



09

Transatlantic Trends



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

KEY FINDINGS 2009

Transatlantic Trends 2009 Partners

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TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Key Findings 2009

After his first half-year in office, U.S. President Barack Obama had nearly reversed the collapse in public support for the United States witnessed across much of Europe under his predecessor, President George W. Bush. In the wake of the Iraq War, the Bush years were marked by record low European backing for America. But the Obama era started out with an unprecedented surge in popularity for the new U.S. president and for American global leadership. Indeed, in mid 2009, Obama enjoyed far more support in Germany, Britain, and even France, than he did in the United States. Such sentiments provide a popular foundation for a revitalization of U.S.-European ties.

There are two important caveats to this story, however. The Obama bounce was largely a Western European phenomenon, according to *Transatlantic Trends 2009*. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, enthusiasm for Obama, for American leadership, and for the United States in general is far more subdued in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey. And Obama's popularity has not done much to bridge continuing transatlantic differences on important policy issues such as Afghanistan, Iran, and the response to climate change and the ongoing global economic crisis.

U.S.-European relations have rebounded from their historic low point early this decade. How long the Obama honeymoon will last is anything but certain. A popular American president is clearly an asset in transatlantic relations. But the future trajectory of U.S.-European ties will also depend on the successful management of divergent public views and ongoing policy differences.

In 2009, three-in-four people in the European Union and Turkey supported Obama's handling of international affairs,

a quadrupling of such approval compared with their judgment of President Bush in 2008. This reversal in sentiment is unprecedented in the eight years of *Transatlantic Trends*. Backing for Obama also buoyed favorable opinion of the United States, which returned to levels last seen in the 1990s. And desire for strong American global leadership was up in every country surveyed.

But populations in Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Turkey were markedly less enthusiastic about Obama and the United States than were their West European counterparts. Significantly fewer people in Central and Eastern Europe saw American global leadership as desirable. They also believed there had been less improvement in U.S.-European relations over the last year, possibly because their relations with the Bush administration had been quite good. Support for NATO was weaker than in Western Europe. And fewer people had confidence in Obama's ability to handle international challenges. Nevertheless, more Central and East Europeans than West Europeans backed closer security, diplomatic, and economic ties with the United States. They seemed to desire a better relationship with Washington, even though they had some reservations about the new American president.

Transatlantic Trends also revealed fault lines in European public opinion. Generalized European disquiet about Russia masked a divergent intensity of concern about dependence on Russian energy supplies, Moscow's treatment of its neighbors, and the fate of Russian democracy. West Europeans were often more willing to stand up to the Russians than Central and East Europeans and the Turks. This toughness did not apply to the issue of NATO enlargement, however, where support for defying Moscow was strongest in Central and Eastern Europe. And, in the

face of the worst economic conditions in two generations, fewer people in Central and Eastern Europe supported free markets, and more backed protectionism than their counterparts did in Western Europe.

Overall, the Obama presidency has not yet lived up to expectations for a post-Bush America. In 10 of the 13 countries surveyed in 2009, peoples' assessment of U.S.-European ties was still lower than their projections had been for the relationship in 2008. This data might be a foreshadowing of disillusionment with Obama. Or it might simply be a product of Obama's short tenure in office and the numbers may increase in the future. Serious policy disagreements also continued to divide the alliance. Despite pressure from the Obama administration to increase troop levels in Afghanistan, majorities in all nations surveyed, except the United States, wanted their forces there to be reduced or to be withdrawn. In dealing with Iran, a plurality of Americans supported negotiation to eliminate Tehran's nuclear weapons program, backed by the threat of military action. A majority of people in the European Union opposed any such use of force.

The economic crisis did not bring transatlantic publics together. Americans thought their government had already spent too much to reverse the downturn. People in the European Union and Turkey said their governments had not spent enough. A plurality of Americans supported closer U.S.-EU economic ties. And a plurality of Europeans thought the European Union should actually take a more independent approach to economic affairs.

Similarly, Americans were far less intensely concerned than people in the European Union and Turkey about climate change. And they were less willing to trade off economic growth to slow the warming of the planet.

Turkey remained an outlier on many of these issues, as it had in past *Transatlantic Trends* surveys. In spite of Obama's trip to Turkey in Spring 2009, Turks' confidence in Obama, their support for the United States, American global leadership, and NATO were among the lowest in any country surveyed. And, in a possible harbinger of future tensions,

EU opposition to Turkish membership in the European club had increased at the same time Turkish desire to join the European Union was on the rise.

Transatlantic Trends is a comprehensive annual survey of American and European public opinion. Polling was conducted between June 9, 2009 and July 1, 2009 in the United States and 12 European countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The survey is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from the Fundação Luso-Americana, Fundación BBVA, and the Tipping Point Foundation. The academic advisory committee for the survey included Pierangelo Isernia, professor of political science, University of Siena (Italy); Philip Everts, director of the Institute of International Studies, University of Leiden (Netherlands); and Richard Eichenberg, professor of political science, Tufts University (United States). The *Transatlantic Trends 2009* Key Findings Report was written by Bruce Stokes, a GMF Transatlantic Fellow.

KEY FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY INCLUDE:

- Three-in-four (77%) respondents in the European Union and Turkey supported U.S. President Barack Obama's handling of international affairs, compared with just one-in-five (19%) who approved of the foreign policy of President George W. Bush in 2008.
- People in the European Union and Turkey (77%) were considerably more likely to approve of Obama than were his fellow Americans (57%).
- A majority of EU citizens and Turks had a favorable opinion of the United States.
- Central and East Europeans (60%) were significantly less enthusiastic about Obama's handling of international affairs than were people in Western Europe (86%), and were less likely (53%) to see America in a positive light than were West Europeans (63%).

- Fewer Central and East Europeans (25%) than West Europeans (43%) believed that relations between the United States and Europe had improved over the past year.
- In 2009, a plurality of respondents in the European Union (42%) supported closer transatlantic ties. A year earlier, a plurality (48%) backed more independence from the United States. American (48%) support for closer transatlantic ties was essentially unchanged from 2008.
- Majorities in the European Union and Turkey wanted to see the number of their troops in Afghanistan either reduced or totally withdrawn.
- A majority of people in the European Union (53%) ruled out the use of military force to halt Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. A plurality of Americans (47%) favored maintaining that military option.
- Three-in-four Americans (74%), but just over half (55%) of people in the European Union said their families had been impacted by the economic crisis.
- A majority of Americans (55%) thought Washington had already spent too much money in dealing with the economic crisis, compared with 24% of people in the European Union who thought their governments had spent too much.
- A plurality of Americans (43%) supported closer U.S.-EU economic ties, compared with 37% of the population in the European Union.
- People in the European Union (84%) were more worried than Americans (65%) about climate change.
- A strong majority of West Europeans (72%) were willing to forgo some economic growth to slow the warming of the planet. Only 56% of Central and East Europeans and 43% of Americans agreed.
- Only one-in-five Turks (22%) had a favorable view of the United States, and 42% of the Turkish public had a *very* unfavorable view of America, by far the most negative of all countries in the survey.
- Half the Turkish population (48%) thought EU membership would be a good thing. But, in the last year, opposition to Turkish membership went up in 9 of 11 EU countries surveyed.



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Section One: The Obama Bounce

Over the last seven years, transatlantic relations deteriorated substantially. In many European countries, the public's approval of the United States and of the American president dipped to historic lows. In 2008, barely a third of Europeans backed strong U.S. leadership in world affairs. And European opposition to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and to Washington's policy on global warming severely complicated management of the alliance.

The election of Barack Obama as the 44th President of the United States opened a new chapter in transatlantic relations, transforming European assessment of the American president, U.S. standing in Europe, attitudes toward U.S. global leadership, and perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic of the U.S.-EU relationship. The earlier unparalleled decline in European support for the United States was followed by an unprecedented favorable rebound in many Europeans' attitudes toward America in 2009.

Still, publics in Turkey and Central and Eastern Europe were less enamored with Obama than their West European counterparts. Long considered some of the most pro-American populations in Europe, in 2009 they were some of the least supportive of the United States and American policies. Moreover, significant transatlantic differences remained over pivotal issues, such as Afghanistan and Iran, responses to the economic crisis, and to climate change.

Transatlantic Trends 2009 suggests it is far too early to tell whether newfound transatlantic comity will facilitate resolution of long-standing policy differences between America and Europe or whether such disagreements will eventually erode the revitalized American image.

OBAMA'S TRANSATLANTIC IMPACT

To Europeans, President Obama is certainly no George W. Bush. In 2009, three-in-four (77%) respondents in the European Union and Turkey supported the new U.S. leader's handling of international affairs, compared with just one-in-five (19%) respondents who approved of the Bush foreign policy in 2008. Support jumped 80 percentage points in Germany and 58 percentage points across all of Europe. (See Chart 1) No other single annual indicator changed this much in the eight years of *Transatlantic Trends*. Even in Turkey, where half the population (50%) supported Obama, that backing represented a 42 percentage point increase over approval of President Bush (8%) in 2008.


EUROPEANS' OBAMA-MANIA

People in the European Union and Turkey have fallen under the Obama spell.

In 2008, their assessment of Bush was 18 percentage points lower than Bush's approval in the United States. In 2009, the situation was reversed. Their positive judgment of Obama (77%) was 20 percentage points higher than in the United States (57%).


Obama's lower backing in the United States reflected the continued stark partisan divide in America. Most Democrats (86%) approved of Obama's handling of international affairs. But only a quarter of Republicans (26%), and half of Independents (54%) agreed.

And on the issues of highest priority for Europeans—managing international economic problems and fighting



international terrorism—they had more confidence in Obama to succeed than did Americans. (See Chart 2)

Several regions of Europe had not caught Obama-mania, however. Half of Turks (50%) and only three-in-five Central and East Europeans (60%) approved of the U.S. President’s foreign policy. And the Poles went from being one of Europe’s biggest boosters of Bush (44%) to Obama’s least enthusiastic (55%) supporter.



ADIEU ANTI-AMERICANISM?

The harsh critique of America is, for the time being, a thing of the past. In the first half year of the Obama tenure, two-thirds (66%) of the respondents in the European Union and Turkey had a favorable opinion of the United States, roughly returning such ratings to their post-World War II historic average in Europe (based on a variety of public and U.S. government polls over the period). In France (74%) and in Spain (74%), America's favorability rating was actually higher than it was at the beginning of the decade.

U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, BUT NOT TOO MUCH

Europeans and Turks also look to Washington to lead, but with some reservations.


Nearly half (49%) of the respondents in the European Union and Turkey believed it is desirable that the United States exert strong leadership in world affairs. In 2008, only a third (33%) favored such an American role. Support for Washington to lead increased in every country surveyed. And the dramatic rise in approval of the new American president also buoyed backing for U.S. leadership. (See Chart 3)

Yet, still less than a third of Slovaks (32%) and Bulgarians (32%) thought robust American leadership was desirable. Moreover, in the six European countries for which there are comparable data, only in France was the desirability of Washington taking the lead stronger in 2009 than it had been in 2002.

EUROPEAN UNION LEADERSHIP

Favorability of the European Union (72% among EU member states surveyed) was also generally quite high on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly in the Mediterranean and Central and Eastern Europe. But pockets of relative discontent highlighted ongoing problems.

In two European countries, the public was significantly more well-disposed toward Washington than it was toward Brussels: in the United Kingdom (73% expressed a favorable opinion for the U.S., 48% for the EU) and in France (74% for the U.S., 66% for the EU). And Americans (63%) held the EU in higher regard than did their British cousins,



whose assessment of Brussels was almost evenly split (48% favorable, 46% unfavorable). Majorities of Democrats (75%) and Independents (57%) in the United States had a favorable view of the European Union, but less than half of Republicans (47%) saw Brussels in a positive light.


Among EU member states, three-in-four (75%) respondents also wanted Brussels to exert robust leadership in world affairs. This support had not changed much over the last four years. Seven-in-ten Americans (70%) agreed. That was a more favorable American view of Brussels than was held by the British (60%).

LIVING UP TO EXPECTATIONS?

The Obama presidency has been a boon for Euro-American relations. In 2009, the proportion of the population that believed transatlantic ties had improved over the past year doubled in the European Union (to 41%) and tripled in the United States (to 31%) from 2008 (See Chart 4). There was less of a sense of improvement in Central and Eastern Europe, however.

In the United States, attitudes toward transatlantic relations divided along partisan lines. Fewer Republicans (14%) and Independents (22%) than Democrats (39%) believed that the U.S.-European relationship had improved over the last year. In Europe, there was far less partisan difference in opinion, with 47% of those on the political left and 40% of those from the center and right thinking relations had improved.

However, in 2009, Europeans believed that the transatlantic partnership had not improved as much as many once expected. In 2008, people were asked about their predictions for the relationship if Obama was elected U.S. president. In 2009, in 8 of the 11 EU countries surveyed, peoples' assessment of U.S.-European relations was less positive than their predictions were in 2008. The Italians and the British reported the greatest difference between their hopes and their experience. Conversely, in 2008, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia had some of the lowest expectations for Obama. And, in 2009, their assessments slightly exceeded their predictions.





TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Section Two: A Divide in the Continent: Central, Eastern, and Western Europe

Central and Eastern Europe—Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia—have long been bastions of pro-American and transatlantic sentiments. Indeed, in *Transatlantic Trends 2007* and *2008*, President Bush was actually more popular in Poland and Romania than he was in the United States. This year's *Transatlantic Trends* suggests the region may be changing.


In 2009, there was a bounce in public support for President Obama and for the United States in Central and Eastern Europe, compared with results in 2008. But the surge was significantly less than the Obama effect seen in Western Europe. Few people in the region believed Obama's election helped improve transatlantic relations. There was relatively little confidence in the new U.S. president's ability to handle priority international challenges. NATO support in the region was lower than in Western Europe and there was less support for NATO's mission in Afghanistan. If there is a part of Europe where the Obama administration has yet to connect with the public, it is in Central and Eastern Europe.


OBAMA-MANIA, BUT LESS OF IT

In 2009, all Europeans thought Obama was handling international affairs better than his predecessor. But Central and East Europeans (64%) were significantly less enthusiastic about Obama's record than were people in Western Europe (86%). (See Chart 5) Central and East Europeans' appraisal of Obama was 32 percentage points higher than their 2008 assessment of Bush. But West Europeans' grade for Obama was 69 percentage points higher. The difference in individual countries was often even greater. In France, for example, the current U.S. president was 77 percentage points more popular than his predecessor. But Obama's increase in popularity in Romania and Poland was just 14 and 11 percentage points, respectively.

Less support for Obama also translated into less confidence in Central and Eastern Europe in his ability to handle the major international challenges facing the alliance: Afghanistan, Iran, Russia, and the Middle East.

And, when it came to the desirability of U.S. leadership, an attitude closely linked to the image of the American president, support in Central and Eastern Europe (44%) was also lower than in Western Europe (56%). (See Chart 6) Moreover, the increase over the last year in support for American leadership was much greater in the seven West European countries surveyed than in the four Central and East European nations. And across Europe people preferred global leadership by Brussels rather than Washington.






NOT ANTI-AMERICAN, BUT LESS ATLANTICIST

In 2009, fewer respondents in Central and Eastern Europe (53%) than in Western Europe (63%) saw America in a positive light. That was a reversal from 2008 when, by a slight margin, Central and East European nations (44%) were more favorably disposed toward the United States than were their West European counterparts (40%). Yet there were differences in attitudes within the region in 2009. The Romanians were still generally the most pro-American, followed by the Poles. The Slovaks and the Bulgarians were far less supportive. The opinion of America had improved the most among the Poles.

People in the region (25%) were also far less likely than West Europeans (43%) to believe that relations between the United States and Europe had improved over the past year. (See Chart 7) And fewer Central and East Europeans (53%) than West Europeans (63%) believed that NATO, the cornerstone of the Euro-American strategic alliance, was essential.

But *Transatlantic Trends* suggests that Central and Eastern Europe is not ready to turn its back on the United States



or the transatlantic relationship. More Central and East Europeans (45%) than West Europeans (39%) believed that the partnership in security, diplomatic, and economic affairs between the United States and the European Union should become closer, suggesting a desire for better ties with Washington even as the region remained less enthusiastic about the new American president.

WARINESS OF RUSSIA

Europeans are divided over Russia, but that division is complicated. The popular image of a Russia-phobic Central and Eastern Europe and a more Russia-friendly Western Europe was not found in the *Transatlantic Trends* 2009 data.

Majorities all over Europe were worried about Russia as an energy provider. Consumers in Central and Eastern Europe (73%) were more concerned than their West European counterparts (67%). But, in 2007, slightly more West Europeans than Central and East Europeans were upset about Russia as an energy supplier.

But there was also considerable difference of opinion within Central and Eastern Europe. The Poles (80%) were by far

the most anxious of any of the Europeans surveyed that Moscow might turn off the pipelines. The Bulgarians (56%), on the other hand, were the least worried in the region.

Anxiety about Moscow's treatment of its neighbors has gone up all over Europe over the last three years. Nevertheless, in 2009, more people in the West (69%) expressed concern than in Central and Eastern Europe (63%).

A growing number of Europeans were also troubled by the weakening of Russian democracy. But in Western Europe (67%) this troubled two-thirds of the respondents. In Central and Eastern Europe (52%), it was a worry for barely half of those surveyed.

DEALING WITH MOSCOW


Central and East Europeans are hedging their bets on their Russian neighbor.

For the first time, *Transatlantic Trends 2009* asked whether people would be willing to abandon certain Western alliance policies, such as NATO enlargement, in order to secure energy supplies from Russia.

Central and East Europeans were united in their opposition to placating Moscow. Only 28% of those surveyed in the region countenanced trading off NATO enlargement for Russian oil and gas, while 41% of West Europeans would consider such a move. In this regard, Central and East Europeans tended to agree with the Americans (26%). (See Chart 8) And there was almost no difference on this issue among Bulgarians, Poles, Romanians, and Slovaks. They all took a hard line.

However, slightly fewer Central and East Europeans (66%) than West Europeans (70%) supported EU security assistance to countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, a move that might antagonize Russia. Similarly, there was less support in Central and Eastern Europe (62%) than in Western Europe (66%) for such aid by NATO.

Fewer Central and East Europeans (59%) than West Europeans (66%) were also willing to apply diplomatic pressure on Russia to meet its commitments to provide energy



to other countries, even if this would increase tensions. And backing for such a confrontation was particularly low among Bulgarians (36%) and Romanians (38%).

A HARsher ECONOMIC IMPACT, A PROTECTIONIST RESPONSE

The 2009 economic crisis shook support for free markets in Central and Eastern Europe.

People in the region (59%) were more likely than West Europeans (54%) to say they had been personally affected by the recession. But the differential impact within the region was even greater. Three-in-four Bulgarians (74%), Romanians (73%), and Slovaks (73%) said the downturn had harmed their family finances, while only one-in-two Poles (46%) had such a complaint.

Central and East Europeans (62%) were less likely than West Europeans (71%) to believe that people were better off in a free market economy. And far more Central and East Europeans (80%) than Western consumers (65%) thought people should buy local products, not imported ones, in response to the economic crisis. Respondents in the East

(59%) were also much more likely than their counterparts in the West (35%) to think that their governments were spending too little to deal with economic problems. And fewer Central and East Europeans (74%) were committed to keeping their markets open than were Westerners (82%).

CAUTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

Many more Europeans (84%) were worried about climate change than were Americans (65%). But there were divisions within Europe over what to do about global warming.

Fewer Central and East Europeans (37%) than West Europeans (50%) were *very* concerned about the climate. And they were more likely than their counterparts in the West to believe that climate change was unstoppable; were less likely to believe that personal actions to fight climate

change can make a difference; were more likely to believe it is companies, not citizens, who have to change their behavior; thought it was governments, not citizens, who were primarily responsible for dealing with climate change; and were less likely to believe global warming can only be addressed at the international level.

Central and East Europeans were also less willing to make sacrifices for the climate. While a strong majority of West Europeans (72%) were willing to forgo some economic growth to slow the warming of the planet, a much smaller majority of Central and East Europeans (56%) agreed. And they were less altruistic about climate change than people in the West. Compared to Western Europe (84%), fewer respondents (69%) in the region supported doing all they could do to fight global warming, when others did less.



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Section Three: Ties that Bind and their Frictions

The first part of this decade was marked by bitter transatlantic disputes over Iraq, a growing European desire for greater strategic independence from the United States, and different perspectives on Russia.

But for the last few years many Europeans have been increasingly supportive of NATO. And European interest in strengthening transatlantic security and diplomatic ties has been on the rise. For their part, Americans have not lost their enthusiasm for NATO, but they have been wary of further deepening the strategic relationship.

In 2009, Afghanistan was an alliance sore point, since most Americans supported the war and many Europeans opposed it. And Iran continued to be a potential headache. Americans wanted to maintain a military option against Tehran if negotiations fail to eliminate Iran's nuclear weapons capability. Europeans opposed the use of force.

Europeans and Americans shared a concern, however, about Russia's rise, especially Moscow's behavior toward its neighbors and Russia's growing role as an energy provider.

ALLIANCE RENEWAL

The Obama presidency has rekindled European interest in working with the United States. But the feeling was neither general nor mutual.

Europeans' attitudes toward a closer U.S.-EU security and diplomatic partnership have reversed in just the last year. In 2009, a plurality of respondents in the European Union (42%) supported closer ties compared with 33% in 2008. A year earlier, the opposite was true: a plurality (48%) backed more independence from the United States, compared with 36% in 2009.

In 2009, a majority of Romanians (54%), Spanish (53%), and Italians (51%) thought security and diplomatic relations should become closer. And backing for closer ties was up 16 percentage points in both Germany and Spain. The French (49%) and the Dutch (49%) remained the most supportive of keeping the United States at arms length.


Americans were not convinced, however. Support for closer transatlantic ties was essentially unchanged in the United States (46%) from last year and still far below the backing found in 2004 (60%). And, while a majority of Democrats (55%) believed that the Euro-American partnership should become closer, only a minority of Republicans (35%) and Independents (40%) agreed.

NATO, the embodiment of the transatlantic security relationship, was still seen as essential by six-in-ten (58%) respondents in the European Union and Turkey and Americans (62%). Support for the military alliance has been rebounding in a number of countries for the last few years. In 2009, it was up from recent lows by 13 percentage points in Spain (to 61%), by 11 percentage points in the Netherlands (to 77%), and by 10 percentage points in the United Kingdom (to 72%). Yet, in 9 of the 13 countries surveyed, NATO backing had yet to return to its highpoint in this decade. (See Chart 9)

DISAGREEMENT OVER AFGHANISTAN

Notwithstanding growing European and Turkish support for transatlantic security cooperation, the NATO allies disagreed about Afghanistan.

Three-in-five (62%) respondents in the European Union and Turkey were pessimistic about stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. The most negative were the Germans (75%). At



the same time, a majority of Americans (56%) were optimistic. (The same contrast existed in perceptions on Iraq, with most people (61%) in the European Union and Turkey gloomy and most Americans (57%) hopeful about the future.)


Despite their pessimism, the NATO allies showed no inhibition about increasing European contributions to Afghanistan's economic reconstruction, as was requested by the new American president. Majorities or plurali-

ties approved it in 10 of the 12 countries surveyed. (See Chart 10)

Putting more of their soldiers in harm's way was a different story, however. All 13 of the countries included in *Transatlantic Trends* had troops stationed in Afghanistan. The preponderance of respondents in all of these nations, except for the United States, wanted to see the number of their troops reduced or their forces totally withdrawn. Complete troop removal was backed by 51% of the Poles, and 41% of the Germans and British. More than half of West Europeans (55%) and two-thirds of East Europeans (69%) wanted to reduce or remove their soldiers from Afghanistan.

In the United States, but not so much in Europe, the Afghanistan troop deployment was a partisan concern. Two-in-five Democrats (46%) and Independents (43%), but one-in-five Republicans (22%) wanted to reduce or withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan.


President Obama's charisma had a limited impact on some Europeans' Afghanistan concerns. Told that he had asked European countries to increase their contribution of combat troops in the effort to stabilize Afghanistan, the percentage of the French willing to do so quadrupled (but only from 4% to 15%) and the percentage doubled among the Germans (from 7% to 13%) and the British (from 11% to 23%).



MARS AND VENUS ON IRAN

Europeans and Americans also disagreed on what to do about Iran. If diplomatic efforts fail to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons, a plurality (48%) of respondents in the European Union and Turkey would increase diplomatic pressure on Iran, but ruled out the use of military force against it, a perspective that had not changed since 2007. A plurality of Americans (47%) favored increasing diplomatic pressure on Iran, while maintaining the option of using military force, which had long been the favored American position. (See Chart 11)

Within the United States, there were significant partisan differences over Iran. Republicans (57%) and Independents (49%) were much more likely than Democrats (36%) to want to maintain a military option in dealing with Tehran.



TREPIDATION ABOUT RUSSIA

Moscow's behavior toward its neighbors is a growing concern among the NATO allies. The most worried were the Dutch (78%) and the Americans (78%, with 35% *very concerned*). The least troubled were the Bulgarians (40%). But in all countries, except in Poland, more people were worried in 2009 than in 2008.

Both Americans and Europeans also supported countering Russian influence. Seven-in-ten Europeans (70%) favored the European Union providing security assistance for emerging democracies such as Ukraine and Georgia. And a majority of Americans (68%) backed Washington taking similar action. Strong majorities (62%) in the European Union and Turkey and in the United States (66%) favored NATO providing such assistance.

WORRY ABOUT ENERGY RELIANCE

Europe is increasingly dependent upon Russian energy supplies. And two-thirds (66%) of respondents in the European Union and Turkey and nearly the same majority of Americans (63%) said they are troubled by this development. The most concerned were the Poles (80%). The least bothered were the Turks (50%), but they also showed the greatest increase in concern since last year (up 15 percentage points).

Eight-in-ten (78%) respondents in the European Union and Turkey wanted to reduce their energy dependence on Russia even if this would require additional investments to acquire different energy sources. Far fewer—six-in-ten (62%)—were willing to apply diplomatic pressure on Russia to meet its commitments to provide energy to other countries, even if this increased tensions.


Without a direct stake in this game, Americans (57%) were more willing than people (52%) in the European Union and Turkey to increase energy cooperation with Russia and less likely (58%) than those (62%) in the European Union and Turkey to want to apply pressure on Moscow.

COMMON VALUES?

Seven-in-ten Americans (71%) and two-in-three (66%) respondents in the European Union and Turkey thought the United States and the European Union had enough common values to be able to cooperate on international problems. This proportion had not changed much in the United States in recent years, but it had improved noticeably in Europe where only 55% thought there were common transatlantic values in 2008.

But on a key value relating to security, the transatlantic allies remained mirror opposites. Seven-in-ten Americans (71%) believed that, under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice. Seven-in-ten Europeans (71%) disagreed with this statement. Only in the United Kingdom (55%) did a majority of those surveyed agree with the American view. But, notably, on both sides of the Atlantic, support for war had come down somewhat over the last four years.

This long-standing value difference also manifested itself in perceptions of the relative importance of economic and military power. Four-in-five Europeans (78%) thought economic power was more important than military power in world affairs. Three-in-five Americans (61%) agreed. (See Chart 12)





TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Section Four: The Economy: The Dog that Did Not Bark

In 2009, with the transatlantic economy suffering its worst downturn in 80 years, there was great danger of transatlantic finger pointing over whom to blame for the economic crisis. With much of the problem a product of America's trade imbalance and lax U.S. financial regulation, there was every reason to believe that the recession might further sour European attitudes toward the United States.

But Europe's economic woes have not fanned anti-Americanism. To the contrary, Europeans approved of Obama's handling of the economic crisis and they thought strong U.S. leadership on world economic affairs was desirable. This may have been because fewer Europeans than Americans said they and their families had suffered from the crisis, possibly thanks to Europe's stronger social safety net.

NO UNDERMINING OF U.S. ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP

The economy was a main concern on both sides of the Atlantic. Europeans looked to Washington for help, in part because of Obama's popularity.

A plurality of both Americans (29%) and people in the European Union (31%) believed that managing international economic problems should be the top priority for the American president and European leaders, trumping concerns over international terrorism, climate change, or the Middle East.

And more than half of Europeans (53%) thought strong U.S. leadership on world economic affairs was desirable in addressing that priority. This may be evidence of the Obama effect. Four-in-five (79%) respondents in the European Union, but barely half of U.S. respondents (54%), approved of Obama's handling of international economic affairs in his first few months in office.

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS HURTS AT HOME

More Americans (69%) were *very* concerned about the economic situation than were people in the European Union (47%). This difference reflected a more intense personal economic experience with the crisis. Three-in-four Americans (74%) compared to just over half of Europeans (55%) said their families had been impacted by the recession.

DEMAND FOR ACTION

Despite widespread concern about the economy, the "Great Recession," unlike the Great Depression, has not shaken peoples' faith in the free market. Nevertheless, people clearly wanted change.

Eight-in-ten Americans (81%) and seven-in-ten (69%) people in the European Union still believed that people were better off in a free market economy. But fealty to the free market was most intense in America (54% *strongly* agreed), while only 37% of the British, 20% of the French, and just 13% of Slovaks were strong free market supporters.

Whatever their philosophical views, however, on a practical level, overwhelming majorities of respondents in the United States (75%) and in the European Union (82%) thought the current crisis could only be solved with fundamental changes in the way the economy is run. In the United States, Democrats (85%) and Independents (80%) more than Republicans (69%) backed major reform. In Europe, support for change was more equally shared by respondents of all political persuasions.

And for most people in the European Union (79%), but also for a strong majority of Americans (67%), this desire for change was accompanied by a belief that government has


an essential part to play in regulating the economy. In the United States, however, significantly more Democrats (80%) than Independents (65%) and Republicans (61%) believed in such a governmental role. In Europe, conversely, there was almost no ideological disagreement on this issue.


But there was a transatlantic divide in assessments of current government spending to deal with the economic crisis. (See Chart 13) A majority of Americans (55%) thought Washington had already spent too much, including nearly three-in-four Republicans (73%), a majority of Independents (60%), but less than a third of Democrats (29%). (See Chart 14) In the European Union, 24% thought their governments had spent too much, while a plurality (39%) actually thought their governments had been spending too little to fuel recovery, again with almost no disagreement between people with different political views. A pro-spending sentiment was particularly notable in Romania (62%), Italy (60%), Poland (59%), and Slovakia (58%).

LOOK OUT FOR ME

In these tough times, people have turned inward. Americans (69% *strongly* agreed) thought that their government should focus on solving domestic economic problems, as did a majority of people in the European Union (55% *strongly* agreed).

To that end, people on both sides of the Atlantic were generally supportive of consumers buying domestically-produced goods and services to bolster their national economies. Such national preference had particular backing in Central and Eastern Europe, where eight-in-ten (80%) of those surveyed supported it. Fully 70% of Americans were in favor of “Buy American,” but only 54% of the French supported a “Buy French” policy. Notably, Republicans (81%) in the United States were more supportive of “Buy American” than were Democrats (68%) or Independents (65%). In Europe, people on the right (74%) of the political spectrum were more supportive than those on the left (62%).





Nevertheless, strong majorities in the European Union (80%) and in the United States (77%) wanted to keep their markets open to international trade to hold down prices for consumers. Democrats (83%) in the United States were actually more supportive of open markets than were

Republicans (77%) and Independents (77%). Only about one-in-six Americans and Europeans supported closing markets, the traditional definition of protectionism.

DOUBTS ABOUT ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP

Burden-sharing in economic leadership is one thing. Transatlantic partnership in economic affairs is another.

Three-quarters of respondents in the European Union (74%) supported Brussels exerting strong leadership in world economic affairs. Two-thirds (67%) of those surveyed in the United States agreed.

But only a plurality of Americans (43%) supported closer U.S.-EU economic ties. And a plurality of Europeans (41%) thought the European Union should take a more independent approach to economic affairs, while 37% supported closer U.S.-EU economic ties. The strongest backing for more economic independence was among the French (56%) and the Dutch (50%).



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Section Five: Same Climate, Differing Perspectives


For some time, people in the European Union have taken global warming more seriously than have Americans. And they have expressed a willingness to do more about it. Such contrasting views of climate change caused transatlantic friction even before the Iraq War.

In 2009, these differences manifested themselves around issues of accountability. Americans were less likely than most Europeans to see combating climate change as a personal responsibility, were divided on companies' responsibility for dealing with the issue, were opposed to it being primarily the government's job, and were among the least supportive of international solutions to global warming.

Moreover, fewer Americans than Europeans were willing to trade economic growth in order to slow the warming of the planet.

MUTUAL CONCERN, DISPARATE RESPONSIBILITY

People on both sides of the Atlantic were concerned about climate change, but respondents in the European Union (48% *very concerned*) were more intensely worried than Americans (40% *very concerned*). The most anxious were the Portuguese (62% *very concerned*), while the least apprehensive were the Dutch (just 23% *very concerned*) and the Poles (29% *very concerned*). (See Chart 15)




Strong majorities of both people in the European Union (82%) and Americans (73%) thought personal action could make a difference in fighting climate change. But 60% of respondents in the European Union thought companies and industries, not citizens, needed to change their behavior. Americans were divided on corporate accountability, 45% agreed, while 46% disagreed. A majority of respondents in the European Union (53%) said that it was governments, not citizens, that were primarily responsible for dealing with global warming. A majority of Americans (55%) disagreed. And 81% of respondents in the European Union, but only 54% of Americans believed that climate change could only be addressed effectively at the international level. (See Chart 16) This transatlantic divide reflected a partisan division within the United States. More Democrats (67%) than Republicans (42%) or Independents (58%) supported internationalism in dealing with climate change. In Europe, there was no meaningful partisan difference on the issue.

Nevertheless, two-in-three Americans (67%) said the United States should do as much as it can to slow global warming, even if others did less. A sentiment also subscribed to by four-in-five (81%) respondents in the European Union. But this altruism was again tempered by partisanship. Four-in-five Democrats (85%) would have America do all it can to deal with climate issues, whatever other countries do. Barely half of Republicans (54%) agreed with this view. There was much less of a partisan divide on this concern in the European Union: 85% of people who identify themselves as coming from the left and 77% of people on the right supported taking action on climate change irrespective of what other nations did. Notably, conservative Europeans were much more supportive of climate altruism than were conservative Americans.

A POCKETBOOK DISPARITY

More than two-thirds of the respondents in the European Union (69%) believed everything possible should be done to fight climate change, even if it slowed economic growth. The French (79%) were the most willing to sacrifice economic advantage for a cooler planet. The Slovaks (53%) were the least willing among Europeans. Only a plurality of Americans (43%) would make such a tradeoff. Again, there was a strong partisan divide on this issue in the United States. Democrats (58%) were twice as likely as Republicans (27%) to favor saving the climate over economic growth. (See Chart 17) In the European Union, there was a narrower divide on this concern, with people on the left (76%) more willing to forego growth than those on the right (64%). Contrary to what might be expected, being personally affected by the economic crisis had no impact on peoples' attitudes toward the balance between economic growth and climate protection on either side of the Atlantic.



**FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE
EVEN IF IT SLOWS ECONOMIC GROWTH**




Chart 17a

Source: Topline Data (2009), Q28

**FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE
EVEN IF IT SLOWS ECONOMIC GROWTH**




Chart 17b

Source: Weighted Data, Q28 of Topline (2009)



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Section Six: The Turkish Enigma

Turkey is an outlier, disaffected from the European Union and the United States. On a range of measures—their confidence in Obama, their support for the United States and the European Union, their backing of American and EU global leadership, their attitudes toward Iran, Russia, and the security alliance—the Turkish people are out of step with Europeans and Americans.

The question of whether Turkey should be a member of the European Union has long divided Turkey from its neighbors. During negotiations this decade between Ankara and Brussels over Turkish membership, European opposition to Turkey joining the club has grown, even as Turks, who were once losing interest, have again warmed to the idea.

For many years, as a member of NATO, Turkey was one of America's staunchest allies. But Turkish support for the United States collapsed during the Bush administration thanks in large part to disagreement over the Iraq War. And, although Turkish backing of American leadership rebounded sharply in 2009, it still remained quite low in relative terms. Likewise, Turkish enthusiasm for NATO was the lowest among NATO members surveyed, notwithstanding rising Turkish anxiety about Russia.

WARMING TOWARD AMERICA, BUT SOME WAY TO GO


Despite a global resurgence in support for President Obama, only half of the Turkish population (50%) approved of how he had handled international affairs, up from just 8% backing for President Bush in 2008.

Moreover, half the Turks (50%) lacked confidence in Obama to fight terrorism. Only Americans themselves (53%) had less faith in the U.S. president on this issue. And a majority

of the Turkish people (57%) worried about Obama's ability to manage international economic problems. With regard to these two priority issues, Turkish confidence in Obama was among the lowest of any country surveyed.

Nor were Turkish views of America much better. In 2009, only one-in-six Turks (22%) (See Chart 18) had a favorable view of the United States, compared with support by half (52%) the population in 1999/2000, according to polling for the U.S. State Department. And 42% of the Turkish public had a *very* unfavorable view of the United States, by far the most negative of all countries surveyed by *Transatlantic Trends*.


Similarly, only one-in-six Turks (16%) thought it was desirable for the United States to exert strong leadership in world affairs.



EURO DISENCHANTMENT

Only 32% of Turks held a favorable opinion of the European Union. Just 26% thought it was desirable for Brussels to exert strong leadership in world affairs. And, by two-to-one, Turks thought they should act alone (43%) rather than in concert with the European Union.


Nevertheless, nearly half the Turkish population (48%) thought membership in the European Union would be a good thing, up from 42% in 2008. This contrasted sharply with the 73% who supported joining in 2004. (See Chart 19) And Turks were skeptical about their chances for eventual admission to the Union. Two-thirds (65%) thought it was not likely to happen.



EU members were ambivalent about Turkish membership in the European Union, with a plurality (42%) thinking it was neither good nor bad. This result is in line with earlier findings. But a near majority in France (48%) thought taking Turkey into the European Union would be a bad thing, up from a third (35%) who thought that in 2004. Overall, in the last year, opposition to Turkish membership was up in 9 of 11 EU countries surveyed. Americans (41%) were twice as supportive of Turkey joining the European Union as were EU members.

Despite their skepticism about Turkish membership, people in the European Union were fatalistic about Ankara finally joining their club. Half (54%) thought Turkey's EU membership was likely, albeit down from 60% who thought that in 2008. (See Chart 20) And only in France (56%) did more than half the population believe that Turkey would never get into the European Union.

European Union opposition to Turkish membership may have reflected those Europeans' belief that Turkey has such different values that it is not really part of the West. Such views were particularly strong in Germany (77%) and France (68%). Only the Romanians (51%), by a bare majority, thought the Turks shared Western values. And barely a third of Turks (34%) believed they shared common values with the West.




RELUCTANT SECURITY PARTNER

Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952. But in 2009, barely a third (35%) of Turks still thought NATO was essential to Turkey’s security, down from more than half (53%) who so valued NATO in 2004.

Only three-in-ten (31%) Turks were optimistic about prospects in Afghanistan, where Ankara has troops. That was about the same level of optimism as among other European members of NATO. And half (50%) the Turkish population wanted to reduce or to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan, a slightly lower level of such sentiment than found in European Union countries. Turks were divided about increasing their civilian contribution to support Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction.

Compared with other countries, Turkey showed a relatively low level of concern about Russian behavior across a range of issues. But Turkish anxiety was growing faster than for any of the nations in the survey. (See Chart 21) Concern was up by 19 percentage points with regard to weapons shipments to Turkey’s backyard and by 15 percentage points on Russia’s role as an energy producer.

On Iran, there was a sharp increase in Turkish willingness to accept Tehran having nuclear weapons. In 2007, only 16% of Turks found such an outcome acceptable if diplomatic pressure to end the Iranian nuclear program failed. In 2009, 29% of Turks said this result was acceptable. This Turkish attitude compared with only 5% of Americans and EU members who would accept an Iranian nuclear arsenal.





TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Conclusion

President Barack Obama inherited a dispirited transatlantic relationship, gravely troubled after years of disagreements over Iraq, climate change, and European frustration with perceived U.S. unilateralism in international affairs. In its last few years in office, with some success, the Bush administration tried to repair America's image and support for U.S. global leadership in Europe. In *Transatlantic Trends* 2008, Europeans expressed very high hopes for a new beginning with an Obama presidency. And their response to Obama's election was overwhelmingly positive. European support for the United States rebounded, creating new political space for transatlantic cooperation, despite the debilitating economic crisis that might well have been blamed on the Americans.

But the Obama presidency has not yet lived up to Europeans' expectations for a post-Bush America. And the results of *Transatlantic Trends* 2009 are a reminder that presidential popularity cannot trump substantive national policy differences. Transatlantic disagreements over Afghanistan, Iran, and how to deal with the global economic downturn remain. If these differences cannot be bridged, Obama's popularity will likely suffer. And his honeymoon may be short-lived.

This was particularly true in Central and Eastern Europe, which during the Bush era was relatively pro-American. The Obama bounce was more subdued in the region than in Western Europe, with people expressing different priorities, and less confidence in the American president and U.S. leadership. These attitudes may have reflected greater East European comfort with Republican administrations, public cautiousness in the face of new Russian assertiveness, or a reaction to the Obama administration's ambivalence toward the proposed regional missile defense system. Whatever the reason, *Transatlantic Trends* this year underscores the amount of work cut out for the Obama administration in Central and Eastern Europe.

But the Obama effect has created a fertile environment for the revival of a more robust transatlantic relationship. It is up to both Washington and the governments of Europe to seize this opportunity. In 2010, *Transatlantic Trends* will assess whether the current Euro-American revival blossoms into a stronger partnership or whether it reverts to more bickering and fundamental disagreement.



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

Notes

METHODOLOGY

TNS Opinion was commissioned to conduct the survey using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews in all countries except Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Turkey, where lower telephone penetration necessitated the use of face-to-face interviews. In all countries, a random sample of approximately 1,000 men and women, 18 years of age and older, was interviewed. Interviews were conducted between June 9, 2009, and July 1, 2009.

For results based on the national samples in each of the 13 countries surveyed, one can say with 95% confidence that the margin of error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus three percentage points. For results based on the total European sample (n=12095), the margin of error is plus or minus one percentage point. The average response rate for all 13 countries surveyed was 18.2%.

Europe-wide figures are weighted on the basis of the size of the adult population in each country. Unless otherwise specified, comparative data are reproduced from Transatlantic Trends 2003-2008 and/or from Worldviews 2002 (www.transatlantic-trends.org).

When processing is complete, data from the survey are deposited with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan (ICPSR), the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut, and the GESIS-Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences and are available to scholars and other interested parties. At the time of printing, data for years 2002 through 2007 are available through ICPSR, the Roper Center, and GESIS.

NOTE ON EUROPEAN AVERAGES

Over time, additional European countries have been added to the survey. While the addition of new countries has affected the Europe-wide average, the impact has usually not been statistically significant. Therefore, for ease of presentation, we have treated several different averages as if they were part of one average: the EU6 and EU7 averages are listed as part of the EU9, and the E10 average is listed as part of the E12. For additional information on the composition of the European averages, please consult the table below.

TABLE OF EUROPEAN AVERAGES:

YEAR	AVERAGE	COUNTRIES
2002	EU6	France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, and The United Kingdom
2003	EU7	Same as the EU6 with the addition of Portugal
2004-2006	EU9	Same as the EU7 with the addition of Slovakia and Spain
2004-2005	E10	Same as the EU9 with the addition of Turkey
2006	E11	Same as EU9 with the addition of Bulgaria and Romania
2006-2009	E12	Same as E10 with the addition of Bulgaria and Romania



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

www.transatlantictrends.org

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