Transcript: U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper Speaks at GMF

Transcript of:

U.S. Defense Policy and NATO, the Way Forward - A Conversation with Mark T. Esper, U.S. Secretary of Defense

October 24, 2019 | 9:30AM to 10:30AM CEST, Brussels

Ian Lesser:
Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. I'm Ian Lesser, Vice President of the German Marshall Fund of the US. And on behalf of GMF, it's really a great pleasure to welcome you this morning to this conversation with US Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper. Thank you very much for being with us here today.

Ian Lesser:
For those of you who know us and maybe those of you who don't know us so well, just to say, our mission is very simply to strengthen transatlantic cooperation in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. And cooperation on transatlantic security and NATO policy are absolutely at the heart of that mission, and I think you'll agree with me, more relevant than ever. And as always the US approach to security, our thinking about defense policy and alliance partnerships is a hot topic in Brussels. There's keen interest. So we're especially delighted the Secretary Esper has taken the time from a very busy schedule here at NATO to be with us today.

Ian Lesser:
Let me also just at the outset, thank our friends at the US Mission to NATO for their partnership on this event and our work throughout the year. Ambassador Hutchison, thank you very, very much indeed. Our cooperation in fact with all three missions here in Brussels is really integral to what we do and we're very grateful for that.

Ian Lesser:
Dr. Esper comes to his role as Secretary of Defense after a distinguished career in the US military, on Capitol Hill, in the public sector, in the policy sector, in the private sector. Most recently he has served as Secretary of the Army, later as acting Secretary of Defense, and was sworn in as the 27th US Secretary of Defense in July of this year. Mr. Secretary, welcome to GMF, thanks for being with us. We look forward to your remarks. Please join me in welcoming him.

Mark Esper:
Well, good morning everyone. And Ian, thank you for that kind introduction. Ian and I were talking a little bit beforehand, and I shared with him my many fond experiences working with the GMF in DC, and we have a lot of mutual friends, so it's just been a good experience I've had during my 20-plus years in the Capitol, and again, working with organizations such as German Marshall Fund, you do great work.

Mark Esper:
But it is great to be here in Brussels at the German Marshall Fund here. An institution named after a great leader and a historic development program. Behind my desk at the Pentagon hangs a portrait of George Marshall taken when he was General of the Army in 1945. I have long admired Marshall for his bold ideas and the courage to advance them. He's considered by many in the military as the greatest general officer of his time, and he and I are also from the same hometown, so that may also have something to do with the fact that I'm such a big fan.

Mark Esper:
I just came from the Middle East where I spent a few days with our commanders and troops in the field, and met with our international partners in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. At each stop I was encouraged by much of what I saw and what I heard. In Afghanistan, the Resolute Support, train, advise and assist mission continues to improve the capability of Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces. Their ability to maintain security during the recent elections was a good indication of the progress they've made.

Mark Esper:
In Saudi Arabia, we continue to reinforce our partners with additional aircraft, air and missile defense systems and other defensive assets. We urge our allies in Europe to follow our lead and contribute their own support to help deter Iranian aggression, to promote stability in the region and defend the international rules-based order.

Mark Esper:
And in Iraq, where I just came from yesterday, the Defeat ISIS Coalition continues to support the Iraqis in their efforts to ensure the lasting defeat of that terrorist organization.

Mark Esper:
Despite these positive signs, however, threats to the security and stability of the Middle East still abound. In Afghanistan, the Taliban's unwillingness to stop their senseless attacks on innocent civilians set back negotiations to establish peace. Iran's continued maligned behavior throughout the Middle East, to include its recent attacks on the Saudi Aramco oil facilities presents a persistent threat to our partners in the region. And Turkey's unwarranted incursion into Northern Syria jeopardizes the gains made there in recent years.

Mark Esper:
It is clear there is still a long way to go to achieve peace and stability in that part of the world. In fact, the numerous security challenges of today have the potential to consume our time, to sap our resources, and to dominate our focus.

Mark Esper:
The commencement this month of our 19th consecutive year of conflict in Afghanistan is a reminder of just how difficult it is to end a war. As we continue our efforts around the world to protect the homeland, to help defend our allies and partners and safeguard our interests, we must do so with an eye to the future.

Mark Esper:
New threats are on the horizon, that we ignore at our own peril. Meeting these challenges requires us to contend with today's foes while simultaneously preparing for tomorrow's potential adversaries. Before it's too late. The world around us is changing at a pace faster than ever before. New technologies have emerged that could dramatically alter the character of warfare. Advancements in fields such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons and directed energy are increasing the lethality of modern weapon systems and expanding the geometry of the battlefield.

Mark Esper:
Staging areas for troops, aircraft, and ships safely removed from the effects of enemy weapons in the past, are now within range of modern missile systems. Satellites that transmit vital communications and positioning data miles overhead, are increasingly vulnerable to attack. And military bases used as power projection platforms are exposed to cyber threats that aim to disrupt infrastructure needed to deploy forces.

Mark Esper:
In the future, wars will be fought not just on the land and on the sea, as they have for thousands of years, or in the air as they have for the past century, but also in outer space and cyberspace in unprecedented ways.

Mark Esper:
Preparing for this type of warfare requires a renewed focus on high intensity conflict. It requires continued reliance on allies and partners, and it requires the foresight to expand our war fighting capabilities across all five of these domains. The United States National Defense Strategy remains the department's guidepost as we adapt the force to this new environment.

Mark Esper:
The NDS prioritizes China first, Russia second, as we transition our primary focus towards great power competition. It is increasingly clear that Beijing and Moscow wish to reshape the world to their favor at the expense of others. Through predatory economics, political subversion, and military force, they seek to erode the sovereignty of weaker states.

Mark Esper:
Over time, this activity is undermining the current international rules-based order that generations before us worked so hard to achieve. It is quite fitting that this very institution where we gather this morning was first established to commemorate a strategy that helped create this order. The Marshall Plan. Along with other post-World War II initiatives, was grounded in a common set of principles such as democracy, freedom, human rights, national sovereignty, and free trade.

Mark Esper:
The international system that followed has long served as the foundation for our security and our prosperity. But today China and Russia, nations with a view of the world very different than our own, are using their power to coercively alter the strategic environment, and they are doing so in a way that uses this system against us. Throughout my travels over my first three months as Secretary of Defense, I've heard firsthand from allies and partners around the world about the damage that is being done.

Mark Esper:
China's One Belt, One Road initiative has left several nations with unsustainable debt, forcing them to trade sovereignty for financial relief. Even developed nations fear China's growing leverage, which not only impacts their economic and political decisions, but perhaps worse, leads them to make sub-optimal security choices. I would caution my friends in Europe against adopting the mindset that American concerns about Chinese economic and military expansion are overstated, or not relevant to their national security.

Mark Esper:
The PRC's influence is rapidly expanding as it continues to pursue new partners well beyond Asia. Our security must not be diminished by a short and narrow-sighted focus on economic opportunity. The United States is not asking nations to choose between China and the rest of the world, but we are asking them to pursue a future that supports democracy, that enables economic prosperity and that protects human rights.

Mark Esper:
All countries must enter their relationship with the PRC with eyes wide open. China's state sponsored theft of intellectual property, its militarization of the South China Sea, and its mistreatment of ethnic minorities are all clear examples of Beijing's unwillingness to abide by international rules and norms. The ongoing protests in Hong Kong are a consequence of Beijing's gradual erosion of the rights guaranteed under the, One country, Two Systems agreement in 1997.

Mark Esper:
In a world dominated by China, these actions by the state, regrettably, would constitute acceptable behavior. Similarly, Russia's foreign policy demonstrates a blatant disregard for state sovereignty. In addition to their military incursions in Georgia and Ukraine, their use of cyber warfare and information operations, continues to interfere in other states' domestic affairs.

Mark Esper:
In the case of both China and Russia, their malign behavior combined with aggressive military modernization programs, puts the international security environment on a trajectory that should concern all free nations.

Mark Esper:
Over the next two days as I meet with our NATO allies here in Brussels, my message will be clear. First, the United States commitment to NATO and Article 5 is ironclad. However, for the alliance to remain strong, every member must contribute its fair share to ensure our mutual security and uphold the international rules-based order. This means not only contributing to the important NATO security missions around the world today, but also making sufficient investments towards the capabilities needed to deter

Mark Esper:
... our potential adversaries tomorrow. In 2014, all 28 NATO allies made a commitment to a defense spending goal of 2% of GDP by 2024. However, only eight nations have so far achieved this important milestone. Just over half of the allies are currently on track to reach this level of defense spending. I commend them for meeting their obligation on time, but a number of other NATO members are unfortunately falling short. Cumulatively, the allies have planned $100 billion in defense spending increases through the next year. A laudable feat but as we've all agreed, 'We can, must and will do more.' Anticipating our leaders meeting in December, I urge all allies that do not yet have a credible plan to implement the Wells Defense Investment Plan and to develop one soon. There can be no free-riders to our shared security. Regardless of geographic location, size or population, all must do their part to help deter war and defend the Alliance.

Mark Esper:
We're only as strong as the investments we are willing to make towards our common defense. In terms of readiness, I'm encouraged by the progress allies are making. We are close to our goal of the 4 30s by 2020. As our leaders agreed when they adopted the NATO Readiness Initiative, having the additional 30 air squadrons, 30 combat vessels and 30 mechanized battalions ready to fight in 30 days or less is a critical first step to reinstilling a culture of readiness in the Alliance. As expected by the NATO leaders meeting in December, we will have 100% of these important contributions identified. Together we all have an obligation to prepare for the challenges of the future, even as we manage the security issues of the present. The international order constructed following World War II benefited the entire world. Initiatives like the Marshall Plan help to rebuild the continent, restore political order and bring about economic prosperity falling a time of great destruction. That order has largely remained intact, but there is no inherent permanence to its design.

Mark Esper:
Our potential adversaries seek to weaken the integrity of these institutions and incrementally reshape the international system. Should we remain complacent and fail to recognize the shifting landscape, we risk inviting greater aggression and further challenges to our shared values and security. Defending this system and deterring this aggression remains our primary task and we can only do this by working closely together to maintain a ready, capable alliance that is prepared to fight and win. I'm confident that we will be successful in doing so if we fully commit to this task and lead our citizens toward this goal. I appreciate your time this morning and I look forward to your questions. Thank you all very much.

Ian Lesser:
Thank you very, very much indeed for your remarks. You've given us a lot to think about, talk about. Just to give you all a little bit of a road map of what we're trying to do here today. We're going to have a little bit of a conversation here and then we'll save about 15 minutes at the end for [inaudible 00:03:32], as well. Maybe I could just start with by asking you this, I mean, you were very clear about in several ways in your remarks about the need to refocus on the security requirements flowing from increased great power competition, especially with China and with Russia. Maybe if you could say just a little bit more about the sort of nuclear conventional balance in this, because there's a lot of debate now about nuclear forces, nuclear doctrines becoming more prominent than in the past and of course that's affecting the arms control regimes and other things both for Russia above all but also for China and maybe if you could say a few words about that.

Mark Esper:
Sure. I think if you look at both countries, you see at least in China a modernization and expansion of the nuclear arsenal in what we would call the triad - in terms of their air, land and sea forces and clearly with Russia, they are modernizing and developing new weapons when it comes to nuclear capability and we've seen reports about that, we know about that and those are the systems as we consider arms control got to make sure that we capture those systems. With regard to Russia, we also have to be clear that for many years, going outside the realm of arms control and I know this because I personally negotiated with the Russians back in 2002-2003 in Geneva, they had thousands of non-strategic nuclear weapons that also threatened the peace and directly would impact Europe. I think as we think about arms control, we need to think about the whole basket, if you will, of nuclear weapons that should be considered as we approached these agreements.

Ian Lesser:
Can we deal with that challenge as a matter of negotiation but also as a matter of our conventional posture in Europe or do we need to start thinking about changes in our own nuclear posture here with allies?

Mark Esper:
Well, the United States is modernizing its nuclear triad as well. We have multiple programs underway to do just that, to make sure that we have a capable strategic deterrent - it is the bedrock of our national security and of course we extend that nuclear umbrella to other countries. For us, we need to do that. I think as well for European partners that should be considered also in terms of those that have nuclear forces. It's critical to modernize it, not because we want a nuclear conflict - Lord knows nobody does - but it has deterred and kept the peace now since the end of World War II in terms of a great power conflict and so I think that's important and we got to consider arms control and the appropriate role of arms control in that context also.

Ian Lesser:
Mr. Secretary, you talked in different ways about burden sharing and of course it's a hot debate on both sides of the Atlantic in terms of defense spending but also in other respects and I'm wondering if you could say a word or two about how you see the recent initiatives within the European Union to do more as Europe on this. Both from the point of view of US strategic interest but also the defense industrial relationship across the Atlantic.

Mark Esper:
Yeah. Well, I think, you know, we all have a commitment, as I just said in my remarks, to defending the International Rules Based Order that we all built, particularly the United States and Europe after World War II and it has served us incredibly well and we've maintained it but it's fragile and we, the United States, see it under threat these days if you look at some of the activities, particularly by China. I think that we agree that we all accept the fact that we need to really reconsider security in a different light, that we need to burden share across the board, whether it's increased defense spending, whether it's participating in more missions, it is providing host nation support in the case to the United States in some places.

Mark Esper:
All those things have to be put back on the table and I know domestic populations want to spend money elsewhere and I understand that we have those same issues in the United States but the fact is our security has to come first. Without our security we can't have economic prosperity and vice versa as well. I think it's what we all need to consider and we should also at the same time maintain the good transatlantic relationship we've had with regard to the openness of our markets when it comes to defense sales because it's critical that we are able to tap into the best of what are all of our allies can provide and present when it comes to purchasing of arms of security, etcetera.

Ian Lesser:
Do you think it's going in the right direction here in that regard? I mean obviously Europe is much more focused on this now, things like PESCO and so on, or does it risk being incompatible with what we and NATO would like to do?

Mark Esper:
There are a lot of concerns by the United States and our other non-EU partners about the direction of PESCO and that may foreclose the opportunity for United States and our companies to participate in that regime, if you will. That concerns us, we think it is heading in the wrong direction. Again, we think the marketplace should be kept open, that we should continue to collaborate and cooperate with one another and that's our view -is ""keep that market open" if you will, so that we can optimize our security needs.

Ian Lesser:
If I could ask you, you've just come back from Afghanistan among other places and to talk a little bit about how you see the security situation there today and what we'll be able to do in terms of, well, an exit. The president, President Trump has been very clear about his desire to seek an exit in Afghanistan and elsewhere. How do you see this evolving and what it would mean for us but also for our NATO partners who've been present with us?

Mark Esper:
Yeah, I did have a great visit there for a couple of days. I had chance to meet with the Resolute Support Mission commanders, with many of the soldiers and many of our allied soldiers and leaders who were on the ground there and had a chance to meet with the President Ghani, his national security team and from what I've seen and it's not my first trip to Afghanistan, I've been there several times going all the way back to 2001 and so I've seen great progress in the country. The performance of the ANDSF has been wonderful, I had a chance to view an exercise by some of their commandos and talk with some of their soldiers. They are committed to the defense of their country. They showed a great strength and pride in having a relatively violence-free election, if you will.

Mark Esper:
I think we need to continue along that path. The United States mission there remains unchanged and that mission is, it's not just the United States, it's all of our NATO partners and others who are there, is to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists to strike our homelands and that is our commitment to the mission, irrespective of how we optimize our force over time but I think that's our mission. We're committed to doing that and I reassured our Afghan partners with that as well.

Ian Lesser:
You were also on this trip in Saudi Arabia. I'm wondering if you could say a little bit about your impressions from that, what you saw there, what we're committed to doing in your view with the Saudis now, the reinforced presence and so on?

Mark Esper:
Well, there's a lot of concern in Saudi Arabia and in other GCC States about Iran's behavior. It's 40 years of malign behavior throughout the region and all the way from Africa, all the way across in Afghanistan and further where they are sponsoring terrorist groups like Hezbollah, they're supplying arms to their proxies in Yemen. They have pursued a nuclear program and long range missile program. I mean they're all quite concerned about the path of Tehran at this point and we're concerned not just because many of our partners are there and US forces are there, but also because once again they are challenging the international rules-based order that we agreed was to ensure prosperity and security. They've threatened the free flow of commerce throughout the Strait of Hormuz, they've attacked vessels, tankers in the Strait and so our commitment to the Saudis and to other states in the region is to make sure we help defend our partners.

Mark Esper:
Number two, we defend that free flow of assets and third, that we again get Tehran to recognize the international rules-based order and obey it. We are not seeking conflict with Iran. That would not be good for anyone but at the same time I've messaged to Tehran, do not miscalculate, do not mistake the United States' restraint for weakness because we will act if need be but at the same time, I think this is another case where the burden cannot be shouldered by the United States alone. We all have an interest in preserving the rules-based order of the security of the region. I've had conversations with many of our NATO allies and I've urged them to meet and consider bringing additional air defense assets, defensive assets, if you will, to Saudi Arabia and to other GCC countries so we can defend and help defend the system.

Mark Esper:
We had a very good meeting the other day by several chiefs of defense in Saudi Arabia. Many of our NATO allies participated and I'm hopeful that we can get some serious and credible commitments coming out of there and again, collectively try and defend the region and ensure security.

Ian Lesser:
As others focus more on trying on Russia on some of these big picture, longer term, higher intensity sort of challenges. How do you think about our traditional presence in the Middle East? I mean, what have you been hearing from the allies? How do you see where we should be in the years to come in terms of our own presence and commitment in the region? Yes, you have this very sharp sort of challenge with Iran at the moment but over the longer term, is this going to be a place where the US is still engaged? There's a lot of debate about that in this town.

Mark Esper:
Well, the region is not static. My first visit to the region was for the Gulf War where I fought with the US army in 1990-1991 and it's changed in many ways since then. It's been nearly 30 years now and so we have to adapt to the changes that happen. Certainly 30 years ago we didn't face the threat of violent extremist organizations that we did today. Nope. There was no Al Qaeda, there was no ISIS, there wasn't any of that and now the region is consumed by it and I think many of the leaders in the region, I've spoken with several of them, understand that this is the threat of their era, of our era, of their generation. We have to deal with that and we have our partners in the region, which we're going to stand by as well.

Mark Esper:
That doesn't mean that we shouldn't optimize our force, adjust our force. Lord knows we've expanded and contracted over time in different parts. We've expanded and contracted over time here in Europe since the fall of the Soviet Union. That's just the normal course of defense planning as we look ahead and my job is to look into the future and as I look into the future, the concern I have and it was my predecessor, Secretary Jim Mattis, who actually drafted The National Defense Strategy, said that China is going to be a long-term strategic challenge for us and when you look at the size of their country, their economic potential, their focus on China's advancements and their needs, that's what we all need to be concerned about as we head into the 2020s and beyond.

Ian Lesser:
As we are focusing that direction, do you see an opportunity or need for NATO to be looking not just in the East but actually doing more in the South? I mean, this is a perennial question obviously for the Alliance but the American presence in our own posture is an important part of that. I mean, do you see NATO taking over more of that sort of a mission looking South, including counter terrorism?

Mark Esper:
Yes. I think NATO should be looking at East toward China - or West, depending on which way you look at it - we've had that discussion during the first ministerial that I attended. I was acting secretary then and we had good discussions and it's not just a security focus, it has to be an economic focus. Again, One Belt One Road is creeping its way into all parts of Europe. Of course we are well aware of the challenge, the threat of Huawei and 5G and I've counseled our NATO allies for the United States - if Huawei becomes the provider of choice, if you will, it's going to seriously undermine our ability to share intelligence, our ability to inter-operate militarily because we simply cannot trust those networks. In some cases Chinese providers are witting and in some cases they're unwitting but those are just threats that we need to work around and make sure that we address them with eyes wide open.

Ian Lesser:
You said that there's a taste in the NATO and elsewhere - I mean, it's relevant for the EU as well - to become more involved in a kind of joint strategy vis-a-vis China.

Mark Esper:
Well, I think we're all coming late to the realization that China's been competing with us for some time. I know in the United States I've been watching this problem for 20-25 years and even the United States has had a late recognition of the challenges China's been presenting. They've been stealing our intellectual property now for going on decades. They've obviously been encroaching deeper in the South China sea, seizing islands, doing all these things and as I noted, the demonstrations in Hong Kong are another manifestation of Chinese tactics. I think Europe is also coming around to recognizing the threat of China. Maybe it's obscured by the fact that a more aggressive Russia is just at the doorstep and you tend to look at the threats right in front of you as compared to the ones that are further distant but again, I think in the long run and the long term, China is the far greater challenge that we face, not Russia.

Ian Lesser:
Now, I want to open it up to all of you and I'm sure there'll be questions but before I do that, if I could maybe just ask you about Syria and about Turkey. We and Europeans have also been very clear about our views on the Turkish incursion in Syria. How do you see this right now, given what has happened, given our own plans, given what Turkey and Russia have been agreeing to, the role of the Assad Regime, the Kurdish militias and so on, this is a very different situation than we faced even a few weeks ago or a week ago. How do you see this evolving and what should our strategy be in this regard?

Mark Esper:
Look, I've been very candid about this. Turkey put us all in a very terrible situation. I think the incursion was unwarranted. I think President Erdoğan was fixated on making this incursion for one reason or another and there was not a possibility that we were going to start a war with a NATO ally. A NATO ally who's been a very good ally since its joining the Alliance in 1952 I think but I've also said that the direction of Turkey with regard to the alliance is heading in the wrong direction on a number of issues: we see them spinning closer into Russia's orbit than in the Western-Europe orbit and I think that's unfortunate and I think we all need to work together to strengthen our partnership with Turkey and make sure they trend back to being the strong, reliable ally, responsible ally that they've been in the past.

Ian Lesser:
Thinking beyond the Syria issue per se, with Turkey both bilaterally and within NATO, what are the ways forward there? We have a lot of issues, contentious issues, including the S-400 purchase and other things, [inaudible 00:18:48], their own complaints about us. What's the way forward there? What are the opportunities to do more with Turkey and what are the problems?

Mark Esper:
I think those are the discussions we need to have both at-

Ian Lesser:
What are the problems?

Mark Esper:
I think those are the discussions we need to have both within the Alliance and in our capitals on a bilateral or multilateral basis. I don't have the solution today, but I think we've got to keep working at it. We've got to reach out to the right people within Turkey and continue to build those ties. I will tell you my experience both as a military officer and in my current role, that the foundation of many of the relationships within the alliance begins at the military level.

Mark Esper:
So I think to continue to build those bonds between the officer Corps, between the organizations, between our defense personnel is a great place to start. We've got to maintain that and build for the long-term. We're in this bumpy period right now. I think we need to plan for the long-term and we need to make sure that we get Turkey back on a different path as we continue to welcome new members in the alliance.

Ian Lesser:
Great. Thank you so much. Let me open it up to all of you. We don't have endless time, but we've got about 10 minutes-15 minutes and just catch my eye and I'll try to acknowledge you. Maybe I can start just right here on the aisle. The woman just right here. We have microphones coming to you. And do, if you could, just tell us who you are and where you're from.

Ana Pisonero :
Thank you. Anna Pisonero from the Spanish news agency Europa Press. Going back to Syria and Turkey, I'd like to know because certain allies, particularly France, has been quite critical of the role that the US has had. Seeing a bit that they kind of helped Turkey to do their offensive because they pulled their troops out of the area. So I'd like to know from your perspective now, did the US do absolutely everything to stop this incursion which has been very criticized by the rest of the allies? And I don't know if you could give us a bit your views on how you see the German proposal to create a safe zone now under international control with the UN. And the third question, if I may, it's related as well. It's regarding President Erdoğan's aspiration to maybe also develop a nuclear program. You've just said that you would say that allies need to think about modernizing their nuclear arsenal, but what would we say for allies that have become maybe a bit more uncomfortable now that they're also wanting to seek nuclear weapons. Thank you.

Ian Lesser:
Okay. Is that it? Three easy questions.

Mark Esper:
Three easy questions. Okay. It was very clear to me in the days leading up to the Turks incursion of Syria that they were committed to do that. And by the way, this is probably the one issue that I paid most attention to now during my first two months on the job. But in the conversations I had with my counterpart, that the chairman, the joint chief staff had had with his counterpart, it was very clear that the Turks were committed to making this incursion. And by the way, they were uncomfortable with it since 2014, since we first began a relationship with the SDS. So I'm not surprised. And they had made two or three other incursions between then and now. But the US' decision to withdraw less than 50 soldiers from the zone of attack was made after it was very clear to us that President Erdoğan had made the decision to come across the border.

Mark Esper:
And I was not about put less than 50 US soldiers in between a 15,000 plus man Turkish army, preceded by Turkish militia and jeopardize the lives of our young service members. I'm not about to start a fight with a NATO ally. Everybody has said, "You could have threatened them with aircraft, or you could have just kept them there in place." If I'd done that, I may be in a situation today trying to explain to the American people why I sacrificed American soldiers for that. I'm not about to do that and I'm not about, again to throw up aircraft if you will and suggest that I'm going to strike a NATO ally because that's just not feasible.

Mark Esper:
We'd be having a different discussion today about the future of the Alliance if that had happened. There has been some criticism about that, but nobody's yet offered a better alternative to what the United States did. Again, we're trying to take a very strategic perspective to our interests in the region. Our interest, our partnership with the SDF, which was a very good one and it still is a very good one, was about defeating ISIS. And by March 2019 we had clearly destroyed physical caliphate devices. Our commitment to the Kurds was not to help them establish an autonomous Kurdish state and to defend them against Turkey. And that's just the cold hard facts. And if I had a better solution, I'm sure we would have implemented it, but that's the situation we faced.

Mark Esper:
I've already forgotten your second question. Oh, the German... So I haven't read the German proposal or studied it in detail. What I know is that the proposal is about having European partners, I think, establish joint patrols in this new corridor. I think it's fine. I think it's good for those countries that want to step up and help improve security in that part of the world because it's something that we've been calling on our European partners to do for quite some time is to step up and do more. So I would be supportive of that.

Mark Esper:
Supportive politically. We don't intend on contributing ground forces or anything to that operation.

Ian Lesser:
If I could go just across the aisle. Just right here please. There should be a microphone coming to you. Just take it.

Marc Pierini:
Thank you. Marc Pierini, with the Brussels office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former EU ambassador. My question is still on Syria, but in a very limited aspect, which is the thousands of jihadists that were under the custody of Syrian Kurds and that maybe are breaking out or being freed deliberately. Do you still see, Mr. Secretary, a prospect for cooperation between your forces, French and British forces, maybe others in that part of Syria where these jihadists are still under Kurdish control? Because here in Europe as you will have heard, this is a major worry of course, especially for those from European nationalities. Thank you.

Mark Esper:
Sure. I've had some brief conversations already with my British and French counterparts. We're going to discuss that this week. I think we're all committed and I know that the United States certainly is to continue to defeat ISIS operations. We need to figure out what the next steps look like in this new phase of the campaign. I understand many in Europe are concerned about this. I think many others in Europe should help contribute to the mission. I have been pleasantly surprised that the last estimates I had with regard to the status of those fighters, ISIS fighters, is that the SDF was still maintaining control of them in SDF controlled territory and the Turks, that they were maintaining control of them in the territory not controlled by Turkey. And their best estimate was only slightly more than 100 or so had escaped so far. So again, to me, I go back to the basic mission, the core principle.

Mark Esper:
This is the same discussion I had in Saudi Arabia and Iraq this week. And again, we will have it in the coming days with some of our NATO allies is how do we keep that mission up at this point in time and make sure we maintain it. The other thing that's popped up as well, "Aren't you really concerned now with the Russians and Syrians and what that's going to mean?" Look, nobody in the region likes ISIS. We don't like ISIS. The Europeans don't like ISIS. Turkey doesn't like ISIS. Syria doesn't like ISIS. Russia doesn't like ISIS. There's probably parts of ISIS that doesn't like ISIS, but I think there's a lot of us have the shared mutual interest of making sure that ISIS doesn't resurge and become the threat that it was a few years ago.

Ian Lesser:
Thank you very much. Lots of hands. Gosh. Maybe just right there. Bart, I think it's you. It's hard to see in the lights.

Bart Szewczyk:
Hi. Bart Szewczyk.

Ian Lesser:
Do stand up so we can hear you.

Bart Szewczyk:
Sure. Bart Szewczyk at the European Political Strategy Center and a nonresident fellow here at GMF. Russia is always mentioned as a great power competitor to the United States and the national security strategy outlines various courses of action against Russia. But if you look over the past several months and over the past couple of years, it seems that Russia has been able to gain as a result of various US moves and most recently in Syria. And so how do you square those two dynamics? On the one hand, the US identifies Russia as a key challenge. On the other hand, Russia has been able to exploit the situation in Syria tremendously. It's hosted Erdoğan in Sochi. It has a new relationship with Africa and so it seems like Russia has been able to exploit a lot of the US moves recently to its advantage. Thanks.

Mark Esper:
Well we'll see in six months how Russia is doing on the Turkey-Syrian border, and we'll see what the impact is on Russia, on its interests. Again, what we're trying to do with a limited number of resources, service members, etcetera, focus on our core interests, on our established alliances and partners and to make sure that we focus our attention in that way.

Mark Esper:
And so again, time will tell with regard to whether or not Russia will benefit from having a presence on that border region. Russia obviously already had a presence in Syria going back to a few years ago when they moved in. But again, what we're trying to do is really use our resources, our time, our efforts, focused on the most critical threats to our national security or that are in the most vital interests of the United States.

Ian Lesser:
Okay, thank you. Right. Perhaps that woman just right there, if I could, just sort of in the middle, halfway down on the left. Please.

Monica Gamba:
My name is Monica Gamba from the International Polar Foundation. The Foundation organizes each year an event about the Arctic region and following the event of last year, this year will be the first one with a focus on security in the Arctic. So I was wondering what is the US security policy in the Arctic and the NATO role in this.

Mark Esper:
In the Arctic?

Monica Gamba:
In the Arctic region. Yes.

Mark Esper:
There's an echo.

Monica Gamba:
Thank you.

Mark Esper:
That's a very good question. I think you're asking another question with regard to the future and we need to be cognizant of as climate change occurs and we see the Northwest passage opening up and things like that, that there are a lot of people competing for resources in the Arctic and for control of the passageways coming through there. The United States participates in the Arctic Council with many of its allies. Russia's there. Somehow China has claimed an observer status yet being 700 miles away.

Mark Esper:
But the Arctic is a place where we need to look forward and make sure we're prepared for that future and what it may mean. And that's where I talk about, that's my focus, is what's next. So I can keep pace with our interests, with our challenges, with the threats that may surface there. And again, Russia is playing a very aggressive game in the Arctic and they're building the capability to have a presence there. And so we need to be prepared for that. And I think that's another area where NATO needs to pay attention. We have good NATO allies who are present in that region and are very capable and we work closely with them.

Ian Lesser:
Thank you. Trying to be geographically diverse here, so I can go right. Just right here. The second row, gentlemen, three in. Ambassador.

Makita Shimokaw:
Hi. I'm Shimokawa. I'm ambassador to NATO and Belgium from Japan. I'm asking this question as a layman, but how do you see the security environment in the Asia Pacific in 10 years/20 years time, especially in the context of the post INF period? Thank you.

Mark Esper:
So Japan is a great ally of ours, a cornerstone of our security presence in the Pacific. My first trip was to the Indo-Pacific in, I think, late July, August. The region is under duress right now, particularly the smaller countries who see a very heavy hand by China. And I've had this conversation with my Japanese counterpart and my Korean counterpart and my Australian counterpart. I mean around the route, and there's a lot of concern about the heavy hand that China is using in the Indo-Pacific. Whether it's military, political, economic. It's clear they're trying to establish some degree of... Hegemony may be too strong a word for now, but suzerainty in the region and we need to compete with them in that region and that's why I've engaged all of our traditional allies and partners.

Mark Esper:
I visited Mongolia. I'll be going back to the region next month and visiting with other current allies and future partners. Again, not because I want China to be an ally. Just the opposite. I want China to follow the same international rules, the rules-based order that this German Marshall Fund has embraced and be a responsible, normal actor in the international environment. And so I have no problem with China's rise. I just have a problem if China tries to use that economic power and the military power to subvert others and to bring them to heal, if you will.

Ian Lesser:
Mr. Secretary, I'm conscious of your time. We're going to have to wrap it up, but let me, if I could, maybe just ask a brief question of my own at the end. It's really a two part question. Very short one.

Mark Esper:
Another multi part question.

Ian Lesser:
Don't you love those when you get those. But no, really. What are you most worried about when you wake up every day, or someone's going to wake you up and tell you something that you don't want to hear. What are you most worried about and what are you most encouraged by in your job?

Mark Esper:
If there's one thing you worry about is a miscalculation somewhere where folks... Something is misinterpreted and leads to a conflict, an unnecessary conflict or an unintended conflict that could have been avoided through diplomacy. The Turkish incursion is a good example. Maybe not as precipitous as others that may arise, but nonetheless. So it's things like that that you're trying to manage on a day to day basis to make sure that we keep the world as secure and stable as possible day in and day out.

Mark Esper:
So we can allow diplomacy to really play its part and help keep things moving in the right direction. And we've seen a lot of positive trends over recent years, but we're seeing negative trends now and I've talked about them in my remarks. Again, my deepest concern is the furthest out and that is the what happens in 10, 15, 20 years. What is the trajectory of China and what path will it choose and will it be a normal, rational actor in the system and follow the rules or will it try and chart its own course and reshape everything that we've built over the last 70 years.

Ian Lesser:
Dr. Esper, we're really conscious of your schedule. Thank you very much for being with us. Thank you for your openness in answering the questions, for all the ground that you've covered. You're always most welcome at GMF. Thank you.

Mark Esper:
Thank you Ian.

Ian Lesser:
Just to keep your seats for a few minutes and let the Secretary's party leave. We'd be most grateful, and while you do that, I'm just going to offer a few thanks of my own. Above all, to all of you for joining us today. To US NATO, once again, and as always to my fantastic team here at GMF in Brussels. Thank you. See you soon.