other countries like
China, like Russia, like some other countries, it does not function.
So, either we create something, some new construction, which will be
equally comfortable for all participants and in that way become
efficient or we will keep us to those old-fashioned cold war variance
of behavior.
FIDLER: I am going to bring the audience in very shortly. I just
want to – you wanted to come in, J.D. Crouch?
CROUCH: I think a couple of things that was said are not exactly
right. I mean, first of all, NATO has been consulted and this has
been discussed in NATO councils for many years. I personally briefed
policy directors on this, at the outset of this.
KOSACHEV: ... ballistic missiles within the range of these
missile system. So to start to develop that system result in a
consultations with Russia without any attempts to reach an agreement in
advance is of course a matter of great concern for us, because we start
putting -- asking questions. What is it all about?
Secondly, to my mind, I think that this is a replica kind of --
this situation is a replica of a formula which existed when NATO was
established, you remember, to keep Americans in, to keep Russians out,
and to keep Germany down -- Soviet at that time, Soviets. OK.
But this time, it is more or less the same, because it's again
about keep America in, to keep Russia out, and sorry to put it that way,
to keep European Union out; because when Alexander speaks about
believing in NATO, it is not a NATO project. It was a bilateral
project between the United States and the Czech Republic, between the
United States and Poland, without any consultation with NATO for the
second time. The first time was about the secret detention centers in
Europe. The second time is about the missile systems.
And now answer on your question (inaudible) maximum and the
minimum program. The maximum program for us is, of course, to create
some common system which would defend us all against new challenges and
threats. And we are ready to participate in that system and Mr.
Putin's proposal about Gabala was our contribution to that possible
development. And as far as I understand, right now, it is not
possible, because the United States still continue to make bilateral
agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic.
The minimum program is to be assured that developing this system,
which is under development, in technological terms, can never be used
against Russia. And as far as I understand, this kind of agreement is
rather close.
And I might tell you quite frankly that the agreement became
possible thanks to great extent to our Polish friends here, the
government in Poland. The new government in Poland acted in a much
more constructive way than the previous government. And unfortunately,
we could not use the same good assistance from our friends in the Czech
Republic. But Mr. Donald Tusk personally did play a very significant
role in making some slight progress in our talks with Americans.
FIDLER: But what I don't quite understand is why the -- you
seem to be saying that the agreement between the Czech Republic and the
U.S. would somehow stand in the way of a kind of mutual system that
would include Russia and the U.S. Is that -- am I --
KOSACHEV: Not the agreement itself, but the format. When the
United States deploy their own system and just invite us Russians to be
there and to observe the system. It will never function, like the NATO
duration in Afghanistan, without involvement of other countries -- like
China, like Russia, like some other countries -- it does not function.
So either we create some new construction which will be equally
comfortable for all participants, and in that way become efficient; or
we will keep us to those old-fashioned Cold War variants of behavior.
FIDLER: I'm going to bring the audience in very shortly. You
wanted to come in, J.D. Crouch.
CROUCH: I think a couple things that were said are not exactly
right. I mean, first of all, NATO has been consulted. And this has
been discussed in NATO councils for many years. I personally briefed
policy directors on this at the outset of this.
I also happen to know, since I was personally involved in it,
that we have briefed the Russian Federation on this project over a
number of years. Indeed, in trying to stimulate missile defense
cooperation with Russia, which this administration is seriously
dedicated to, you know, the notion of this radar down in Azerbaijan is
something that had been put on the table again many years ago by the
Russians, which we tried to follow up on and still have interest in
trying to get incorporated into the system.
And then finally, the point that the placement of these missiles
is designed to counter Russian missiles is just technically not
accurate. I mean, you would never want to put missiles that close,
because just the kinematics of it are very clear, that you get into a
tail chase very quickly, you would have to make launch decisions so
rapidly. And indeed, if you put a missile defense system further back,
it would have more capability against Russian systems; although I
dismiss this anyway, because we're talking about ten interceptors
against a Russian missile force that has about 2,000 warheads.
FIDLER: Right. Now, your turn. Kept the audience out too
long. Please put your hand up and let's have some questions.
(UNKNOWN): (inaudible)
FIDLER: Well, let me chair it. Sir.
(UNKNOWN): Hans Binnendijk from the National Defense
University. I think there are two facts that most of us would agree
upon. One is that the Iranian threat is growing. We might disagree
on the pace. But we would agree that there is a threat growing, and
that NATO has to do something about it. And I think secondly, we would
all agree that the proposed third site, as it currently reads, is in no
way a threat to Russia.
So why all the fuss? Well, it seems to me there are two
factors. And both of these could be settled here in the next week, or
at least progress to be made in the next week. The first has to do
with the breakdown of, or the lack of success in the consultations with
Russia. J.D.'s right. They've been working on it. Russia has
chosen to be difficult on it. And the second that bothers me the most
is that the United States has found itself in the position here of being
the demander for a defense that is designed for Europe. And why is
that the case?
We are in a position where we are going to -- with regard to
Poland, Poland is concerned about the security that might diminish as a
result of this for Poland. So the United States finds itself in a
position where we will be paying twice for this: once for the missile
defenses themselves, and then secondly to help support Poland as part of
the deal.
Now, that's why I think Congresswoman Tauscher's proposal has
been so important. If we can NATO-ize this concept, and the United
States is no longer the demander, but there is a common understanding, I
think -- and that is what I hope will come from this summit, then I
think we can begin to put this concern behind us.
FIDLER: Mr. von Klaeden, would you like to address it?
VON KLAEDEN: Yes. I think the idea to link this program with
the NATO programs is the correct way. And my concern is that if you
make the whole program a NATO program, then you will have -- then the
debate will raise about the costs and the technological probability
whether it works or not. So I think the way we are all now to link
this in NATO with the two other NATO programs, and also to talk with
Russia in the NATO-Russian council and to a common solution is the
correct way.
And I have some -- my personal judgment is that one mistake was
made towards Russia. I said the best model to deal with Russia
regarding common security is, first of all, to try to come with them to
a common threat analysis. The second step would be to develop with
them common solutions and to encourage them to take over own
responsibility. And if these two things not work, of course, then we
have to make clear that we cannot let our own interest vetoed by Russia
if these are rival interests.
But here, my impression is that the United States and the allies
first of all made an own analysis, then an own concept, and then
consultated Russia. And I think for coming models, we have to first of
all try to come with them to a common analysis. This is not a reason
against this program as I said before. But it should show us how we
can deal better with Russia than maybe we did here.
FIDLER: Thank you. Mr. Kosachev and then (inaudible)
(CROSSTALK)
KOSACHEV: Thank you very much for these comments. I
definitely believe that yes, we do not have any contradictions which we
cannot overcome. And in case, initially, the debate, the discussion is
being arranged (inaudible), Russia is definitely a partner in that
situation. But to brief Russia, like you put it, to brief NATO is not
enough. You should have a dialogue, not just a briefing.
Just recall the situation with Russian heavy bombers aircrafts
suddenly starting to fly over some other areas in the world. Our
perception -- initially, and still is -- look, they do not threaten
anybody. This is just about training the pilots. The bombers do not
have any weapons on board. It does not create a threat to anybody.
What is the reaction from the United States, from NATO?
Everybody is extremely concerned. How come? Russians have their
heavy bombers somewhere in the air. It is definitely a threat. We
should not listen to Russians. We shall act in order to protect
ourselves against that hypothetic threat. And this is exactly the way
Russia behaves right now in military terms. Ten or 20 interceptors do
not create any military threat towards Russian military potential, yes.
But first, again, we do not have a proper explanation of that
project, because we still think it is absolutely inefficient. And
secondly, this project may be modernized rather easily. And in that
case, may create a threat towards Russia theoretically in the future.
And this is why we try to avoid such a complication at the initial state
and to make an agreement on what is going on. Thank you.
FIDLER: Mr. Vondra.
VONDRA: I think that, first of all, they are really in favor of
NATO-ization of domicile defense projects. So I think here, we are in
full agreement. And I believe that this summit will be an important
step forward, because once you will read the communique. So there
first, there is a clear statement of the acknowledgement of domicile
defense threats.
Second, there is a clear recognition that this European
(inaudible) -- what means the future installation in my country as well
as in Poland if agreed -- that they will be the substantial contribution
to the protection of all NATO allies. The third, that something more
has to be done to fill certain windows which are still in southeastern
Europe. So the NATO will play even more substantial role, I believe.
And of course, it's about engaging Russia into system. And here
I think, look, we have a very rational debate. I think it's not -- you
know, one thing is occasionally exchange before the public. But I
think that the talks which we lead and we offer the Russians, I think,
enough guarantees to have the insight regarding the radar, that they
would be assured by physical inspections that the specialist is not
directed against them. I think we will move ahead. And this whole
debate would be finished.
FIDLER: Thank you. Can I go back to you later, Mr.
(inaudible)? And I'd like to bring in the audience again please.
LUCAS: Yes, it's Edward Lucas from the Economist. I do think
there's a bit of a paradox here. And I'd like to president Mr.
Kosachev a little bit further on it; that if this was to be used against
Russia, it wouldn't be built in Poland and the Czech Republic. It
would be built in Northern Norway or in Iceland or somewhere like that.
So isn't the real point about Russia's objection not the
technology, but the topography; because this is in a -- these are in
former Communist countries, former Warsaw Pact countries. Isn't that
the real Russian objection? And it's seen as some kind of breach of
some undertaking that was given in the last '80s about NATO expansion.
Isn't that what you're really worried about?
KOSACHEV: Shall I (inaudible)
(CROSSTALK)
FIDLER: Yes, please go ahead.
KOSACHEV: No, it's (inaudible)
(CROSSTALK)
FIDLER: Sorry, there are some follow ups here. Let's -- can
we come here please? Excuse me?
DROSS (ph): Bill Dross.
FIDLER: Yes.
DROSS (ph): Just to amplify that last point, isn't the real
purpose to provide some symbolic commitment to reinforce Article 5
rather than provide, you know, genuine missile defense? I think this
is what the Czech's have been looking for in the absence of any allied
troops on the ground. And I'd like also to hear from Mr. Kosachev,
isn't this one of the real fears; because certainly your scientists know
that it doesn't pose any serious threat to your country?
(UNKNOWN): Henri Kartoska (ph) from Poland. I also want to
amplify the last two questions and direct it to Mr. Kosachev. You are
objecting these ten American missiles in Poland as some unknown threat.
On the other hand, at this very time, several west European navies
are arming their warships with standard SM-2 missiles, which have strong
anti-ballistic missile capability -- tested and developed even farther.
And you don't object that. Why?
FIDLER: There's just a gentleman here would like to ask in the
similar field.
PASCO (ph): Ron Pasco (ph), Rumania. Two things - I would
have expected that you protest the reconciliation by the U.S. to the ABM
treaty more than you protest to this ten projectiles. So maybe you
did. But that was not that public as it is this one. If you have 11
missiles, you beat the system. And I believe you have 11 missiles.
So technically speaking, I think that there is something else which is
rather political in this game. So I would like to find out what is the
political motivation of your resistance, if you can tell us.
Secondly, I can't understand, you know, how a defensive system is
perceived as a security threat to your country, unless you have
offensive intentions. Otherwise, I don't see it. Thank you very much.
FIDLER: I think most of these subjects are directed to you, Mr.
(inaudible)
KOSACHEV: Well, I will start from the last. We did protest
against the United States decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty.
And it was an extremely hot debate in Russia. And our reaction was
extremely hard.
Secondly, the strategic balance of powers is, for quite obvious
reasons, an interrelation between the offensive capability and defensive
capability. And in case have too much of defensive capability, the
offensive one is to be strengthened, just to keep the balance alive.
That's quite simple. This is why we try to keep the defensive
potential as low as possible, not to be provoked to develop our
offensive systems, which both us and the United States still do have,
unfortunately.
On the other issues, I definitely reject any theories about us
protesting against the missile system for the reason they are being
deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic. It's not about politics.
It's about geography, because our military experts -- and we do have
military experts -- they keep telling us politicians that, in technical
terms, the deployment of these systems in Poland, in the Czech Republic
is completely -- it does not have any logic. Again, in technical,
military terms, they may accept deployment somewhere else, in Turkey, in
some other southern parts of Europe; but not in central Europe, because
the threats do not go over Poland and the Czech Republic.
And this is why. It's not about the number of interceptors.
This is not about any threat being created by that project. It's about
undermining mutual confidence and trust. In case our American partners
keep telling us during a bilateral summit, GA summits, everywhere, that
we are partners. We do not threaten each other any longer. We should
cooperate and simultaneously do something else which do not have
technological explanation in the eyes of our military experts. Then we
have to react on that somehow.
And I feel very sorry about that, because we are ready for that
cooperation and partnership with the United States. We are ready.
And we are somehow trapped. We are now limited in our possibilities to
make progress in that cooperation, because Russian public opinion is
right now rather anti-American for the reason we do not have three (ph)
people who maybe have some better understanding of what is going on.
We do not have enough arguments to put forward for our public opinion
why we should have better cooperation with the United States.
And my last point, the way it was done. It was a very
provocative way of doing it, provoking tensions, provoking Russia's
reaction on that. My theory, that one of parts of that behavior was to
influence public opinion in Poland and the Czech Republic, which
initially was against these deployments. But now, when we have the
Russian factor, and Russia behaves somehow strange in eyes of many
people, look, we have to deploy those systems for the reason Russians
behave that way. So this is one of my theories that it was done
initially for the purpose to bring in that Russian factor and to
frighten people in these two countries to make them support the project.
FIDLER: That does raise a question whether Russian behavior
always redounds to Russia's own benefit. But Mr. Klich.
KLICH: (Inaudible) the member of the Russian State Duma.
FIDLER: No, no, nothing like that.
KLICH: I do understand. I do appreciate very much what you
said about geography. In this case, geography is politics. In your
approach to installations of the missile defense system in Poland and
Czech Republic, you are using geographical terms for political reasons.
It means that -- and this is a...
KOSACHEV (?): United States.
KLICH: This is a result, you know, of those documents that are
still in force of the Russian foreign and security policy. I mean, the
security concept from the year 2000 as well as the military doctrine, in
which Russian Federal perceives the threats, especially in the
enlargement or expansion of Western Hemisphere to the borders of Russia.
So from that point of view, I understand what you said -- that
geography determines your political approach to such initiatives, such
projects like missile defense from the military point of view; from the
political point of view as well, from our side, from our central
European perception. From the technical point of view, those
installations, I mean the site and the radar, are not the threat for
Russian Federation. I don't understand how long this geographical
perception can determine your political choices.
FIDLER: Can I -- the other panelists want to come in. But I
just want to bring in a few more audience members. And I will come to
you. Gentleman here with the --
(UNKNOWN): (Inaudible) democratic policies, Lithuania. This
is a question to Mr. Kosachev. I like your pattern of thought, as the
Russian, sort of, punch line goes. And the arguments that...
(UNKNOWN): Could you keep a little bit away from the mouth,
because it does not sound so good.
(UNKNOWN): Does that sound right now?
(UNKNOWN): It's better.
(UNKNOWN): It's better.
(UNKNOWN): The argument that anti-missile defense sites
constitute an act of implicit aggression against Russia, because Russia
is at the moment the only state which has ballistic missiles within the
region of these sites, reminds me slightly of Emperor Caligula, who
learning that his brother was taking antidotes, exclaimed, "What,
antidotes against the emperor?"
But it's also a part of why the pattern of thought where Russia
is offering itself as a solution to collective security structures where
it is actually, sort of -- well, created the problem. And when you
were saying that NATO's involvement in Afghanistan is in a way
unpardonable, because it doesn't involve Russia, that does tend to
overlook slightly that actually it was Russia that created the problem
in the first place by destroying the state.
And is that not a kind of reductio ad absurdum of this pattern of
line of thought? Thank you.
FIDLER: I'd like to bring an audience member over here.
IONESCU (ph): My name is Ionescu. I am working for the
Romanian MOD. Well, I wouldn't like to press more, Mr. Kosachev. But
I would like to connect some information, like for example your offer of
these radar in Azerbaijan, or some other installations in southern
Russia. I am ignorant and perhaps even yourself, you wouldn't know
about it.
But my question is is there similar installation like this
missile shield in southern Russia or eastern Russia, or somewhere in
Ukraine or Georgia or southern Caucasus; because such kind of issues,
like the folders (ph) which are connected by yourself with this occasion
in the present days between MAP for Georgia and Ukraine, missile shield
and so on. It seems like connected by yourself an entire policy of
facing the NATO enlargement in the West.
FIDLER: I want to -- just so Mr. Kosachev is not doing all the
talking -- I'd like to bring you in on that question, J.D. Crouch, on
actually the extent to which incorporating Russian facilities would be
useful in a technological sense. And I believe you, Mr. von Klaeden,
would also like to talk. And then...
CROUCH: Well, first of all, Russia has some fabulous ballistic
missile defense technology. It's very advanced. They're the only
ones who deployed ballistic missile defense against strategic missiles
in Eurasia. They have somewhere around 100 interceptors around Moscow.
They also have a very good radar capability in Russia and cooperative
relationships as my colleague mentioned here down in Azerbaijan.
So we have been of the view throughout this administration that
there is a technical basis for cooperation. Where I think there's been
a problem is there hasn't been a political will. And I'm hopeful that
President Putin will break that deadlock this weekend; because I think
much more can be done.
I think transparency is valuable. I hope that the Russian
Federation thinks the offers of transparency in Poland and the Czech
Republic are a valuable piece of this. But I think we can go many
steps further with Russia if they're willing to move in that direction.
And I think it's hard politically.
You know, when you think about this whole conversation, it's all
been based on the idea that somehow Russians and Americans have to
retain the capability to blow each other up. I thought we had moved
beyond this. In other words, you know, you mentioned the bombers. We
really didn't react to your bomber flights with any -- and at least
personally, I think the fact that the Russian Federation is exercising
its capabilities is a good thing, so that they don't atrophy, and that
they don't -- you don't have problems that, you know --
So from my standpoint, it's really important that we move beyond
this adversarial relationship to one where we're cooperating on projects.
FIDLER: Mr. von Klaeden.
VON KLAEDEN: I don't understand the Russian concerns about a
missile defense program. But nevertheless, the United States
administration took some, I think, very useful reasonable initiatives to
overcome these concerns -- common consultations, common threat analysis,
the inspections proposed, and so on, and so on. My question is why did
this happen not earlier? This shows me that there was a lack of
consultation with Russia and maybe also with other allies within NATO
before.
And the second point I want to make is Russia criticizes the
United States for Cold War thinking. I think this criticism is not
correct. In my assessment, it provokes Russia more the way of post
Cold War thinking, saying that Russia is neglectable or not relevant any
longer for the security in Europe. And bringing Russia in in that way
I described it could be for further initiatives very helpful.
FIDLER: J.D. Crouch, do you think that's fair, that suggestion
which I've heard before, that actually the Washington brought in --
started its consultations too late with the Europeans and with the
Russians on this?
CROUCH: Well, you know, I can tell you, as I said, that in
terms of NATO -- and I think there are people in this room who may have
been involved, I briefed policy directors on this long before it was
really a major negotiation between our countries. I also was involved
in the first initial contacts with the Czech Republic and Poland back in
2003. Same time frame, we were running a discussion with now-Chief of
the General Staff
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: …relationship to one where we are cooperating
on projects.
VONDRA: I don’t share the Russian concerns about the missile defense
program. But never the less, the United States administration took
some, I think, very useful and reasonable initiatives to overcome these
concerns. Common consultations, common threat analysis, the inspection
proposals and so on and so on.
My question is, why did this happen not earlier. This shows me that
there was a lack of consultation with Russian and maybe also with other
allies within NATO before. And the second point that I want to make is
Russia criticizes United States for Cold War thinking. I think this
criticism is not correct in my assessment. It provokes Russia more the
way of post-Cold War thinking saying that Russia is neglectable or not
relevant anymore for the security in Europe .
And bringing in Russia that way I described it, could be for further
initiatives very helpful.
STEPHENS: J.D. Crouch, do you think that’s fair, that suggestion which
I’ve heard before that the Washington brought in – started these
consultations too late with Europeans and with the Russians on this?
CROUCH: Well, you know, I can tell you that as I said, in terms of NATO
and I think that there are people in this room who may have been
involved, I brief policy directors on this before, long before it was
really a major negotiation between our countries. I also was involved
in the first initial contacts with the Czechs, Czech Republic and our –
and Poland back in 2003.
Same time frame, we were running a discussion with now Chief of the
General Staff Ballefski (ph) on missile threats where we were trading
information and we had differences. I mean there’s no question about
it; we had differences about whether or not the kinds of technology for
example that is in North Korea and is now migrated to Iran , whether
that could end up with intercontinental range systems.
But we were exchanging those views and we were talking about our
perceptions of threats, you know, back at the beginning of this
administration. I don’t know how much earlier we could have done it and
I happen to know that the Clinton people were also doing that with the
Russians as well back in the late 90’s.
STEPHENS: Mr. Kosachev.
KOSACHEV: I believe we could have avoided a debate like that right now.
In case three mistakes had never been done. Number one the United
States starting this project without consultations, proper consultations
with Russia in advance, they didn’t.
Number two, Poland and the Czech Republic accepting that proposal from
the United States without consulting NATO, without consulting Russia .
And thirdly, NATO countries pretending during the initial stage that
nothing is going on it’s about bilateral agreements with the Czech
Republic . And Poland , it’s not about NATO and we should not be asked
about that. It’s not about us.
So these three mistakes were done initially and this is why we do have
this debate right now instead of discussing how good we are at
co-durating (ph) with each other in the area of missile defense.
But I think that the major mistake was done much earlier in the early
90’s when the Soviet Union collapsed and the so-called west had a unique
chance to initiate. Russia was weak at that moment, to initiate some
new construction in the field of security which would include every each
interested country, including Russia , including China , including other
countries.
And Russia was ready for participating in such a new construction with
laying down our rudders in Krustiv (ph) years. Remember the discussion
about the rudder in Krustiv (ph) years, how much it was a problematic
discussion. Laying down our rudder in ((inaudible)) in Latvia ,
withdrawing our bases, laying down our basis in Vietnam , Cuba , Eastern
Europe , poor Soviet countries, everywhere.
STEPHENS: Doctor, let’s talk about …
KOSACHEV: Yes, instead …
STEPHENS: …from now on, if we could ….
KOSACHEV: …the NATO expansion was the slogan of the year and of the
century and this is how NATO is now responsible for not being able to
read the problems in Afghanistan . I definitely wish NATO operations
success in Afghanistan , this is also our interest. But I do not
believe that NATO is a capable form for forming such an operation.
Thank you.
STEPHENS: Can I bring in the Czech and the Polish views just after one
or two more questions. I need to bring in the audience. Sir.
JENKINS: Thank you very much, Bennet Jenkins from the U.K. Defense
Committee at the House of Commons. I think it is a very fruitful
discussion to be having because I think its demonstrating that a lot of
the fears and suspicions that we have about this project can be
dispelled on all sides.
We Europeans, we tend to be very sensitive about America determining
global security policy and imposing ideas upon us. And I think we have
to look at this in a different context that we are being offered
basically a free gift of security at vast expense to the American tax
payer.
And, I mean the ABM Treaty is gone and we’re not in a new super power
arms race. I think that fear has been disposed of. And we need to
dispose of, also, some of our Cold War reflexes that we still have in
Europe and I include Russia in that European umbrella. We still tend to
spook at each other for how we use to behave when it’s not really
relevant to the modern threat environment.
But my question is about NATOization of missile defense. I think this
is a good label to attach to missile defense. But I think we need to be
realistic. First of all, missile defense is a single weapon system
requiring very, very fast responses. A very, very agile command and
control system. It doesn’t really lend itself to a extensive
consultation about operation at the moment that it’s going to be required.
And I – all the questions of information sharing and the fact that the
Americas are putting all the money on the table, unless we Europeans are
prepared to put a lot of money on the table. And I don’t see many
European countries prepared to increase their defense spending at all at
the moment. I don’t think we can demand a say over the operation of
this system from the Americans. How would the Americans explain that to
their tax payers?
And secondly, I think we have to reiterate, if the opening questions had
been asked in a different way, do we think weapons proliferation is
going to continue and they’re going to be more rouge states and more
rouge states with missile capability, the probability is one. And do we
think that missile defense in time will work, yes, it will work.
So we would either be very brave or very stupid to turn down this free
gift from the United States .
STEPHENS: Thank you. Yes, we haven’t really talked much about
developing the threat developing beyond the realm. The gentlemen up here.
COLLINS: Thank you. Collins Continental Defense College . Apparently
a key question is the one of consultation. The U.S. said it has briefed
extensively. The Russian side says it hasn’t been consulted sufficiently.
Three brief points. First, how does Russia define consultation? Does
it mean having a say on a national security issue? Question number two,
assume there had been consultations in the Russian sense, assume it is
that way, what had happened if the Russians had said no to that American
idea? Was the expectation that the Americas say, “OK, then we can do it.”
And the third point is a cheap shot. Yes, I agree. President Putin has
announced a number of fancy weapon systems recently, Topel M and Boliva
and what have you. Have there been any consultations on this? Thank you.
STEPHENS: Gentlemen here.
AGGERT (ph): Constantine Aggert (ph) from Moscow . One observation and
a question to participants. An observation, honestly, is Constantine to
Konstantin. With regards to public opinion, I think the fact that it’s
anti-American, anti-Western to a large extent is due to the fact that
the Russian political collapse prefers it to be so. Because we know how
Russian television operates.
And I think at the same time it’s a good thing. Because probably on
Sunday night, this tonality of anti-Americanism is going to be
automatically turned down quite a bit because probably it’s going to be
a deal between the two presidents in Sochi .
So my question is, to Mr. Crouch and to you Konstantin, what do you
think is going to be the deal? What are going to be the agreements in
Sochi ? Because we presume it is about missile defense. Thank you.
DEMPSEY: I would like to ((inaudible)) sort of amplify on this. I’ve
got a – I don’t understand your position. I don’t understand your
position Mr. Kosachev. Judy Dempsey, IDT. And are you satisfied? You
say you are satisfied with Polish assurances but you’re not satisfied
with the Czech. I’m still not clear of actually the Russian position
now that the consultations have taken place because this conversation is
really looking at the past rather than the future.
And secondly, the Sochi meeting will be very interesting. Would you
like to discuss that if you are satisfied with the arrangements and the
consultations, would it influence decision to return to the CFE Treaty?
STEPHENS: Thank you. I’d like to – we’ll ask Mr. Klich to come in on
that and then Mr. Vondra. But I’d also like to, this is a sort of just
to a point, just to make sure. Is it both your positions that the
presence of Russian observers or in some way of the sites is not
objectionable; there is no objection in either country to that prospect?
And then to sort of comment more generally.
KLICH: We have, of course, discussed the question which should be the
role and the extent to which potential Russian observers that would have
the right to be included into the process of reviewing the development
of the site in Poland . But we would like to base our approach – or
basing our approach on traditional confidence including measures and
inspections.
Inspections are we agree for. Inspections for Russian inspections.
Temporary inspections, of course, this tool that is used in various in
the implementation of various agreements. So that’s of course possible.
Although, we have the problem with – this is the challenge to what
extent transparency of potential American site in Poland that should be
open for our allies and for those who are not our allies. This is the
question, the challenge.
But let me return for a while to this very important question about the
so called naturalization of the American approach. Personally I don’t
believe in such a naturalization of the missile defense because there is
this anonymous project, anonymous system.
And what I believe, and the Polish side believes these are very close
relations between the American project and the potential European
missile theatre ballistic missile defense. Yes. European or NATO,
continental project. This is necessary. Very close relations and
inter-operability between those systems is necessary and I believe that
if during this summit or the next one, the crucial decisions concerning
implementation of the regal decisions are taken, we should see in the
future this is a cohesion between those systems. But still they will be
separate.
STEPHENS: Mr. Vondra would you like to?
VONDRA: I think, you know, somebody has told us that it’s about a
definition of consultation. So is somebody perceives a consultation as
a way, you know, we are going to ask Moscow for permission, that’s not a
consultation. It must be fair, balanced and just for the metro
declaredly, last year regarding the Czechs, you know, we underwent three
rounds of very detailed consultation on the level of deputy ministers.
So Deputy Minister Kesliv (ph) was engaged in that. Czech president was
visiting Moscow and discussing that, so there were the consultation for
the metro declaredly. And regarding those inspections for certainly the
authority to assure our Russia partners that the system is – and the
radar which should be based on the Czech territory that it’s not
directed against them.
But at the same time I think we should be able under the radar which are
on the Russian territory which can easily monitor the central territory.
So even, I think this is the confidence building measures. It must be
balanced in effect. So not just about the Russian inspectors being
allowed to monitor situation in the Czech Republic regarding the radar
but also our possibility to do the same regarding the Russian facilities
which have atleast heuristically the outreach in to Southern Europe.
So I think if this is going to be fair, balanced, we are ready for
cooperation. I think, you know, those remarks that Czechs are now
bad-guys, closer to good guys. You know, six months ago, we have heard
totally different the Pol’s had the bad guys, the Czechs had the good
guys. I think, look don’t play those kind of games. We are working all
together.
Then the same was with the NATO enlargement in the Central Europe . I
remember in the middle of ’93. We had the whole debate, but finally we
find a solution which I think Russia can easily live with. With have
the NRC to work together and I have no doubt that at the end of the day
we would have a same or similar kind of arrangement regarding the
missile defense because we need defense.
In the current world, this Cold War concept of difference does not work
perfectly if you have see-side number, you know, you can’t rely just on
the classic difference. You must have defense, offense is not an arm.
STEPHENS: Well missile defense doesn’t yet as far as I know deal with
suicide bombers.
VONDRA: Well, that’s correct. But the concept of classic Cold War
veterans was based on the fact that the enemy or the country where the
Czechs originate behaved hundred percent rational. And look I was
living – I was living in Czechoslovakia on the communism, you know, we
were fighting for freedom. We did not like the communists. We did not
like Stalin, we did not like Brezhnev. But you know you have to admit
to certain extent they were behaving rationally.
STEPHENS: And you’re saying that …
VONDRA: Survival was the imperative. We must not say necessary the
same about the regime in the Middle East .
STEPHENS: Mr. von Klatden.
VON KLATDEN: Just about the character of the consultations. I know
some important people in the German administration who share the threat
and who say that this missile defense program is right and the correct
answer. Who even were surprised last year about how far you were with
this program. And this shows me that the way of consultations, what
not, I would not say went deep enough.
And just want to emphasize again, following – answering the question of
Karl Hines, my three step model of how to deal with Russia . First of
all become an analysis. Then thinking about, in the second step, about
a common solution where Russia takes part and takes over responsibility
and sometimes we have to encourage them to do this.
What I really don’t like is the Russian attitude, what I call the
Waldorf Statler attitude. Standing on the balcony and judging what’s
going on the stage. But we encourage them to do this if we don’t let
them participate earlier than we do.
And then of course the third thing has to be if we don’t agree and if we
just think that things are vital in our interest, of course, we can not
accept a Russian veto. But this is much more accredible if we tried the
first two steps more seriously than we have done in several cases before.
STEPHENS: Thank you. I’m going to come back to the – I’m going to
bring in some more audience members. I’m going to come back to the
question of the prospects for – towards the end. The prospects for the
agreement and to answer some of the other questions. But let me just
bring in a little more – OK. The gentlemen here.
FLANNIGAN: Yes. Stephen Flannigan from the Center for Strategic
International Studies in Washington . We haven’t touched on the other
bit of arms control that’s been put into crisis, that is to say CFE.
The Russian Federation , of course, having taken the action of
suspending its participation in the treaty suggesting that its concerns
about movement on the adaptive treaty hadn’t gone forward and we all
know the reasons behind that.
My question though really is, is this a treaty worth preserving? Is
this a Cold War acronymisms (ph) is it something the NATO and the other
countries participating states in Europe should spend some capital on in
terms of preserving some elements of it or should we move on and think
about just other priorities?
STEPHENS: William Wallace, I think with a question. Just