Brussels Forum

March 23, 2014

A World Transitioning

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Welcome back for this final session of Brussels Forum in 2014. The purpose of this final session is really to take stock of what we've heard and what we've learned over the last 48 hours. At least for me, I think this has been one of the richest conversations we've ever had. It always helps if there's a crisis to stoke things along. I think this was also some of the most lively debates that we've had on almost every issue so a big thank you to the audience.

We've got a great final panel of people that have worked closely on a variety of issues related to the transatlantic relationship. Carl Bildt, the foreign minister of Sweden, who I think has participated in every one of these Brussels Forums, probably one of the most knowledgeable people in Europe on just about every foreign policy issue. Marc Grossman, a board member German Marshall Fund, one of the most distinguished foreign service officers of the United States, most recently the special representative, Af-Pak representative. And then finally, Dr. Mostafa Terrab, the chairman of OCP in Morocco who has worked really closely with us in broadening the horizons of GMF and

focusing on the wider Atlantic and also the role of U.S. European cooperation in Africa.

So I guess the way I'd like to start out is to kind of look back over the last 30 or 40 years and I'd like to give you each a chance to say what's the biggest accomplishment that we as this community, this Atlantic community, can cite? And don't worry, I'm going to come back and ask you what's the biggest failure but why don't we start with you, Carl?

Honorable Carl Bildt: I mean, I think the accomplishments are fairly obvious if you look at Europe. If you have the starting point 1989, we know where we were then. We then had a period of, I think, fantastic success with some exceptions. The exception was the decade of war in the Balkans but a fantastic success up until 2004, 2005, 2006. (Inaudible) free, all of that, and it did, essentially, work with, after all, the tragic exception. Then we've been in a period of sort of financial difficulties and additional turmoil to the south. Now I think we are at the reset of the resets. Now we are truly at the end of the post-Cold War period and now we are entering into something fundamentally new that we need to try to understand but vast successes. Now we're entering into a new period of uncharted waters.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Okay, thanks. Marc?

Ambassador Marc Grossman: Well, thank you very much. I, first of all, want to take the opportunity as a board member here to say that I think one of the most important successes of the last 19 years has been the growth of the German Marshall Fund and I'd like you to join me in a—

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Nah.

Ambassador Marc Grossman: You're not getting out of here without somebody saying thank you to you. You're not going to do that.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Last time for that, okay?

Ambassador Marc Grossman: I'm going to do it, thank you very much. Craig, I think if you look back on this time, I agree with the foreign minister. It's been an enormous set of successes, lots of challenges to come. And I just listed a few as I was thinking about your question.

First, and I recognize my bias, but I think that two rounds of NATO expansion set this alliance, this transatlantic relationship, very much on the right path and I know there's a lot of controversy about it, people opposed at the time, people oppose it now but when I look back, I think those two chances to integrate more and more countries into the alliance, hugely important thing.

Second, and that is I think the transatlantic partnership, the transatlantic relationship, also is a

leader in what we've seen over the past 20 years or 25 years and that's in the enormous success of globalization. And when you think about the millions of people who are now kind of out poverty, participate in the system, you know, you're all using your SpotMe, the millions of people who are today connected is hugely, hugely important -- the number of voices that we hear today that we did not hear 20 years ago. And I think very importantly are the young people who are all here today, very important. And also the transatlantic relationship over these past 20 years has also opened up the enormous power and recognition of the private sector so that these government-private sector efforts together are something new.

Third thing I listed, and I'm a North American so I just say this with all due respect to my friends in Europe, but we as North Americans I think need to stop from time to time and recognize also the enormous success of the European Union. And when I think about the beginning of my career at the State Department where things are the EU today, this is an organization of Europeans trying to decide for themselves how they wish to live and I have great admiration for what has happened in that area.

A couple of things finally. One is this phrase that we repeat but it's worth stopping here maybe at the end of this conference is exactly the right place to do it:

whole, free and at peace. And that is a guiding philosophy of this transatlantic relationship, as the foreign minister said, that has guided us through this time. Things yet to do, but nobody can bring together a group of people in this transatlantic relationship without talking about whole, free and at peace and Europe is substantially on its way to that, challenges yet to be but whole, free and at peace.

And finally, I would say that we've got to step back and we've talked a little bit about it at the conference here and that's the nuclear questions. You know, 20 years ago, 25 years ago, we would have talked a lot more about nuclear posture and what was happening. And I just listed for myself one of the great successes of the transatlantic relationship was the deployment of intermediate range nuclear weapons. I think this was a very important thing and worth kind of thinking about again.

So all of these areas seem to me are things that the transatlantic relationship, while many things yet to do, are things to be proud of.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Dr. Terrab, what would you see as the great strengths in these last 30 or 40 years or accomplishments?

Dr. Mostafa Terrab: Thank you. I think when you say transatlantic in that framework looking back 30 years you're talking about North Atlantic. So what I'm going

to say is very much an outside view as that of an Atlantist but with the southern dimension, so it's an outside view.

I think what has really been a major contribution of that northern transatlantic relationship has been, you know, to set up, you know, rules of the games and frames of reference, both in geopolitical terms and economic terms and global economic terms that have served very well the global economy and the end prosperity and growth. And I can name some of these frames of reference but I also want to say that I think that today, these very same frames of reference are not serving the global community very well in ways that, you know, stability was mentioned as one of them, you know, the quest for stability but that is becoming now almost an illusory quest.

We're talking about transitions. There's a complexity in global politics that is due to the fact that there is not one single transition and I think you have transition in the singular form. There are several transitions ongoing today that interact and create a complexity that the old frames of reference cannot address, in my opinion.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Okay. Thank you. We're going to go to the biggest failures in just a second. On SpotMe, we're going to let you put up questions that will show up on the side. Maybe we'll even do one of those fancy

word clouds. I'm not the most pro-technology person at GMF. But if you have questions, start sending them in.

Is that right? Is that the way it's going to work? Yeah, okay. And we'll go to all of you in just a bit.

So what's been the biggest failure? What's the thing that we should really be embarrassed that was not accomplished or something where, even with best intentions, we failed?

Honorable Carl Bildt: Well, I mentioned (inaudible). I mean, I'd normally say that in the period since 1989 there were two enormous successes. Two issues that we sorted out, which were virtually unthinkable before that: the reunification of Germany, often forgotten, in peace. There were 19 Soviet divisions, heavily armed, in the heart of Europe and they were withdrawn in order and everything sorted out. The independence then of the different satellite countries, but primarily I would say the three Baltic countries reestablishing their independence because they were part of the Soviet Union. They were not out of the Soviet empire. They were the Soviet Union and that was due, to large extent also the wisdom of Russian leader Boris Yeltsin at that particular time.

Then we had the fatal mistakes or the fatal failure of a decade of wars in the Balkans, starting with Slovenia and ending in Macedonia, all of that

particular mess. We are now trying to build peace there for the time with integration.

But looking at the slightly wider perspective, not necessarily our fault, I would say that looking back on this sort of a quarter of a century, I would be most concerned with the fatal failure of Russia to win friends among its neighbors.

I mean, look, one of my political heroes has always been Helmut Kohl and Helmut Kohl was a man very sort of deep down in the history of Germany for reasons that are fairly obvious. And one of the lessons he always preached was that Germany will only be safe when even the smallest of his neighbor considered Germany the best of his friends. And Germany had been treating all of its neighbors, big and small, in an absolutely disgraceful and awful way for generations, but his aim was to build a friendship step by step. It took one or two generations.

Russia had that chance a quarter of a century ago when it liberated itself and Russia emerged out of the Soviet Union. We should not forget that Russia was also oppressed by the Soviet Union. It was the liberation of Russia from Soviet Union that occurred and the possibility of building something new.

But I was struck with that during the debate, through all the initial debate that we had yesterday when you had individuals, whoever they were, from

Georgia, Estonia and Ukraine. Had Russia learned from the historical experience of others, those individuals would have been standing here and saying that Russia has come across as a new nation and we did share a rather tragic history in the past but we are now friends and are going to be together to build a new future.

That is a fatal failure of Russia and you can answer that to try in desperation to counter that with short-term military might. I don't think that's going to succeed.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: So let me just ask a follow-up on that. Is there something that we, the United States and Europe, could have done that would have encouraged Russia to take the steps that you're talking about? I mean, there's at least a few people that would say some of it was not our fault but that we didn't do as much to incentivize, encourage? And let's face it, Germany had some very strong incentives to make peace with its neighbors.

Honorable Carl Bildt: No, absolutely. So would Russia have had because there's been a tendency in the Russian debates lately to talk about that Russia should also be a bigger soft power, culture and nostalgia and Tolstoy and whatever. There's a lot of potential. Russia is rich European culture that radiates that culture into the sphere that is fairly large. One

should have been able to build on that and what has it? Have we made mistakes? Well, there's a debate about that. I don't think Europeans that much because we've been engaging with Russia all the time.

I think there was a tendency, there was a uni-polar moment of period when I think Washington tended to say, "We don't really care and we do whatever we want." There was an element of that for a while and you can, when you listen to the Russians, you can still feel that they feel hurt by certain things that happened in that particular period.

Would it have made a difference? Probably not because it has to do with Russia itself.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Okay. Ambassador Grossman, what's the big failures?

Ambassador Marc Grossman: Well, Craig, I have been thinking about this and certainly I associate myself with a lot of what the foreign minister has said but I was thinking about failures or challenges or things yet to be done that have come out of this conversation over the past 48 hours. Let me give you a couple that I put.

First of all, I listed whole, free and at peace as, of course, one of our successes. Well, I said a couple of times whole, free and at peace certainly isn't finished yet and one of the things that's absolutely true about the Brussels Forum this year since Friday is the Ukraine has been a clarifying event. And so when

you think about whole, free and at peace, it isn't finished yet because there are these challenges and you have them still in the Balkans, clearly on Ukraine and Georgia. Whole, free and at peace is still a goal so it's both a success and things yet to be done.

Second thing is that when I listen to a lot of the conversation for the past 48 hours, I'd also say that we're still some way in this transatlantic relationship from really integrating the economic aspects of strategy with the political aspects of strategy and I think that's a hugely important thing. And when I was listening yesterday to some of the issues in trying to integrate these things--very interesting conversation here yesterday on employment, on growth, on what's the future for young people and those are all strategic questions for the transatlantic relationship--a very interesting conversation that comes in and out on Ukraine but energy, hugely important strategic question for the transatlantic relationship. And I thought we heard a little bit yesterday in the conversation about the future of trade, is that I hope that one of the answers to what's happened in Ukraine here is that we start to see the TTIP as a strategic issue, as I think Mike Froman said it's not about exports of chickens or bananas; this is a strategic response to the challenges that we have today.

Final thing is that I think since maybe the past few years, I don't know, that you're still in a period where there's an enormous amount, remarkably for me, an enormous amount of pessimism, I think, still about the transatlantic relationship and that means you're yet to find a unifying, clarifying answer to extremism, answer to terrorism.

You know, what about the questions of how society, especially in civil society, build themselves up? And so I think one of the clarifying things about Ukraine, and a clarifying thing I hope that comes from this Brussels Forum, is that values matter. We can identify them and that this pessimism that we have over kind of our way of life and our future, we put that aside because it's now challenged a clarifying event. And so as I listened over the past 48 hours I put that in a category of things still to be done.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Okay. Thanks. Dr. Terrab?

Dr. Mostafa Terrab: Well, if I think of what could be or could really be anchored as a failure but looking forward is really not recognizing, again, the frames of references that are implicit in the strategies and policies that were implemented in past, again, that may have served some purposes but today I think we can make, I mean, again, thinking of North Atlantic strategic mistakes can be made by not recognizing and changing the frames of reference.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: And what do you mean by the frames of reference?

Dr. Mostafa Terrab: I'll give you one that--maybe a couple ones. But they all evolve around perception issues, vis-à-vis the south, and emerging markets, you know. When today, we discuss emerging markets, the role of China, for example, I saw a picture with some heads of states: Russia, Brazil, India, China and South Africa. This game, at least from an economic perspective, is very much viewed as a zero-sum game, a zero-sum mentality that is a cold war type of situation. You know, it's either us or them. We're seeing now, you know, even here, a lot of talk about some of the vocabulary, east and west, coming back at the occasional Ukrainian situation.

But what this leads, I think, is also a perception of risks and opportunities that is very biased. The fact, you know, the zero-sum mentality would lead us to think that economic growth in China, emerging markets, and in Africa are threats, are things that have to be managed, when they're serving the global economy. After the 2008 crisis, I think the world economy was very happy that China was still growing. It did help, you know.

Africa is a case in point. I mean, I heard that the only time Africa was mentioned here was as an area of instability. It is an area of instability. It's not the

only one. But it is also a tremendous area of economic opportunity.

And, you know, you mentioned TTIP. The question I would have is where is the area of growth in TTIP looking forward? You know, it will serve a purpose; free trade is important. It creates things but, you know, if TTIP is only a North Atlantic thing, I guess it's ignoring the big area of growth. Africa is growing at double digits. Some of the African countries are growing at a double digit.

But it takes an explicit recognition of the frame of reference we're using to address these things and whether they're useful or not.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Okay, thank you. We're going to go to the audience in just a second, so either start putting your questions up--here we go. But what I wanted to do was ask the panel, what are the two or three things that you worry about for the future? Things that this U.S.-European community should be addressing, things that they may be neglecting in the part of the world that you were talking about, Dr. Terrab. What are the big worries? What keeps you up at night, Carl? Well, I--

Honorable Carl Bildt: Well, that's a separate question. Separate session on that. No. Which are the biggest challenges which I think we have sort of been--by the way, I agree on Africa. I mean, the fastest-

rising billion of people in the world today are in Africa and that is our European immediate south. Lots of problems, as well, but it's there.

The biggest challenge, I would say, is everything that has to do with the world of hyper-connectivity that we are entering into. I mean, the figure that I like is that in five years' time, two-thirds of the population of the world will have access to or will be covered by mobile broadband with a capacity higher than we have in Europe today. That's a new world.

And then the battle for the governors of the control of this cyberspace that will determine more and more will be decisive. I mean what's been playing out this week are two battles; the battle for the control of Crimea and the battle for the control of Twitter. And which one is, in the longer perspective, going to be the most important one? I just leave that question hanging there. I think the answer is obvious.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Okay. Marc?

Ambassador Marc Grossman: Well, many. Just if I could go to the very important point that Dr. Terrab made about Africa. I think one of the great opportunities in Africa is this trade connection. And if you think about what the United States has done over the past few years, for example, in the African Growth and Opportunities Act, all of these things show the way, they pave the way towards something larger. And so

I think exactly as you do, sir, that I hope that this Transatlantic Trade Investment Partnership will lead to an increasing number of these, whether it's in Asia or Africa because the proof of concept is there and AGOA is one of those proofs of concept.

Craig, I think when I look out and consider, you know, what keeps me up, one is to go to that challenge-failure that I talked about before, and that somehow that we've become pessimistic about our values and we're not as quick or as open to talk about things that we believe in. I'd like to kind of get back to that.

Secondly, I think the point that Dr. Terrab made, which is to say that we still live in a world where for so many people, or too many people, everything is a zero-sum game. And when you think about Iran, when you think about North Korea, when you think about the challenges that are out there today, integrating China into the global system, somehow--and moving toward an international conversation where it isn't a zero-sum game for everybody, and it becomes--or there's some mutual benefit in this, would make, I think, a very big difference in our lives.

Final thing is--and that is to how to use the transatlantic relationship or apply the transatlantic relationship to the philosophy that GMF has had, which is how do you finish the job, whole, free and in peace in Europe, and then apply the transatlantic

relationship and the power of it to try to solve challenges outside of Europe? So that's a job that GMF has started and one I hope it will continue.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Now, Marc, do you think that this crisis in Ukraine and the kind of renewed, at least, awareness of Russia as a problem will detract from exactly that kind of mission of the U.S. and Europe trying to tackle bigger issues other places in the globe? Certainly, over the weekend, a number of our Asia friends who are here have looked quite worried. You know, they may say that Europeans are worried about the American tilt towards Asia. We don't really feel it and now we see it tilting back the other direction.

Some of the young professionals that are here from Africa and North Africa and elsewhere have said, "Oh, sure. Now they're going to go back and focus on Russia, they're going to forget about the various projects that they've started in our part of the world." What's your assessment?

Ambassador Marc Grossman: My assessment is that I think that the nations of the transatlantic--and here I certainly include the southern Atlantic and all of North America, I think we have the capacity to do more than one thing at one time and the fact that you can, you know, maybe refocus attention on Russia.

Foreign Minister Bildt was talking a little bit before we started about that Russia will be back on the

agenda in Washington, DC. Yes, that's absolutely right, but it's not the only thing on the agenda and I believe we can do more than one thing at a time; one.

And two is that what do you look out on and see in the world today? It is these problems, these challenges are only going to be met simultaneously. You can't say, "Well, on Monday, we're going to worry about Russia. And on Tuesday, we're going to worry about energy. And on Wednesday, you know, the whole free and at peace and the rest of Europe," blah, blah, blah, for the rest of the week. You have--

Mr. Craig Kennedy: You've got to get Syria in there one of those days.

Ambassador Marc Grossman: Well, and that's why I go back to the point that Dr. Terrab made about the question of the zero-sum game; one. Two is I also think, and we'll see, that the clarifying event here of Russia's invasion of Crimea, of Ukraine, will also require people to start talking again about these values. And if people start talking about values, well, those things are larger than just Russia. They're larger than just the transatlantic relationship. They are what define this relationship across the world.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Okay, thank you. Dr. Terrab. What keeps you up at night?

Dr. Mostafa Terrab: Well, I think the lack of creativity in policymaking. You know, we're always

going back to policy tools and instruments that are based on frames of references that may not be relevant today, but not recognizing that link. Again, I agree with what was said in terms of we don't have to choose what we address. There is not one transition, there are several transitions ongoing. Creates a complexity because they're interrelated. So I think it's illusory to think that we can divide and conquer and handle and pick and choose which transition and which area and what you're going to deal with because there are these interrelationships between these.

Now, the only reason we are thinking this way in terms of, you know, a zero-sum game in terms of the instruments and the attention and the resources put over this is because we are not recognizing that there are other instruments, tools and policies that can be brought to bear that, for example, leverage the new communication realities, just to name one.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Okay. Thank you. We're going to start to go to the audience for some questions but let me start with one. I'm going to paraphrase one that is up there. At least one thing that you hear when you talk to people here at this conference is that, in some ways, the transatlantic community in 1947 was the democratic world, for the most part, with the exception of Japan. The world has changed. There's more democracies, there's more people that vote in elections

in Asia than in Europe and the United States combined. Is it time that we extend our thinking and stop thinking about it as a transatlantic world and instead focus on the democratic world? Carl.

Honorable Carl Bildt: Well, I think we've done that to a very large extent. Because we see the--what we call the rise of the west and we see the emergence of a global middle class all over from Shanghai to São Paulo, which is forming the politics of the world. No question about that. But the transatlantic community is still essential for the simple reason that there ain't [sic] any global challenge that you can start to tackle if you don't have the transatlantic community on board. Often, it's not enough. We need other players as well. But if we don't have the transatlantic community in shape, it's going to fade.

So I would say the transatlantic community is very important for Europe, needless to say; to some extent, for the United States. But we must see it as sort of the bridge to global influence and a global partnership with the new emerging powers that are there. And that's a somewhat new approach because if we go back to 1945, it was still the old world and now it's a very new world and, as said, Africa, China. There's a huge election in India, election campaign.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Yeah.

Honorable Carl Bildt: The biggest election in the world, which is obviously going to result in a new government. That's an issue that hasn't even been mentioned during our discussions here.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Absolutely. Dr. Terrab, how do you view that? I mean, does the idea of this transatlantic community need to be broadened? Does it need to be opened up? Certainly, you go to Morocco and it feels closer to Europe than an awful lot of your neighbors do. We sit there at our other big conference, the Atlantic Dialog, and you see Brazilians and Mexicans and South Africans who certainly seem to share a lot of our values. Is it time to kind of rethink this community?

Dr. Mostafa Terrab: Well, again, I think frames of references are important and words are important. You're talking about how does the transatlantic community, I think, the first question that you've adopted, so-to-speak, how does it extend to the south Atlantic? Imagine that the south Atlantic nations decide to create a transatlantic community. We also have the right to call it transatlantic.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: No, I don't think so. I don't think NATO has that--I think it's copyrighted. I'm sorry.

Dr. Mostafa Terrab: Is it? Well, in--

Mr. Craig Kennedy: You can call it the Southern Sea Group or something like that but--

Dr. Mostafa Terrab: Intellectual property is another. But no, one of the things that is, I think, fundamental at the beginning is a dialog, is dialogues, is talking to each other.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Right.

Dr. Mostafa Terrab: So I think, you know, the question alluded to what mechanism should be brought to bear; it's a dialog. And this is why I really commend what GMF--and what we're starting to do in Rabat, which is really a dialog, you know, that is not just east, I mean, transatlantic but also north-south.

But you saw--and I also have to tell you, Craig, that you're an inspiration in this. You are able to change and at least to accept other frames of references in going to this and making the Atlantic Dialogues in Rabat a success. It took that effort on your part. So I think the dialog--it's important for the dialog to be fruitful, one has to be flexible to others' point of view and be able to, I would say, question your own frame of mind.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: So let me go up here and then we're going to go to the audience. I have to say it's nice to read them but I prefer to hear your lovely voices. For Carl Bildt, did NATO create Putin, as Todd Friedman recently wrote, did NATO create Putin and was

NATO membership for countries like Poland and Estonia a mistake? And that comes from Stephen Biegun. Where is Mr. Biegun?

Male: He's there, way in back.

Craig Kennedy: Where? Okay.

Honorable Carl Bildt: Answer no. I think that--

Craig Kennedy: Do you want to elaborate?

Honorable Carl Bildt: I want to elaborate. I think NATO membership for Estonia and Poland was extremely important in order to be able for these countries to develop a good relationship with Russia.

They needed, coming out of the history that was, they needed reassurance. I mean, they got their independence back, but they were nervous. And it followed naturally that they were nervous. And I think NATO membership gave them the reassurance, the security, the confidence with which it was able also to engage with Russia.

As a matter of fact, there's been--let me speak about the problems that I said also. The amount of reconciliation that has been going on between Poland and Russia is rather remarkable. I don't think these issues would have been impossible to handle had Poland not felt the basic security in NATO.

One of the good things that have happened during the last few weeks, I mean, you need to have a microscope, but anyhow there's been finally signing of

the border treaty between Russia and Estonia. That took 20 years or back and forth over there and very controversial. Now it's signed. And the fact that NATO membership is there has been--we've settled issues of the past and been able to move forward in the future. It would not have happened had there not been NATO membership.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Marc, do you have an opinion on this?

Ambassador Marc Grossman: Yes. I gave my opinion in my opening remarks.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Free Poland.

Ambassador Marc Grossman: No, I listed NATO expansion two times during the time I had the good fortune to serve the United States of America as a diplomat. That was one of the great accomplishments of the transatlantic relationship.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Okay. Great. Let's go to the audience. Let's start over here. Can we get a mic? There we go.

Ms. Elle: Elle (inaudible). Visiting fellow at Wilfried Martens Martens Center for European Studies and former Georgian ambassador to the European Union. I would argue that the biggest failure of the, you know, last two decades is that a failure to secure democratic Russia, and to settle the terms of the end of the Cold

War in a comprehensive way, not leaving the potential areas of instability and we're paying price for this.

So if Russia was, you know, relatively open democratic--I mean open political system, it has transitioned back into authoritarian system the last 10 years and now it's trying to force its neighbors to transition back to authoritarian governments. And I think looking forward this is the biggest challenge, how to bring democracy to Russia and prevent it from forcing neighbors transitioning back to the closed political system.

And also another new reality, I think, after Crimea is that the future of nonproliferation world looks very different, I think. It will be very difficult to convince anyone to give up their nuclear weapons in the future. Thank you.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: You know, I'd like to take that question and make it just a little bigger. It seems like sometimes the United States and Europe take on projects and they get halfway through them. It's kind of like renovating a house. And then they get bored or they get distracted or they move on to something else.

I mean, you were talking about the Balkans, where there was great energy applied initially and then kind of a waning interest, certainly if you're in Washington. The example of I guess the greater Black Sea region would be an example.

Honorable Carl Bildt: Libya.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Libya. The work that--tremendous work that people did in Turkey to encourage a government that really had civilian control of the military and a strong judiciary, and got there with a little bit of the--much with the promise of EU membership. The work in North Africa, Libya, but I would say with maybe the exception of Morocco, the whole strip across the top of Africa. Is that one of our problems? Do we not know how to finish things?

Honorable Carl Bildt: I think it's a very good point. I think we are bad at strategic patience. It might be that we Europeans are somewhat better at it than Americans. There's a tendency to go in and try to fix a problem. Libya, I think, is the ultimate example at the moment.

Everyone has Libya as a major success. Is that really true? We--

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Wait, wait, wait. They have it as a success?

Honorable Carl Bildt: Well, it sounded like that at one of the previous panels, anyhow. But, yes, it was a success as a short-term military operation but short-term military operations can achieve short-term military goals, period. But when it comes to sort of building a new state and stability, it's a far more complex and long-term endeavor. And then we often lose

the patience. Then the media attention goes elsewhere. Then you can't make the rousing speeches any longer at the press conferences. That is boring long-term stuff.

And where is Libya today? It's one of the emerging big problems of Europe, because we see it as a channel for all sorts of things. It's spreading its influence, as was pointed out. The reason why we now have--in Mali, we have in Niger is some extent of fallout from the failure of the finishing of the Libya operation.

But let me make another point just so I don't forget it because they're things that worry me. What worries me is what I call the stalled transition, as well. I say the success period in Europe was really sort of from early '90s to 2004, 2005. In economic terms, we saw the gap closing. This country was starting to catch up. So we could see at some point in time that there would be approaching EU standards or whatever.

From 2005, roughly, transition stalls everywhere, happens nothing any longer. And what we have seen since is that this leaves the building up of social and economic tensions and frustrations. And I think what we have seen in, say, Bulgaria or Bosnia, and to certain extent in Ukraine, is the building up of the frustrations coming from the stalled transition of the last 10 years. That's an internal stability issue that

will have an external European dimension if we don't deal with it.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Mostafa, do you have confidence when the Europeans and Americans come and say we're here to help that they're actually going to follow through all the way to the end?

Dr. Mostafa Terrab: Depends if the policy behind it is clear and explicit. We talked about stopping something in the middle, but how do you define that something? In order to build confidence, and I guess buy in, one has to be very clear in terms of what the policy is. You know, if people look at what happened again was maybe stopped, I don’t know if it was stopped.

In Libya, it depend what was the--what we were trying to achieve. Then is it consistent across the region and how do you--then you handle what didn't happen in Syria. So I guess the question we have is what is the policy?

Mr. Craig Kennedy: What's the objective? Is it just throwing over bad guys or is a longer term buildup?

Dr. Mostafa Terrab: I know the answer. The objective is democratization. No, it's what the policy.

Craig Kennedy: Okay. Okay. I get it. Marc?

Ambassador Marc Grossman: My thought actually follows very well from what Dr. Terrab said and also what Carl had to say. You know, I think the issue for

both Europeans and Americans, if you'd allow me, is a question of strategic patience. And I don't think one or the other of us has a great king of hold on all this exactly.

But it isn't just strategic patience. It is the point, I think, that Dr. Terrab just made which is you need a policy, and when that policy then is connected strategically to other policies that you're pursuing.

I mean, I've been noticing some of the questions that have been coming up and throughout this whole conversation over the past 48 hours at the Brussels Forum, it's about the strategic connections between things, you know. What happened in Georgia is connected to what's happened in Crimea. What happened in Syria is connected to what's happened in Crimea, Ukraine.

So I think the strategic connections, we do have a real challenge with that. And if you call that finishing, okay. But I would call it not continuing to make through the strategic connections. And I'll give you--and I recognize my bias, but I'll give you the example we haven't talked about at all here in the past 48 hours is Afghanistan.

You know, how much cost, effort, sacrifice did Europeans and Americans together, along with the people of Afghanistan, but Europeans and Americans over 11-12 years make in Afghanistan? They're walking up to an election on the 5th of April. Afghanistan is not the

same country that it was in 2003. I believe Afghans will fight for what it is that they've achieved. And if this Brussels Forum was the cobble for them, Afghans would be saying, "Excuse me, but is anyone out there going to continue to support us in our fight?" It's not--

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Right.

Ambassador Marc Grossman: --your fight anymore. In our fight. And so that's a matter of finishing. It's a matter, though, of recognizing the strategic connection and having the courage and the patience to see this through.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: So one observation I'd make is that over the nine Brussels Forums this is the first one where there wasn't a major panel on Afghanistan.

Ambassador Marc Grossman: It's the panel Carl and I usually do.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: That's right. Well, no. Dick Holbrooke and Kouchner did it several years.

Ambassador Marc Grossman: Right. Right.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: This is the first Brussels Forum where we haven't had a major session on climate change or related issues with that. It is the first--there was something else that came up here, but you realize how our attention span or our attention gets diverted so easily when there's a big crisis, yeah?

Honorable Carl Bildt: Well, it does and it should.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Right.

Ambassador Carl Bildt: And I think one of the--I was going to say the last discussion, I say, the ultimate soft power instrument in the world is the Brussels Forum. No, it is true, because when we are faced with new challenges, and the Ukraine situation is a new challenge, no question about that, we need to intensify these sort of intellectually interaction, intellectually intercourse to try to understand what's going on. Because as we know, the generals normally fight the last war and the politicians repeat the phrases of the last issue. But when we are faced with new situations then it's very important to have gatherings, as Brussels Forum, to come together and have the sort the ferment, the turmoil that is associated with intellectual debate in order to try to understand the new situation. So the fact that we are overtaken by an event is a good thing.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Is a good thing.

Ambassador Carl Bildt: We should be.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Okay. Okay. Now, we're going to take three right in a row here. Here, here and then at the end, General Allen.

Mr. Hari Hariharan: So that is a good segue for my question, and that is a lot of the art of the possible and the art of the affordable, especially in a transatlantic construct, was simply because of the

economic might of the United States, which eventually was supplanted by Europe coming along.

Looking forward, the reality is that both the United States and Europe have significant economic difficulties ahead of them, simply because the debt to DGP, the initial conditions today, are not what they were 10 years ago, 20 years ago.

What is this going to do in terms of a forward-looking commitment? Simply because where the weak-- economic weakness is beginning to show up pretty quickly is in the attitudes of the working people? I am from the U.S. and as I mentioned in several of the forum questions before, there is significant fatigue on matters related to State Department issues.

So outside of leadership and state activism, I don't think there's very much support among the American people for a lot of things which are not domestic. So my question is economic might, if that is not a given condition going forward, what is it going to do to your recalibration of the art of the possible?

Mr. Pete Keller: I'm Pete Kellner. I'm president of the polling company Britain's YouGov. My comments follow actually from that last question and from Carl's reference to hyper-connectivity. Just over six months ago, Britain's parliament voted very narrowly by 13 votes not to accede to President Obama's request for Britain to take part in bombing of Syria's chemical

weapons sites. In the debate, which led to that result, a lot of members of parliament referred to public opinion, and it was universally accepted the British public were against involvement. It was only four days from the President's request to that debate, and in those four days MPs were hit by a wall of e-mails, Twitter, and the widget of online poll of the public.

One can't prove it, but my guess is that 30 or 40 years ago a similar event would have led to a different parliamentary outcome, because there would not have been the time for that clear expression of the public mood to come forward.

So my two questions are these. Firstly, do they think that was simply a one-off case, not likely to be repeated? If they think that real-time public feedback is part of the new world that all democracies will live in, do you think this is on balance a good thing, because it's more democratic and politicians were accountable? Or a balance of bad thing because it potentially stops politicians doing what they believe to be right?

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Good question. General Allen?

General John Allen: Thank you. Marc, I want to thank you for bringing up a subject that has not been treated really in this forum, and it's the issue of Afghanistan. This is 2014. As a result of NATO decisions to end the period of transition at the end of

2014 into--as a result of the Bonn II Conference where 100 entities and countries came together to pledge a decade of transformation for Afghanistan, and then the Tokyo Summit which committed $16 billion for Afghan development. You know, this is probably one of the biggest transitions that we're going to face in the Atlantic Alliance, and the biggest transition that Europe and the United States have committed itself to in the last 13 years. We've got an awful lot at stake here, and we could easily, if we're not careful, snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. We've got a whole class of women who are empowered in ways they have never been before in Afghanistan, a whole swath of civil society that has a future in Afghanistan that they never could have imagined before the European Alliance, the Atlantic Alliance, NATO, and the EU and others became involved in Afghanistan to make a fundamental difference.

This is not just about Afghanistan. It's about central and south Asia. It's about the stability of Pakistan. It's a big, big issue, and we are treating it now just briefly, but I would simply ask that all of us here--there are former ministers, there are active leaders of government--we need to keep our eyes on the period of transition at the end of the campaign and the decade of transformation which will lock in the successes. I notice that Afghanistan wasn't considered

a success or a failure. It wasn't considered unfinished business. It is unique, but it is something to which we have committed ourselves, the blood of our children, and the dollars from our treasury. We've got to remain seized on this issue. It can't come off our agenda.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Thank you. Gentlemen, so first question. I think one of the lessons of history is that strong economic ties between countries don't necessarily prevent wars, but what is also true when countries have really good economies, they're ambitious. I think the United States in the 1990s is a good example, and I think Hari's question was a good one along those lines. Do we need to get back to having economic growth to really be willing to take on these big, ambitious challenges?

Second one, populism and the Internet. Is this a good thing or a bad thing? Is it good that our politicians--that, you know, thanks to some of the technology from YouGov--that YouGov uses and others--you can send millions of messages to our elected officials, and, you know, you assume that they're seeing five or six of them?

And then the final one is Afghanistan. Who's going to start? Carl?

Honorable Carl Bildt: Well, I just thought with the last question, I mean, is this good or bad. Well, wake up to reality. It is what it is. Because we are

entering this world of hyper-connectivity. I happen to believe that it’s most probably going to be a much better world, but the demands for political leadership are going to be different. No question about that. I mean, we can’t settle things in closed rooms any longer. It would have been possible. Prior to a vote in the House of Commons, you'd meet out there somewhere else in the Palace of Westminster and decide it. No longer possible. Is this better or worse? I think it’s probably better, and it’s going to happen everywhere.

Look at China. This effort at building a totalitarian country that, I think, ultimately is going to succeed. Even there, even if they control the social media enormously they have to take it into account. It doesn’t work any longer, the ways of governing that we had in the past, and I think it’s essentially a good thing.

Remarks on the economy. Yeah, I mean Europe is going to be seven percent of the global economy or seven percent of the population, I think, of the world by the middle of the century, probably more of the economy. This is, of course, something that is very good. It’s better for Europe if we have a world in which the rest of the world is doing better than they did before. The fact that we have after a couple of-- well, after a hundred years when the gaps in the world

were widening, they are now starting to close. That's a good thing.

What we need to do, and so far the transatlantic world have managed to do, we are still the most innovative economies and societies of the world. And we are innovative because we have societies based on the freedom and creativity of the individual. That's where I think the Chinese are going to face their most significant challenge. You can't be innovative, you can't be creative if you don't have a society based on rule of law and openness and freedom, and as long we sort of preserve those values in our economies I think we will remain the major source of innovation and creativity in the world. And that's going to be our most significant--I wouldn't call it weapon--soft power in the world of tomorrow.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Marc?

Ambassador Marc Grossman: All right. All three questions here are really important. First, on the question of the economy--absolutely right. I've often believed if you represent the United States of America what you're representing is the power of the United States. But I think it's been interesting--the last Transatlantic Trends that was done by the German Marshall Fund and also the last poll that was done by the Pew and CFR, what did it tell you? It tells you that Americans absolutely recognize the need to deal

with education, with healthcare, with infrastructure, with the economy but not for an end in itself, although it would be good. They also said we want to do these things so we can be powerful in the world again, so people will respect us again, so people will listen to us again. So I think you're right on both counts which is to say that it's a requirement that these things be done but that I think people in the United States recognize that when it is done it gives us again a capacity to speak in the world in a way that the United States needs. I think that's a real show of both of these sets of polls.

Second, on the question of connectivity, my answer was exactly the same when I wrote it down with Foreign Minister Bildt which is good, bad, it is. And anyone who's in this business knows that it is. It seems to me that what is going to change is the way that politicians, diplomats, people who are trying to make these decisions and then carry them out, will recognize that they have to do a completely different job now in speaking to the narrative.

You know, one of the things you try to convey to people in this new world of hyper-connectivity, you know, for years and years and years governments were on send, businesses were on send. What do you know now? People are talking back. It's a dialogue, and people have to learn to do that. And so when you talk about

the House of Commons or the Congress it's more and more incumbent upon leaders then to recognize that they have a new job because, as Carl said, this is happening.

Third, I just wanted to appreciate the point that General Allen made and his service in Afghanistan. I wanted to also say--to go back to a point that was made before, you know, one of the things, when you think about strategy here--and we see it, I think, in Afghanistan--is you're trying to bring together all of the elements of national and, in this case, transatlantic and international power, whether economic, their military, their political, their values. You see that playing out in Afghanistan. As I say, I think if you put yourselves in the position of Afghans today their question is really to us and it's an answer I hope that we have the patience and the courage to give. It's their fight. It needs to be supported.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Dr. Terrab?

Dr. Mostafa Terrab: Let me address the economic challenge first. Look, I think what characterizes the North Atlantic today, unfortunately, is this huge public debt that has been accumulated. Now, there is only a few ways to wipe out that debt. The first one is inflation. It has been used in the past, but we know what that leads to. The other one, the only other one, is growth. You know, if you do not find a way to grow

yourself out of this debt then inflation is the only remaining tool. But my question is where is that growth going to come from?

This is why I think the growth imperative is really a priority, and looking south is extremely important in that context. So I agree that, you know, the Brussels Forum is the most important soft power tool, but I think the Atlantic Dialogues is the second most important.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Okay. We're going to take a last round of questions. I'm going to work this area over here. Mia?

Ms. Mia Doornaert: Thank you. Well Craig, I love you, and I admire you, but I disagree. Yeah, okay. The rest is silence. But I disagree with you if you think that NATO is to blame for unfinished results in Libya or in other countries. I mean, the business of bringing democracy to Russia is the business of the Russians and as you want to go and occupy it like the Western Allies did with West Germany--and the business of creating order in Libya is the business of the Libyans. I must say, as a columnist, I was one of the few who wrote against an intervention in Libya because I foresaw that afterwards we would be blamed because the result wouldn't be perfect, and of course it's chaos. The more terrible a dictatorship is the more scorched is the

earth it leaves behind and the more difficult to create something resembling good government.

So my question--I was arriving there--so my question is should we only--if you hear all that criticism should we only intervene where the outcome is guaranteed? Or to paraphrase Wolfgang Goethe, should we prefer injustice to disorder?

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Who else?

Male: Let me come back to the worries, the worries about excellent anchormen, and I suggest we hold onto you and use you as an anchorman in the future. My greatest worry is that Asia becomes what Europe was in the 20th century, a Europe that starts wars and then exports them to the rest of the world. You know, your worry is increased when it concerns something that you cannot do much about. I think we should have a strategy for this. I think there is a European experience that is positive. I agree with when Carl Bildt called a call on this. War is now impossible in Europe. How did we achieve this? Maybe there is a lesson. Maybe there is something that is a thinking that we can export. Well, the question is implicit, you know, what are your reactions to this?

Honorable Carl Bildt: Italian elegance.

Ambassador Marc Grossman: I mean, I wonder if the answers are implicit.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Thank you.

Mr. Roland Freudenstein: Thank you, Craig. I'm Roland Freudenstein from the Wilfried Martens Center for European Studies here in Brussels. Western values or universal values? I was extremely happy that values were mentioned at all because that's one of my frustrations about the soft and hard power debate was exactly that it's so valueless. You know, you can discuss soft and hard until you're blue in the face, but, you know, it's like discussing the strength of a car without discussing who is the driver. So, Carl Bildt and Professor Terrab maybe, is this--what should we stand for then as a transatlantic community, so-called Western values or universal values that happen to emerge in the West but have global validity?

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Okay, three good questions. One, should we stop trying to be democratizers [sic] and recognize that that's something that has to be done by the people in those countries? Second, what are the lessons that Europe in particular should be exporting to the world? And I guess the side question is do you sit there and start to think about Asia as Europe in the 20th century? And then the final one, universal values versus Western values. Are you a Platonist or a--well. Carl, you want to start? Well, military intervention but also what you do after you intervene. Right? Okay.

Honorable Carl Bildt: No. I think clearly that we must have the possibility to intervene in certain situations, but we need to think it through. We need to carry it through because when you go in a situation--I was the other day in Timbuktu, and there was a conflict there. We are sending forces there. The complexity of the situation that you find in the Sahara requires not primarily soldiers but cultural historians and economists and linguists in order to understand and change social patterns, including existing slavery still that is there out in societies of which we know very little. So yes, we should intervene, but we should not be naïve. We should be prepared to stay the course.

Alexandra has mentioned South Sudan, all of the euphoria that was there about setting up this new state. Were we sufficiently realistic? The answer is of course no, we were not. Have we learned that particular lesson? I hope but not certain. So yes, we should but far more careful when we do it.

Female: Are you saying we should have stayed in Libya or we should go back into?

Honorable Carl Bildt: I said that when we went into there, we should have stayed the one way or the other, clearly. And we must understand that the military things we can do can only achieve certain military things. The rest is the hard part of it. I mean, I

think we learned that in the Balkans, as well, certainly in Afghanistan.

I mean, state-building ability, democracy in a society is far more than you can do with military force. Then you need the security; otherwise you're going to fail. But it's only part of it. So that's that.

Values, values, I mean values comes on different levels. We should stand for universal values, but we should respect that there are other values not necessarily contrary to the universal values.

I visited the other day, which I consider in retrospect the ultimate capital of soft power in the world: the Chinese city of Qufu. Whom have heard of Qufu? It's the birthplace and where he worked all the time of Confucius. And this legacy has kept the Chinese empire going for 2,500 years. And China, I would argue, is the ultimate soft power empire because it's that philosophy 2,500 years ago that it carried that empire through. And they still keep the duke, as they call it; the director ancestor is now generation 88. He happens to be in Taiwan since 1948. They keep track of everything that has happened for the last 2,500 years.

And for all of the turmoils of China during 2,500 years, the Confucian culture and the values are still central to that society. Are they necessarily contrary to the universal values? No, not necessarily. So we

should still say to them yes, universal values, but then we should respect the cultural characteristics of every single country. It applies even more when we go to the Muslim world and others.

So we must be able to operate with the different value systems, see them as reinforcing each other rather than in conflict and clash with each other.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: And Europe as a model for the rest of the world, which at previous Brussels Forums, up until about three years ago, was a very common theme? I think it was at the fourth or fifth one that Bob Kagan even got up and said, "I stand corrected," or "I want to modify my argument about Mars and Venus; the real power of Europe and the European Union is its legitimacy, it's model."

Honorable Carl Bildt: Yeah, no, I think that's-- there's still quite a lot of that. We are not necessarily a model for everything, but we are a model for nations that have come out of war and contradictions and disputes and trying to do things together. I mean, if you see what the African countries are trying to do in the African Union, it's not a smashing success; they have a long way to go, but see where they were 15 years ago. See what the Latin American countries are trying to do together. See what sort of the countries of Southeast Asia, which more recently than Europe was a source of major conflicts

and wars, what they are trying to build together. In that sense I think the European model is very important.

I think we go--we are heading towards a multi-regional world. These regional organizations will be far more important in the future, and Europe is one of the models that are inspiring people around the world in that respect. We might not be a model in every single respect, but in this particular respect we are.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Okay, Dr. Terrab?

Dr. Mostafa Terrab: Well, thank you for calling me professor. I'm not, unfortunately, a professor. I'm just a manager of a company. But this is where I want to bear on the discussion. You know, it's a large company; it has 20,000 employees. And you've noticed that companies have values statements. You know, I mentioned policy as an important explicit policy, as an important component, but a policy has to translate values. And companies are not shy by making those values explicit. This is precisely, I think, what is missing on the global politics, is, you know, I am sure we can agree on a set of values that are universal. They don't have to be older values that people espouse, but the intersection at least of these different value sets we can agree on.

But the key question and the reason they should be explicit is because we have to hold the decision-makers

accountable for the respect of these values. That's where the actions have to reflect these values. So I'm asking again what were the values behind the intervention in Libya, and what were the values defended by the non-intervention in Syria?

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Would you have written, if you were a columnist, would you have written against the intervention in Libya?

Dr. Mostafa Terrab: I would have asked what are the basic principles and values that led to that, and are you ready to use them coherently throughout--

Mr. Craig Kennedy: For the long haul.

Dr. Mostafa Terrab: For the long haul.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Okay, great. Marc, the final word goes to you.

Ambassador Marc Grossman: Not a final word, but I just want to say, to highlight the point, I think that's a very important one, that in the end, Russians and Syrians and Afghans are responsible for their own lives and their own responsibility, and I think that's a very important point.

Also I just wanted to associate myself with the point that Carl made, which is you need the capacity to intervene. That's a hugely important thing. Whether you do it again, how you do it, all the debates--very important.

But finally, I appreciate the fact that, you know, you have asked this question about values, universal values, Western values. Let me give you my observation. It goes back to the question of intervention. I don't think you have to trap yourself between intervention and silence and so speaking out for a certain number of values strikes me as a really important thing, especially because values define this transatlantic relationship and the larger transatlantic relationship.

And so you say to people, I think, organize yourselves as you wish, have the values that you wish. But I do think it's absolutely right and proper for representatives of this transatlantic community to say that it's our observation that successful societies in the 21st century will have a certain number of things true about them. They'll value the sanctity of the individual. They'll have the rule of law. They'll promote the role of women in society. They'll allow people to make choices about their own lives. They'll be pluralistic.

And so people can choose how they wish to live and how they wish to organize themselves, but I think it's absolutely right for us to be able to say that if you'd like to be a successful 21st century society, it's our observation that four or five of these things, call them what you will, will be true about your country.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Okay. Please join me in thanking our panel. That was a great concluding session. We really appreciate it. It was just terrific.

Now a couple of last thank yous, first to our founding partners, Daimler and the federal government of Belgium, big thank you. We really appreciate it. Thank you. All of our other partners, and there's many of them, we can't do this without you. We really appreciate it. Whether it's large or small contributions, it makes this very complicated but I think successful conference possible. So a big thank you to you.

Two final thank yous. One is to the wonderful staff of GMF, who make this possible. Nicola? And she has a couple of sidekicks, Paige and Baine, that also do a lot of the work here and big thanks to them, as well.

And then the final thank you is to all of you. Part of what I think makes this conference interesting is that we actually sit here as a relatively small community in a sometimes, okay, maybe too hot room, but it's close, it's small enough that people can argue with one another. At least last night at the bar when I left at, I don't know, 1:30, there were still a lot of pretty intense conversations going on, and some not so intense. But there was a lot of conversation.

It's your participation, these great questions. Ending up with these real discussions on fundamental

values makes this conference really special. So thank you so much. We'll see you next year for Brussels Forum 10. Bye.