In Brief: Just two weeks after the U.K. shocked its partners with a vote to leave the EU, members of the other key Western alliance will meet in Warsaw, on July 8-9. The shadow of Brexit now adds to the already challenging agenda. How will the UK define its new role, and what will Brexit mean for London’s defense posture and budget? What is in store for the European Union and EU-NATO cooperation? In this collection, experts from GMF offices in seven of NATO’s capitals — Brussels, Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, Bucharest, Ankara, and Washington, DC — report on their governments’ agendas. While all members agree that unity and solidarity are even more critical for the alliance after the Brexit vote, the Summit’s agenda is broad and the Allies’ priorities diverse. The Summit looks set to meet the central challenge of keeping the East and South of NATO on board, with a balance that increases capabilities in both arenas. As the first meeting of the transatlantic community after Brexit, the summit is a key opportunity to reaffirm Western unity, confirm Britain’s partnership and engagement, and to step up NATO-EU cooperation.

National Priorities for the NATO Warsaw Summit

United States: All About the Burdens

Derek Chollet and Steven Keil

There will be no shortage of challenging agenda items for the Obama administration to tackle at the NATO Summit in Warsaw. From Brexit and Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine to the likelihood of increased refugees bound for European shores and the looming terrorist threat, the agenda will struggle to not be overtaken by crisis (as happened at the 2014 summit in Wales, which was dominated by the Ukraine crisis and ISIS). Understanding the need for a flexible approach, U.S. officials are laboring to take a handful of priorities to Warsaw.

Of course, burden sharing and capacity building — the more polite way of talking about what many in Washington call “free riders” — will clearly be at the top of the Obama administration’s list of priorities. While the practice of U.S. officials demanding more from NATO counterparts has become routine, the necessity behind it has not changed. During his recent trip to Europe, President Barack Obama followed in the long line of U.S. officials demanding more from NATO partners, suggesting that every NATO member state must step up and show the political will to invest in collective defense. The Wales Summit concluded with a reinvigorated commitment to defense spending across the
Alliance, but time has decreased the political will to follow through, and many NATO member countries have gone back on spending commitments. Many in Washington are asking: if NATO allies will not step up now, will they ever?

That is not to say that European partners are doing nothing. Several countries are contributing to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition through direct air strikes, including Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the U.K. Key countries in Eastern Europe have increased defense spending and added capacity in the face of Russian aggression. And some countries, such as Germany, have provided key assistance and training to the Peshmerga in Iraq and Syria. Yet, for the United States, many NATO member countries continue to fall far short on building capacities and investment the necessary resources in defense spending, and Alliance effectiveness as a result. Moreover, Burden sharing and capacity building — the more polite way of talking about what many in Washington call “free riders” — will clearly be at the top of the administration’s list.

while the full consequences of the recent Brexit vote are unclear, it seems the outcome may only exacerbate Europe’s internal struggles. And this is likely to complicate strategic thinking and Europe’s ability to muster the political will for shared sacrifice in the Alliance.

At Warsaw, the United States will continue to demonstrate its unwavering commitment to the NATO Alliance, as well as to Europe’s security and stability. Over the last year, the prepositioning of equipment in the Baltic States, the recent jump in European Reassurance Initiative funding to $3.4 billion, and a persistent rotational presence in the Baltics have cemented this pledge. At the summit, more politically challenging conversations regarding permanent or “heel-to-toe” multi-national rotational forces will follow on these efforts. But U.S. policy will likely lean toward a less-costly approach than permanent structures and deployments.

Lastly, the United States will seek a more innovative, adaptive, and flexible Alliance that is able to deal with a full spectrum of threats. A recent Washington Think Tank consortium report, of which GMF was part, identified the need to address a range of challenges extending from nuclear deterrence to hybrid threats. Such an Alliance must equally face challenges in the South and East, boost maritime efforts in the Mediterranean, address growing adversarial A2/AD capabilities, and find innovative ways to strengthen and enable partner nations. Whether NATO can address the gamut of issues it is confronted will be seen in late July. What is clear is that NATO will need to adapt and modernize itself and overcome political hurdles. As one senior U.S. defense official recently remarked, “I’m afraid NATO is a bit like Texas Instruments when it needs to be Google.”

During his recent visit to Germany, Obama said that he counts “European allies to be among our closest friends in the world.” And while Europe may often be a partner of first resort, it seems NATO is in danger of losing its luster as the go-to organization for addressing many security challenges. For example, when looking at the Levant, the United States opted to pursue an approach of the coalition of the willing in its anti-ISIS efforts. Current Italian-led deliberations on a possible stabilization effort in Libya are happening outside of NATO. And following the Paris attacks, the

French government turned to the European Union for solidarity rather than NATO.

There are many reasons why this occurred, but a NATO that can contribute to these efforts by being more balanced, fit, flexible, and agile to deal with a range of security challenges in Europe’s neighborhood will be the continued goal of U.S. policymakers in Warsaw and beyond.

**Belgium Seeks Balance**

*Bruno Lété*

Belgium, a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Association, traditionally places the collective security and defense character of the Alliance at the heart of its international relations. The deterioration in European security has encouraged Belgium to seek closer collaboration with other NATO member states. For Belgium, the next Warsaw Summit must therefore advance NATO’s adaptability by increasing the Alliance’s ability to address challenges in the east, south, and north simultaneously, and by improving NATO’s force-multiplying functions in hybrid, conventional, and nuclear warfare.

Brussels believes that balance is critical for NATO unity and solidarity. As a result, while Mediterranean security — long part of Belgium’s calculus but rarely at the forefront of its strategy — has now become a pressing concern in light of risks emanating from North Africa and the Levant. Brussels also understands the importance of its commitments to deterrence and defense in the east and north, where Russian threats remain at the center of strategic considerations.

For many obvious reasons, Belgium continues to consider Russia a principal threat to European security. Moscow’s military build-up of army, air, and naval capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and the Arctic has created unpredictability and instability in Europe. Belgium will continue to demonstrate its solidarity with NATO’s most vulnerable allies. Four Belgian F-16 fighter jets contribute to the Baltic Air Policing mission from the Ämari base in Estonia, and a Belgian mine-sweeper reinforces NATO’s Mine Counter-Measures Group in the Baltic Sea. But while the country supports a strong military response to the Russian escalation strategy, Brussels also emphasizes the need for political de-escalation and has welcomed a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council on April 20 in the belief that NATO needs new channels to avoid further escalation with Russia. Belgium considers incident avoidance and incident management a key component of NATO-Russia relations and will want to see this reinforced at the Warsaw Summit.

For Belgium, however, its security environment will be principally defined by instability on NATO’s southern flank, a reality painfully demonstrated by the terrorist attacks in Brussels on March 22. Terrorism linked to Islamic extremism to Europe’s south, including the phenomenon of foreign fighters, will head the list of intermestic challenges facing both Belgium and a significant number of other NATO allies in the years ahead. Human security and the criminal trafficking in migrants will also be part of this equation. Hence,
Belgium will expect NATO to help manage these challenges and sees the development of a long-term “Strategy South” as a key test to Alliance evolution. In the military sphere, Belgium is considering participating in the multinational naval force in the Aegean Sea, supports transparent and better information management and intelligence sharing among NATO allies, and seeks to reinforce the value of NATO’s seven-country Mediterranean Dialogue alongside the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with the Arab Gulf states. But Belgium also believes that NATO cannot be the sole security provider in the Mediterranean, and has actively encouraged more explicit discussion and coordination between the Alliance and the European Union. It is in the South that closer NATO-EU cooperation would be felt first and foremost.

Nevertheless, the greatest challenge for Belgium may well eventually emanate from its meager defense spending. Since the end of the Cold War, Belgium has steadily reduced the size and capabilities of its armed forces, with spending falling from 2.5 percent of Belgium’s GDP in 1989 to 0.85 percent in 2015. Belgium is one of the worst offenders of the NATO 2 percent spending pledge, and no short-term plans to increase the military budgets are in sight. The disinvestment has led to some alarming shortfalls in capabilities and operability. These cuts affect the Belgian military at the strategic and operational level and jeopardize Belgium’s standing as a partner in multinational defense cooperation projects. From Afghanistan to Libya to Mali to the fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State group (ISIS), Belgium has systematically been a small but reliable partner in international security coalitions. But the longer the country delays serious investment and sets its hope on EU pooling & sharing or NATO smart defense to fill the gaps in its military capabilities, the more other EU and NATO countries may increasingly question the added value Brussels can provide.

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France Wants Flexibility

Martin Michelot

France’s main priority at the Warsaw Summit is to maintain a balanced and flexible Alliance. This means that the French position on permanent presence is unambiguous: any deployment of NATO troops and capabilities beyond the agreed-upon Wales commitments would put the Alliance in a static posture that run counter to these priorities. This position reflects the desire of France to preserve its strategic autonomy and the ability to carry out its interests either via NATO or EU structures, something that an “east-heavy” NATO would not favor.

In this context, the balance between east and south is therefore of the utmost importance for France. Part of this balance also includes a feeling that any move that could escalate tensions with Russia at the time when the NATO-Russia council has finally gotten back together on Paris’s (partial) initiative does not contribute to a safer Eastern neighborhood. This is also the cause for French reluctance on further enlargement beyond Montenegro (whose implementation of reforms deserves recognition). Beyond the artificial and perhaps damaging East/South divide, France pays particular attention to transversal challenges, and continues to believe that NATO has a role to play in the South by acting as a toolbox whereby willing countries can use NATO resources — especially the NATO-owned drones and AWACS capabilities — to conduct counter-terrorism operations, and also benefit from NATO expertise on training and capacity building to
enhance the role of regional partners in stabilization of the Middle East and North Africa region.

Paris is a major stakeholder, alongside the United States, in devising the outlines of the proper balance between crisis management and reliance on partnerships in the South. Paris will reiterate oft-repeated desires for a significant improvement of EU-NATO cooperation in order to better address the multiple facets of the southern challenge but also to build resilience in European societies. On cybersecurity, for example, France believes that each Ally should remain in charge of its own structures but that a stronger exchange of best practices should be fostered via the two institutions. As such, transversal threats such as counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing for better protection or reinforcing common approaches to cyberdefense will remain at the heart of the French agenda in Warsaw.

For France, maintaining a balanced and flexible Alliance is crucial to preserving its strategic autonomy and its ability to defend its interests.

France’s active position on nuclear defense is informed by its position as the steadiest European nuclear power, and the understanding that NATO remains a nuclear alliance. Two high-profile events have been organized in 2016 to highlight the continued importance of the nuclear agenda. Paris is critical of the lack of strategic nuclear culture of other Allies who remain under the U.S. umbrella and believes that not all threats can be deterred solely by pre-positioning of conventional forces in the East and ballistic missile defense (BMD), to the extent that it weakens nuclear deterrence. However, Paris continues to grudgingly admit the complementarity of BMD and of nuclear forces, based on the position expressed at the 2012 Chicago Summit. Regarding the declaration of the initial operational capacity of NATO’s BMD, Paris does not believe that there are sufficient guarantees for a full control by 28 of the political and operational aspects, which constitutes a strong red line, especially as long as operational control remains in the hands of the United States. Any change of that position is conditioned by Allies exercising actionable political control over these instruments. However, French industrial interests remain high in terms of reinforcing European-based BMD capabilities.

In Warsaw, France will continue to push for transatlantic armies that can be operational, flexible, and deployable, considering that European Allies need to be made responsible for their own security by acquiring capabilities and making them available for NATO purposes. This constitutes the key of the transformation agenda of NATO, alongside forward thinking about transversal threats and new security challenges in the High North.

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Germany Pairs Deterrence and Dialogue

Christian Mölling

Germany actively shaped the agenda of the last NATO summit in Wales 2014 and this time around is focused the Wales decisions being implemented and continued. This may seem like Berlin is reverting to its traditional, more passive and reactive position, but Berlin has shaped the Warsaw agenda by securing
several of its objectives early such as membership perspective for Montenegro.

Germany’s first focus is on strong contributions to reassurance and adaptation in the East. For Berlin, NATO is the guarantor of deterrence and defense in Europe against conventional military threats. Hence Berlin’s military focus is on conventional capabilities and reassurance measures on the Eastern flank — and is the second biggest troop provider (the biggest European contributor) to these efforts. Germany is one of the leading members in terms of participation in maneuvers, the staffing of NATO’s new regional units (the NATO Force Integration Units — NFIUs), and troop contribution to the persistent presence in the East. Moreover, in 2015, Germany was the first to take over, jointly with the Dutch, the backbone of the new Spearhead force “VJTF.”

While Berlin aims to maintain solid and significant engagement, it remains reluctant to station forces permanently, as the host of the summit in particular is pleading for. Berlin, Washington, and others agreed on a compromise formula of persistent enhanced forward presence, of multinational forces on rotation, and a command structure mainly offered by the host nation. The force size envisaged is also limited — about a brigade with contributions potentially no bigger than a battalion by each participating nation. These will rotate across the Baltic countries and Poland. This all builds on the trip-wire idea: it is less the number of forces and more the political message of joint engagement of all NATO members on NATO’s Eastern border that is important.

While active on reassurance, Germany has also pushed for dialogue with Russia as a necessary complement to deterrence to achieve security. Referring to the 1967 Harmel Report, Berlin insists that lasting security is the sum of deterrence and dialogue, and that both are intrinsically linked. Therefore, Berlin welcomed the NATO-Russia Council meeting on April 20 (the first since 2014) as an important achievement, and there is hope that a second one may take place soon. For Berlin, the summit in Warsaw should be a Harmel Summit, combining deterrence and dialogue.

Berlin’s posture to the south is reluctant. Germany recognizes the necessity for more engagement in the South for political cohesion within the alliance. However, it sees NATO in a secondary and complementary role to the EU and UN because classical military threats are not the main problem in the region, and NATO is not the right framework for the fight against ISIS, or engagement in Syria or Libya. NATO assets can support a border control mission in the Mediterranean, but for Berlin, the most important task is empowering NATO-partners like Iraq, Jordan, and others through the Defence Capacity Building (DCB), despite the fact that it is increasingly difficult to identify new candidates for DCB packages who correspond to NATO standards.

A fourth priority for Berlin is EU-NATO cooperation. The list of potential activities is still being written and rewritten, but key elements are: exchange of situation assessments and information, strategic communication, protection of cyberspace, and improving resilience. At the same time, it is difficult to define a specific and unique role for NATO beyond its traditional military one. On the military capabilities, Germany is fully aware that is has to deliver on the Framework Nation Concept (FNC) that it proposed in 2014. Here, plans have evolved from an initial focus on small niche capabilities toward organizing larger
formations, a division or larger — but success will depend on the contributions of Berlin’s partners to the FNC.

On other topics, Germany will be more defensive. It has responded to the NATO 2 percent pledge with a guarantee to spend at least 1.17 percent of its GDP on defense — not exactly what Washington was hoping for.

But Germany keeps making the point that the output matters. While Germany recognizes that nuclear policy and missile defense are rather important, because of domestic politics, it will passively follow debates on these issues, but avoid taking the lead.

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**Poland: From Reassurance to Deterrence**

**Michał Baranowski**

The upcoming NATO summit is seen in Warsaw as the most important political event for Poland in recent history. The expectations are high for a decisive, ambitious summit that initiates a long-term transformation of the Alliance from the logic of reassurance to the logic of deterrence. There is a clear recognition in Warsaw of the need to address the Alliance’s challenges coming from both the South and the East — but it is the Eastern flank where the Alliance remains the most exposed both militarily and politically.

Russia has clearly demonstrated that it wants to undermine the post-Cold War European security order. This is a long-term development and therefore requires a long-term response from the Alliance. The logic of the Wales Summit, with rapid reactions forces deployed in the case of crisis, no longer offers sufficient deterrence. Over the past years, Russia has greatly improved the mobility of its forces — demonstrating it in large-scale exercises right on the borders of NATO — and now can command an overwhelming 10:1 force ratio on NATO’s northeastern flank. Russia’s increasing anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities — the ability to create no-access areas with advanced anti-aircraft weapons like the S-400 missile — means that in the case of a crisis, the Alliance will not be able to easily reinforce its Allies. A RAND study has concluded that in the case of an attack, the Baltic States would be lost within 72 hours. Therefore, NATO needs to shift its strategy toward an enhanced forward presence that would be in position and thus serve as a deterring and defending force.

The forward presence is not about building big, Cold War style, permanent bases; it is about what Polish President Andrzej Duda described few weeks ago at a seminar at GMF as “intensive permanent rotation” and enhanced NATO’s infrastructure in the region. The enhanced forward presence has to have several characteristics to do the job. First, it has to be multinational, so that it is clear that an attack on one will be an attack on all. The United States has recently announced an additional heavy brigade to be rotated through the countries of the Eastern flank — European Allies need to do the same. Second, the forces need to be combat-ready — properly trained and equipped to address NATO’s threat assessment in the region, and large enough to conduct autonomous defensive operations.

The logic of the Wales summit, with rapid reactions forces deployed in the case of crisis, no longer offers sufficient deterrence.
vehicle for building up resilience of frontline member states, but expectations of significant progress on this front during the upcoming summit in Warsaw are low.

NATO also needs to begin to reopen the nuclear debate. Russia has developed a new doctrine that permits use of tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict and is developing nuclear war-fighting capabilities, including low-yield nuclear weapons. At the summit, NATO should agree on a statement that highlights nuclear deterrence and also initiate a process of reflection and debate similar to one that resulted in the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review.

The Warsaw summit package will make progress moving the Alliance for reassurance to deterrence. The four multinational battalions to be persistently rotated through the Baltic states and Poland will serve as an effective trip-wire, thus rising the costs for any aggressor. Most of all, the summit needs to show the unity of the West in the wake of Brexit - failure to do so would only encourage further aggression from the challengers to the liberal international order.

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Romania Faces Hybrid Threats
Alina Inayeh

Romania has been a steady supporter of increased NATO presence and involvement on its Eastern flank, as the country is preoccupied with the various threats Russia poses in the region. Romania currently hosts a NATO Force Integration unit, Multinational Division Southeast, and elements of the NATO anti-missile system. The country also hosts a forward operational base for U.S. troops.

As a neighbor of both Ukraine and Moldova, Romania is concerned by the deployment of Russian troops and heavy equipment in both Crimea and Transnistria, and with the militarization of the Black Sea following war in Ukraine. Close monitoring of these deployments is imperative, but Romania is also advocating for a stronger NATO presence and activity to deter Russia from further military adventures. A more robust NATO presence, including troops, logistics, equipment, and leadership, is one of Romania’s security goals. To address the militarization of the Black Sea, Romania, together with Turkey, initiated the idea of a NATO Black Sea fleet to which Bulgaria, as well as NATO partners Georgia and Ukraine, would
contribute. This idea is gathering momentum as the summit approaches. Romania is a strong supporter of more intense cooperation with NATO partners and their deeper involvement with the Alliance as another means to deter Russia.

Romania is also concerned about the hybrid warfare tactics Russia employs in the region and its subversive actions in Europe, and is a strong advocate of closer cooperation between NATO and the EU to address and mitigate these threats. Of major concern is cyber defense, and Romania is deeply and constructively involved in the Alliance’s efforts to prevent cyber attacks and increase resilience of its members.

For those countries in Russia’s neighborhood, security is a serious preoccupation, and Romania decided to dedicate resources to further modernizing its army and equipment. Starting in 2018, the country will meet the 2 percent NATO spending requirement, having adopted a law to this effect.

Within Romania, Russia is widely perceived as a major security threat, a homogeneous view created and nurtured by a history of difficult relations. This has helped Romania build its strong profile on the Eastern flank and within NATO, and gives the government a strong mandate to pursue the stated security goals. Top among the goals for the upcoming summit are NATO presence on the Eastern flank, an intensification of NATO exercises in the Black Sea — ideally leading to a Black Sea fleet — and closer cooperation with NATO partners in the region.

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Turkey Focused on the South

Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı

Since it became a NATO member in 1952, NATO has not only been the central pillar in Turkey’s security strategy but also contributed to Turkey’s integration with the Euroatlantic Community. Turkey has the second largest army in NATO; but with a defense expenditure at 1.7 percent of its GDP, it is not among the five allies that meet the 2 percent defense spending target.

Turkey’s main priority for the upcoming Warsaw summit is the threats coming from the South, including but not limited to the violent civil war in Syria, the refugee crises, terrorism, and Russia’s efforts to create A2/AD capabilities in Syria and its increased presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey is likely to raise the issue of the connection between the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), which is designated by Turkey and its allies as a terrorist organization, and the Syrian Kurdish group (PYD), a central ally to the United States in the fight against ISIS. Turkey is currently facing missile attacks from ISIS-held territory in Syria and may ask for assistance from NATO allies against these attacks if the threat is not eliminated before the summit.
Turkey, despite the recent overtures to normalize ties with Russia, is preoccupied with the threat of Russian aggression like many of its allies. But for Turkey this is a threat from the south as well as from the north, since a Russian Su-24M fighter jet was brought down by Turkey in Turkish airspace along the border with Syria in November 2015. Therefore Turkey will support increased NATO presence in Eastern Mediterranean as it seeks continued military and political support against potential Russian aggression.

Partnerships, particularly the strengthening of the Mediterranean Dialogue and further enhancement of relations with Gulf countries through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative will remain priorities for Turkey as Ankara has recently closed ranks with the Gulf Cooperation Council members. On the other hand, Turkey’s position regarding the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU will remain complicated. While Turkey welcomes NATO-EU strategic cooperation in principle, it will continue to oppose a model that keeps Turkey outside and the Republic of Cyprus inside.

Missile defense has been one of the key issues on the Alliance’s agenda over the last couple of years. After initially hesitating, Turkey has agreed to host the radar component of the NATO missile defense system and a mobile AN/TPY-2 radar, which is stationed at Kurecik, as part of the phase 1 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). Turkey will support the EPAA as long as it does not target a specific country.

Turkey does not have a strong position on NATO enlargement, but generally supports an open door policy. Integration of the Western Balkans, particularly (Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, will remain a priority in this regard.

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