THE BUCHAREST CONFERENCE - Russia on the Rise: What Impact for NATO?
(Check against delivery)
KENNEDY: Welcome back. We're ready for our final session.
Russia on the rise, what impact for NATO. Also a number of you have asked if we're going to give any kind of report on what's going on at the summit. And I'll tell you if you just sit still at the end of the session, we hope to have a summary of the press conference that will be held at the summit in probably about an hour. So we'll try to have some information available for you then.
It's a special pleasure to introduce our next moderator, Robin Shepherd, who's with Chatham House, but used to be at GMF. And it just shows what a close working relationship we've had with Chatham House.
And he's the perfect guy to take on this, kind of, positive, upbeat final topic. Go ahead.
SHEPHERD: Thank you very much, Craig. And welcome everybody to this final panel on Russia. I mean, Russia is always on our minds when it comes to NATO, and these days more or less anything else in the world. So I'm very pleased that this final panel is going to be addressing directly the question that's been implicit in everybody's discussions throughout this wonderful conference, which I think Craig Kennedy correctly described as the idea summit next to the politicians'
summit, which is taking place a few hundred yards away from us today.
Like the other panels, what we're going to be doing is starting off with some sort of opening questions, bringing you in as quickly as possible. I'd like to ask you all, when you do make comments, to state your name and affiliation. And also, if you could, you're very welcome to make comments rather than questions. But when you do make either a comment or a question, please be as punchy and as concise as you possibly can.
So I think the first question, which is the question which is interesting to me, and it's interesting to everybody right now looking at Russia, is the obvious one about the succession. President Putin is about to step down from the presidency from what has been -- I think where everyone stands on the question of Vladimir Putin and the way he's run Russia, I think one thing can't be denied, that from his own point of view, his own terms, this has been an incredibly successful presidency.
There are also those people looking at the summit here in Bucharest, who might say -- and I'll introduce this as a controversial thread, which I hope people will pick up on in the questions. This actually has potentially been a very successful summit for Vladimir Putin as well here in Bucharest.
But back to this key question -- we're in a situation, or entering a situation, if I can put it in grandiose terms and perhaps terms that won't actually capture the reality, of entering a situation of dual power perhaps in Russia. But the last time we had dual power in Russia was in 1917. And we all know what happened after that. So I'm wondering now exactly how we should be characterizing the situation in Russia.
Vladimir Putin is stepping down to become, as we expect, the prime minister. Dmitri Medvedev is taking over as president. What kind of a man is Dmitri Medvedev? Does he want to use this juncture in Russian history to promote a warmer relationship with the West? Or are we missing the point in focusing on personalities? You know, is this increasingly fraught relationship with Russia, which has been very much fraught in the rhetorical sense -- is this a product of trends in Russia which go beyond the question of the name of a man, the person who's in charge? I mean, what exactly is going on?
I'd like to address this question first of all to Sergei Markov, who's on the right-hand side of this panel, who entered the Russian Duma for United Russia in the December parliamentary elections and has an illustrious past in Russia as a commentator, as an advisor to Vladimir Putin. He was just telling me that, from 2000, Sergei was involved in brainstorming sessions with Vladimir Putin in an advisory capacity. And also, he's a man who is listened to by the Kremlin and by the people who support the Kremlin.
So I wonder, Sergei, if you could provide some insight into what exactly is going to be happening in Russia now. Is Medvedev going to be his own man? Is there a transition period? How do you see the situation?
MARKOV: Thank you. Thank you for the good words. And thank you, German Marshall Foundation and Chatham House for organizing such kind of discussion, because I think we really need more discussion; because security issue, cooperation issues still to be very problematic.
And maybe main question which we have towards our partners from the NATO to United States can be regard something like this.
Last 15 years, you have been most influential organization, most influential country if you're talking about United States. And we should ask ourselves is situation and security in the world became better or worse? And their answer is clear -- much more worse. I'm talking not comparison with Cold War, but after Cold War -- last 10, 15 years.
So it is because leadership of United States and NATO. And we should ask what kind of mistake you made you think. If you made mistake, in what specific you want to change to improve situation. If you don't want to change your policy, if you don't want to recognize your mistake, what we should expect later? The situation and security will be worse and worse. So everybody have to have military race.
Everybody has to increase its military budget. And what else? What later? I think it's the main question.
But now, to answer (inaudible) question, I think that it will be no two centers of power. Or to say it another term, it will be two centers of power. It will be bad development of situation. It will be wrong development. I think these two leaders want to have one center of power, which will include two persons. And most of the key decisions will be made by two (inaudible). And then they will implement it through their specific institutions. And then house will develop.
Either Dmitri Medvedev will be not only the Russian president but also national leader, mostly popular politician who will be elected in 2012, not because he was suggested by Vladimir Putin, but because he is Dmitri Medvedev. We don't know. I think Vladimir Putin would like if such development will happen, because a country needs some kind of new impact. And we think that country now move to another stage of development.
We reached stabilization. We recreated governmental institutions. We recreated stability and have economic growth. Now we need another stage of development, moving from the raw material exactly to the high-tech economy, to create big middle class and to create more opportunity for the business and for public opinion for the (inaudible) to develop.
If Dmitri Medvedev will be able to do this, he will be national leader. If he will not able, I think next election maybe Vladimir Putin will take title or somebody else from his team. But the team will continue. But the roles inside this team will change. And (inaudible) either Medvedev will be able to be the leader. Still before, we didn't see him in the culture. We never saw him as a loser and never saw him as a winner. For to be leader, he has to be in political contract. And we will see what kind of (inaudible) it will be. Thank you.
SHEPHERD: Sergei, a quick follow-up to that. People who've been optimists about Russia since the end of Communism have tended to place a lot of emphasis on the need that Russia has in order to become the kind of modernized economy you described to achieve that next phase to engage with the world, to attract foreign direct investment, not just in the extractive sector, which has been the dominant form of foreign direct investment recently; but in terms of Internet, in terms of the broad spectrum of economic and business interests that define modern economies.
Perhaps going on that optimistic vein, doesn't that therefore mean if Dmitri Medvedev wants to be that kind of leader, that he's going to try and adopt a more conciliatory relationship with the West? This is not to say that -- you know, I'm not apportioning blame at this stage. It's simply from his own point of view, to achieve the things he wants to achieve, do you genuinely believe there is now an opportunity for a warmer relationship with NATO and with the West?
MARKOV: Of course, of course. There are good opportunity and we can see the torrent of rhetoric already change. Maybe the policy position didn't change yet. But the tone of rhetoric change. And it's very good. I think it's great, good opportunity also for the changing of policy. And we hope that this (inaudible) considerations of Russian better relationship, including Russia-NATO relation also will change; because we think Russia and most of the members of NATO has basic common interests or the general international politic issue.
And I frankly believe that Russia, during last two years, took right positions. Russia took right position on the Iraq. It was bad war. And still to be criminal war. Here, by the way, I should stress that those country which support idea to push Ukraine and Georgia to the NATO, it's exactly those countries who support the war in Iraq. They already created this problem. And they are going to create another problem.
We want to improve relationship. But we think that its improvement of relationship shouldn't be in style of '90s when Russia president just repeated yes sir, yes sir, yes sir, and the West took everything. No. That should be bilaterally relation and respective interests. I think Russian interests should be more respected in different areas, including security issue, including human rights issue.
Look at happened what in Estonia and Latvia. These country, by the way, members of NATO, you recognize them as democratic country. But they are not. Ethnical Russians openly discriminated in those countries, only because they are Russians. It's not democracy. And we expect such kind of things will be changed. We're very open. Russia keeping low profiles on the different issues. We try to minimize those conflicts.
But everyone who want to improve relationship with Russia should take in account that Russia never will be such weak as it was in '90s.
SHEPHERD: That's very...
MARKOV: It will more and more influential. And Russia will try to play positive role in those areas, as it's played in their situation before Iraq war, as it's played in situation in Northern Korea, as it's played on the Kosovo issue (inaudible) that we are right, and on other issues too.
SHEPHERD: Thank you very much, Sergei, for a very clear explanation, I think, of where the Russian governmental elites are coming from. And this is something that I think many debates that one gets and goes to, whether United States or Western Europe, we debate with people who agree with us rather than people who disagree with us.
And we therefore fail to get insight into what's actually going on. And I think that's a very clear expression of exactly where the Russian elites are going.
I'd like to turn now to a man who has been at the top of Russian government, or had been at the top of Russian government for many years, Mikhail Kasyanov, the gentleman at the far end of the panel. Mikhail was deputy finance minister for five years, I think, from 1995 and finance minister for a year under President Boris Yeltsin, and then was for four years the prime minister of the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin.
Mikhail Kasyanov also made a bid to run for the Russian presidency, which came to naught. We're not here to discuss the internal workings of Russia, except insofar as they then provide us with an insight as to how we should deal with Russia internationally and how, therefore, in the context of this conference, we and countries in NATO should deal with Russia.
I wonder whether to pick up on one of the final points that Sergei made. It seems to me that when it comes to the security relationship in Russia, and the security agenda defined by the political elites in Russia, the 1990s is an area, as Sergei said, which is referred back to as a time of humiliation. This wasn't exactly Sergei's word. But it's a word that I often hear from Russian friends.
How important do you think it is for the way that the current people who govern Russia, the perceived losses that Russia suffered in the 1990s? How important is that as an explanation for the way Russia sees the outside world today?
KASYANOV: Robin, thank you very much for your comments and the questions and organizing such a panel. It is absolutely crucial time to reconcile what we have and to understand where we end up. Just very soon, second term of Vladimir Putin ends, and Russia moves to another stage. And NATO, with its developments, also going on further on. And maybe in the near future, say six moths after or a year after, we can get together again and would see where we will be at that time.
To answer your question, first we should understand how we perceive, how we see, relations between West and Russia in the near future. I think these relations will be more difficult compared with the period what we have now, because of the simple reason; because after eight years this authority and power, President Putin I mean, and especially last four years, second term; and up us, with the situation that Russia is not democratic country anymore.
Within short period of time, all main democratic features of democratic state has disappeared. And right now, Russians lost all major fundamental rights, like political freedoms and a lot of problems with human rights. And it means that, at the end of this period, Russia is experiencing a growing self-isolation, I would put this way -- self-isolation.
And this growing problem is based not on the disagreements between West and NATO and Russia on the topics on one or another particular project or problem on international scale. That problem, growing problem, is based on values; because it's appeared to be that suddenly, in autumn 2004, values which Russian authority implement and practice appealed to the different (inaudible) pretended. And then majority of Russians stopped before.
That's why now, we have a great gap between understanding how this world should operate, how nations should interact. That is the fundamental problem. And all other problems that consequences of this misunderstanding or different understanding of the life. That is the main explanation.
And, of course, there was a period of time when we, after our problems we experienced in (inaudible) as we come up to the period that we believe. Then me being head of the government, I just had the bright ideas. I believed in that, where finally we'll have an opportunity to be integrated much more with European Union, with NATO, with United States and the whole civilized world, we call it West.
And as practical operations in the first two, three years, we achieved quite a lot. And both the joint operations in Afghanistan and fight against international terrorism, and then creation of NATO-Russia Council which, of course, would lead to another great idea, that my idea of -- and millions of Russians -- that Russia should be a full-fledged
G8 member, not only. And Russia in principle, that my policy view should be, in the future full-fledged NATO member. So that to create and to establish a global security which every nation believed too.
That was absolutely a great opportunity follow us. And I think Americans and Europeans feel the same way in the year 2002 and beginning 2003. We lost this opportunity. We lost to be united. We Europeans lost an opportunity to create enlarged real Europe with the safe territory and sharing the same values. It is written in our constitution -- the same values written in the constitutions of any European countries.
But now we hear nice words. But we know that during last four years, nothing has been delivered. And now it's continuation the same political course. We hear nice words from President-elect Dmitri Medvedev. But we should make judgment on fruits delivered, but not nice, perfect words. That's why we should make a judgment later, in six months.
SHEPHERD: So is this a central point, because it seems to me that when I speak to Russia analysts in the West or Russia analysts in Russia, that the honest answer to the question, who really is going to be running Russia, at this stage is we don't know. Is that correct?
KASYANOV: Absolutely. We...
MARKOV: Putin and Medvedev will run country.
SHEPHERD: OK. One of the two, or both.
KASYANOV: We, within short period of time, lost a main fundamental, constitutional right -- right for free and fair elections.
As a result, we have not legitimate parliament. As a result, we have not legitimate president. Country with a nuclear power without legitimate power authority. That is something. That's why to obtain legitimacy, delivery of those nice words should take place in reality, in the real commitments and the restoration, at least free restoration of rights for manifestation, restoration of rights for creation of association, and restoration of the rights for free elections and free media.
SHEPHERD: Thank you, Mr. Kasyanov, Mikhail. Let's flit over Europe and over the Atlantic to the United States now. And I'd like to introduce our next panelist, Angela Stent, who's the director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies at Georgetown University and amongst many other great and wonderful things she has done in her life was the national intelligence officer for the United States between 2004 and 2006 for Russia and Eurasia.
Angela, what do you see, and what does America see in terms of the future of the -- this is a very broad question, OK -- in terms of the relationship between the United States and Russia due to the transition in the presidency in Russia? Is it about personalities? Is it about a juncture where it's not -- the personalities happen to be on the scene and shifting, but there are real underlying forces which might change this relationship? Or are the underlying dynamics set. And we're just going to have to live with them?
STENT: Well, thank you very much, Robin. I'm delighted to be here. And I think that's a 64,000-ruble question, better than dollars at the moment. I belong to a breed of recovering Sovietologists. And we're still recovering, and we're still challenged by that. I think the honest answer to the question of who Mr. Medvedev is and what he will do, and how this dual power will work, I don't think anybody knows.
Certainly we don't know it. In terms of...
STENT: – who Mr. Medvedev is, what he will do, and how this dual-power will work, I don't think anybody knows, certainly we don't know it. In terms of what his foreign policy might be, the statements he has made so far have been just to say that he supports President Hu's foreign policy. On the other hand, he has made statements about the rule of law, about the economy, about the need to bring back, to remove the state from the economy which sound as if he would move in a somewhat more liberal economic direction. What we also know is that we are now facing a Russia that has become a major international economic player and I think we have to remember that. This is the new Russian reality, with 460 or maybe it is 80 by now billion dollars of reserves, with a
7 percent growth rate every year, et cetera, et cetera, and poised to become an outward investors.
And yet, as we have heard from Sergei Markov, and we heard from Mikhail Kasyanov as well, the narrative in Russia about what happened in the 1990s and you write about that in your paper is completely different from the narrative in the West about what happened. Someone raised today in one of the morning sessions about Chancellor Merkel talking about Russia's legitimate security interest and I want to come back to this because the whole issue with NATO, NATO enlargement, U.S.-Russian relations, European-Russian relations, boils down to this question of what do we consider to be Russia's legitimate security concerns in its neighborhood, in Europe. Globally we heard some other things from Sergei here. And what does Russia consider to be its legitimate interest? Can we sit down and have a conversation about that? We tried to do it earlier on in the Bush Administration, didn't go anywhere. So I think these are some of the challenges; I think the other thing we do know, even though we don't know what will happen domestically, is Russia is determined that future solutions to global problems will not – there won't be solutions unless Russia has an input into these and that it really does seek to revise agreements of the 1990s that were made when it considers itself to have been weak and we heard that on CFE and other issues.
So, right now, it is – the relationship is certainly atrophied in terms in the U.S.-Russian relationship of contact, the President Bush is trying to remedy that. He is going to meet with both President Putin and President elect Medvedev. In Sochi, there is this new strategic framework deal on the table that they will discuss; it contains many elements, not only missile defense, it has – it contains elements that have to do with nuclear cooperation, with energy, even Jackson-Vanik WTO, OECD. We will see what happens, what comes out of these discussions, but I think it is a period of great uncertainty from certainly the U.S. point of view as to how Russia will develop and how the succession will play out, will depend on these domestic forces and different groups that we know are in contention, but we don't know how they will resolve their issues.
SHEPHERD: Thank you very much, Angela. Let me go now to my own country, to Great Britain. Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones, who is David Cameron's National Security Adviser, David Cameron being the leader of the Conservative Party, the main opposition party in Britain at the moment and a party which, if the opinion polls are believed, stands a decent chance of becoming and forming the next British government, although two and three years in politics is a long, long time, so we can't be sure of that. Nevertheless, Pauline is the Shadow Security Minister for the Conservative Party, specializes in counterterrorism. Until 1996, he was Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee in the Cabinet's Office, somebody who understands security issues intimately.
Pauline, one of the things, one of the saddest developments I think in the relationship between Russia and the West has been quite specifically in the last year or two, the relationship between Russia and Britain. We have had the case of the killing of the Litvinenko; we have had the furor over the person the British governments and the British judicial authorities went to interview Sir Lugovoi. We have had issues over the British Council in Russia. It is a relationship that has become very fraught. Do you believe that there is any chance, do you get any sense from what you hear or in terms of your analysis of the way the relationship between Russia and Britain is going that there is hope here at this juncture that we are out with the Russian leadership changing that we can actually get a more constructive – let's not talk about a warm relationship just yet, but at least a more constructive relationship back on track between Britain and Russia?
PAULINE NEVILLE-JONES, MEMBER, HOUSE OF LORDS, UNITED KINGDOM: It would certainly be highly desirable to be able to move to something which was rather less negative than we have at the moment. I would like, if I could, for just – a moment just to disaggregate why we think we are there. Can I just say that we have some experience in the UK of one policy two people and it doesn't work, and …
SHEPHERD:Is that the Queen and the Prime Minister or the Prime Minister and the …
JONES: I leave it to the audience who is very well informed, to understand my meaning. I think that it does raise doubts and that's sort of highly desirable it seems to me from the point of the view of the outside world, about who is actually in charge and therefore, what the policy is going to be, and that in itself I think is potentially a cause of aggravated difficulty in the relationship. Clarity about who holds office and who holds power seems to me to be highly desirable.
The other rather disconcerting thing I think I've just heard is both of these two gentlemen who have extraordinarily different analysis of where Russia is, where Russia ought to be, and what Russia ought to be doing, agree on one thing, which is this relationship is going to get more difficult between this country and the West and that's a depressing prognosis of our forthcoming future because this relationship across the Atlantic and including the European, I mean in that, is really one of the axis of power in the world, no argument about that. So, this is not I think a good start. Sochi seems to me going to be very important, if I might just say that people are going to be looking to that, to see whether that meeting represents some kind of turning of the corner or potential for improvement in this relationship or whether actually if it doesn't do that, then I think I do conclude this is probably going to get worse because the momentum to stabilize of itself doesn't seem to me to be there at the moment.
But, to turn to your question, just briefly on the UK. UK I think in some way is, has been something of a sort of hard example of some of the broader issues which actually affect the relationship between Russia and Western allies. You mentioned Litvinenko, that ties up two separate issues, one is clearly there is a bilateral problem between my country and Russia over the question of asylum and people have sought asylum in UK and also immigration policy. We have tried to dissuade the Russians that actually they should actually take advantage of UK legal procedures. What is wholly unacceptable is to come and kill people on our streets with radiological weapons. And that has done something else quite undesirable, it has turned the UK-Russia relationship into something, which was largely a matter of the elites worrying into something now which has popular antagonism behind it. That in itself makes it more difficult for the government not to do what I think it would like to, which is actually to find grounds of gradually moving the relationship forward.
Two other things. You mentioned difficulties of the British Council.
There is also difficulties for BBC World Service. I think this goes to the gradual tightening of the noose, I mean Mikhail Kasyanov spelt it out much better than I can. That in turn has affected our support for non-governmental organizations like Human Rights across the board in Eastern Europe, but including Russia. And I think that it is fair to say that one of the drivers of a poorish UK-Russia relationship is actually the issue of – values is one and the security agenda is the other. And I think that there, you see in (INAUDIBLE) there are some of the problems that we do face. Finally, I'd just say, despite all that, there is bifurcated character in our relationship. We have never invested so much in Russia as we do now. There has never been such as lively commercial relationship as there is now and so far, would be I think the willing consent of both sides, this has remained largely untouched by the political difficulties. How long that kind of bifurcation can continue I think is one of the issues and indeed how far on its own merits it will continue depends I think on some of the things that Mr. Medvedev will or will not do.
I would like to come back, but perhaps you want to do the second round, a little question of the security agenda, but it seems to me, the security agenda, NATO security agenda is actually one of the areas of objective clash of interests between Russia and ourselves.
SHEPHERD: That's a better point at which to bring in the audience here because I was going to actually raise this question. Are we actually because of our different views of the way the world should be ordered, because of our values in terms of way – regardless of how you characterize it, I think everybody can agree that Russian political society is different let's say from British political society and the American and French and German. If we are expanding a security alliance based on values which more closely reflect the realities in Western Europe and United States than those in Russia, are we not fated therefore to have a relationship which is always going to be tense at some level and may often be at least rhetorically very vitriolic? Let me open the question to the audience. First person I saw was this gentleman here.
TOMS BAUMANIS, LATVIAN TRANSATLANTIC ORGANIZATION: My name is Toms Baumanis; I am from Latvian Transatlantic Organization. I want to ask question to Mr. Kasyanov because I really found your statement about lost opportunity very appealing and here I want to have a little comment. I remember in early '90s when Yeltsin visited Warsaw, he said, "It's fine. You can join NATO." After return back to Moscow, he suddenly withdrew his statement. I think this is about security agenda, but that time if Russians would have a little bit more positivism in their strategic thinking saying that we don't have any problem or Central Eastern Europe joining whatever European institution, that would be a really different story. Even for Kremlin hardliners, it will a possible solution because for us, Balts, in '94, it would be much more difficult to convince Europeans that we need to join NATO. In '94, Douglas Herb was writing that the Baltic countries should be Finlandized. But, for a positive scenario, there is a way building Europe you talk about. So I wondered if you can have a comment on this. Thank you.
SHEPHERD: OK. I will take a couple more and then we will come back to the panel. Please.
MIKE HALTZEL, CENTER FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AT JOHNS HOPKINS: My name is Mike Haltzel; I am from the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins, SAIS, in Washington. A brief comment on Mr. Markov's statement and then a question. You continued the – you repeated essentially and elaborated on the official historical rendering of the 1990s which Mr. Kosachev gave us in the last session, names that more or less there was an attempt by the West to keep Russia down, humiliation and hence we go up to the Munich speech by Putin which was made necessary by all this. I would like to vigorously dispute this rendering. The world is complex; there are many things that the West did, different countries that Russia didn't like; there are many things Russia did. But, let me just give you two quick examples, Yegor Gaidar, the former acting Prime Minister of your country has said on several occasions that the emergency food aid that the United States shipped immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union helped stave off starvation; this was a human rights issue. It was done very quickly by the United States. Second thing on security matters, you mentioned the CFE. We have heard about the CFE. In the late 1990s, the U.S. Senate ratified a hundred to nothing. The CFE flank document which allowed for Russia's security concerns after the first Chechen war. I mean this is just – I must say I find this almost an official myth to justify the current policies of the Russian regime. But that brings me to the question that you brought up about maps for Ukraine and Georgia and you tied them in, Mr. Markov, with the Iraq War, calling it a criminal war and the countries that support this were the same.
Let's – if – it would be really helpful to us I think if you would get the question which is hanging over this conference, what exactly troubles you about amps for Georgia and Ukraine. Let's below this slogan hearing. Do you look at NATO in sort of Soviet terms, as an aggressive alliance, that really threatens your security interests?
What precisely bothers you about maps for Ukraine and Georgia? Thank you.
SHEPHERD: Thank you. We will take one more question from the gentleman there, (INAUDIBLE) in the blue shirt and the red tie.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: I am really grateful for having the opportunity for all of us to listen to what Mr. Markov has to say because he sort of justifies with his own words all the misgivings, fears and question marks which we have over the Russian policy. First of all, since he is the author of the famous definition of, how do you call it, democracy for Russia, what was it termed? Sovereign democracy. It comes to me the old Soviet joke, what is different between democracy and sovereign democracy? The same as between chair and electric chair. It was about essentially democracy. It means Russia sort of portrays itself as a world in itself and it is not. We asked the question – you ask a question who is ruling Russia? I was at the briefing at the State Department with different agencies there and we asked the same question, and they couldn't like during the Soviet times, we could determine who is close to the leader on the
(INAUDIBLE) we knew who is ruling Russia. Russia is a very – is being ruled by the group, which cannot be named by name.
I met during one of the conference a gentleman who spoke in a very interesting manner, and I asked who is this man? He said, "No one really knows what he is doing, one thing, he is signing minister's permission to go abroad." He is from the Kremlin administration. So, we are dealing with a very complex situation, which will not be solved by the termination, whether there is a duality of power between Medvedev and Putin. This is much more complex than that.
Thirdly, this create major problems when dealing with Russia and I think that we, when we are having complex problems, we have to reduce them to some issues which we can deal with. And for me, those issues have been spelt by our British speaker, we speak about BBC World Service, we speak about British Council. Mr. Medvedev said British Council is a spy organization. I don't need more debate on the other complex issue because it tells me more about the frame of mind than any other arguments. And if you would have members of the Polish or Czech public opinion asking themselves, do we really need the missile defense, I think we should invite Mr. Markov and he would do a very good job as he (INAUDIBLE). Thank you.
SHEPHERD: Well, Sergei, you came into the lion's den, which is a testament to your courage. There have been some interesting questions, I think, which were directed, quite a few of them towards you, but I think anybody who wants to comment on the panel should comment. You made notes as I saw from the questions, if I can just come back to one of the questions, which I think in a way sort of – it's emblematic of everything else which then lies beneath it. It was raised over here.
What exactly is it that Russia is so concerned about if Ukraine and Georgia join NATO? Does Russia absolutely believe that these countries will one day invade Russia or finance terrorism inside Russia, or if there are any security threat that you can identify? I can understand that there are people in Russia who would have a sense that this is a loss of territory that used to be ours. But, in what sense, do you believe – do you believe yourself and do you believe that Mr. Putin and perhaps Mr. Medvedev would view those countries as representing a security threat to Russia?
MARKOV: Of course, these countries, Ukraine and Georgia, and thank you very much for your question and I think that we need debates. And I think it is important to debate such issue. I think Russian approach towards these countries' membership, NATO is based on few principles.
One is democratic principles means that what citizens want and we can see that citizens of Georgia want Georgia to join NATO and we respect it very much. Yes, it is political will of citizens of Georgia, but citizens of Abkhazia don't want and citizens of South Ossetia don't want too. So, join NATO but without those countries. It is one.
Secondly, it is clear, ask people. By the way, I should remember you if you don't know history. I think, might be not everybody knows it, Abkhazia and South Ossetia never been a part of the independent Georgia. They have been part of the Georgia which has been part of the Russian Empire. And when Georgia, [Carthia] and Ossetia joined Russian Empire, they have been very small territorial from point of view and then Russian Czar put together and then Russian leader (INAUDIBLE) who was ethnically Georgian maybe, they put together Abkhazia and Ossetia under the control of (INAUDIBLE). So, I think that opinion of the Georgians should be respected, but opinions of the Abkhazians and Ossetians also should be respected.
Same about Ukraine. Its political view of the nation. We should ask them and their answer is clear, 75 percent against Ukraine joining NATO. Now, I heard that furor that, oh, it is a victim of propaganda, the victim of pro-NATO propaganda. (INAUDIBLE) is government is conducting already the last ten years, and nevertheless, majority of the Ukrainian citizens strongly think against Ukraine joining NATO not because they see that NATO is their enemy, no, just because they see that NATO is some kind of opponent to Russia. And Ukrainian citizens, first of all, wants to build good relations with Russia. It's their opinion. And democracy, if government follows the political will of the nation, it's a substance of democracy.
SHEPHERD: I will let you go to your second point. Just on your first point, so are you therefore saying that if the political situation were to change in Ukraine, let's say over the next couple of years and there will be a large majority in favor of joining NATO, then you would accept Ukraine as a member of NATO?
MARKOV: Yes, of course. Russia will change, but (INAUDIBLE) second principle is the decision should be based on the law. Everybody, who is against the law here? Is there somebody in this auditorium against the law? I think everybody agrees that democracy also is the law.
Ukrainian Independence Constitution directly clear outline Ukraine as out of bloc country.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: (INAUDIBLE).
MARKOV: No, it is clear outlined Ukraine is out of bloc country. Also, Ukrainian law on security and defense say that Ukraine can join NATO only if it does not undermine Ukraine's relationship with Russia.
That's way, Ukraine joining the NATO is violating Ukrainian laws.
SHEPHERD: But, OK. But, in a democracy, you can change the law, so you could change the constitution.
MARKOV: Of course, yes, yes.
SHEPHERD: So, (INAUDIBLE) constitution change the laws, (INAUDIBLE).
MARKOV: Yes, change the law. Our third principle is also we want to base (INAUDIBLE). And frankly speaking, we think that NATO should be coalition of democratic countries and NATO should support democracy and so. When we see a situation in Georgia, I read a lot of international press of Georgia and I think if somebody of you read only English media about Georgia but never Russian speaking, you would be very surprised what happened in Georgia November 7 and generally last November, but you wouldn't be surprised if you read Russian media because it was clear that situation in Georgia moved from semi-democracy under Shevernadze to the (INAUDIBLE) regime of personal power under Mikheil Saakashvili. There are lot of questions, who killed Zurab Zhvania? Prime minister and real opponent of Mr.
Saakashvili.
SHEPHERD: OK. We can go into questions – let's stick to security issues.
MARKOV: Who, why – no, no. Yes, but it is important. Who is this people? Who killed Mr. Yushchenko? I think most of the auditorium in this – most of the people in this auditorium think that Mr. Yushchenko is really big proponent of democracy. I don't think so. Mr.
Yushchenko, his dismissal of the parliament, was not having constitutional right. He blocked constitution court. He violated human rights of ethnical Russians and he tried to suppress Russians there and it is what we are afraid of.
SHEPHERD: Hold on a second. Hold on, let me ask a question here.
MARKOV: Yes.
SHEPHERD: Because we don't want to locked into all the internal dynamics, although if you are going to make an argument that Ukraine and Georgia pose a national security threat to Russia, let's for the sake of argument accept everything you said about the two countries, still in what sense does Ukraine or Georgia represent a national security threat to Russia if they join NATO? Let's forget about the democracy, forget about everything else, in what sense do they threaten Russia by joining NATO?
MARKOV: Good question. First of all, we think that if Georgia, for example, join NATO, Georgian not quite democratic government very bit (INAUDIBLE).
SHEPHERD: But, democratic or not (INAUDIBLE).
MARKOV: Will try to create crisis between Russia and NATO. That's exactly Latvia and Estonia is doing every time.
SHEPHERD: OK.
MARKOV: This country has specific goals not to improve relationship between Russia and NATO but to undermine relationship and to create a difficult crisis.
SHEPHERD: No, no, this is (INAUDIBLE).
MARKOV: Second, Ukraine. We need, first of all, cooperation with Ukraine, for economic reason, for humanitarian reason, for different, different reasons. We need this cooperation exactly like United States needs cooperation with Canada, for example. Let's imagine, if Canada will join military alliance together with Chavez Venezuela, Fidel Castro Cuba, and Morales Bolivia, and it will happen (INAUDIBLE) against public opinion of Canada and which will happen by Canadian President who dissolved Canadian Parliament without constitutional rights, and then blocked constitutional court of Canada and what will be the behavior of Washington? Angela would say it.
SHEPHERD: OK.
MARKOV: If so happens. What people in …
SHEPHERD: OK. I will actually ask Angela because – hold on a second, Sergei, you will definitely get a chance to …
MARKOV: One last question.
SHEPHERD: No, no, let me just go on to – because I want to you ask your question to Angela.
MARKOV: Yes. Estonia (INAUDIBLE) we saw this country, when this country joined NATO, situations for ethnical Russians have been improved as NATO members promised to us many times. But, (INAUDIBLE) and we pray the situation for Russian language, Russian culture and ethnical Russians in Ukraine, NATO also will be not improved but will be worse, and the result it will that (INAUDIBLE) and political instability inside Ukraine. You will see that (INAUDIBLE) in Ukrainian Parliament really has been blocked by political forces, who are against membership of Ukraine, because Ukraine is against it.
SHEPHERD: OK. Sergei, (INAUDIBLE) next question. Listen, I think it is very easy to people from Western countries to actually just dismiss everything Sergei said. To be honest with you, I might dismiss quite a lot myself, but let me actually – let's phrase this question a little bit more intelligently in terms of trying to under Russia here. We are saying – I am playing devil's advocate, but I want to put this to you Angela. We are saying that if Georgia joins NATO, that poses no threat whatsoever to Russia's national interests. That's what we are saying.
We are saying there is no security threat. But, Georgia wants to join NATO because it thinks there is a security threat from Russia effectively. There were other reasons, but that is the fundamental reality. I put it you as that (INAUDIBLE) of this question. We can't have this both ways, can we? There are either – if there is a security threat we are trying to counter from Russia by bringing Georgia in, that means we have accepted that we are actually going to block a potential route for Russian power in the Caucuses.
STENT: Well, I am going to turn this around a bit. I mean, if I listen to Sergei, to make the analogy with Hugo Chavez or Raul Castro, you are assuming that NATO is an enemy organization, which is what we hear from a lot of Russian officials. There is a NATO-Russia council, Russia and NATO meet regularly, (INAUDIBLE) there is going to be meeting tomorrow. I would say you can't have it both ways if you are Russia. If NATO was an enemy organization and an antagonist, why do you have a NATO-Russia council, why is President Putin coming tomorrow, why are the joint military things that we do together, NATO and Russia? So, there – now, you also point out it is true that given the history of the Russian empire and the Soviet Union, there are concerns among some of Russia's neighbors about what Russia's future intentions might be and they see NATO as a way of integrating into Euro-Atlantic structures and enhancing their own security.
But, NATO itself does not see Russia as an enemy and we heard that from President Bush yesterday, you can hear that from any other member of NATO. NATO is – Russia is not an enemy, it is a country with whom NATO tries to cooperate and cooperates to some extent. So, I think that – again, you cannot, it is either an organization with which Russia cooperates or it is an enemy organization. Now, again, I also understand that given Russian history and what happened in the '90s and the breakup of the Soviet Union, it takes a long time obviously to adjust to the new status. We all understand that there has to be some understanding there. But, then, we come back to the question, what are Russia's legitimate concerns in its neighborhood. I would argue that if there is a threat to Russia and you argue that in your own paper the threat is potentially from the East, it is from the rising China and it is certainly from the South. It is from terrorism, it is from all of the evils that beset us globally, the things that we heard about, those things are potential threats to Russia. It is not NATO.
It is not having four airplanes patrol the Baltic States once they join us. That is not a threat to Russia.
And I think the final point, I don't want to go on about Ukraine and Georgia, but there is a difference between a membership action plan and a membership. And if Ukraine had been granted, which it wasn't, the membership action plan, it is not membership, it takes a long time. It could have taken same – same with Georgia to up to ten years, and public opinion as we heard – as we have heard several times in this conference, in many of the states that are now members of NATO, where it is also not very much in favor of NATO including the Federal Republic of Germany, when it first joined NATO. So, I think one needs to be a little clearer about what the organization represents.
MARKOV: Angela, don't ignore what people see. Don't ignore, it is not quite democratic. I know that some of the people believe that now Ukraine (INAUDIBLE) NATO, but then (INAUDIBLE) propagandistic machine, we will enforce total strong propaganda and then we will force it.
SHEPHERD: That's a good …
MARKOV: It is not good.
SHEPHERD: But that is a good segue into what I was going to ask Mikhail, because you mentioned a propaganda machine and there might those who would say, you certainly know what you are talking about.
So, in that score, Mikhail, do you believe that the Russian government is deliberately digging up a threat, digging up – making appear a threat that isn't actually there in order to legitimize –
STENT: ...It's either an organization with which Russia
cooperates. Or it's an enemy organization. Now, again, I also
understand that, given Russian history and what happened in the '90s and the break-up of the Soviet Union, it takes a long time, obviously, to
adjust to the new status. We all understand that there has to be some
understanding there. But then we come back to the question what are
Russia's legitimate concerns in its neighborhood?
I would argue that, if there is a threat to Russia -- and you argued that in your paper the threat is potentially from the East.
It's from a rising China. And it's certainly from the south. It's
from terrorism. It's from all of the evils that beset us globally, the
things that we heard about. Those things are potential threats to
Russia. It's not NATO. It's not having, you know, four Arab planes
patrol the Baltic States (inaudible), that's not a threat to Russia.
And I think the final point -- I don't want to go on about
Ukraine and Georgia. But there's a difference between a membership
action plan and membership. And if Ukraine had been granted, which it
wasn't, the membership action plan, it's not membership. It takes a
long time. It could have taken --and same with Georgia -- up to ten
years. And public opinion, as we've heard several times in this
conference, in many of the states that are now members of NATO were also not very much in favor of NATO, including the Federal Republic of Germany when it first joined NATO.
So I think one needs to be a little clearer about what the organization represents or not.
MARKOV: Don't ignore what people see. Don't ignore it. It's
not quite democratic. I know that some of the people believe that now
Ukraine (inaudible) NATO. But then we will switch you on
propagandistic machine, we will enforce total strong propaganda. And
then we will enforce it.
(CROSSTALK)
SHEPHERD: That's a good point...
MARKOV: And it's not good.
SHEPHERD: But that's a good segue into what I was going to ask
Mikhail, because you mentioned a propaganda machine. And there might
be those who'd say you certainly know what you're talking about from
that score. Mikhail, do you believe that the Russian government is
deliberately digging up a threat, making appear a threat that isn't
actually there, in order to legitimize its ideology? Is this part of
what Vladimir Putin and the Putin regime needs in order to create a certain atmosphere in Russia which is conducive to his style of
government? How important is that in the whole interplay that we're
talking about between NATO and Russia?
KASYANOV: It's very important aspect of propaganda and control
of the media, that the major power of current regime. I would say
more. Current regime doesn't enjoy a real political support of people.
This regime is a very powerful and this power based on administrative
power and secret services power and propaganda. As soon as free media
restored or established, within short periods of time all this so-called
support would disappear. That's why it's absolutely important for the
regime.
There's a key instrument: national-wide TV channels. Russia
still a TV-set (ph) country. Majority of people, we came from Soviet
Union periods of time. And they continue, some of them -- a lot of
them -- continue to believe if something's said on Channel number 1, on
Channel number 2, that's truth. And manipulation of public opinion is
taking place every day. That is the fundamental aspect of today's
Russia's life.
Talking about Ukraine or Georgia and relations with Russia and
NATO, I think that is absolutely clear. I would like you to come back
to what I described, like as values -- crisis of values; because part of rhetorics we hear from Russian leadership right now, they don't
implement those really strictly in the constitution. We should be the
same, not values in terms of political culture (inaudible) powerment or
in Russian powerment. I mean values like human rights and political
freedoms and democratic structure of power, separation of powers and
independent judiciary and free media. I'm talking about this. And
people direct right for free and fair elections.
None of those values right now is respected by current
authorities. That's why my political view was, and continues to be,
that Russia should lead all other former USSR Republics now independent
states, to more integrated world. And Russia should be a leader of
this process, be integrated more with European Union and be integrated and full-fledged part of NATO.
SHEPHERD: But...
If it doesn't implement it -- let me finish this idea. It is
not a case right now what we see. It means Ukraine and Georgia, of
course, have their rights to follow those countries where those values they would like to be -- they wanted to respect, because Russia not anymore example for them, not good example, even maybe sometimes
creating a danger for them. That's why they have even more rights and
reasons to issue this way.
SHEPHERD: I wanted to pick up on this point that you mentioned
in your introductory remarks and you repeated now about Russia one day,
in your view, joining NATO. Now, I want to put it to you that this is
the kind of talk which is not going to resonate, regardless of the
censorship in Russia and the control of the television and so on. It
just doesn't seem to me that the idea of Russia simply becoming another NATO country inside a U.S.-led alliance is something that the Russian people would accept or want.
I mean, it seems to me -- let me put it to you. I'm sure Sergei
can ask this question probably better than I can. But many in Russia
would say that this is -- you're out of touch here; that this is not something which reflects the way that Russia wants to develop as a country.
KASYANOV: That is absolutely such a conclusion I have just
referred to, that Russians just have a negative attitude to Americans and the West in particular and NATO.
SHEPHERD: No, no. Not that it's America. But...
(CROSSTALK)
KASYANOV: But that's a result of propaganda, of manipulation.
If we return to public use, which we at that period of time still had independent social pulse institutes, and that time attitude to the West
was much, much better. Majority of people were for cooperation with
West, with the United States and with the European counties.
Right now, it's different, because of manipulation of public
view. That's why talking about future and potential Russian
participation, of course if people would be opportunity, their constitutional right to get alterative point of view on one or another event, they can face in Russia or outside, or for somebody to go use, if
they have this right -- constitutional, fundamental right. Of course,
public opinion would change immediately within short periods of time.
SHEPHERD: Right.
KASYANOV: And if you're talking about global security and
saying that West are our friends, because we share same values. Within
short periods of time, and a prudent policy of such a government based on democratic values, of course, would conclude with the appropriate results, as I said, just member of not only NATO and G8, but also WTO and OSCD.
SHEPHERD: Right.
KASYANOV: That's absolutely natural and crucial for us to be there.
SHEPHERD: Thank you. Pauline.
NEVILLE-JONES: Can I come in?
SHEPHERD: Absolutely, you can come straight in if you like.
But one little question, are you on? I think you're on. Just speak
into it.
NEVILLE-JONES: I think I'm on. Yes.
SHEPHERD: It works. Please go ahead with whatever you want to
say. But I also wanted to get a sense, when you listen to two sides of
the Russian political spectrum, what do you draw from this in terms of
the security. You're an expert on counterterrorism, on security
issues. In terms of the security relationship, what do you draw from
the discussion from our two Russian friends here today?
NEVILLE-JONES: I'm not sure my conclusion is particularly
security-based. I mean, what I do think is these are very two
different visions, an important country in Europe. I have to say,
sadly, I think that the view expressed on my right is a minority view.
But it does at least show, and it's very important, that there is a debate inside Russia that actually not everybody has signed up to the agenda which we've had expressed on my left.
I thought I had two key words there. One was out of block, and
the other was propaganda. What do I mean by that? I think what Mr.
Markov was saying was Ukraine's legitimate status and rightful status and only status in the world is neutrality -- may not determine her own
alignment, i.e., limited sovereignty. That's to say you've got -- your
patch in the world is to be in this position. And you don't actually
have freedom of choice.
I think that goes absolutely to the fundamental of the clash of interests, which I did refer to earlier on, the freeing how Western Europeans and North Americans seen the future of countries inside Europe
and along the security (inaudible). And I use the word security
advisedly. There are no military plans. There are no defensive
measures or arrangements that are being made. They're all being
dismantled in relation to NATO and Russia. There's nothing left of
that structure.
What we do have, however, is a security agenda. And what we'd
like to see, of course, is a shared security agenda, not a security
agenda that actually leads to conflict. And there, I think Kasyanov is
absolutely right. I don't interpret the word participation actually a
membership. I'd interpret the word participation as a much closer
relationship in precisely the sort of organizations that have already been set up.
And there is no necessary reason why actually the whole question of MAP for Ukraine and Georgia; and that (inaudible) remind people that
MAP is not itself membership. There are a very large number of
conditions that have to be fulfilled, including some of the solutions to
some of the problems that have been pointed to. And I think it
risible, absolutely risible, to say that because there may be imperfections in Russia's view about the Russian language minority in
Estonia, that Estonia is not a democracy. Ridiculous. And if that...
MARKOV: No, it's not ridiculous.
NEVILLE-JONES: It's absolutely -- it is ridiculous.
MARKOV: Democracy is where all people have equal rights. It's
democracy. But where some people -- you remember their experience of
United States when Afro-American had no rights. Do you think it's
democracy when Afro-Americans had no rights? Do you think that
democracy is when I think Russians has no political rights, right to war, to parliament, a right to be elected to parliament.
(CROSSTALK)
SHEPHERD: Sergei, you'll get a chance in a second to come back
on that.
NEVILLE-JONES: I think...
MARKOV: That is un-democracy.
NEVILLE-JONES: Let me just say...
MARKOV: If you teach us to such democracy...
NEVILLE-JONES: (Inaudible)
MARKOV: When technical Russians should had no right to be left
in the parliament, if you teach us that democracy, we'll say no.
(Inaudible) to see democracy.
NEVILLE-JONES: If Russia had perfect rights for all ethnic
minorities in Russia, she would be in a position to teach us lessons on
this subject. I'm sorry. I don't begin to accept that kind of
reasoning. And to go back to the basic point, the basic point is
actually there is tension in that part of the world. And the kind of
policies that we see outlined -- we will turn on the propaganda machine if you step out of line -- is precisely the kind of thing that had gained a heightened tension and will lead to a situation in which NATO membership becomes more difficult for these countries and the more necessary.
Now that is the root we wish and need to avoid.
SHEPHERD: Thank you. Well, we've had some very clear views
from a variety of points of view. Let's have some very clear and
strong views from another point of view. Let me ask Edward first of
all, please, and then --
(UNKNOWN): Yes, hello. I really -- I do think, and I don't
want to make this into a big argument about the Baltic States, but it does seem there's a really ironic contrast here; because on the one hand we have here Mr. Kasyanov who had quite a lot of public support and was not a -- Russians in Russia were not able to vote for Mr. Kasyanov, because the Kremlin didn't want him to be a candidate.
And then we have the extraordinary spectacle of Mr. Markov, claiming that Russians in Estonia somehow are given a second-class democracy or are not in a democracy, when over the last 10 years the language of the particular (inaudible) policy in Estonia and in Latvia
has been a success. And many, many tens of thousands have -- I think
now a plurality of Russians living in those two countries have gone from being non-citizens to citizens and can vote and actually have a free media as well than the Russians across the border are able to experience.
So I really find it extraordinary. I'd really like to ask Mr.
Markov why do you think that Mr. Kasyanov was not a suitable person to be allowed to run as a candidate in Russian elections?
SHEPHERD: OK. We will come back. We'll take a few more
first, Sergei.
(UNKNOWN): I would like first to address to Sergei Markov in
his capacity as an advisor of Russian government. After listening to
you, now I understand much more better why Russia has so many problems
with the outside world. But to me, more concrete. You mentioned,
referred to Georgia, parts of Georgia -- Abkhazia and southern Ossetia
-- referring to these parts as countries. Does that mean that Russian
government has recognized them as independent countries?
About democracy -- we know a lot about Russian democracy. You
are caring about Russian language in Ukraine. Tell me how Ukranian
identities are being protected in Russia. And by the way, this year,
the Freedom House issued a new latest report on the status of democracy
in different countries of the world. And Ukraine was upgraded to fully
democratic country, whereas Russia was downgraded to non-democratic
country. So this is the answer to your question what kind of democracy
you have in Russia.
You were talking about Ukraine in case of joining NATO, there
will be instability and a crisis. That's what are you trying to do for
many years but unsuccessfully. After Ukraine will join NATO, there
will be no reason for you whatsoever to try to undermine. And not 75
percent in Ukraine do not support NATO membership; just roughly 50
percent. So where have you found another 25 percent? So these are
the questions to you.
And now I am addressing to Mikhail Kasyanov. We felt very pity
for the central electoral commission, you know, denied you the right to
run for the presidency. This was another manifestation of Russian
so-called democracy. And my question is did you feel support and
solidarity from the outside world, namely the Council of Europe, OSCE, European Union in connection with this decision of the Central Electoral Commission?
And question number two for you -- you were at that time prime minister when Russia provocatively started the moves around tiny island
in Kerch Strait, Tuzla. What was your position as the head of the
government? Thank you.
SHEPHERD: I'm going to round up a few more. And we'll make it
the last round of questions and comments. And then we'll follow-up
with discussion. So I see quite a few hands. The only thing I do
ask, because I'm a human being and so are they, keep your questions as short and pithy as you can; because otherwise, we'll just forget them, which won't do you any good at all.
James, please.
NIXEY: Thank you. James Nixey, Chatham House. Following on
from this discussion, I'd like to ask Angela and Sergei Markov, bearing
in mind your comments on South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Bearing in mind
your differing views on Russia's part to or from a liberal democracy, what would a more liberal democratic Russia mean for Russia's
territorial integrity? I'm thinking Indibeshetia (ph), I'm thinking
Tatarstan. That's question one.
And very briefly to Mr. Kasyanov, I understood that senior Russian opposition figures were meeting in St. Petersburg this week or
next week or soon anyway, or maybe you just have done. What was the
outcome of that, if it has already happened? Or what are the chances
of genuine unification of a Russian opposition? Thank you.
SHEPHERD: Is there anybody from Georgia here who'd like to ask
a question, because -- yes, ah, please. You're right behind him.
(UNKNOWN): Thank you. I'm Georgian, and I'm (inaudible). I
used to be a member of Georgian government for a while. I was member
of Georgian government for a while. And were I back now to Georgian
government, I would hire Mr. Markov as Georgian lobbyist for Georgia's
(inaudible) process, because the arguments he used I think should help Georgia to become full member of NATO as soon as possible.
I have couple of questions, of course. And I'd like to pick up
where Angela just -- on the question Angela raised about legitimate
interests Russia should have and may have. There's no doubt about
this. But can anybody -- and I think now Sergei Markov can do it best,
explain where's the difference now between legitimate interest, influence, control or to simplify this question, what is Russia's good neighborhood policy; because I heard this so many times that Russians are irritated over Georgia -- over using a good neighborhood policy.
But what is Russia's good neighbor?
And to make it even more simple than that the previous question, and hypothetical one, if one day out of blue -- and it's an academic question -- Georgia makes decision, which I have no doubt that never happen, and joins back, you know, Russia as sort of province, Ubernia (ph), Soviet Republic, would you resolve (inaudible) issues?
SHEPHERD: Thank you. Gentleman there please, right in the
front row. The white shirt.
BINNENDIJK: Hans Binnendijk from the National Defense
University. We started out this conference focusing on Afghanistan.
And there is this sense that if we don't do well in Afghanistan, the
alliance is in trouble. We all remember the out-of-area or
out-of-business quote. And we've been focusing out-of-area for most of
the last decade. What I take away from this session is that there is a
lot of business to be done in-area. And as we focus on Afghanistan as
an alliance, that's fine. We need to win there. But we can't believe
that that should be the fundamental focus of the alliance. There's
plenty of work to be done right here based on what I've heard.
SHEPHERD: Thank you. And the gentleman two rows behind you
directly. Yes. The gentleman there, yes (inaudible)
(UNKNOWN): I just wanted to ask Mr. Markov, since quite often
Russian officials appeal to the public opinion in Ukraine before Ukraine joins either NATO membership action plan or NATO as such or European Union as such -- did you ever ask your population before prior to
signing the agreement with Shanghai agreement? Or with the (inaudible)
or going to agreement with Iran with military support promises? Thank you.
SHEPHERD: OK. I will take a question from Andre from Belarus.
SANEC (ph): Thank you, Andre Sanec (ph) of Chetland (ph) Sound,
Belarus. Actually, I don't have questions. So to Mr. Markov I agree
completely with your (inaudible) that really beautifully presents Russia
today. And I wish that presidents yesterday could have a chance to
listen to what we're listening. Maybe the MAP decision would be
different then.
But to clarify some things, it's good that Mr. Markov knows very
well the Ukranian constitution. But you should also know then
Belarusan constitution that has a neutrality clause in it, which didn't prevent Russia from dragging Belarus into the collective security
treaty, the (inaudible) Treaty. And it didn't prevent Putin from
offering to Belarus to join Russia to be incorporated in Russia by six
regions. By the way, there were no reaction from the West at that time.
My question is to Mikhail Kasyanov, because what I understood from Mr. Markov statement is that he's quite sure that Putin will really keep control for long time, because he said that if Medvedev refused the
job, then in 2008, he has chance to be reappointed. And if he doesn't,
then Putin's group will choose somebody else. What chances do you see
for Democrats in Russia? And what you personally plan to do as one of
the visible opponents of the current authorities? Thank you.
SHEPHERD: OK. Thank you very much, everybody. We're going
to go now. I'm sorry for everybody. But there are so many people who
want to say something. And it's a testament to how important Russia is
and how interesting the whole Russia question is to this debate that
everybody does want to see. People are not falling asleep in their
chairs. They are on the edge of their chairs and clenching their fists
in some cases. At last it's exciting.
Sergei, there have been a lot of questions. It's very clear
you're in a minority position. As moderator, let me say I admire
anybody who's prepared to stand up for themselves in an environment
where most people disagree with you. And I really mean that sincerely.
It's important that we understand the point of view which is guiding Russia, and not the point of view we want to guide Russia -- which is
important too? But we must live in the real world. And we must have
an understanding of where Russia is actually going.
There's been an awful lot of comments, quite a few directed
towards yourself. Feel free to address those points. But I want to
put to you the question. Do you really believe -- because it sounds
from the way you're talking -- do you really believe that the relationship between NATO and Russia is forever going to be conflictual,
full of friction, tension, unpleasantness? Are we fated to that? Or
is there any way that we can change, in your view, from your point of view, the view that you represent in Russia, the situation that we're now in?
MARKOV: Thank you. First of all, answering your question,
Robin, I don't think that situation between Russia and NATO will be
conflict. On this point, though, I disagree with Mikhail. I think
this situation will be improved, because basic interest for Russia and
NATO is quite similar. And same system of values which shared by
citizens who live in Russia or in countries of NATO members also quite
similar to each other if you go and to see opinion polls. And Russia
European country and share most of the values which we described as European values.
And I think this issue will improve. But to be improved not I
think Russia will make step forward. But first of all NATO will have
to make a step forward as Russia, and to respect Russian interest in
(inaudible). I have been asked many times why I behave, what Russia --
what NATO can make to improve relations (inaudible). Some things can
be very easily, very easily. Please put soldiers, (inaudible) NATO's
soldiers nearby (inaudible) of Russian soldiers who dead in fighting
against (inaudible) regime. Put it in all countries of NATO members
and don't allow to the -- how would you say -- (inaudible) public politician to move this monumentals for heroes who gave their lives for
their fighting for liberation of the Europe. Do it in all countries.
And immediately, the image of NATO immediately will be improved in Russia.
SHEPHERD: So fundamentally it's a question of lack of respect
in your view. This is what it...
(CROSSTALK)
MARKOV: Lack of respect of the interests and go again to the
Latvia-Estonia. Tell them, please, make all your people has rights to
vote in elections and to be elected in the parliament, and to give
education to your children in your native language. And immediately
their NATO image will be immediately improved. Please stop a rising of
narcotraffic in Afghanistan. Why it's narcotraffic rise 20 times
(inaudible) sent United Nation expert evaluation.
And another such kind of issue -- be more honest. Don't lie.
NATO members promise to Mr. Gorbachev that it will be no expansion to
the east and so. But it happen. It's violation. And we more or
less honest and maybe more general, because give opportunity to
(inaudible) people to talk...
SHEPHERD: Sergei...
MARKOV: ... without -- oh, sorry.
SHEPHERD: Literally, can you wrap it up in one minute, because
we need to finish in about two, three minutes.
MARKOV: Yes, yes, yes. I just listen. And then about
atmosphere of dialogue. When I'm answering, I see them laughing. I
see them (inaudible) who don't need to discuss. I don't think it's
good approach. Frankly speaking, it's really good that Chatham House
organizes meeting. But I feel myself uncomfortable, because huge
negative psychological way putting on me.
You know, some of you who knows me knows that I've been all this years one of the most strong proponent of the big strategic alliance
between Russia and the West. And if I feel myself psychologically
uncomfortable, how majority of the Russians will feel in such situation.
SHEPHERD: OK.
MARKOV: Please, change your approach. And on the base of this
changed approach, we will be good strategic alliance (inaudible).
Thank you.
SHEPHERD: Well, this is a very clear point of view from Russia.
And I think one that is representative of the governing elites in
Russia today. I'd like to ask somebody who's not a member of the
governing elites in Russia today, nevertheless is as true a Russian as
Sergei is, to give his final comments please. Just if you can, in
about a minute and a half. I'm sorry.
KASYANOV: The final comment would be very clear. I would like
to respond to Sergei on this statement, just about life. I would say
the whole policy of current Russian leadership for the last three, I
would say, four years was absolute lie. Everything was contrary to
what's written in laws and constitution. Russians lost their basic rights.
That's why you being a member of leading so-called party, which is not a party, are association of bureaucrats and loyal businessmen -- being a part of leading group, you of course understood that this leading political party adopted all these so-called laws, which contrary
to constitution. And Russians lost those rights. And that's why
being to such a position, being in such a situation, it's absolutely, I would say, unacceptable to try to require and demand and complain that others should follow the same values you -- you, I mean, the whole
authority -- not implementing in our own country. And that is
absolutely great problem...
KASYNOV: … where as you, I mean, the whole authority, not implementing our own country. And that is absolutely great problem even growing problem for all of us, of Russians. That’s why we have very difficult periods of time for internal politics. And that’s why I say, just we will have more difficult relations with
(inaudible) and the West in general because there is no any instrument to balance any policy, any politics because there is no competition, political competition in Russia.
That’s why we’re coming to a difficult situation. That’s why I’m insisting there is only one opportunity for these new authority just to start changing, to restore or to create those basic fundamental rights of people, free elections, free media, right for manifestation, and right for association.
There is not opportunity for people to create a political party. That’s why there is no opportunity to be elected to the parliament. There is no opportunity for people to nominate their candidates to the parliament. There is no opportunity to run for the presidency. There is no opportunity to work for presidency.
What we can talk about values. There is a fundamental gap we have, unfortunately. And we have to join before we can combat.
(APPLAUSE)
SHEPHERD: There’s obviously a lot of work to be done in the relationship between NATO and Russia. Very briefly, if you could, is there anything you can think of that we could actually do or is that missing the point? It’s not about us being able to do something. As I keep saying, perhaps it’s my bugbear, is what I fundamentally believe and kind of help myself from repeating.
NATO and Russia – NATO is an organization in transition. Russia is a country in transition to something or other. They’re moving in transition to a different equilibrium. We don’t quite know what it is yet. It’s fated to be problematic.
(UNKNOWN): Well, you’ve put your finger on what seems to me the thing we focus on is that there is a moment coming up when there is a chance for a new beginning and I think we should try very hard to try and change the terms of this debate.
We focused this morning on a relatively narrow area. It has to be said of the relationship. It’s the one that’s most neuralgic. It’s the one that affects a lot of people in this room and the fate of their countries that they live in. That’s not surprising.
But we shouldn’t forget there is a border agenda. And it does include things where there is a very great deal of reason why and indeed, there’s evidence of an ability to cooperate. It may not be perfect but it’s there around things like Iran, which are important to us both, are areas where, as I say, without perfection. Nevertheless, we are important to each other.
So I think one (inaudible) there’s a whole series of nuclear issues, too, which actually, there is real fundamentive (ph) cooperation, very important to the safety of the world.
There’s an area we haven’t mentioned at all, which is very important.
It affects everybody, in particular, it affects Europeans, and that is energy security. This is clearly going to come into the NATO agenda for all sorts of reasons, which go well beyond the whole question of our supply relationship with Russia.
But the supply relationship with Russia is very important. There are a number of areas there where there is doubt. And I don’t refer particularly to, though you can’t forget it, so there does seem to be a certain tendency to use energy as a format of political leverage.
Just as important to that, though, are a whole series of questions which relate to security of supply and Russia’s future as a supplier to Western Europeans and the level of investment that’s going to go in, including, I would hope, western investment that will ensure that supply is kept up as a result of new finds and new exploration. Because there are some problems, you know, in the future.
The point of mentioning all this is, is that we ought to get down and talk to each other befor