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A NEW EUROPEAN ORDER?

INCLUDE RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS

HOW TO MOVE TOWARD A COMMON SECURITY SPACE

ROBERT LEGVOLD

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

THE WRONG ANSWER

WHY THE MEDVEDEV PROPOSAL IS A NON-STARTER

DAVID J. KRAMER AND DANIEL P. FATA

THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES

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BRUSSELS FORUM PAPER SERIES

MARCH 2010

Include Russia and its Neighbors
How to Move Toward a Common Security Space

Robert Legvold
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The Wrong Answer
Why the Medvedev Proposal is a Non-Starter

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INCLUDE RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS

How to Move Toward a Common Security Space

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Robert Legvold*
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1 THE STAKES

Calls for improving Europe's patch-quilt security arrangements are on the lips of many, but on the minds of fewer and in the hearts of fewer still. It makes for a curious moment, but also a portentous one. On the one hand the sense is growing that Europe has arrived at an impasse, divided over security issues, unsure of what comes next, and increasingly conscious of how far the earlier lofty promise of a continent whole and at peace for the first time in 300 years has receded. Yet, lethargy and skepticism over the chances of altering affairs remain widespread, fed in some quarters by reluctance to tamper with what exists; in others, by doubts that change is feasible or, if feasible, that it would be for the better. Leaders speak urgently of giving fresh consideration to an enhanced European security architecture—an appeal initiated by the Russian president, endorsed by his U.S. counterpart in their London Joint Statement in April 2009, and taken up by NATO's new secretary general. In the expert community, a rising chorus lobbies for attention to a looming set of new security challenges, from the consequences of governance failures in many key issue areas to a shrinking confidence in Europe's economic competitiveness. Meanwhile politicians and publics shrug, distracted by other matters, and bureaucracies in Brussels and major capitals plod on, unruffled by the need to collect themselves and begin thinking seriously of what might be done.

At the same time, a moment's reflection underscores the stake all parties have in transcending today's reality. The West and Central Europeans do, because European security will remain incomplete and subject to rupture until there is a genuine "common security space" incorporating Russia and its neighbors. The Americans do because the U.S.-Russian relationship cannot be put on a durably positive and productive basis until a *modus vivendi* with Russia in the post-Soviet space has been achieved, and this will not happen unless the larger security framework is conducive to it. The Russians do because arriving at a mutually acceptable European security arrangement will largely determine the kind of relationship Russia can have with the West, and this in turn impinges decisively on Russia's range of choice in managing relations with other major powers, including China and, more broadly, B(R)IC (Brazil, Russia, India, China). And all of them do, because discord over core security issues guarantees suboptimal responses to the security threats that all agree on, from terrorism to the flow of narcotics and illegal migration. Hence, if a moment has arrived when some are again ready to consider ways of reducing Europe's security divisions and inequalities, while strengthening this vast region's collective capacity to deal with the large security challenges facing it, then to waste it would be foolish, even reckless.

2 OBSTACLES TO A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER

NATO's new Strategic Concept may or may not rescue NATO's shaken identity and future mission, but it will not resolve the underlying conceptual problem because it cannot.

But how to proceed? How when the obstructions on the road ahead loom so large? And when they come not merely in one form but three: conceptual, practical, and psychological?

Conceptual obstacles

- At the conceptual level, defining the scope and scale of the security challenge has scarcely begun, and *the agenda remains without a sense of priority*, let alone a clear idea of where and how to integrate the different dimensions of the challenge. In their various forums, beginning with the 56-member Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), governments have repeatedly embraced the notion of “comprehensive security,” encompassing not only the political-military sphere, but energy and the environment as well as the human dimension. It must, they say, encompass not only hard security issues but those raised by conflicts over resources and threats to welfare posed by drug trafficking, illegal migration, and corruption. What precisely comprises each of these sweeping categories and what strategy or strategies should be adopted in response, however, constitute a large void.

Even the two most prominent initiatives—Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s appeal for a new European security treaty and the OSCE’s Corfu process—do little to fill it. Instead the agenda of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), the various mechanisms of the OSCE, and fledgling institutions in the post-Soviet region, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization, are tasked with a host of worthy but discrete concerns from controlling small arms and light weapons (SALW) to coordinating civil defense programs, from interdicting the narcotics traffic out of Afghanistan to promoting national defense reform. These, however, do little to grapple with what the key

security challenges are, the order of priority, how they relate to one another, and how they might be better integrated in devising a response. NATO’s new Strategic Concept may or may not rescue NATO’s shaken identity and future mission, but it will not resolve the underlying conceptual problem because it cannot—not when it encompasses but a portion of the relevant universe, important as that portion is.

- A second conceptual difficulty surrounds *the inapt notion of European security architecture*. No self-respecting architect would regard the hodgepodge of poorly coordinated institutions populating the European security landscape as deserving the name. Finding ways to transform this relatively shapeless environment into a coherent, mutually reinforcing, coordinated set of institutions constitutes a stern conceptual and organizational challenge. It will not be enough to exhort, say, the OSCE and NATO to develop better lines of communication and look for ways to coordinate their approach on the treaty of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), counterterrorism, and nuclear non-proliferation. Nor will it suffice to imagine a list of tasks on which the CSTO might cooperate with NATO. The problem originates at a deeper level, and will persist until policymakers think through what a more integral security structure will entail.
- The final conceptual obstacle revolves around *envisaging North America, Europe, and Eurasia as a “common security space.”* Can a common security space only be fashioned when underpinned by common values—in this case, a dedication to democracy; or, alternatively, can its foundation be shared interests even in the absence of shared values? If the latter, one still needs to whittle down the spheres in which values directly conflict. NATO and Russia may have a shared interest, for example,

in preventing the friction-ridden aspects of NATO's future shape and role from escalating into open conflict, but steps to reduce the danger are likely to come harder if the atmosphere is toxic from recrimination over things that the Russian government is doing at home or excusing among friends.

Practical obstacles

Second, there is a very real practical obstacle obstructing the way forward: *the problem of disparate security agendas*. Whatever their common ground when signing on to general principles under OSCE auspices, countries from “Vancouver to Vladivostok” have different threat perceptions, assign them a different order of priority, and favor different approaches to those even agreed upon. It is not simply that national security and what imperils it look fundamentally different in Georgia from in Ireland or Portugal, let alone in Russia and the United States. Within NATO itself a sharp dissensus exists over whom and what constitute a threat. For the United States, Afghanistan is a war of necessity. For many of its allies, it is a war of choice, with an obvious impact on buy in. For Poland or Estonia, Russia looms as a problem; for Germany and others it is better approached as a part of the solution. Conceiving the struggle against terrorism as literally a war has palpable meaning for some; for others it seems a harmful miscasting of the problem. Nor among the post-Soviet space does security for Ukraine mean what it does for its neighbor Belarus. The same holds true when comparing Azerbaijan with Armenia, and the list goes on.

The heart of the problem, however, resides in the critical rift that still divides the continent. What sets Russia apart from major Western countries is not simply sharply opposing views on NATO, the CFE treaty, and the role of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), serious

as these disagreements are. The divide is at a deeper level. Russia may agree that European security must be comprehensive, and, therefore, include the “human dimension,” but it not only refuses to give it equal footing with “political-military” and “economic and environmental” security, it has a very different notion of what the human dimension of security should include: *viz.*, less emphasis on good governance and civil rights and more on the fight against illegal immigration and narcotics trafficking. Moreover, as the Medvedev European Security Treaty (EST) initiative underscores, and Russian officials openly stress, enhancing Europe's security institutions should be first and foremost about hard security. When it comes to hard security, again as reflected in the Medvedev initiative, Russia's principal concern is with guaranteeing itself against the threats that it sees to Russia, not threats to European security as such. It is with securing a large, perhaps decisive, voice in security decisions anywhere on the continent, and much less with strengthening existing machinery to better address security challenges facing the continent.

On the other side of the divide, beginning with the United States, a critical inertia prevails. When it comes to Europe's new grey zones or security vacuums, *i.e.*, the new “lands in between” (Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova) and the turbulent Caucasus, policy hangs suspended between a formal commitment to a NATO open to all qualified comers and the recognition that the extension of NATO into these areas will not happen soon. No one has thought to cut through the unresolved quandary by trying to imagine alternative arrangements addressing the problem in ways fostering mutual security all around and eliminating the need for a NATO option. Or, at another level, NATO officials and the leaders of key NATO members strenuously insist that NATO no longer exists to ensure against a Russian threat,

Countries from “Vancouver to Vladivostok” have different threat perceptions, assign them a different order of priority, and favor different approaches to those even agreed upon.

The encrustation of mistrust and apprehension that has thickened over the last ten years weighs heavily on prospects for overcoming frictions that make security in Europe anything but indivisible, let alone equal.

but its members battle over whether contingency planning should be undertaken against precisely such a threat even if only prospective. Contingency planning with the force modifications being recommended will almost surely beget contingency planning and force modifications on the other side, even if, as proponents usually argue, it comes with an effort to engage Russia in a security dialogue.

Add to this a largely unrecognized problem merging the conceptual and the practical. Among a growing number of politicians and commentators in Europe and the United States, the urge to think beyond hard-security issues—seen as backward-looking—and to focus on newer so-called soft security threats grows. Not only are these concerns (ranging from the rapidly swelling impact of cybercrime to the noxious effects from illegal flows in drugs, arms, and humans to the threat of health pandemics) ever more on peoples' minds; they also have the advantage of being less divisive than problems in the other sphere. For the most part these soft-security issues are not unique to Europe, but global in their effect and solution. They are the external dimension of European security. The internal dimension, that is, the divide over what and who within the Euroatlantic region constitute a potential traditional security threat, inspires less hope of cooperation. To assume, however, that the two realms can be divorced from one another, and the less promising set aside in order to focus on the other more congenial is folly. The synergy between the two cannot be severed, and the difficult trick will be to make it positive rather than negative.

The psychological obstacle

One then arrives at the third and no less formidable obstacle: the psychological factor. The *encrustation of mistrust and apprehension* that has thickened over the last ten years weighs heavily on prospects for overcoming frictions that make security in Europe anything but indivisible, let

alone equal. That many in Europe and North America view Russia as predatory and ready to employ energy and arms to impose its sway over neighbors, while just as many Russians see the United States and NATO as bent on squeezing Russia out of these countries and perhaps dictating Russia's own political future hardly creates a good starting point for solving the security problems of Ukraine, Georgia, and, for that matter, Belarus. Here, too, however, the ultimate tension exercises its influence more subtly. A sophisticated Western analyst suggests that for Russia "the ultimate prize is not so much a more effective European security architecture as an environment that would facilitate (or at least tolerate) the projection of Russian influence," establishing it as the dominant power in the post-Soviet space and heeded as a great power in Europe-at-large.¹ Phrased in the Russian fashion, the issue looks quite different. Says one prominent commentator, "NATO expansion is nothing more than the extension of its zone of influence and in the most sensitive military and political spheres. And yet the West's unwillingness to abandon that effort is coupled with a repeated refusal to recognize Russia's right to have its own zone of interest."²

One version treats Russian impulses as aggrandizing, the other as legitimately self-protective. Like so much else when the analysis is subtle rather than crude, the phenomenon is not the source of disagreement, rather its implications are. When reality is a Rorschach test—and not simply set aside in order to preserve pre-existing biases—what different parties think they see takes on particular force. This is not to say that misperception—that is, the pernicious

¹ Bobo Lo, "Medvedev and the New European Security Architecture," Centre for European Reform Policy Brief, July 2009, p. 3.

² Sergei Karaganov, "Russia Will Save the West," *The Moscow Times*, December 29, 2009.

and well-developed tendency to make threats out of non-threats—poses a lesser problem. It may be understandable but nonetheless wrong for Russians to interpret NATO planning and actions as designed for Russia or U.S. ballistic missile defense plans in Europe as a piece with a larger scheme to degrade Russia's nuclear deterrent, yet in this case subjective reality counts far more heavily than objective reality. Just as it may be wrong, but unsurprising, for Poles to believe Russia is determined to control oil and gas transit routes to Europe, and particularly to the Central European states, in order to dictate the outcome in a political crisis. But again the perception counts for more than an accurate reading of why Russia works so hard to preserve its monopoly over pipelines.

The damage from clashing views dominates not only a few large issues, such as disagreement over the root causes of the Russian-Georgian War in August 2008 or whether the unilateral declaration of independence for Kosovo was the right move, but crops up day-after-day in a dozen ways. Take the current response to apparent French plans to sell the *Mistral* helicopter carrier to Russia. Reactions well illustrate the challenge posed by the cacophony of opposed views. U.S. Senators John McCain, John Kyl, and colleagues have written to French Ambassador Pierre Vimont vigorously objecting to the sale, perceiving it as strengthening a Russia that remains a clear and present danger to its neighbors.³ It is a view obviously shared by Georgian leaders and many of NATO's newest members. In sharp contrast, the French government—whatever the raw necessity of the sale in hard economic times—argues, not without sympathetic echo in Berlin and a number of other European capitals, that to refuse a normal intercourse in military

³Links to the correspondence are in a generally broadcast e-mail from David J. Smith, Jan.4, 2010.

sales with Russia would be to imply that Russia should not be treated as an acceptable partner in European security affairs.⁴ Meanwhile, conservative voices in Russia worry that by making Russia dependent on NATO members for key military technologies the country risks creating an unnecessary national security vulnerability.

What is to be done?

Dealing with the psychological dimension

Attacking this multi-layered challenge will not be easy. It makes sense, however, to start by considering ways to peel back the layers in sequence. Approached in this fashion, the outer layer would appear to be the psychological dimension. It not only accentuates the sharp disparity in security agendas, it also weakens the will to tackle the hard conceptual issues confronting any design for a sturdier and more inclusive European security framework.

Greater transparency and good-faith dialogue may help, but it is an illusion to assume that the exaggerated and misconceived fears plaguing European security relations can be erased simply by candor or argument, however well-honed. Attitudes are likely to change in telling ways only when the grounds for them change.

Concrete actions are required—two kinds, in particular; actions that flow from a clear-eyed strategic calculation. One set might be thought of as *political confidence building measures*. As military confidence-building measures (CBMs) are aimed

⁴Gerrard Coward, "Russia's New Arms Dealers," *Foreign Policy*, Jan. 6, 2010, available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/06/russias_new_arms_dealers. The Obama Administration has also expressed to Paris its discomfort over the deal, although more for the message it conveys than the military threat it represents. See "Mistral: la France veut une 'offre formelle,'" *le Monde*, Feb. 9, http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2010/02/09/mistral-la-france-veut-une-offre-formelle_1303190_3214.html.

at increasing trust by altering threat analysis and creating a more favorable basis for arms control, steps consciously designed to convey pacific intentions or to dispel apprehensions (whether justified or not) chip at the shell of mistrust that hardens security perceptions. Some are already underway, even if not formulated as such. The December 4 NRC decision to launch a “Joint Review of Twenty-first Century Common Security Challenges” qualifies as a political CBM. So does NATO’s active effort to solicit Russian concerns and ideas as it goes about devising a new Strategic Concept for the alliance.

To succeed, however, initiatives of this sort, whatever their indisputably important practical purpose, ought to be consciously treated as political CBMs, multiplied, and, as much as possible, woven into a strategy designed to create a cumulative impact. They, of course, will only work if reciprocated by the other side, but one function of a strategy should be to elicit responses that turn initiative and counter-initiative into a process. Nor should these initiatives be confined to easy steps. Rather they should be addressed to the most contentious issues.

- **Steps to avert further Russian-Georgian confrontation** by de-escalating military preparations on both sides—the Russians by forgoing base development and military reinforcements in Abkhazia, Georgia and NATO members by postponing defense cooperation designed to equip Georgia for war with Russia.
- **Agreement to bring proposals for easing the stalemate over Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdnistria** to common forums for discussion and refinement rather than advancing them independently.

- **Encouraging the planning staffs** within the ministries of foreign affairs and defense in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia—as well as Poland, Belarus, and Russia—to **cooperate in devising CBMs** likely to ease tensions in these key three-way relationships.
- **Giving serious consideration to CSTO proposals for cooperation with NATO** in a number of concrete areas.

These are only limited examples, but they are not randomly selected. They are chosen to address key areas of greatest mistrust—much as a strategy intended to maximize the impact of political confidence measures should.

The other means of eroding the destructive psychological factor already exists, and only needs to be adapted. NATO’s Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in a September speech underscoring the priority he attaches to improving NATO-Russian relations, stressed the importance of featuring areas of practical cooperation where NATO and Russia have clear common interests.⁵ He listed six, including an improved Joint Action Plan on Terrorism, intensified efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, collaboration on missile defense, a greater common effort in Afghanistan, counter-narcotics training, and closer cooperation in the fight against piracy. All are worthy aims, but they will only be half successful if they become a weak stand-in for the progress not being made on the hard core security issues setting Russia and NATO members at odds. Rather they too need to form part of a strategy, leading to a more comprehensive common security agenda.

⁵ Andes Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO and Russia: A New Beginning,” Speech at the Carnegie Endowment Brussels, Sep. 18, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_57640.htm.

3 ADDRESSING THE CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGE

Weakening the wellsprings of mistrust gives national leaderships a chance to wrestle more productively with the conceptual aspects of the problem. Just what does it mean to imagine an area stretching from North America to Europe and across Eurasia as a “common security space?” How, when the security priorities of these states, even if shorn of distortions, are so different? How, in practice, can the often repeated pledge to take a comprehensive approach to security, giving due attention not only to its political-military, but the economic and environmental and human dimensions, be achieved? Indeed, what belongs under each rubric; what would a coherent strategy for dealing with each cluster of challenges look like; and how are the three categories to be integrated?

Not only have past and present discussions of European security as well as major initiatives—from the enlargement of NATO to the Russian advocacy of a new European Security Treaty—failed to answer these questions, they have failed even to address them. NATO enlargement solved one set of unarguably important security problems by exacerbating another equally fraught set, all the while ignoring the overarching issue. The Medvedev Initiative, notwithstanding its merits, also side-steps these questions, which partially accounts for the proposal’s deficiencies.

Shortcomings of the Medvedev initiative

These stem not, as critics would have it, from a clear Russian desire to make mischief, say, by adding to the tensions between those in the West who distrust Russian aims and those who are eager to work with Russia, or even more directly by seeking to undermine NATO. On the contrary, the West should be pleased that the Russian leadership, rather than digging in and blocking the efforts of others, has taken the lead in putting ideas on the table. In doing so, its president has

shown flexibility, making plain that Moscow is trying to start a dialogue, not dictate its content. Both the idea of a new European security treaty first introduced by Medvedev in June 2008 and the later accompanying notion of an enlarged OSCE (to include NATO, the EU, the CSTO, and the CIS) to consider it have from the start included an invitation for counter-proposals. Russia, Medvedev has repeatedly said, “is open to any proposals on the subject.”⁶ Or, as Russian officials underscore, Russia seeks to “address jointly” all of these issues “through dialogue and creative teamwork.”⁷ Equally the Treaty’s focus on creating a mechanism and process for dealing with potentially dangerous disputes should be welcomed.

The shortcomings in the Medvedev initiative are different, and directly related to the conceptual challenge. In a word the proposal falls short in four respects.

- First, it focuses on process and architecture while leaving aside the prior question of how legislating in treaty form that security be “indivisible” and “equal” will address Europe’s deep real world security divisions, or even improve on the commitments already in existing treaties, including the UN Charter; let alone come close to advancing a comprehensive concept of security that encompasses economic and environmental security and the human dimension of security.

⁶Dmitri Medvedev, Speech at the World Policy Forum (Evian), Oct. 8, 2008, http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/speeches/2008/10/08/2159_type82912type82914_207457.shtml.

⁷Alexander Grushko, “Proposals from the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on the New European Security Treaty: Origins and Prospects,” IISS-Valdai International Conference “Toward a New European Security Architecture?” Dec. 9, 2009, <http://www.iiss.org/programmes/russia-and-eurasia/conferences/conferences-2009/towards-a-new-european-security-architecture/keynote-address-alexander-grushko/>

- Second, Russian officials recognize that, despite the importance they say they attach to all aspects of security—and not least the human dimension—both their concept of European security and their national priorities cut the other way. As stressed by Medvedev in his Evian address: “We need to concentrate on military and political issues because it is hard security that plays a determining role today.”
- Third, and a primary reason Russia’s proposed European Security Treaty in its present form is politely but universally seen as a non-starter traces even more directly to a conceptual flaw. A commitment to principles—such as the “indivisibility of security,” or in an earlier era the “indivisibility of peace”—is weak and ineffective when “security” (or “peace”) remains in the eye of the beholder. Medvedev has argued that the treaty should be anchored on “three noes:” “no ensuring one’s own security at the expense of others. No allowing acts (by military alliances or coalitions) that undermine the unity of the common security space. And finally, no development of military alliances that would threaten the security of other parties to the Treaty.”⁸ Not only is their target transparent, but even were this inconvenient truth overlooked and the three principles embraced by all, who would decide when they had been transgressed, in what forum, and by what criteria? Principles (or norms) only work when there is essential agreement on their content.
- The fourth flaw cuts across a large and poorly treated but fundamental conceptual issue—poorly treated not just by the Russians. When thinking about which organizing principle

⁸ Dmitri Medvedev, Speech to the World Policy Forum, Oct. 8, 2008.

would best serve the goal of transforming a wider Europe into a common security space, the logical recourse is the notion of collective security—that is, the principle of one for all, all against one. And, indeed, the Russians make collective security the ultimate point in their appeal. But *collective security is the great failed concept of the last century*—first, in the ill-fated League of Nations system and then in its later United Nations incarnation. History’s implacable lesson seems to be that in ambiguous security environments mutual security arrangements sooner or later trump collective security commitments. Later—much too late—in the interwar period, sooner during the Cold War. They do so because the all-for-one, one-for-all rule requires more common purpose, perception, and sacrifice than states are willing to muster when views differ on what or who constitutes a security threat.

The pros and cons of enlarging NATO to include Russia

Lately, however, an ersatz version of collective security has resurfaced. Talk is again of NATO enlarged to include Russia.⁹ In theory, while an all-inclusive NATO would not be any more likely than previous attempts to solve collective security’s inherent defect, it could well ease the one factor poisoning nearly all other aspects of European security—Russia’s exclusion and, therefore, alienation from current arrangements. In practice, however, the obstacles to moving in this direction are enormous. They include not merely the obvious: that NATO’s newest members and voices within

⁹ For a very well-argued case for enlargement that deals skillfully with both the pros and cons, see, Charles A. Kupchan, “Russia in NATO,” Working paper of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, Feb. 2010. The International Institute of Strategic Studies (London) and the Institute of Contemporary Development (Moscow) are developing a joint project exploring the virtues and feasibility of bringing Russia into NATO.

many other NATO states would be dead set against the idea or that Russia might well not accept the invitation. Even if resistance in both quarters were to vanish, four more subtle complications remain.

- First, Russia presumably would not come alone, but only together with the rest of the CSTO, not least because among NATO's current 28 members plus Ukraine and Georgia CSTO members would be Russia's security blanket. Digesting NATO's 13 new members has been anything but easy. Preserving any kind of uniform capacity, organizational coherence, and decision-making efficiency in a NATO fattened by a large chunk of the post-Soviet space would seem a low odds prospect.
- Second, to the extent that an enlarged NATO did maintain its efficacy, including its capacity to mobilize military power, the *apprehensions this would generate will simply pass to the Chinese and the others on whose borders it now presses.*
- Third, *trying to make a military alliance into a collective security organization may be a reach too far.*
- Fourth, as a military alliance, *NATO is hardly suited to bring order and focus to an agenda that includes economic and environment security as well as the human dimension of security.* Thus, unless recast in fundamental respects, an enlarged NATO would address an important but fragmentary portion of the security challenges facing Europe.¹⁰

¹⁰ Broadening NATO's mandate to deal with what Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in her speech before the l'Ecole Militaire in Paris Jan. 29, 2010 called "21st century threats" (cyber terrorism, climate change, illicit trade, and "threats to Europe's energy supply") will surely figure in NATO's new Security Concept when completed. But whether this mission will be either well specified or the organization sufficiently adapted to meet it is far less certain.

Here, two imperatives merge. It is doubtless crucial somehow to ease the perils of a Russia alienated from a NATO-dominant security order, meet the security needs of Ukraine, Georgia, and the other states left out of this order, and do so in ways that avoid compounding the existing standoff. But it is also important that the foundation of European security be as broad as it is sturdy. Unless the next stage in constructing this order not only acknowledges the importance of economic, energy, environmental, and human security, but also wisely identifies its components, and then devises effective mechanisms for responding, Europe will be short-changed, its security half-addressed, and the potential synergy from attacking the links among different threats lost.

For example, policymakers in Russia, the United States, and key European states must both come to terms with the way climate change, the race for hydrocarbons, and military planning to defend national claims in the Arctic are swiftly converging, and then decide on how an unfamiliar problem should be broken down and its different aspects tackled. The parallels are many. If terrorism, violent extremism, illicit trade, and illegal migration are a mounting threat to the welfare of all European states and the stability of some, and if, as the 2003 OSCE strategy document says, they have their roots in "deepening economic and social disparities, lack of the rule of law, weak governance, corruption, widespread poverty and high unemployment," Europe will have to find ways of translating this maze into a workable action agenda.¹¹

Dealing with these two imperatives—overcoming the political-military divide and addressing the new security threats—implies the need for a structure matched to both. Ideally this would be a structure

¹¹ "OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension," Eleventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Dec.1-2, 2003.

From the start, the focus should be on launching and then nurturing a process that encourages positive reciprocity.

that by its very being resolves the divide and at the same time reduces the insecurities of Russia's neighbors; a structure capable of focusing on and integrating the new security threats, establishing priorities among them, and then setting Europe's existing institutions to work on them.

One path forward might be an institutionalized triangular collaboration among the United States, the European Union, and Russia.¹² Conceptually such a structure would more resemble a concert system than a collective security arrangement. In effect, it would be a superintending body, responsible for creating a comprehensive, coherent, and integral security agenda, and then for effecting an optimal division of labor among the OSCE, NATO, CSTO, the EU, and the Council of Europe in carrying it out. Its governance function would be limited to a few, albeit critical decisions, including the use of force. Europe's current configuration of institutions would remain in place and each would retain its present function, but all would operate within a tighter, overarching framework.

What next?

Neither an enlarged NATO with Russia on the inside or a U.S.-EU-Russian directorate is, as the French would say, for tomorrow. Nor will there be a tomorrow for either unless the very real political obstacles standing in the way of both are removed. But one or the other (or some equivalent) has a critical role to play even if only as a distant prospect.

Two things need to happen if the process of revamping the European security system for the better is to advance. On the one hand, process is as important as destination, and, from the

start, the focus should be on launching and then nurturing a process that encourages positive reciprocity—a constructive tit-for-tat dynamic to replace the more negative version of the last lost decade. This process, however, ought not to be aimless, resting on the hope that positive steps, even if random, will eventually transform the larger picture. On the contrary, it requires a sense of direction, a notion of where the Euroatlantic community wants to end up—in short, a lodestar—and this is the function a common vision of an ultimate architecture can perform.

Still, process is crucial. There are several ways to think about it; several guidelines to give it. They come in five forms: contextual, operational, strategic, functional, and qualitative (i.e., steps that can change the quality of the process). First, *developments in other spheres bear directly on the context surrounding efforts to enhance European security*, and should be recognized as such. To the extent that the deterioration in U.S.-Russian relations over the last decade contributed to frictions over security in Europe, reversing that trend becomes important to changing direction in Europe as well. For example, while some in Eastern Europe worry that the Obama administration's focus on U.S.-Russian relations will be at their expense, almost certainly the opposite is true. Consider how the Russian reaction to the U.S. decision to deploy ballistic missile facilities in Central Europe heightened Polish and Czech suspicions and fear of Russia. If as the result of removing the issue Russian actions are tempered, tensions in Russia's relations with these countries should soften, and that should ease, albeit not eliminate, the discord within NATO over how to respond to Russian European security initiatives. Or, to take another example, if U.S.-Russian cooperation in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime falters at this critical juncture, and Europeans have not done their part to help, the

¹² The issue is discussed in Mark Entin and Andrei Zagorsky, "Can the European Security Dialogue Return Russia the Sense of Ownership of the OSCE?" *EU-Russia Centre Review*, Issue 12 (Nov. 2009), p. 19.

negative fallout for U.S.-Russian cooperation on European security issues will be large.

Second, *aiding the process operationally entails bringing order and then energy to what is already an elaborate and extensive agenda.* Long ago, the OSCE defined a wide array of security challenges, which a score of groups have discussed annually for years. The NATO-Russia Council's workplan has many elements and more are added each season. The need now is less with cutting and shaping issue areas or gingerly testing minor fixes, and more with persuading governments that real movement across a range of these tasks, including the compromises required to achieve it, is critical to giving the larger process momentum.

The third guideline for energizing the process and lending it a positive thrust concerns strategy. Inertia and a failure to focus on the issue has left states for the most part favoring what an academic international relations theorist would call a "balancing" strategy—that is, addressing perceived threats by seeking alignments designed to match and blunt them. A better alternative strategy would be one designed to *eliminate or reduce threats rather than balancing against them. Economists would call this a "risk-averting" strategy.* In the world of economics this means diversifying economic relationships to avoid the pitfalls and hazards of dependency on a single supplier or customer. Here it would mean not merely striving to have constructive relations with all parties but actively building ties, including participation in institutions, all around.¹³ In Europe, however, this has no chance, unless it becomes a conscious objective sought by major players, beginning with Russia and

key NATO members. One cannot expect states, such as Ukraine, Georgia, or Belarus, to embrace a risk-averting strategy, if NATO, the European Union, and Russia, by their attitudes, policies, and actions, do not make it possible.

Fourth, at this stage, before a more constructive process can gather speed, *states in the Euroatlantic region need to prove that they have the will and capacity to meliorate the day's most immediate and difficult problems*—that European security, even in its present incomplete form, is functional. Important as it is to choke-off the drug trade and limit the flow of small arms and light weapons, or agree on steps to mitigate climate change, *the gravest threats to European security come from smoldering tensions between states, notably Russia and Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and potentially over an issue such as the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea.* If, as in the months before the August 2008 Russian-Georgian War, the parties are left to themselves or treated to desultory diplomatic efforts, Europe's security system will again fail at some point.

Thus, key institutions and players need to deal more boldly and directly with these conflicts. Rather than settle for an inconclusive coat-holding exercise, such as the OSCE's Minsk Group in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, or confine themselves to admonishing the Russians for failing to live up to the EU-Russian agreements ending the Russian-Georgian War, Washington, Berlin, London, Paris, and Brussels need to actively mediate a normalization of Russian-Georgian relations and forcefully push Baku and Erevan to a resolution of the Karabakh problem. The former still carries the risk of reignited violence, which would devastate Russia's relations with the West, and the latter of coming unfrozen, thus, adding to the tumult already plaguing the Caucasian corner of Europe. At these points, where the fabric of European

Aiding the process operationally entails bringing order and then energy to what is already an elaborate and extensive agenda.

¹³ The idea is more fully developed in Robert Legvold and Celeste Wallander, eds., *Swords and Sustenance: The Economics of Security in Belarus and Ukraine* (The MIT Press, 2004), pp. 241-259.

security could tear, major states should be willing to risk greater involvement, and not count on Europe's weak crisis prevention machinery to measure up in the event.

Fifth, and finally, *more attention should be focused on the one or two issues that if resolved would give a qualitatively new impulse to the prospects of a more constructive European security dialogue.* The first is conventional arms control, the other an agreed framework for energy cooperation. Both issues deserve exploration that cannot be given here, but several points are worth making.

Moving ahead on conventional arms control

In the case of the wounded and side-tracked Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), it does not take a skilled diplomat to see that no agreement will come without further compromise from all sides. The Parallel Actions Package proposed by NATO in March 2008 in an effort to bring Russia back to the negotiating table and give the 1999 Adapted Treaty a chance does not go far enough on sequencing, treaty limits, and follow-on. On the other side, Russia's December 2007 decision to suspend its participation in CFE is merely destructive. By refusing to honor the treaty's data exchange provision and blocking its routine and challenge inspection regime, Moscow has generated very little negotiating leverage; it has simply introduced what in a very practical respect is a confidence-reducing measure. Perhaps the bilateral U.S.-Russian draft of "a package solution" launched this past spring, if further modified, can bring Europe closer to an agreement that addresses the inequities NATO enlargement has introduced into treaty limits, fashion a flank agreement that aids stability by constraining force buildup and movement on both sides of the line in these sensitive northern and southern regions, and create a simultaneous implementation procedure

with a seamless link to further efforts at rendering military forces in the Euroatlantic region mutually reinforcing rather than pitted against one another.

Next steps in energy cooperation

Much the same applies to the issue of energy cooperation. Here too the need is to move beyond the stalemate over Russia's refusal to ratify the Energy Charter and Europe's distinctly unenthusiastic response to Medvedev's 2009 proposal to craft a global energy convention governing not merely oil and gas relations, but trade in nuclear fuel, electricity, and coal. Perhaps the EU-Russian dialogue over energy is the appropriate forum to deal with the European component of an international energy regime, but, again, to achieve real progress in this area—that is, a regime that protects consumers, producers, and transit countries in a fashion that has healthy environmental effects—everyone will need to compromise.

Compromise on this scale in either area is simply not on the minds of key players at this point. Basic mind-sets need to change. Rather than viewing negotiations through the prism of fixed positions rusted in place by narrow national interest, Russia, the United States, and the rest of NATO should start from a different calculation: better that they give pride of place to the qualitative impact a breakthrough in one or the other area—or, better yet, both areas—would have on the chances of actually giving life to the larger process.

If a stronger, more equitable, and inclusive mutual security system in Europe is the goal, getting from here to there will not be easy. Neither random catch-as-catch-can steps, nor overly grandiose schemes bereft of strategy will bring it closer. Progress will depend on a slow, awkward, multifaceted process that has to begin

with a reasonably frank and comprehensive assessment of the challenge. Focusing on this, or that institution, or source of tension without having a more capacious understanding of the problem will surely stifle any real advance. In the same way, an unwillingness to attack the problem at many different levels and from many different directions also guarantees a process that

meanders at best and implodes when stricken. Above all, unless major players, particularly, those claiming the right to lead, prove themselves able to form something like a common vision of what an inclusive European security system should look like, and then demonstrate a readiness to work collaboratively to bring it about, not much will change, unless for the worse.

THE WRONG ANSWER

Why the Medvedev Proposal is a Non-Starter

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1 INTRODUCTION

In June 2008, when Russian President Dmitri Medvedev first floated the idea for a new pan-European security architecture, it was already clear to members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—organizations that were created during the Cold War—that meeting the challenges of the end of the 20th century, let alone the 21st, has proven to be difficult. Some of these challenges came from sources not anticipated even a decade ago, such as NATO’s (and to a degree, the European Union’s) war efforts in Afghanistan. As for the OSCE, the challenges it has faced have been more from within, with certain countries led by Russia questioning the fundamental principles of the organization’s “Third Basket” (democracy and human rights). Notwithstanding the flaws of these organizations, few members were looking to scuttle them in place of something new or to subsume them under some new, legally binding entity.

Yet that is what Russia essentially has proposed. On the eve of the OSCE and NATO ministerials, nearly a year and a half after Medvedev first raised the idea in Berlin, Russia unveiled a draft European Security Treaty on November 29, 2009. Leaving aside the questionable timing of the draft’s release, the content was initially and continues to be met with negative reaction in the West. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen summed up

the feelings of many when he said, “I do not see a need for new treaties or legally binding documents because we do have a framework already.”¹ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a similarly dismissive assessment of the Russian proposal a month later.²

This paper will examine the Russian proposal and explain why it is a non-starter. We recognize that NATO and the OSCE need to undertake needed reforms to better meet the challenges of today, in ways that would include Russia, if the latter were so inclined. But we do not accept that institutions such as NATO and the OSCE, which have worked well for decades, need to be replaced because Russia finds them objectionable. We focus on these two organizations, since they form the backbone of European security (and the United States is a party to both), and less so on the European Union (despite its growing importance but because of its complicated decision-making process made even more opaque after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty), or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

¹ As quoted by Conor Sweeney, “NATO Chief Opposes Russia’s Security Pact Proposal,” Reuters, Dec. 17, 2009.

² “Remarks on the Future of European Security” by Hillary Clinton, Paris France, Jan. 29, 2010. <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/136273.htm>.

2 RUSSIAN COMPLAINTS WITH EXISTING STRUCTURES

Even before Medvedev, in June 2008, fully articulated in Berlin Russian interest in a new security architecture, his predecessor, Vladimir Putin, indicated Russian displeasure with the existing arrangements. In a speech in Munich in February 2007, Putin railed against the United States as well as, implicitly, NATO:

Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force—military force—in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible.

One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations It results in the fact that no one feels safe. I want to emphasize this—no one feels safe! Because no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall that will protect them. Of course such a policy stimulates an arms race I am convinced that we have reached that decisive moment when *we must seriously think about the architecture of global security*. (emphasis added)³

Later, in his Munich remarks, Putin criticized the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, in particular the failure of NATO states to ratify it because of Russia's unwillingness to comply with accompanying Istanbul Commitments associated with the adapted version of the Treaty in 1999, and NATO enlargement. On the latter, Putin was clear:

I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr. Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: 'the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee.' Where are these guarantees?⁴

To Russian leaders, NATO is a relic of the Cold War; its counterpart, the Warsaw Pact, dissolved with the collapse of the Soviet bloc yet no modifications, Russian leaders argued, were made in NATO. Even the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the creation, in 2002, of the NATO-Russia Council didn't alter these Russian perceptions. The OSCE, on the other hand, became tarnished in Russian leaders' minds with the 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty and concomitant Istanbul Commitments, and with the organization's over-emphasis, according to Russian critics, on democracy and human rights.

In Berlin, 15 months after Putin's rant in Munich, Medvedev offered an equally clear, albeit less impassioned, plea to an audience of German political, parliamentary, and civic leaders. He questioned the ability of NATO and the OSCE to adapt to the changed environment and proposed the need for something new. The end of the

To Russian leaders, NATO is a relic of the Cold War; its counterpart, the Warsaw Pact, dissolved with the collapse of the Soviet bloc yet no modifications, Russian leaders argued, were made in NATO.

³ Vladimir Putin, speech, 43rd Munich Security Conference, Feb. 10, 2007, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?sprache_en&id_179.

⁴ Ibid.

“NATO has also failed so far to give new purpose to its existence,” Medvedev explained. “It is trying to find this purpose today by globalizing its missions, including to the detriment of the UN’s prerogatives... and by bringing in new members. But this is clearly still not the solution.”

Cold War, he argued, “made it possible to build up genuinely equal cooperation between Russia, the European Union, and North America as three branches of European civilization. It is my conviction that Atlanticism as a sole historical principle has already had its day. We need to talk today about unity between the whole Euroatlantic area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Life itself dictates the need for this kind of cooperation.”⁵

Medvedev went on to warn against “marginalizing and isolating countries, creating zones with differentiated levels of security, and abandoning the creation of general regional collective security systems.” He proceeded to criticize the OSCE: “An organization such as the OSCE,” Medvedev argued, “could...embody European civilization’s newfound unity, but it is prevented from doing so, prevented from becoming a full-fledged general regional organization. The problem is not just in the organization’s own incomplete institutional development but also in the obstruction created by other groups intent on continuing the old line of bloc politics.”

He then turned his sights to NATO. “NATO has also failed so far to give new purpose to its existence,” Medvedev explained. “It is trying to find this purpose today by globalizing its missions, including to the detriment of the UN’s prerogatives, which I mentioned just before, and by bringing in new members. But this is clearly still not the solution. There is talk of exchanging further NATO expansion to the east for ‘something else,’ but I think this is just so many illusions,” he said, presumably eluding to talk of a swap on stopping missile defense plans in exchange for further enlargement of the alliance. “I think that in such a case our relations with NATO would be completely

undermined, ruined for a long time to come. There will not be confrontation of course, but the price would nonetheless be high indeed and would cause serious damage.” His solution:

Our predecessors during the Cold War years managed to draw up the Helsinki Final Act (which, as the legal foundation for the European system, has withstood the test of time despite all the difficulties encountered), and so why should we not be able to take the next step today? Namely, drafting and signing a legally binding treaty on European security in which the organizations currently working in the Euroatlantic area could become parties.⁶

Medvedev followed up his call for a new European security arrangement with a speech in Evian at the World Policy Conference on October 8, 2008. He outlined five specific provisions that would be included in a new treaty. Several provisions—calling for “respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of states” and the inadmissibility of the use of force—struck many observers as real chutzpah in light of Russia’s invasion of Georgia two months before. “[W]e do not seek to abolish or even weaken anything that we have now,” Medvedev argued. “All we want is to achieve more harmonious work together on the basis of a common set of rules....[W]e must speed up our efforts to fix the European security architecture. If we do not, we will only see it degrade further, as well as face growing crisis in security and arms control.”⁷

French President Nicolas Sarkozy, speaking after Medvedev at the same conference, indicated a

⁶Ibid.

⁷For a transcript of Medvedev’s Evian speech, see http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/speeches/2008/10/08/2159_ty-pe82912type82914_207457.shtml.

⁵Medvedev speech in Berlin Jun. 5, 2008 at http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/C080DC2FF8D93629C3257460003496C4.

readiness to discuss the Russian leader's proposal, though with a strong preference for doing so under the OSCE rubric. He also stressed that human rights must be a key component of any such discussion and insisted that the United States have a seat at the table in any such meetings, pushing back on an earlier Russian effort to keep the forum limited to a European audience.⁸

Following his Berlin and Evian speeches, Medvedev did not return publicly to the theme of a new security arrangement until a meeting with students and faculty at the London School of Economics on April 2, 2009. Expressing his dissatisfaction with current structures, Medvedev promised to circulate a draft of a text for a new treaty "very soon, which could, if not replace certain agreements, at least help ensure their implementation." Responding to a question at the same session, Medvedev argued, "[T]here is there is no organization that unites all of us. This is a real problem." The reality, of course, is that such an organization does indeed exist—the OSCE, which includes all countries envisioned under a new arrangement. The NATO-Russia Council also exists to try to bridge the gap between those who are alliance members and Russia. But Medvedev proceeded to dismiss the OSCE, saying it "deals with quite specific matters, and not always effectively." He went on to say that "we should not see the conclusion of a new treaty as leading to the replacement of existing organizations with new ones. The organizations that already exist should be maintained, and what's more, they should take part in drafting the new treaty, which should be a universal agreement."⁹

⁸ For a transcript of Sarkozy's speech, see <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/President-Sarkozy-s-World-Policy.html>.

⁹ See http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2009/04/02/2200_type82914type84779_214720.shtml.

Despite Russian objections to having the OSCE host discussion of a new treaty, that is in fact what happened, first at the Helsinki OSCE Ministerial in December 2008, where the discussion was very general, followed by informal talks from June 27-28, 2009, in Corfu, Greece. With Greece as host, Russia expected to find a somewhat receptive OSCE chair, but those hopes would be dashed, as Greek officials argued that the OSCE was the "natural anchor for such a dialogue."¹⁰

The "Corfu Process" was launched to facilitate further discussion of existing arrangements and consideration of new ones, but aside from the intervention by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, only German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier offered a positive attitude toward a discussion of the Russian proposal. "Our meeting should give a strong signal for starting a meaningful and well structured dialogue on European security issues to better address the current security challenges in the Euroatlantic area," Steinmeier said. "Our principal aim must be to restore and strengthen confidence in our common security area. This is best done by deeds, not words alone." Calling for the "Corfu Process" to prepare for a ministerial decision in Athens in December, Steinmeier said, "This will send a strong signal that we are indeed ready to tackle our security concerns together, giving new meaning to the principle of cooperative security in Europe that we are all committed to."¹¹

OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis was more measured in her comments at the press conference after

¹⁰ See http://www.osce.org/conferences/inf_mc_2009.html?page=38312.

¹¹ See http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/38549_en.pdf.html.

the informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers. Traditional security problems remain unresolved, she noted, citing “protracted conflicts and other unresolved tensions, the suspended CFE Treaty, the need to strengthen democracy and rule of law in parts of the region, the economic crisis, terrorism, trafficking, and instability in neighboring regions.”¹² Corfu, in other words, was a bust as far as what Russia was hoping to achieve. This was due in large part to the absence of a text, which Russian officials had been promising for months, leaving discussions at Corfu in the abstract. As analyst Bobo Lo astutely observed, the vagueness

¹² See <http://www.osce.org/item/38493.html>.

coming out of Moscow reflected a sense that Russia had a “far better understanding of what it does not like—a European security environment dominated by the United States and NATO—than of how an alternative architecture might look like, let alone work.”¹³ Emblematic of the problems, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did not even attend the Corfu meeting because of a broken elbow; her deputy, James Steinberg, took her place. While Russian officials continued to discuss the need for a new European security treaty, their efforts through the summer of 2009 were unsuccessful.

¹³ Bobo Lo, “Medvedev and the new European security architecture,” Centre for European Reform Policy Brief, July 2009, p. 7.

3 FINALLY, RUSSIA PRESENTS

After months of waiting but then with little advance notice, the Kremlin posted on its website on November 29, 2009, its draft text for a new European Security Treaty, on the eve of both OSCE and NATO ministerial meetings. Because the text was delivered to OSCE and NATO leaders too close to the meetings, there was not much specific discussion of the Russian draft; instead, there seemed to be a sense of annoyance with how Russian officials unveiled their long-awaited proposal. Doing so hours before ministerial meetings did not seem to be a serious way to unveil the proposal. We have already noted NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen's reaction, but the comments of other figures was not much better from the Russian perspective. Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb summed up the mood at the OSCE meeting this way: "People didn't really talk about the new Medvedev proposal that much because it has only been distributed to us over the weekend, so in that sense it's too early to discuss the matter." Moreover, Stubb argued, NATO, the OSCE, and the EU were functioning well and "so one would have to prove the value added of new security structures on top of this."¹⁴

Even within Russia, some analysts were very critical. Frequent Kremlin critic Andrei Piontkovskiy dismissed the proposal as "empty declarations" and a "propaganda exercise." Alexander Golts, longtime military analyst writing in *The Moscow Times*, said the proposal "smacks of a trap that is thinly veiled in flowery, diplomatic language."¹⁵

¹⁴ Comments by Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb as quoted in "OSCE Lukewarm on Medvedev Plan," Associated Press, Dec. 2, 2009 at <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/mobile/news/article/390737.html>.

¹⁵ Piontkovsky, as quoted in, "Russia Unveils Proposal for European Security Treaty," RFE/RL, Nov. 30, 1999, http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Unveils_Proposal_For_European_Security_Treaty/1891161.html. Alexander Golts, "Medvedev's Grandiose European Security Trap," *The Moscow Times*, Dec. 15, 2009, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/mobile/news/article/396146.html>

In late January, during a speech on European Security in Paris, Clinton weighed in with a firm rejection of the Medvedev proposal:

Now, the Russian Government under President Medvedev has put forth proposals for new security treaties in Europe. Indivisibility of security is a key feature of those proposals. And that is a goal we share, along with other ideas in the Russian proposals which reaffirm principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the NATO-Russia Founding Act. *However, we believe that these common goals are best pursued in the context of existing institutions, such as the OSCE and the NATO-Russia Council, rather than by negotiating new treaties, as Russia has suggested—a very long and cumbersome process. (emphasis added)*¹⁶

Also in that speech, which offered arguably the most critical take on Russia from a senior Obama administration official to date, Clinton cited Russia's failure to comply with the 2008 Georgian ceasefire agreement and its suspension from implementing the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty as obstacles to moving forward.

Russian officials were not to be deterred, however. In remarks at the 46th Munich Security Conference on February 6, 2010, Lavrov argued for further consideration of the Russian proposal. "Will the pan-European space be a truly, in legal terms, single space?" Lavrov asked. "Or will it be divided into 'spheres of influence' and areas in which different standards are applied in terms of military and political security, humanitarian obligations, access to markets and modern technology and so on? It's a hugely important issue, a kind of test of the members of the Euroatlantic 'family' for maturity,

¹⁶ "Remarks on the Future of European Security" by Hillary Clinton, Paris France, Jan. 29, 2010. <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/136273.htm>

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for their ability to adequately perceive what is happening in the world.¹⁷

The text's shortcomings

Without examining every single provision, suffice it to say that the text is skimpy and riddled with problems.¹⁸ In the very first article, the Russian text says, "Any security measures taken by a Party to the Treaty individually or together with other Parties, including in the framework of any international organization, military alliance or coalition, shall be implemented with due regard to security interests of all other Parties." Aside from confusion on how this article would work in practice, what seems clear is an effort to subordinate existing structures—i.e., NATO—to this treaty. Needless to say, this is a non-starter for the alliance. In calling for an Extraordinary Conference if a party to the treaty is attacked, the draft, if implemented, would delay action needed for a country's self-defense, collective or otherwise.

According to the text released by the Kremlin, "A Party to the Treaty shall not undertake, participate in or support any actions or activities affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty." Yet, Russia is already in violation of this clause through its continued illegal troop presence in Georgia's separatist regions, its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, and its unwanted presence in the Moldovan separatist area of Transnistria. Russia's military conducted "war games" in September 2009 with Belarus to include a simulated attack against Poland involving nuclear weapons. Russia also uses other

methods short of military force that significantly affect the security of its neighbors, including energy cutoffs (Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, Belarus in 2007 and 2010), cyber attacks (against Estonia in 2007), and bans on other countries' exports (Moldovan and Georgian wine and agricultural products). Such tactics and behavior clearly run counter to existing security arrangements, to say nothing of the new Russian proposal. And they certainly run counter to building confidence among Russia's neighbors that Russia does not pose a threat.

The Russian draft makes no reference to human rights standards and democratization, key issues for the OSCE and NATO. Given the internal trends in Russia toward greater authoritarianism, this omission should not come as a major surprise. Finally, the text seeks to equate NATO and the OSCE with Russian-led organizations like the CIS and CSTO; neither organization is comparable to NATO or the OSCE. Unlike NATO, for example, countries (Georgia and even Ukraine) have been seeking to leave, not join, the CIS; in the case of NATO there are countries in the former Soviet Union and the Balkans that wish to join. Also worth noting is that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, of which China is a member, is not listed even though the text argues for remaining open to signature states from "Vancouver to Vladivostok."

Russian motivations

In the year and a half it took to flesh out Medvedev's idea, it became clear that Russia was interested in creating a new pan-European security architecture to replace Cold War-era institutions such as NATO and OSCE. In its purest form, the Russian proposal recycles Soviet-era thinking to separate the United States from European security and to set the conditions for Moscow to further their "divide et impera" aims toward Europe and specifically NATO. In early

¹⁷ Transcript of Speech by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the 46th Munich Security Conference, Feb. 6, 2010, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/49F4C4EB6473C1E5C32576C500311EB4.

¹⁸ For the full text online, see <http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/11/223072.shtml>.

February, the Russian Foreign Ministry argued that there were countries in the alliance that “want to discuss the proposal with us, among them Spain and Italy.”¹⁹ At a minimum, the Russian proposal seeks to marginalize the role of the United States in European security matters and drive wedges between and among allies in order to increase Europe’s reliance on Moscow. Replacing NATO and halting the alliance’s enlargement appear to be at the root of the Russian proposal. The Russian proposal reflects the view in Moscow that NATO and even EU enlargement pose a threat to Russia, ignore Russian interest in the region, and increase instability.

A study released days after the Kremlin issued its treaty text by the influential Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and RIA-Novosti news agency made this clear. “[T]he possibility of NATO’s expansion to Ukraine, which Russia’s elite views as a vital threat to its security, has created and maintains—for as long as this possibility exists—a threat of a large-scale war in Europe, which may escalate unpredictably,” the authors of the report write. They go on to say:

None of the existing collective security organizations in Europe can serve as a universal mechanism for cooperation and conflict prevention. The absence of legal obligations for the OSCE member states to cooperate on crucial issues is the main reason for the OSCE’s inadequacy. NATO’s emphasis on maintaining peace and stability inside the Euro-Atlantic community—that is, on preserving the unity of the West—as well as its function as a defensive alliance are becoming an obstacle to the extension of the organization’s capabilities, both geographically and functionally. Yet the main

problem of NATO is its genetic code, which can be overcome, as practice shows, either by transforming the organization into a collective pan-European political-military union, or by creating a genuine pan-European security system.²⁰

Moscow considers today’s institutions incapable of addressing 21st century security challenges and worries that absent new configurations, existing security structures and their expansion will leave Russia behind. “It is necessary to clearly identify the problem,” the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and RIA-Novosti report argues:

Does the West want to continue its geopolitical expansion, proliferating its institutions, above all NATO, to countries bordering on Russia? Or is it ready to put an end to this short-sighted policy? It is time to stop hypocritical talk about the renunciation of recognition of zones of special interests, used to cover up the expansion of one’s own zones in the most sensitive, military-political sphere. This is what NATO is doing. It would be better to avoid such ‘zones of special interests,’ at least in Europe. But then one must give up this expansion in favor of their joint development and renounce rivalry in the name of cooperation.²¹

Such claims are interesting coming from a country whose government repeatedly has laid claim to a “zone of special interests” along its own borders. Still, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy’s concerns about NATO enlargement were echoed two months later in

Replacing NATO and halting the alliance’s enlargement appear to be at the root of the Russian proposal.

¹⁹ Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Igor Lyakin-Frolov as quoted in “Lavrov to Push New Security Pact,” *The Moscow Times*, Feb. 5, 2010.

²⁰ “Towards a new Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture,” Report of the Russian Experts for the Valdai Discussion Club Conference, London, Dec. 8-10, 2009, at http://en.dgap.org/midcom-serveattachmentguid-1deeb044b1fadcccb-0411de853b0fbfecc85a165a16/Karaganov_eng.pdf.

²¹ *Ibid.*

If Russia does not abide by these agreements, on what basis can there be sufficient trust and confidence that Russia will adhere to new arrangements?

Russia's newly approved military doctrine, issued February 5, 2010. In it, NATO and its possible enlargement are considered the "main external dangers" to Russia. Missile defense is not far behind the list of dangers, as is "the violation of international accords by individual states, and also noncompliance with previously concluded international treaties in the field of arms limitation and reduction." This, too, is ironic given Russia's own non-compliance with such treaties as CFE.²²

In his June 2008 speech, Medvedev argued that Russia was becoming a fully-fledged member of the European community. "Having cast aside the Soviet system and any idea of its restoration," he said, "Russia has laid the foundations of a state that is completely compatible with the rest of Europe, or to be more precise, with the best of all that makes up the common heritage of European civilization.... Russia has 'come in from the cold' after almost a century of isolation and self-isolation."²³

At least two developments would raise serious questions about this claim, however. The first unfolded before Medvedev's speech when Russia in December 2007 suspended its compliance from the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. The second took place two months after Medvedev's Berlin speech, when Russia troops invaded Georgia. Both highlight Russia's non-compliance with existing security arrangements and beg the essential question: *If Russia does not abide by these*

agreements, on what basis can there be sufficient trust and confidence that Russia will adhere to new arrangements? In fact, part of the Russian strategy appears to be to deflect attention from its non-compliance with these existing agreements.

In the case of Georgia, putting aside Russia's disproportionate use of force against its neighbor, Russia has not complied with the provisions of the ceasefire accord negotiated by Sarkozy that include withdrawal of forces to the positions occupied prior to the armed conflict; Russian forces remain in clear violation of this part of the agreement. Moreover, Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states contradicts Russian claims of support for the concept of territorial integrity in their new treaty draft. On CFE, a source of frustration highlighted in Putin's Munich speech of February 2007, NATO parties to the treaty had not ratified the adapted version because of Russia's unwillingness to comply with the Istanbul Commitments calling for Russian withdrawal from Georgia and Moldova. Having rebounded and become more confident after the chaotic 1990s, Russia under Putin chose to "suspend" its compliance with the 1990 Treaty (which was adapted in 1999) in the summer of 2007, even though there is no such provision to do so. In suspending its participation in data exchanges and inspections, Russia thus was in breach of the Treaty. Again, if this is the case, what kind of interlocutor will Russia be in negotiating a new treaty?

²² See "Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461. For an English translation, see Johnson's Russia List, 2010-#35, Feb.19, 2010.

²³ Medvedev speech in Berlin Jun. 5, 2008 at http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/C080DC2FF8D93629C3257460003496C4.

4 EXISTING ORGANIZATIONS NEED TO BE FIXED

While Russia's solution for fixing the problem is fundamentally flawed, to be fair one should not reflexively dismiss all Russian concerns, for Moscow has a point in observing that existing security institutions have struggled to address key issues and to determine their role in the changing security environment. After all, the Georgia-Russia crisis exposed weaknesses in NATO, the EU, and the OSCE, most notably by demonstrating a lack of political unity in how to respond to naked aggression in Europe. Despite the painful failures of these organizations during this crisis, the solution should not be to scrap these organizations but rather to reform them so that they can adapt to 21st century security and political realities.

The efforts by a group of experts led by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to revise NATO's Strategic Concept, to be unveiled in Lisbon at the November 2010 NATO Summit, are hopefully the first step in correcting this organization's shortcomings. The Strategic Concept, which was last updated in 1999 coincidentally just before the launch of the Kosovo campaign and which, therefore, predates the events of September 11, 2001, is intended to give vision and reason for what the alliance should do in the years going forward. And while the OSCE does not have such a distinguished experts' group studying its future, the organization has suffered challenges from key member states that require it to reassess its purpose and mission, too. The recent ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by EU member states has already put that organization on a new path toward foreign policy decision-making. However, it is arguably too early to fully know how Lisbon will either positively or negatively affect the EU's conduct of foreign policy writ large.

NATO's April 2008 summit meeting in Bucharest (and the lead-up to it) highlighted some of the serious challenges facing the alliance, most notably how to shoulder burdens on the ground

in Afghanistan, whether to invite Macedonia to formally join the alliance even though it remained locked in a dispute with Greece over what the country could rightfully call itself on the international stage, whether Georgia and Ukraine should be invited to participate in the Membership Action Plan or MAP (a program that is a final step before, but not a guarantee to, full membership in the alliance), and whether a ballistic missile defense was needed for Europe.

Against this backdrop was a real discussion among new allies from Central and Eastern Europe questioning their status within the collective defense organization. Allies such as Poland and the Baltic nations feared they were turning into second-class members within NATO whose requests for contingency planning, NATO stationing of forces on their territory, and greater integration into the organization seemed to fall on deaf ears—largely because of a difference in approach between Western European members and Central and Eastern European members over how to deal with Russia. Looming large in the new allies' minds, both then and now, is whether the entire alliance would come to their defense should they face a threat or attack. In many ways, this overarching concern has resulted in a lack of confidence in NATO as an institution among new allies.

Meanwhile, the OSCE was being challenged for its perceived emphasis on the “democracy/human rights basket” by a small contingent of countries led by Russia. In September 2007, this Russian-led group of countries (including Belarus and Kazakhstan) sought to emasculate the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) by proposing new measures that would undermine ODIHR's ability to determine how to monitor elections in member states; Moscow was unhappy with criticism voiced by ODIHR in some nearby elections. In addition, Russia tried to challenge ODIHR's

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primacy in observing elections by establishing a competing mechanism within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and other Russia-dominated entities. For the March 2008 presidential election in Russia as well as for the parliamentary election three months before, ODIHR declined to send an observer mission because of Russian efforts to dictate the terms of those assessment missions. At a Vienna conference in those 2008, the Russian-led contingent sought to shift the mandate of the OSCE toward greater emphasis on the military and economic baskets. Although that effort failed, it revealed unhealthy and growing differences within the organization about its future.

NATO, the EU, and the OSCE have served and will continue to serve increasingly important roles in managing transatlantic security challenges, but they are certainly not perfect and need to be improved. That is far different from replacing them or subordinating them to a larger superstructure. Interestingly, a central premise of Moscow's proposal is that NATO and EU enlargement has been negative for the stability of Europe and has been directed against Russia. The reality is that since the enlargement of NATO into Eastern Europe, Russia's western borders have remained stable and secure. None of its neighbors has built up forces to challenge Russia or declared Russia the enemy. The signing of a border treaty between Latvia and Russia in May 2007 and the visit seven months later by Lavrov to Riga, for example, were simply not possible before Latvia joined NATO.

Moreover, for years, Russia's stable, predictable, and democratic neighbors have expressed a willingness to cooperate with Russia in a variety of areas (including having Russia as one of their largest trading partners) and in a variety of organizations such as the NATO-Russia Council, the EU-Russia joint partnership agreement, and numerous OSCE bodies. It is not that Europe's security organizations

have failed but rather that Russia's reforms have stalled and thus Moscow has been incapable of taking advantage of all that today's existing security and political organizations have to offer. As Clinton said in her Paris speech:

For years, Russia has expressed a sense of insecurity as NATO and the EU have expanded. But we strongly believe that the enlargement of both has increased security, stability, and prosperity across the continent, and that this, in turn, has actually increased Russia's security and prosperity.

Furthermore, the right of all countries to enter into alliances of their own choosing has been endorsed by Russia and all members of the OSCE at the 1999 Istanbul summit. NATO must and will remain open to any country that aspires to become a member and can meet the requirements of membership. But we do not seek to create divisions between neighbors and partners. Russia's confidence in its security enhances our own.²⁴

Acknowledging that NATO is in need of reform to operate more effectively in the 21st century, we recommend that NATO members engage in strategic discussions on key security challenges. This simply is not happening today. Some allies have been repeatedly hesitant (if not outright resistant) to hold discussions on some very important issues for fear the discussion might lead to an actual course of action. This cannot continue. There are real issues affecting Europe and the transatlantic alliance with Afghanistan, Iran, missile defense, and Georgia, to name just a few. Allies must be able to discuss key

²⁴ "Remarks on the Future of European Security" by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Paris France, Jan. 29, 2010. <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/136273.htm>

strategic issues before future crises develop within Europe or outside its borders.

Next, the execution of NATO-agreed decisions must be streamlined. Once allied leaders agree on a policy, a committee of 28 members operating by consensus simply cannot be expected—or be allowed—to micromanage every tactical detail of the policies' execution. Such an approach has had an effect on NATO's operations in Afghanistan. Members must allow NATO's chief civilian and military officials to carry out their decisions. Too much micromanaging is damaging the alliance's ability to be effective. Such a step does not require a change to NATO's treaty; it just requires a change in attitude by its members.

Finally, the alliance's military officials must be able to give pure military advice to the political leadership. Too often military advice is being tainted by political influence early in the process because a member state does not want to see a policy option presented. This is unfair to the process and hurts NATO's ability to execute its core mission of being a military alliance.

Arguably, the European Union, too, must spend more time addressing key security issues affecting its member states, namely Afghanistan and Russia. There also must be greater practical coordination between the EU and NATO. As U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and numerous other allied ministers have argued, both the European Union and NATO must have broad spectrum capabilities to undertake all missions. Today, both organizations possess such capabilities. However, institutional biases and political considerations continue to hamper more fruitful joint action. Moreover, continued paralysis within and among NATO and EU over Greek-Turkish-Cypriot issues is limiting the potential both organizations can play in the field of transatlantic security. Such impasses need to be overcome by all parties to allow the greater security good to be realized by NATO and

the European Union while the existing processes continue to work to resolve differences between the three nation states.

As for the OSCE, to be clear, Russia is a large part of the problem. Russia may not like the way ODIHR monitors elections, but Moscow has been anything but helpful when the OSCE tries to pursue its military security basket either in South Ossetia, where Russia refused to extend the mission there in early 2009, or on Transnistria, where Russia blocks any efforts to resolve that frozen conflict. In Ukraine, during the recent presidential election, ODIHR demonstrated once again that it can play a positive role in assessing a country's conduct of an election. Of course, when countries such as Russia do not follow democratic paths, ODIHR becomes a thorn in their side and an organization to put out of business. That the OSCE operates on the basis of consensus enables Russia to become a major obstacle in the way of anything OSCE or ODIHR try to do. Overcoming that problem may simply be impossible absent a radical change in the way the organization functions. And yet one should not overlook the important role the OSCE plays in the security field; its contributions in the economic basket are less impressive but that is not a real problem given the existence of other tools (OECD, EBRD, etc.) for promoting economic reform and stability. OSCE missions in various troublespots in Europe have contributed to improving stability and security in the Balkans, Moldova, and the Caucasus, making Russia's decision to block extension of the mission in South Ossetia particularly regrettable. (The same was true when Russia ended the OSCE mission in Chechnya at the end of 2002.) As the only organization that brings all countries in Europe and the United States and Canada together, the OSCE should be the focus of concentrated efforts to turn it into a more effective mechanism and a more open forum in which to air differences among members without adulterating its "human dimension basket."

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5 CONCLUSION

If Moscow were actually to adhere to the principles it argues a new pan-European security organization must be founded upon—i.e., respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international law as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes—then not only pan-European but also transatlantic security would be greatly improved.

Notwithstanding our rejection of its specifics, the Medvedev proposal offers an opportunity in broad terms to engage with Russia on addressing security needs in Europe. But such engagement should make clear that replacing or subsuming existing organizations under some new arrangement is a non-starter. Although the Georgia-Russia crisis exposed areas that need serious improvement, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE still work as organizations but we accept that they could be much more effective. So, too could the NATO-Russia Council, but efforts to deepen ties between the alliance and Moscow never quite seem to lead anywhere, even in areas where we should have obvious common interests, such as Afghanistan.

Improved cooperation in such areas, however, should come about through a convergence of interests, not because NATO would unilaterally concede future prospects of NATO membership for countries along Russia's borders or abandon missile defense. Such a position may strike some as wanting one's cake and eating it, too, but the more disturbing possibility is that NATO allies and Russia in fact don't have all that much in common; this is certainly the case when it comes to values but may also be increasingly true on fundamental matters of interest. How else, for example, to explain Russia's contradictory desires to see Afghanistan become more stable (that, after all, is in Russia's interests) and yet also try to pressure Kyrgyz President Bakiyev to kick the United States

out of Manas airbase (because of Russia's zero-sum approach to the region)?

Rather than creating a new European security organization, nations should focus on reforming the bureaucratic and political operations of NATO, the EU, and the OSCE as well as improve cooperation between and among themselves. These organizations must be strengthened and reformed if they are to deal effectively with future transatlantic as well as intra-European and Eurasian political and security challenges. NATO in particular should continue to try to work with Russia without, however, sacrificing its principles and mission.

Russia can and should play a constructive role in these efforts, too; the question is whether it really wants to do so. At a certain point, one has to ask whether the problem is not really in Moscow. The Medvedev proposal reminds us of the saying that Russia does not have friends; it has interests. Why, after all, should 28 members of NATO adjust their behavior and approaches while Moscow insists it has nothing to "reset"? If Moscow were actually to adhere to the principles it argues a new pan-European security organization must be founded upon—i.e., respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international law as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes—then not only pan-European but also transatlantic security would be greatly improved.

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