THE BUCHAREST CONFERENCE - The Door to NATO: Open or Closed?
(Check against delivery)
KENNEDY: It's probably been quite as complicated for this
summit as the issue of enlargement. We've put together a really
excellent panel. I want to thank one of the members right now,
Wolfgang Ischinger, our good friend, former ambassador to the United
States, who agreed to fill in at the last minute. It was really great
of you to do so.
And now, I think I'll turn it over to Jacques Rupnik and his
panel to continue the discussion. Jacques?
RUPNIK: I think we need one more chair, I think.
GEOANA (?): This is like politics in Romania.
(UNKNOWN): Should I be standing back? Do I stand back from
the audience?
RUPNIK: Good morning, ladies & gentlemen. It is a great
pleasure to have -- and an honor to be able to introduce this morning's
panel on prospects of NATO enlargement. It is really remarkable to be
discussing this subject here in Bucharest. That, in a way, is already
part of the answers of what has been happening to NATO over the last
decade or so. 1999, three central European countries have joined.
There was a Prague summit, which continued this process. Here we are
in Bucharest discussing and political leaders deciding the future of
this process.
However, there have been series of doubts, discussions about the
limits of the process as well. And some people are suggesting -- this
is even the title of the session -- is the door still open? Or is the
door starting to close? And we have, I think, a very good panel to
address some of the reasons for pursuing the process and perhaps also
some of the more prudential arguments about the consideration of the
costs or the risks involved.
The panel has just been introduced. And I will therefore not
dwell on this. I will go directly to the subject itself. The case
that has been often made for expanding nation is consolidating new
democracies in eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Block.
Now few people have been more consistent advocates of this process than
Bruce Jackson, president of the Project on Transitional Democracies.
Bruce, what is the case for continuing the process today?
JACKSON: Thank you, Jacques. I guess you've given me the
opportunity to argue the imprudential side of the debate, the risky side.
RUPNIK: Yes, you guessed correctly.
JACKSON: I would basically say that I'm arguing the prudential
side of the debate. In every case we have had since 1945, the
presumption that countries and peoples, given the same opportunities
that were extended to say, Germany or Greece or Turkey or Spain or
Poland, that that is the prudential case. In all cases, if we look
backwards and consult history, is there any expansion or engagement that
we have regretted since 1949.
So it seems to be that people that want to argue in the
alternative, that we should be more cautious now, and we should be less
generous in extending the possibilities -- it seems to me they have to
make that case. And I don't think that case has been made. And I
think the presumption of innocence and the presumption that people,
given the same chances will have the same outcome, I think that has to
be the prudential argument at this point.
RUPNIK: Thank you, Bruce. Well, let me now turn to Ambassador
Ischinger. There is a view that, yes, NATO should be continually
expanding for the reasons Bruce has just mentioned. Perhaps the
context, however, is changing. In the 1990s, the situation in Europe,
the relationship with Russia was perhaps a different one.
Should we, in discussing this issue, consider the overall
relationship we're having with Russia before pursuing the issue of
expansion? In other words, are there other issues in our global
relationship with Russia that would justify being prudent in expanding?
That doesn't mean not expanding, but perhaps not expanding at the
same pace and to as many countries as perhaps Bruce would wish.
ISCHINGER: Well, thank you, Jacques. And thank you for having
me as part of this very important panel. Allow me to just make a
couple of very quick points before I try to respond to your specific
question. First of all, I just want to remind everyone that there has
been no country in NATO over the last 50 years the armed forces of which
have been more, and for a longer time, totally integrated into NATO than
Germany. My country has benefited more and has been more dependent on
NATO than any other country that I know. In other words, for my
country, NATO has been and continues to be the backbone of our entire
security thinking. I just mention this in order to make sure that no
one doubts the seriousness of our thinking about NATO.
Secondly -- and I'll be immodest for a moment, but this may also
be important to remind everyone -- that the very idea of NATO
enlargement was actually first proposed by Germany. None other that
Volker Ruhe made a speech proposing to enlarge NATO, long before anyone
in the U.S. Congress or in the then-Clinton administration was willing
to consider that. In other words, don't forget where I come form. I
come from the country that started the process.
The process then had its first culmination in Madrid. And this
is the third point I wanted to make. Today and tomorrow here in
Bucharest, we will see something that is not new. This is a
continuation of a process which has now gone on for over a decade. We
have had long, sometimes painful, discussions about what is the best way
forward? In Madrid, it was the question three or five, with Romania or
without Romania. Everybody knows what the result was then.
And now coming to your question, Jacques, I think it is very
important that we take this question of enlargement as serious as we
can. It is not a question to be decided on emotional terms. We need
decent criteria. And I remember that when we started this process,
trying to figure out how many, when, at which moment, et cetera, we
asked three questions.
Question number one, is NATO membership going to be good for that
applicant country? Second question, is NATO membership or future NATO
membership of that country good for NATO? And third question, and that
is my response to your point -- third question we asked in '96, '97,
would NATO membership of that country be good for European security and
stability in its totality. If we can come up with a yes to all three
elements of this three-part question, then without any doubt we're doing
the right thing by inviting a country in. If there is a remaining
doubt on one or two, we should hesitate and be very careful.
NATO is serious. It's important. It's the backbone of our
security. It's not something we should be doing out of charity or to
please or displease anyone. This is the most serious security
business. So that would be the point I would make.
RUPNIK: Well thank you very much, Wolfgang Ischinger, for
reminding us that the process and the debate has a history, that Germany
was one of the first enlargers. Volker Ruhe, I remember, was a very
powerful in his argument for that in the mid-'90s. Let us also forget
that at '97, France was a very vocal advocate of expanding to Bulgaria
and Romania, which is now often forgotten, even in this country. And
the United States was more reluctant.
Anyway, you've just mentioned the three reasons. Is it good for
the applicant country? And is it good for overall European security?
Some of these arguments we had already heard ten years ago, when
there was a first expansion. You remember after the first three got
in, no troops, no nukes, no more was the summary after that first
expansion. And then we saw a process of expanding further. The
Baltic countries were included.
So I'm now turning to the Latvian president, Valdis Zatlers.
What is the Baltic lesson? What is the Baltic response to the
prudential argument we should first see the overall security
relationship with Russia in particular before moving anytime further?
You will be, tonight, at the dinner with the heads of state
discussing these issues. What will you be telling them?
ZATLERS: Thank you very much for inviting. And you are right.
I will be at the table tonight when we'll be discussing what the final
decision will be. And I have advantage to be here in a panel, because
my country, as well as all three Baltic countries, had the positive
experience about implementing all the steps from idea to be a NATO
country up to the membership.
And what I want to emphasize, I emphasize the importance of
membership action plans, because when you get the membership action plan
for a country that has been proved not only military but also in a
matter of good governance, good civil society and all the values up to
NATO standards, when you get the action plan, you undertake the action.
What I mean this, that we have to give the membership action
plans to Georgia and Ukraine nevertheless are the conditions there;
because I will answer yes on all these three questions mentioned before
that this is yes; because on an example of Ukraine -- and the argument
is that the population really doesn't support by majority the
membership, there's nothing to support, because they don't know too much
about NATO. And when you give them membership action plan, you have
definite criteria. You have definite goals, checklists. And that's
what it is a subject for discussion in the Ukranian society.
And I think if we hesitate, we just postpone the situation for a
later period. But we have to not to hesitate and start the process.
As I say, no action plan, no action. What do we want -- because
another matter I want to emphasize is that our experience shows that the
relationship in Russia greatly improved after joining the EU and NATO.
And we could solve a lot of very serious and sensitive problems, like
a border treaty, just after joining the NATO and the EU, not before.
So we have a lot of good to say, because we have a lot of
benefits for being NATO and EU members. And we think the NATO has got
a lot of benefits for the countries being members of NATO. So I'm
optimistic about doing things immediately, the right time, the right
place, and the right action.
RUPNIK: Thank you very much. When you say your relations have
improved after joining NATO, it is perhaps more difficult to make that
case today, given the evolution of the situation, perhaps also the
context over the last decade -- the Putin years to put it bluntly -- has
changed our relationship with Russia.
So I'm now turning to Mircea Geoana, who is head of the Foreign
Affairs Committee in the Senate here in Romania. What is the main
thrust of your argument? Is it a argument about democracy? This is
as in the case Bruce makes very powerfully. Or is it more broadly a
geopolitical argument, which involves energy supplies, which involves
importance of the Black Sea area as a strategic goal? What is, in your
view, the main reason for going in the direction that the Latvian
president is suggesting, that is Ukraine and Georgia?
GEOANA: I think that our alliance and also with Europe is all
about is also about values. So I always embrace the strategic
arguments, including what is the perspective of joining NATO and/or EU
for a country that is under transformation as a catalyst for change.
But I will never give up. As a citizen of a country that has
lived under oppression and Communism, to deny any nation in Europe the
right to dream and aspire to be part of our common family never ever.
And it is probably something that is motivating the new members in NATO
that are really pushing for Ukraine and Georgia to start some action.
My second point is also more strategic, of course. We are
witnessing, as we speak, a change of the geographic and geopolitical map
of Europe. We are slowly overlapping the geopolitical map of Europe
and the geographical map of Europe saying that we are discovering that
Europe is not ending on the border between the East and the West, as you
knew it in the Cold War.
But today, basically, we can strongly argue that Georgia and the
Caucasus is the new southeast Europe and Ukraine is the new central
Europe. And this is something that is happening as we speak, because
events in the world are driving this catching up between geopolitics and
geography. So this is a major step forward. And I think this is an
argument for us to be more courageous and embrace that region as well.
The third thing that I will make as a point -- if the last
roundup enlargement, as President Bush has stated in Warsaw, in an
absolutely historical speech about the Baltic and to the Black Sea, I
think what we are starting to speak in Bucharest. And probably this
will be continuing in the next summits of the alliance.
We start to speak of an alliance and a Europe from the Adriatic
to the Caspian Sea; because what we are doing here in Bucharest, we are
giving a partial answer to the Balkans. We have still work to be done
in the Balkans to complete this region as full members of EU and NATO.
And also we are starting to speak about Georgia and slowly starting to
speak -- I'm not predicting anything -- also about Azerbaijan and even
Armenia as part of a new puzzle that is developing.
My experience from the Romanian case is that never say never.
Nobody would have put a penny, a Eurocent or any other currency ten or
15 years ago that Romania will ever be part of EU and NATO. There is a
mutual reinforcing mechanism of membership between NATO and EU. So
far, NATO enlarged first and EU followed. We might be seeing in the
future also the reverse. Who knows? It depends also on how ambitious
European Union will become.
And my experience is that once the train has started -- and the
train is starting, even if we'll not have the decisions that a Romanian
would like to see when it comes to Georgia and Ukraine here in Bucharest
-- I hope it is still possible. But even if not, the train has
started. And nothing and nobody can derail it. The problem is how
can we proceed from here and make sure that on the way to the 60th
anniversary of our alliance in Berlin next year.
I think that a train has started. And people try to slow it
down. But it cannot be stopped.
RUPNIK: It cannot be stopped. We will see. You gave us the
new -- this is the new geography lesson for all of us. So the new
southeastern Europe, that's the Caucasus. And the new Central Europe,
that's Ukraine.
GEOANA: General de Gaulle told us that Europe is from...
(CROSSTALK)
RUPNIK: Went from the Atlantic to Europe, yes? So we have a
new geography -- a new map of Europe. But let's not forget about the
southeastern Europe that we are familiar with, that is the Balkans. We
discussed Georgia, Ukraine. This summit should decide about the
enlargement to three countries of the Balkans. This scene is crucially
important for the region.
And to pursue this discussion we're having here shouldn't we have
a hierarchy of priorities in our prospect of expanding? In other
words, if you announced, you know, either you expand all the way to the
Caucasus, the Balkans and the Ukraine, or you're an appeaser of Russia.
Should we rather establish what is the actual hierarchy of priorities
we have? And perhaps we not having the same views. And I would want
to test your views.
I mean, if you ask somebody like (inaudible) Dzerzhinsky (ph), he
will tell you crucially important country is Ukraine. That is the
geostrategic importance. My own feeling is, at this particular
juncture, our crucially important area where we cannot afford to fail is
the Balkans.
So I would like to test the obvious (inaudible), should we have a
hierarchy of priorities in pursuing the enlargement? If we cannot take
everybody in at the same time, does it mean we have failed? Or should
we pursue perhaps more step-by-step goals as the NATO enlargement
process has been this last decade?
GEOANA: I'm not sure about the hierarchy. What I'm sure about
is that there is, as this summit starts, I think there is total
agreement that the open-door approach ought to continue. This is a
process that started 11 years ago. And it will continue.
With great probability we will have some countries being invited
to be new members of NATO in the course of this summit. It is, in my
view, absolutely desirable. It would be wonderful if we had these
three Balkan countries offered the perspective.
And I think that even if one has, as my country does and as I do,
hesitations about responding to the third question -- namely what about
-- can we be sure that we're doing a good thing for European security
and stability as a whole, if at this moment in time, we invite Georgia
and Ukraine. Even if one has hesitations about this, as I do.
I want to be very clear that we should, of course, not only
reaffirm the open-door policy, we should also welcome the aspirations of
these two countries very warmly and do our best to encourage them to
continue on their course toward the alliance. That is a very good thing.
My last remark is this. Let's not forget that in the context of
the initial NATO enlargement effort in '96, '97, a huge effort was
undertaken by the United States and by many of us on the European side
of NATO, to create a situation where this political project of NATO
enlargement would be understood as we hoped it would be understood in
Moscow. We created at that tie, for that purpose, the NATO-Russia
relationship, which has evolved over time and has -- we have tried to
intensify it.
In other words, we did -- even as long ago as '96, '97 -- we did
manage to have a balanced approach, an approach that took into account
not only the membership interests of individual countries and the
security interests of the alliance as a military security organization;
but we also managed to take into account our interests and the
collective interests of creating an overall atmosphere that would not
result in any hostile reaction.
We actually conducted a very successful policy vis-a-vis Russia.
And I think that is also an element which needs to be continued as we
try to take the steps that we're now discussing here.
RUPNIK: Bruce Jackson, you want to react to this?
JACKSON: Well, there's some frustration here. I don't really
think we can talk about future expansion until we talk honestly about
past expansions. I think there is a history here.
Wolfgang made the, I think, astounding premise that we should
make sure that NATO expansion is never an act of generosity. Well, if
it hadn't been an act of generosity, Angela Merkel wouldn't be
chancellor of Germany today. It is fundamentally, and it has always
been, an act of generosity in every single case.
It seems to me that if we ask the questions that we're raising
today -- does the country have an Army? Has it satisfied territorial
integrity? Has it resolved frozen conflicts? Has it actually handed
in its war criminals? Germany would not have been accepted in the '50s
if we'd asked all those modern questions.
And the rewriting of history -- it says Volker Ruhe was an
author, that Germany was an author, of NATO expansion. No, Germany was
a beneficiary. And 50 years later, it became an author. That is
basically the fundamental logic of NATO expansion.
So I think the people that will want to oppose to this, why was
the generosity of spirit and the assumption of association extended to
Germany and Greece and Spain, not -- we're not going to be prepared to
do the same thing with Boris Tarasu (ph) or Constantine (ph).
You know, what makes this modern period so different, when
there's no empirical evidence submitted. I know perfectly well the
role you played. I still think you believe your own debate. There is
an argument that this is a fundamentally new, modern time. And we
should induce certain new questions. Then let's have that debate and
say how has history so changed that we will do things different in the
future than we've done in the past? That's the debate.
And there is a presumption of belief here. We do believe that
Ukraine and Georgia, as we did with the Baltics -- they shouldn't be
restricted; that if we give them the same chances, they will perform
much the same way that western Europe did before us. That's the
assumption.
RUPNIK: But Bruce, when you say what makes this period
different from the past, from the '50s, or from Spain, et cetera, I
supposed the end of the Cold War makes a slight difference, and the need
to redefine what the alliance is for. And that may be a very good case
for expanding it. But that means, at the same time, linking the
expansion argument with the redefinition of its purpose.
JACKSON: Certainly, I don't believe things change just because
we enter -- years go by.
RUPNIK: You're expanding, because you're a conservative.
That's a very unusual type of conservative. In France, I'm used to
different kind of conservative arguments, which for short they can
prudential.
Let me now -- unless there are urgent needs to respond. Yes,
Wolfgang, you wanted to respond?
ISCHINGER: Well, just very quickly. I mean, you know, with
all due respect, Bruce, I think there is a difference -- a significant
difference -- between the decisions that were taken in NATO and with
regard to NATO membership in the 1940s, '50s and so on as compared to
the post-Cold War period. We are living in a different universe, thank
God.
But on the question of what is the right decision today, I don't
think that we should have an argument about whether, you know, we are
right or whether you are right. Let me just restate that point.
There was a point when the United States was in favor of a smaller
number of new members. And major European countries were advocating a
larger number. I'm not suggesting to you that necessarily, at that
moment, the Europeans who advocated in '96, '97, Romania should be were
right. Maybe the United States was right.
We should not doubt each other's intense commitment to continuing
the enlargement process as a serious, credible process that will enhance
the security of everyone involved. And that is why we happen to take a
very careful look, not only at the interests of the alliance and at the
interests of the applicant countries, but also at the question of what
could be the consequences of this for European security and stability as
a whole.
There are important strategic considerations in addition to the
bilateral and the institutional considerations. That is very clear.
And it is something that I believe we are right in having on our agenda
as well.
JACKSON: So if the process should continue, you agree that
Ukraine and Georgia should go into the membership action plan.
ISCHINGER: I agree that they should be offered a very strong
encouragement to put themselves in a position where everyone in NATO can
advocate that. We believe that the moment today is not right.
RUPNIK: OK, so we have...
ZATLERS: I'll try to play devil's advocate, because I have some
vision of the future; because we are very cautious about the future,
because we don't know what will be and what will happen in the future.
And I'm thinking about we are spending right now a lot of effort of
increasing our influence in what I call the buffering zone or, let's
say, Ukraine and Georgia, it's something in between. And instead of
giving them a membership action plan, so we'll try to find out are they
ready; because their conditionality is one of the most important issues.
But we come close to close with the direct border NATO Russia.
And then there is a place for spending our efforts and resources on
NATO-Russian cooperation, instead of in trying to increase out influence
in a definite country.
I think this is the vision of the future. And it was mentioned
also by President Bush this morning. And I don't see any arguments
against that, because again our experience -- very fresh one, a couple
years only -- Estonia and Latvia has direct borderline with Russia.
There are no fences, no walls, no mine fields. It's controlled by
technical means just to control the trespassing of the borderline.
And, you know, even Russia doesn't spend much resources for creating
much more defensive or offensive structures according to the borderlines.
So we have the direct borderline at present. So I think it's
very important to do the same in the other regions. That's like in
Georgia and Ukraine.
RUPNIK: Yes. So the Baltic lesson is you can expand NATO to
the Russian border without necessarily provoking a backlash. So with
this statement, let me turn to the audience. I see a number of hands
already raised.
I think you are first. If you could briefly introduce yourself
and mainly make a brief question, not lengthy statements. The
panelists have been very disciplined in making concise statements.
Yes? So I see that I have eyes in my back. And the floor is yours.
HALSELL (ph): OK. Am I on? I'm Mike Halsell (ph) from the
United States. I think President Zatlers made a very important point
at the beginning that relations between Latvia and Russia have improved
since Latvia joined the alliance. I will take issue with you, Mr.
Chairman, when you said that that point is vitiated because of President
Putin becoming president. He had been president for almost four and a
half years by the time Latvia became a member of the alliance.
My question is simply are we not looking at -- we should
certainly take Russia's interests into account. But in a sense, aren't
we accepting their frame of reference about the very nature of NATO?
NATO has never been an aggressive alliance. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, it
never had an offensive battle plan. And aren't we, in a sense, falling
into sort of a zero-sum mentality that seems to be reigning in Moscow
now in this whole debate?
For the life of me, I don't understand why we shouldn't be
encouraging Russia, as I think all the participants have said, to
cooperate more with NATO.
RUPNIK: OK. Mr. Geoana, you want to respond to this?
GEOANA: Yes. I remember that, in the Clinton administration,
when the whole debate started, irrespective who had the first idea, I
think it was an inevitable consequence of the fall of the Berlin Wall.
I think Strobe Talbot was the one who invented the term of dual track
-- enlarging NATO and engaging Russia.
And I think the situation in the last many years, since we have
seen the first and a second round of enlargement, show that if Europeans
and Americans -- we are putting our arguments, our incentives and our
disincentives together. Then we can reach a decent dialogue with
Russia enabling us to keep a normal relationship with this great nation
that we all need to be part of our concept and philosophy of the 21st
century; but also making sure that the countries and citizens that are
willing to join the family of democracies will be welcome when they are
ready and, of course, if we feel that it is adding to our common security.
So I think that the Russians are overplaying their hand. I also
believe there is a reservation, which is not very loudly expressed, in
some of the older members of the EU and NATO. Usually, NATO
enlargement was a catalyst for EU enlargement as well. I think Europe
is not ready -- I mean, the big donors. We are discussing about the
financial perspective of European Union, so the budget for the Union,
between 2013 up to 2020, because we work in seven years' budgets and
have some members of European parliament in this audience.
So I think there is, besides the Russia factor, besides the real
concern about the frozen conflicts -- because this is an issue. And
here Kaliningrag is a vivid example that we know how to manage Russian
enclaves within our territories.
But I think there is an unspoken concern in some of the key
European capitals that, after an eventual enlargement of NATO to Ukraine
and Georgia -- Ukraine being a very sizeable country -- inevitably the
next push will be for EU enlargement. And Europe is not ready to talk
about Turkey, not to speak that a -- we are not ready to talk about
Ukraine, which I think is nonsense; because denying Ukraine as a big
European country, the prospect of joining Europe and NATO, I think it's
a recipe for paralysis.
RUPNIK: Yes. Well, thank you for reminding us that there is
this double discussion. Is the enlargement of NATO preparation, so to
speak, for enlargement of EU? Or is it seen by some as a substitute or
perhaps a temporary substitute for the enlargement of the EU? And I
think that this is a very important issue. I don't want to go into it
now. I have a number of speakers. Rabbi Andy Baker is next.
What is it? Send me a paper? Sorry?
(UNKNOWN): It's right here.
RUPNIK: Cross -- OK.
BAKER: Thank you very much. Mr. Geoana spoke about the
importance of NATO as a community of values. And the prime minister
this morning spoke of the importance of confronting history. And I
think one aspect, one byproduct, particularly of the last enlargement,
has been advancing and confronting the issue of history and the issue of
values along with the question of security and stability.
If we remember in the early '90s, there were Latvian Waffen SS
veterans marching in Riga and being received by government officials.
There was a revival of history of Marshal Antonescu here in Romania.
You have examples throughout this region. Germany knows how long it
took to confront that history.
And I think one of the values that we've seen was pressing these
new members in a very short period of time to try and confront these
very difficult issues, which I don't think would happen automatically in
their respective societies. Mircea himself was critical in the
creation of an historical commission in Romania to confront the
situation where you had literally a president saying there was no
Holocaust in Romania.
I think we have to look at that, too, as one of the remarkable
benefits of an open door in NATO. Even as I say it, there's so many
examples of where this process has stopped short. But I think we have
to acknowledge its special value. Thank you.
RUPNIK: Thank you. Thank you very much for reminding us that,
of course, the enlargement process of NATO and, I think, of the EU both
in this way are complementary -- help or should help these countries
confront their past -- not just their Communist past, but sometimes also
their pre-Communist past.
I have three speakers behind (inaudible), so you are first,
second and third. So three questions.
EGGER (ph): Yes. I'm Constantine Egger (ph), BBC Moscow.
One of my grandmothers got out on the last train from Vienna in August
1914 before probably being sent to an internment camp. So my question
is to Herr Ischinger.
What are the big consequences that the German officials expect
from Russia in case MAP is granted to Georgia and Ukraine; because
listening to the German officials over the last few months, you keep
thinking about some kind of new European war or some kind of tragedy
happening in the middle of the continent. So I start worrying whether
I need to take the last train out here. So could you explain what
exactly really do you fear?
RUPNIK: OK. What should we expect?
ISCHINGER: I think you would be totally misunderstanding the
thinking and the approach in Berlin if you defined it in the way you
just defined it. Our concern is about the viability, the credibility
of NATO and of the enlargement process. And our concern is certainly
not in the first -- as a point of priority -- you know, what might or
might not be the reaction from Russia.
I really want to get rid of the suspicion that, of all people --
of all people -- the current German chancellor would be sort of
understood to be, quote, unquote, the appeaser. That would be the
wrongest possible misreading of our approach.
ISCHINGER: I really want to get rid of the suspicion that, of all
people -- of all people -- the current German chancellor would be sort
of understood to be, quote, unquote, the appeaser. That would be the
wrongest possible misreading of our approach. We want to be sure that,
as we encourage applicant countries to become future members of NATO and
eventually end up in NATO, that we do it at the appropriate moment.
And again and again, I can only say that we take this process very
seriously. We have had, quite honestly, some doubts about whether this
is the right moment for some of our Balkan countries, because there are
deficiencies in certain areas, both political and military. We did
collectively, I think, come to the conclusion that it was a defensible,
a correct approach to offer -- if I can call it that -- the upgrade to
these three at this point.
We have dou! bts whether we have given enough time to the people of
Ukraine to develop a more comfortable view about eventual NATO
membership, about their future with a new NATO. And we have some
similar hesitations about Georgia. And I think my country is certainly
not the only NATO partner who has these concerns and worries.
That again doesn't mean that we are prepared. We're as little
prepared as anyone else in NATO, including the United States, to offer a
veto over NATO membership or MAP decisions to anyone including Russia.
That must be very clear. We've been totally misreading Germany's track
record on this for the last 11 years. And I've been personally part of
this for quite a while.
So, you know, I really want to be very clear on that.
EGGER (ph): You have been very clear.
ISCHINGER: OK.
RUPNIK: T! here's a question behind -- yes. And then you.
&nbs p; (UNKNOWN): Izhak (ph) (inaudible) from Istanbul. And I get
the impression from the panel that talking about Ukraine becoming a
member of NATO automatically brings a question that Ukraine will also
join the European Union. And very few people here in the audience will
remember that we had a problem in the Far East. And Turkey joined NATO
in 1951, 57 years ago. And we sent a part of our army to Korea to fight
with the Americans under the umbrella of NATO.
So the question I have to the panel -- what do you think about
Turkey being a member of NATO since 1951 and still being kept out of the
European Union membership?
RUPNIK: OK, who wants to take on this question, if anybody?
GEOANA (?): Because I raised the issue. I strongly believe that
our job would not be completed before we see the whole of Europe
becoming part of our institutions and our me! chanisms. I strongly
believe that also Turkey's place is in Europe, if we want to play a
global role as a European union this time, because as NATO, Turkey has
proven herself in many, many occasions.
I also believe that this is a matter of the ambition of European
leaders. I also believe that what we are now witnessing these very days
is a renationalization of European foreign policy, not in terms of our
NATO hat, but in terms of our EU hat. And the temptation to strike
bilateral deals with Russia on energy, on other things, I think is very
detrimental to the capacity of the European Union this time to act in
the near future as a true global power for the 21st century.
And that's why my caution is that before we launch ourselves in
splitting our position so dramatically between older members of the EU
and newer members of the EU and NATO, we should keep in mind the
capacity for us next year after the Euro! pean elections to come with a
coherent view about our neighborhood.&nb sp; I think the European
neighborhood policy is weak. And I think both NATO and EU, short of the
perspective of membership, we have not devised instruments to keep our
neighbors attracted by us and in close cooperation to us.
So both NATO and EU, once we are not offering the perspective of
NATO membership, our inspiration drops dramatically. And that's an
issue for all of us.
RUPNIK: In other words, the only way we relate to our periphery is
to membership or non-membership. Can we invent anything else? This is
a big issue.
Bruce, you wanted to respond?
JACKSON: I just wanted to comment on that. You know, Americans
are very enthusiastic about Turkey joining. All institutions and most
Americans remember the sacrifices of Turkey in the Korean War. But the
single country keeping Turkey out of European institutions is probab! ly
Turkey. That's the problem.
And, you know, this is not a question that -- most countries here
have gone through the process of reform, have done these things. And it
is really the limitation -- Turkey has to continue that process. So I
think the end of the day, I completely agree with Mircea. But you know
perfectly well what we're talking about.
RUPNIK: Yes. Well, Bruce, when you said there's only country that
may stop Turkey joining, I thought you were going to mention my own
country. And you mentioned Turkey, which is very good of you. And I
will now turn to this speaker.
(UNKNOWN): (Inaudible) What we heard here was a very good analysis
of -- like, cost-benefit analysis for Europe for European union, for
NATO, of granting the membership action plan to Ukraine and Georgia. At
the same time, I would bring your attention to the fact th! at Europe is
making decisions very carefully and slowly.
; Now, on another part, Russia is acting quite aggressive and very
quickly. It's ready to absorb these countries without any condition, as
is, without any process, without any additional conditions. Would it be
possible to hear, kind of, cost benefit analysis of not doing anything
-- I mean, of not granting MAP to Ukraine and Georgia? What will be the
result of that for European security progress? Thank you.
RUPNIK: Yes, very good question. What's...
ZATLERS (?): That would not be a good idea, because I'm really
surprised we are talking about a membership action plan as a membership.
If we (inaudible) the membership action plan tomorrow, it doesn't mean
the country is a member tomorrow. So we can look at the other part of
Balkan countries, it took nearly ten years to implement that membership
action plan. It doesn't mean one year, five years, 20 years.&! nbsp; We
give the plan. And it's up to the country to fulfill the conditionality
and to be real member. And nobody else from the outside can do. It's
the best intentions, no.
So we have to give the chance and a definite chance, not to only
say we'll give you the chance in the future. We have to give the chance
right now.
RUPNIK: Now, this is a very strong argument. And it's true for --
you just have been through this process. But I think it's also true for
the Balkans. I mean, many people have questioned the wisdom of offering
partnership for peace to Serbia at the Riga summit, because if they're
not fulfilling the conditions, why are we giving them partnership for peace?
Well, the only convincing argument I find is that that engages the
Serbian military in a reform process that starts something in Serbia,
which perhaps is not too visible, but which ! is very important, even at
this present juncture to have the Serbian m ilitary in a reform mode
with a president in charge of the armed forces. And that leads me to
the question of the Balkans which we have so far neglected a bit.
You wanted to intervene on this subject.
JOSEPH: Thank you very much. Edward Joseph also from the United
States. Jacques, I was pleased that you mentioned the importance of the
Balkans. As everyone here knows, there was tremendous divisions on the
question of recognition of Kosovo, of independence for Kosovo. But
there is not division in the NATO alliance on the question of Macedonia
becoming a member.
We heard just now that the prime minister used the country's
constitutional name Republic of Macedonia. President Bush this morning
stated that he strongly supports membership for all three, including
Macedonia.
What we have instead is one country, a member, and one NATO membe!
r, Greece, that's exploiting its leverage to prevent Macedonia from
joining. And last night at the Balkan event, we discussed the very
serious consequences if Macedonia does not become a member, which it may
not become if it doesn't join now, and the consequences for its neighbor
Kosovo and for the region.
My question for the panel, particularly for Ambassador Ischinger,
is what does it mean for the alliance if one member can thwart the will
of essentially the rest, including the United States? And also,
Ambassador, if I could ask you, as a European, what measures do you
think would be appropriate to convince Greece that it should not thwart
the will? And I say this hoping Greece will not veto. But it's quite
possible that it may come to that. Thank you very much/
RUPNIK: OK. What measures do we have to bring the one member to
change its mind. Wolfgang, that's the easy one.&n! bsp; Wolfgang
Ischinger, do you have a...
IS CHINGER: You know, those of us here who are representing
countries which are members of the EU know maybe better than others that
in the EU once you are a member, of course, you import, whether you like
it or not, all the problems that are attached to you. And once you're
in, it's very difficult sometimes to deal with these issues.
So we Europeans have had a lot of experience with that. My
response to your question would be -- and, of course, I have to exercise
a bit of restraint. I'm a diplomat. I'm a civil servant of my country.
I think that it would be extremely regrettable if no compromise
formula could be found hopefully in the last possible hours.
It would be extremely desirable -- let me phrase it in the positive
-- to have all three countries come in. And we hope that there will be
no necessity for a single veto, certainly not just by one country. That
would, for the e! ntire alliance, be an unhappy moment if there ever has
been an unhappy moment.
RUPNIK: I know, Bruce, you wanted to respond to this as well?
JACKSON: Well, on this issue and also the Kiev issue -- you know,
on the Greek-Macedonia dispute, the U.N. negotiator, Ambassador Nimitz,
put forward a proposal on Monday. The Macedonians responded we accept.
And it seems to be at that point that is the compromise. That is on
the table.
(UNKNOWN): Let's hope so.
JACKSON: And we can't continue to improve if the only -- the only
thing Macedonia could say, that's acceptable to Greece, is a proposal
that they know Macedonia will reject. And there's something a little
bit offensive in taking very small stages, like Macedonia, who has a GDP
4 percent the size of Greece, and saying that Greece is being threatened
by Macedonia. This is a ! little of what happened in Versailles when
the peacekeepers came to th e peace conference and decided to eliminate
nations like Montenegro and other states. It's happening again. And
it's contemptible.
RUPNIK: I think for those of us who were at yesterday's discussion
about the Balkans, the importance -- this was stressed by Goran
Svilanovic -- the importance of the message coming out of this summit
for the region and or Serbia in particular, that the three western
Balkan countries are on track in. This is not only good news for them,
but this is a very strong message for Serbia as well.
JACKSON: If you'll permit me to go back to the question about the
risks of not doing something with Kiev, because I think that question
really needs to be answered.
RUPNIK: OK. Well...
JACKSON: Sorry.
RUPNIK: But first, you wanted to say on the Macedonian issue. And
we will ! come back to the other.
ZATLERS (?): I happened to be a witness to the Macedonian crisis
in 2001, when I was sharing the OSC and together with Lord Robertson
from NATO and Javier Solano from the EU. I think we've done a
remarkable effort to really keep Macedonia together and avoid a major
crisis in the Balkans. So from my perspective, having this three
Adriatic countries joining in Bucharest is of paramount importance. And
I think that some compromise would be reached.
I also believe that we are facing another risk. Goran Svilanovic,
I think was in the Georgian debate yesterday. We'll have early
elections in Serbia in the next few weeks. There is a chance. I hope
this will not happen. But there is a risk that what really didn't
happen at the presidential elections when President Tadic managed to win
in a very, very tight race the presidential race in Serbia. There! is a
risk that Serbia might really choose for the frustration coming out of
the Kosovo solution, which of course triggered a negative sentiment in
the Serbian public. That's life.
But I think there is a risk. And what I'm hearing also from
Brussels, from the EU, that the moment if this thing eventually happens,
there will be basically a door...
NKNOWN PARTICIPANT: Giving nothing, there will be some consequences.
They’ll be…
RUPNIK: Like what?
UNKNOWN PARTICIPANT: Like what?
We’ll be still fighting for the influence instead of fighting for the
cooperation. That’s what I mentioned before. That’s what we have to
eliminated and understand. We’ll have still a problem, consequences
fighting for influence in Georgia . Fighting for influence in Ukraine .
When you give them map, these things will change.
RUPNIK: Giving map to Ukraine or to Georgia .
UNKNOWN PARTICIPANT: Or both.
RUPNIK: Stops you fighting for influence.
UNKNOWN PARTICIPANT: No the fighting will be inside the country because
as we mentioned before, a couple times, the country itself has to do
their homework to improve their governments, to improve their relations
to make the decisions to work with the republic and that’s much better
consequences and still leave it alone and get the conversation we had
today, two years or four years later. There’s no sense.
RUPNIK: Well what if the country is divided on the issue?
UNKNOWN PARTICIPANT: Well give them time.
RUPNIK: What would be the consequences for a divided country?
UNKNOWN PARTICIPANT: I hope if you give a subject for the discussions,
the split will be to one side or another side. So we give them …
RUPNIK: Give them a split?
UNKNOWN PARTICIPANT: A split? It will be forever because in every
country you have some percentage even in the old native countries they
have some percentage of populations that say, "No, we don’t need it."
So they’ll be split. But the important question is, where is the split?
Two to one, three to four , whatever.
RUPNIK: OK.
UNKNOWN PARTICIPANT: But we’ll never know the exact situation if you
don’t give the plan. What is the situation if you don’t give the plan?
We know, it’s today. We want improvement. We want to increase
stability and security in the whole Europe . We want to be a global
player, NATO and EU so we have to make some proposals. If we don’t give
the proposals that we just adapt or try to incorporate proposals of
other countries, mainly the Russia n. So we’re just in a position that
we adapt to their proposals. Say, "Yes, or no."
It’s now time to change this policy to say, "Our goals are, we propose."
And leave Russia to say yes or no, or to discuss with us.
RUPNIK: Bruce, you’d agree with that?
JACKSON : Can I yield to the President of Estonia?
RUPNIK: Sure.
JACKSON : That’s you, sir. Thank you , Estonia . When I read in the
financial times a few days ago that Mr. Mircea said that we have to take
into account the strategic interest of Russia .
I was a little concerned. Because if you actually look at – with whom
Russia has good relations around its borders and with whom it has bad
relations, it is, the more democratic you are, the worse your relations
are. And I think that is a serious security problem.
It is a serious strategic security problem for Europe because we are
after all, be it NATO or the European Union, ultimately community of
values fundamentally based on rule of law and democracy. And if that,
going for a rule of law and democracy means that you’re going to have
bad relations with a country, I think we should feel a certain sense of
solidarity with those countries.
Now with the issue of map, it is – we talk about it as if it were a
carrot. But in fact having gone through it, it is really a big stick, a
very big stick in an often very uncomfortable stick in all kinds of
places. That means that it is how – it is how you get countries to
change and reform even when they don’t want to do it and keep them from
taking the easy path of avoiding the serious issues be it on rule of law
and democracy, freedom of the press, good governments, corruption,
governance and corruption issues.
I think we owe it to these countries for ourselves and in defending
democracy and rule of law to give them the stick with which to get them
to really shore up their democracies. Leaving them out to sort of be on
their own, I think is a failure on our part to our own values. And we
know that had we been left out we would be in trouble today, although we
might have much better relations with our eastern neighbor by not being
as democratic and rule, law based as we are.
So I think we have to think of these issues in terms of our own values
and use the stick and give them the stick.
RUPNIK: OK. Valdis Zatlers, you want to say something?
ZATLERS: If I may offer two quick words on two questions. I don’t
agree that there – that we have only two options in the map or nothing.
You know, in ’97 there was not no map, it hadn’t been invented. And I
think, if I remember correctly, the communiqué issued at Madrid made it
crystal clear and it was not misunderstood by anyone in Moscow or
anywhere else around the world that Romania …
JACKSON : And Slovenia .
ZATLERS: And Slovenia were going to be out principal next candidates.
In other words, I think it is not beyond the capabilities of intelligent
drafters of communiqué’s to express such a thought even if collectively
NATO leaders decided not to grant map status. So I think we have some
flexibility, some options here.
If I may, Jacques, while I have the floor briefly respond to Erlanger’s
(ph) question. Somebody else mentioned earlier in our discussion that –
and I think it was a correct observation that the idea of a enlarging
NATO and engaging Russia, the dual track approach, had it been invented
in Washington in the mid-90’s.
And I think we were collectively, with strong American leadership,
successful as we approach the first NATO enlargement round to create a
relationship with Russia that made it possible for Russia if not to like
and appreciate the steps taken in Madrid , but to, I suppose, to
understand them.
And in successive efforts over the last decade, I think we have
continued that. Now maybe, I’m speaking off the top of my head, maybe
there will be a great opportunity, hopefully a successful one, for the
two presidents when they meet in Saatchi (ph) this weekend, to discuss
the outlines of a more welcoming strategic relationship.
It’s the absence of that at this moment that makes me wonder, that is my
response to the earlier question, that makes me wonder whether we have
done, if I look at the various categories of homework that NATO needs to
undertake, whether we have done enough of our homework on that front at
this point. And that is one of the reasons why we believe maybe a
different moment in time would be better for all concerned for this map
decision. Thank you.
RUPNIK: It’s important, indeed what you just said, that to remind that
the enlargement issue is not the only one in our relationship with
Russia . And when the two presidents meet, they have a number of
issues. Afghanistan , Iran , missile defense shield, and NATO
enlargement comes in that context.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: Star, three.
RUPNIK: Of other issues.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: Star, three.
RUPNIK: No, no, I didn’t go to the full list because we are running out
of time and there are several speakers threatening me.
ZATLERS: Can I add something about ’97, just a second, it might help
the conversation. The language in the final communiqué in Madrid , we
called it at that time a rendezvous clause. A rendezvous clause. So I
think we should really, if this is not going to be possible here with
two presidents and others deciding tonight. I hope this will be a
positive decision. But if not, I think we should do two things. Number
one to have an explicit rendezvous clause, simply de-dramatize the whole
thing and bring it to a lower level than a summit level. And I think
also our German friends will be happy not to have or to have this issue
addressed before the Berlin Summit next year.
RUPNIK: Yes, OK. I’ve heard all speakers and I list Eugene Smaller (ph)
was next and Mr. Georgu (ph), you after.
SMALLER (ph): Well, you know, speaking from Warsaw , you’d be surprised
if I didn’t go into Russia ’s problems. I mean, Ambassador we have a
major problem here. We have a major problem of a certain ‘I’. That
means when we analyze a situation and we ask ourselves did we do
anything wrong because of Russia , I can’t say that we did anything
wrong. We sort of, you know, unnerved them on a few decisions, but they
decided to be unnerved and they put themselves in direct adversaries to
NATO.
Whatever we say, whatever we do, we hear it’s not from the highest
echelons of the – from the Kremlin, but if you read for example,
military papers, military papers of Russia . This means the papers that
educate young officers, you will see the kind of language you heard in
the ‘70’s and in the ‘80’s in the worst regime time.
And you ask – you go to Moscow and I was on a missile because of NATO
missile defense conference, and I heard not the old marshals or
generals, but young colonels who actually completed the Rome NATO
Academy speaking the language which I heard a lot in my life, but really
upset me a bit.
Germany was not safe; it was not put aside in a special case.
RUPNIK: OK.
SMALLER (ph): Germany was part, very much of the encircling Russian
syndrome. So the question that I put to you is, shouldn’t we behave
like just a normal distant people who say this is our value, this is
what we want to offer to the world and this is what we want to do now to
the countries we care about in Europe East as they have problems.
We discussed them yesterday. Ukraine has problems as well, internal
problems. But we give them years to solve those problems. And when we
say, we give them map today; it doesn’t mean membership of NATO. And
that should be the communiqué to Moscow if Moscow chooses to be out
adversary.
RUPNIK: OK, I think Bruce you wanted to react to this?
JACKSON : Well I was still struggling with Wolfgang’s notion if you
give the diplomats more time they will be creative. Well we’ve been
waiting quite a while to get these answers. The countries in the
western Balkans have been in the membership action plan for nine years,
three times longer than any other country has prepared for NATO.
It took three ministers of foreign and defense ministers and there’s a
distinguished minister sitting here today. Three defense ministerial to
get an intensified dialogue with Georgia , this is a joke. You know,
basically this is the second or third year we’ve talked about the
beginning of a membership action plan, which is merely a dialogue plan
with the east.
And in that time we’ve seen defense budgets go up all over the Eastern
Europe . Georgia defense budget is up by 400 percent since 2003. Why?
Because they are being cut out, because they don’t have anything else to
do because they’ve been isolated.
There are consequences to this kind of thing. And we educed these new
kind of ideas like, "Oh, my God, only 20 to 30 percent of Ukrainians
support NATO." Well that’s exactly the same number that Hungry had 12
months before they got in. These things – we’ve never made – waited
longer for creative diplomacy.
So I don’t think waiting any further makes it any better.
RUPNIK: Yes, sir. If you could introduce …
BURKE: Thank you, Richard Burke from the United States . Two very
quick points. First while I happen to support the Bush Administration
on Ukraine and Georgia …
RUPNIK: Step up to the mic.
BURKE: There’s a lot of this discussion that makes me a little bit
uncomfortable. There’s been a tendency I think to sort of view this as
a contest or a discussion between people who have seized the moral high
ground and are promoting that kind of moral point of view versus the
appeasers. And I would be a lot more comfortable if we kind of looked
at this in a more realistic framework that looked at national interest.
First point, I mean, I think we ought to ban the word appeasement from
this debate. Usually when appeasement is used in these debates, the
people have made that argument, turn out to be dramatically wrong,
whoever it is or whatever we’re trying to appease.
But I think more importantly we haven’t spent enough time talking about
what is the most important change that’s occurred during the sort of 10
or 15 years of NATO expansion and that is the change that’s taken place
in Russia itself. This process got underway in the 90’s when the
Russians were weak, they were politically on the defensive and not
because it was necessarily a western strategy, but we found that we were
able to achieve pretty much what we wanted to achieve with the Russia of
the 1990’s.
That Russia has gone away.
RUPNIK: OK, what is your question?
BURKE: And we’re facing a Russia now that increasingly views itself as
a great power, so their going to be costs and benefits to the decision
that we take in this area.
RUPNIK: Yes.
BURKE: And as you pointed out Mr. Chairman, we have a Russia that
participates in the six power talks with Korea, could be an important
part of a solution to Iran and a non-proliferation that is a major
energy producer, so I think to be fair about it we have to understand
that NATO expansion has to be seen in this broader form policy context.
So it’s not surprising here, that the Germans, the French and even
some Americans, perhaps, not in this administration are thinking twice
about this issue.
RUPNIK: Are you suggesting that a different American administration
would have a different policy?
BURKE: I think, I don’t – I do think that with a new Russian
administration and with I think a desire on the part of a number of
European leaders as well as President Bush to work out a more
cooperative relationship in the aftermath of what we’ve seen in Kosovo
and Serbia, it’s not surprising people are thinking about the cost
associated with this issue as well as ((inaudible)).
RUPNIK: OK, I think – I think we’ve got the point. Anybody wants to
react to the idea a new American administration will make any
difference? Bruce?
JACKSON : Americans maybe having second thoughts about further
expansion, but Senator McCain isn’t one of them.
RUPNIK: We would expect nothing less from you, Bruce. Mr. Georgu (ph)
is the next on the list and you as well.
GEORGU (ph): Thank you.
RUPNIK: There’s an impatient gentlemen, but he’ll have to wait one more
moment.
GEORGU (ph): Since I am one of the only Greek here, I like – I’ll be
very brief. Mr. Geoana and the other speakers have covered me. The
train has stopped and this is the big message from Bucharest . If there
is a small delay in the station, does not minimize nothing. History is
((inaudible)).
RUPNIK: OK. Yes.
FOREKA (ph): Andorra Foreka (ph) from Journal Association, Romania .
In Warsaw , last month, Secretary General of NATO talking about NATO
involvement in Pakistan mentioned that the main site of NATO should stay
on Europe . Calling Europe an unfinished business. We are talking here
about the Balkans, all the countries in the Balkans, recognized or
incompletely recognized.
What are countries like Ukraine , Georgia ? What about the Republic of
Cordova ? People crying is going to accepted in the map. Do you think
Mr. Jackson, that this move will help the transition into be solved or
by the contrary will create new problems in the area?
Do you think the Republic of Cordova would become an island, an enclave
somehow here in this part of Europe , a country bordered by NATO and the
European Union? Do you think the question is for you and the others,
that countries like the United States or Germany or other countries
including Romania might accept the statue of neutrality that Republic of
Cordova is claiming each and every day? Thank you.