

Section 1 of 3

[00:00:00 - 00:26:04](NOTE: speaker names may be different in each section)

Speaker 1: Pull out your phones. A quick question because as we move in to this final segment, we'd like to get your perspective. You can say it out loud if you'd like or you can answer.

Does news after decades of multilateral efforts ... And with the bilateral agreement ... was it mean when it comes to North Korea? And the future, the idea of multilateralism in this discussion.

If those who are moving to the outside, please move. Those that were coming in, come on in.

Pull out your phones if you can, very quickly. Interactivity. We'd love to hear what you think. Should multilateralism pass on through, please. I love Saturdays because everybody is like, "Anything goes. We're just going to you know, walk in front of everything. We're going to leave." Come on in.

Absolutely 25%, 50%. Let's go to the next one really quickly. We're all policy workers, right? Or we hope to be, right? Do we need to talk less long-term and think a little bit more transactionally based on this recent headline about North Korea? As we find one country speaking with another country and a lot of questions sitting around that. Chris Murphy was bringing that up a little bit earlier.

If you can, give me a little bit more energy. Do this one last question. Maybe I should pull out my phone because I thought it was wrong. I have two data points. That's okay. But the data points will be amazing because we will have Karen and we'll have David doing it, and those are very important data points.

Wherever you are, whether you're here or around the world, let us know. Guess what? We have probably the most timely discussion when all these folks come back in the room, I hope, shortly. That's on North Korea. I have a short little video for the four of you in the room right now to watch. Please.

Speaker 2: If you talk with people who've escaped from North Korea, you quickly learn just how limited our view of that country has been.

This is not your typical film about North Korea.

Speaker 1: By the way, that word mean, millennial. The millennial generation in North Korea. See you in 15 minutes. It's going to be a great discussion on North Korea. See you in a bit.

Xenia Wickett:

All right. Ambassador Kohnoharu Kohno, the Special Representative of the Government of Japan for the Middle East and Europe and former ambassador to Italy and to Russia. Please take a seat. We have Kori Schake, who we all saw yesterday, the Deputy Director of IISS, and formerly from the NSC. Then we have Sokeel Park who's the Director of Research and Strategy at Liberty in North Korea.

This is an incredibly timely topic. I'm actually going to make you all start working immediately. I want to put a question up on the screens, if I may. The question is this. In the aftermath of this week's announcements, and I don't think I need to tell you what this week's announcements are, what do you think is the likely future on the peninsula? Is this a fundamentally different moment than we've seen before, and we should all embrace the opportunity to denuclearize North Korea and bring them in? Is it a different moment, but actually we think this is going to be escalation and new conflict? Or is this a little bit of a shrug? Six months from now we're going to be in the same place. Please answer. I will tell you right now, at the end of this, we're going to come back to this. I'm going to be interested to see whether views have changed during that period.

Because we have such little time, I'm not going to wait for this to finish. I'm going to actually move straight to the questions. Sokeel, I want to start with you. Talk to us a little bit about regime stability. Do we have a negotiating partner in the North Korean leader or not?

Sokeel Park:

Right. I think that this bigger picture and question is really important. I understand that the video of the trailer of the documentary that we produced was shown at the end of the last session. Some of you may have seen that. I'm going to give a quick hard plug. This is available for you guys to watch the whole thing, 50 minutes, from the forum app. If you go into this session and go to the bottom under features, you can go and ... A lot of you guys, I'm sure, are taking transport to go back home after this forum. That is a great time to watch it. The documentary itself is very much focused on North Korean social change and urban youth in North Korea. They are driving interesting changes inside the country, both economic changes and information changes, leading to cultural and social changes. That, I think, is one of the things that's really missing from a lot of the discussion on North Korea, which is that ...

Frankly, even the title of this session, Neutralizing the North Korean Threat, this is how we deal with North Korea. We approach it as a security problem and pretty much just that. North Korea is a country which presents security problems. It's not just that. It's not just the security problem. It's not just Kim

Jong-un, nuclear weapons, and missiles. North Korea is a country of 25 million people. It is an economy, a society, a culture. The good news is that those things are changing. There are things that we can do to interact with those changes and bring forward it.

Overall, I think that one of the problems is that ... We can think of it like this. Focusing on the nuclear weapons and missiles is focusing on the symptom of a problem. It's not the underlying cause. The underlying cause is the nature of North Korea as a country. That's why we keep on going back and forth between negotiations and tensions and negotiations and tensions. There is underlying it the nature of the North Korean regime, and country is fundamentally the same. That would be my major point for today. We need to take a much more holistic approach towards North Korea and target more the soft underbelly of North Korean society. Actually, that's where the international community has a lot of advantages.

Xenia Wickett: I want to come back to that because I think it's an important point. We see Kim Jong-un as a negotiator. Are there things that we can do to help him to be able to negotiate if he wanted to. Kori, I want to come to you next. I want to ask you, the US government has talked a lot about military options and preemption. Is there a military solution to this? Is there something that we can militarily do, or is that just a pipe dream?

Kori Schake: There's a lot we can militarily do. Unfortunately, very little of what we could militarily do will address the kinds of perspectives that he just talked about. There is very little we could do militarily that would be supported by our allies. The administration's strategy seems to be to try and ramp up as much as possible the pressure on North Korea, and to threaten that, if North Korea doesn't capitulate in giving up its nuclear weapons, we will preventatively destroy them. Even in the best possible circumstances of that military operation, one of incredible virtuosity where we could identify and destroy all of the nuclear weapons and infrastructure, where we could destroy all of the missiles, dispersed or undispersed, before they get targeted at Japan, and at my beloved California ...

Even if we could prevent North Korean special forces from undertaking assassinations of the political leadership in South Korea, and even if we could target those 12,000 artillery tubes that are aimed at South Korea, if we could destroy those in the space of three hours, that would be a military achievement of extraordinary virtuosity. You'd still probably have hundreds of thousands of dead South Koreans. For the United States to choose that outcome, as opposed to respond to an attack on us, or to have faith that we can actually deter the North Koreans irrespective of their weaponry, I think making that choice would have enormous and negative geopolitical consequences for our country and for our closest friends.

Xenia Wickett: Essentially, we have a military deterrent potentially, but no military solution, realistic military solution.

Kori Schake: Yeah. I should have said it that way. [crosstalk 00:34:43], Xenia.

Xenia Wickett: This is why I love Kori. Kohno, I want to come to you. Actually, let me just ... I'm going to come to you all almost immediately. We've got 45 minutes. We don't have enough time. There are a lot of smart people in the room. If you have questions, you're on in about two minutes. Kohno, let me come to you. You've been watching this from Japan. I mean, the last week has been ... I'm not sure that I have the word to describe it. How do you interpret that's going on? How do you interpret the recent moves?

Kohnoharu Kohno: Thank you. He explained to us about the societies changing. I'm just wondering whether the leadership is changing at all. I have a few explanation or interpretation of what happened, what's going on right now. Probably I can explain three things. The first two, one is the rather conventional explanation. The last one is rather realistic explanation of this situation. The first one is the ... Sorry, I'm a government bureaucrat so I'm always very cautious and also rather pessimistic on this issue. First and foremost, I'd like to say this is a good time to stop and think about it.

The first point is whether is this famous, or infamous, time-buying tactics by North Korean leaders? We had a very bitter experience for the last 20 years way back to 1994 based on the framework agreement with the United States. They promised ... They means North Korea. North Korea promised to abandon their nuclear ambition, but they betrayed us. They kept doing their own development of nuclear and missile program. That was one thing. Also, the second time in 2005 or 2006 or 2007, the same thing happened. Whether this message by the leader of North Korea is another time-buying tactics to continue to complete their nuclear and missile programs.

Second point is whether this a very cunning tactics, or shrewd tactics, of North Korea to make a wedge between the countries, among Japan, United States, and South Korea. They are driving the wedge among us or they are driving the wedge between China and our like-minded countries like United States, South Korea, and Japan. Also, maybe this is [inaudible 00:37:50]. They may make a kind of a driving wedge between Europe and United States. This is one of my worries and concerns about it.

I'd like to make it short, but one thing which I can realistically think is that we have been doing a pressure campaign based upon the security council resolutions. It seems to be that we believe that this continuous pressure campaign is now working. That should be the reason why North Korean leaders took this kind of decision and send a message to us. Those are what we feel at this moment. This is, again, a good time to ponder what's going to go next.

Xenia Wickett: Actually, I'm going to quickly ... You gave us three potential reasons. One was a time-buying tactic.

Kohnoharu Kohno: Time-buying.

Xenia Wickett: The second one was a wedge to separate the allies. The third was because they're being pressurized. Japan thinks it's the third?

Kohnoharu Kohno: Yeah. Certainly, we are convinced that the third one is working.

Xenia Wickett: Working. Fantastic.

Kohnoharu Kohno: It's a kind of a mystery whether the first one and second one will come up again.

Xenia Wickett: Okay. Fantastic. I'm now going to start bringing in some people. I want to actually bring in Wendy first of all. She was warned a little bit that I might call upon her. I know she has to run. Wendy, is this a different moment?

Wendy Sherman: First of all, all terrific introductory comments. I think represent all three of the pieces of this. The people, the actual people of North Korea and the horrible life which most of them have to lead. The military position that we're in. One has to have a credible threat of force in service of diplomacy if diplomacy is going to work. As you pointed out, the pressure that is also one of the other tools that's essential here. I think that, looking forward, there are a few things I think we all have to keep in mind. First, we can learn lessons from previous negotiations with North Korea, but we are in a very different place. We cannot draw too many lessons out of the past and say that's what's going to happen this time. North Korea now has nuclear weapons and they have the means to deliver them. That has not been the case in previous rounds of negotiations to the extent that it is right now.

Secondly, there are changes going on in North Korea. I agree with that, but we have a time problem here. Those changes are not going to happen in time. We don't want to use military action to force regime change because it would be catastrophic for the people in the region, as well as the people in North Korea, quite frankly. It's not just hundreds of thousands who would die in South Korea and Japan, but in North Korea as well. We have a time sequence problem.

The third thing I would point out is that, as I said this morning for those who were at breakfast, this is about the future of Asia, and who defines the future of Asia. The United States, with our allies and partners, Japan and South Korea, want to, should as a Pacific power, want to have something to say about that and how we go forward. China, that wants this negotiation to go forward, I think is going to be very conflicted as it goes forward because they want to control the future of China. This is going to be a very tough go. If the President moves ahead, and I hope he does, it is the beginning of a very long process in which he has to have patience, persistence, and a pointed strategy going

forward that's extremely well prepared. I don't see any of that right at the moment, but I'm hoping.

Xenia Wickett: Am I allowed to call you out? Do you chose one, two, or three of the answers?

Male: I didn't vote.

Xenia Wickett: You didn't vote. Okay. I will say that ... Thank you, Wendy. I will say that I don't know if you looked at the numbers. It was 15% who thought this was a different moment and there was a real opportunity. It was 30% who thought this was a new moment and it wasn't going to end well. 55% said, yeah, shrug, whatever. There's somebody else I want to bring in from the audience. I can't see him at the moment. I want to bring in Dong Wang. There you go. Dong Wang is a professor at University of Peking. I would love to get the Chinese perspective on what's going on just briefly.

Dong Wang: I think, of course, from the Chinese perspective, this is actually what China has been advocating for many, many, years. To give diplomacy a chance. In fact, I have questions for speakers here.

Xenia Wickett: Go ahead. Go ahead.

Dong Wang: Very brief. My question is, I would like to have your assessment about the likelihood ... Let's assume the negotiations will be going on in the best case scenario, will be going on well, and that we gradually move toward unification and everything. I would like to get your assessment, a sense of how likely you believe this will gradually lead to North Korea opening up and [inaudible 00:43:27]. This is actually another part, a very important piece, of the Chinese vision as Wendy just noted. China also has its own vision about how this whole thing [inaudible 00:43:39] including the North Korea [inaudible 00:43:41] we're moving toward. Fundamentally, we believe, and we strongly support, [inaudible 00:43:48]. We want unification plus North Korea gradually moving toward opening up and [inaudible 00:43:54]. I'd like to get a sense from you. Thanks.

Xenia Wickett: At the moment, you think China is very positive about what's going on?

Dong Wang: I want to be very ... We are not being naïve about all the potential [inaudible 00:44:06] and everything, previous patterns, but we want to be very encouraging.

Xenia Wickett: What did you vote?

Dong Wang: Sorry, I didn't vote.

Xenia Wickett: You didn't vote. Okay. Only for the people who voted, you get to stick your hands up. I actually want to get a European view. Then I will come back. A

European. There's got to be a European what is watching North Korea and has some thoughts. If you're not careful, I will start cold calling. There you go.

Kori Schake: She'll do it too.

Henrich Kreft: Heinrich Kreft, German Diplomat Luxembourg. We heard that we need the holistic approach on North Korea. Don't we also need the holistic approach on South Korea? Is it not the time for the US government to back the South Korean government in this specific moment instead of targeting South Korea on trade and many other issues?

Xenia Wickett: That's a great question. I do have a question for the Europeans. I'm giving my panelists a moment to think about the two issues that were brought up. Something that I don't understand from the European perspective, why is Europe so passive about the threat from North Korea? The North Koreans can reach Europe. I'm seeing no, they're not passive. I'm going to come and catch you on that one. Did you want to respond to the ...

Kori Schake: A couple of quick things. I'm not surprised the Chinese are thrilled by this because President Trump's policy had been that we wouldn't negotiate with the North Koreans until they accepted denuclearization. He let that go by the wayside yesterday. That is a big important change. He made the big important change for a really good reason, which is South Korea asked us to. We can't credibly carry on a strategy unless Japan and South Korea support that strategy. They are the allies most affected by it. As much as Wendy's concerns are justified about the President's erratic behavior and poor judgment, the White House actually made a really important shift yesterday, which is negotiations are a good thing in and of their own right with no preconditions by us evidently since the President said yes. It was at the behest of the ally most affected by it. I think that's a great development.

Kohnoharu Kohno: As I said, we had a rather bitter experience in the past. Chinese comment, I appreciate that very much. I also appreciate that there will be a discussion, the meeting, between the leader of North Korea and President Trump on this matter. Based upon our bitter experience, we'd like to see more concrete action. There is a joint announcement by North and South Korea. If you read the document very carefully, there are some rooms for interpretation. We have to pay more attention to it. For example, North Korea showed their will toward the idea of denuclearization, but what does it mean? They made a commitment to denuclearization, but how to do it. This is a concrete measure should be tested. Probably against many of your wishes and my wishes too, the negotiations and talks between United States and North Korea will start. It will be the first stage of the long process of negotiation. That's what I feel. Having said that, it is a bit too early to make a judgment at this stage. We have to be very careful now.

Xenia Wickett: Thank you. Will you perhaps address the question there in the corner about ...

Sokeel Park:

The South Korean, the South Korean side? Yeah. Sure. President Moon is getting a lot of credit in South Korea right now as you can maybe imagine, and amongst the analysts looking at this as well. If we think that just 12 months ago, he became the President. Even less than 12 months ago, in fact. He was facing a very difficult situation with China, with fraud, and the US-led missile defense system. Facing a very difficult situation between Trump and Kim Jong-un and the chance of war and these kind of things. There's been significant improvement and resolution of the issues with China.

He's going to be meeting with Kim Jong-un next month. The month after, hopefully I guess, Trump will be meeting with Kim Jong-un. There's a lot of questions about who is in the driving seat here. Is Kim Jong-un in the driving seat? Is Moon Jae-in the driving seat? Not that many people, I think, think that Trump is in the driving seat. It's been a difficult situation. At this point, I'm not sure if we can say that the US government has not been supporting South Korea sufficiently. I think that Madeleine Albright yesterday pointed out the kind of weird optics ... In fact, it was the South Korean government officials that announced that Trump is probably going to meet with Kim Jong-un in a couple of months time from the White House lawn. In fact, the South Koreans have been able to lead from the front, at least in the [inaudible 00:49:49].

One more point on that. There's a fair amount of concern on the lack of preparation and also the lack of a team in DC with the loss of key personnel. Still not having an ambassador in Seoul, South Korea. Losing other senior people that have been working on North Korea for many decades. In a way, we're in a very kind of nontraditional phase of diplomacy. Moon Jae-in and the South Korean government are kind of being Trump's team. They're kind of being his preparation, working level talks, and those kind of things. Trump is not going to have his Secretary of State meet with the North Korean leadership before he meets with them. In a way, when Moon meets with Kim Jong-un in April, he has to both do an inter Korean summit, but he also has to serve as somewhat of a role of what the Secretary of State would have done meeting with Kim Jong-un before the President of United States does so. South Korea right now is actually, in some ways, has a lot of power and control over these processes.

Xenia Wickett:

That's a really important point. Thank you. I see this gentlemen. I'm giving [inaudible 00:51:04] a heads up that I'm probably going to come to you at some point.

Kori Schake:

[inaudible 00:51:09].

Xenia Wickett:

Exactly. I'm going to give you a couple of moments to think about what you have to say. [Kishwar 00:51:16], very, very, quickly. You said Europe isn't being passive.

Female:

If you think of European common foreign and security policy, maybe from that perspective you can see a different level of passivity vis-a-vis [inaudible



00:51:30] for example. The United Kingdom, and I would also argue that many of the European countries individually, are taking a very careful line, particularly the UK and the security council, because of the US line being so unpredictable. China is the joker in the pack. I'm delighted to hear somebody telling us that China really welcomes this. We are so exposed in Europe to China's investments and China's other strategic ambitions in the region ...

Section 2 of 3

[00:26:00 - 00:52:04]

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Section 3 of 3

[00:52:00 - 01:16:19](NOTE: speaker names may be different in each section)

Speaker 3: Vestment China's other strategic ambitions in the region, that we feel slightly unsettled by what China's going to do or say.

Xenia: I can understand that. Let me come to the gentleman over here.

Hiro Akita: Thank you very much. Hiro Akita from Nikei Newspaper form Tokyo. Since I'm one of the biggest victims of North Korea, because my editor from Tokyo called me last ... two days ago and I couldn't sleep because I need to write ... announce the story about my Trump. Maybe because of that I'm a little bit cynical.

People talk about Mr Trump's plan to meet Kim Jong un, if preparation is good enough, still, is it good idea to meet Mr Kim right now, if as Japanese ambassador said, if North Korea's intention might be buying time, maybe it will give more time for him to postpone the program without any verification that he will freeze [inaudible 00:53:08]

This question, maybe answer will be based on two premises. One premises is that North Korea is developing Nuclear Missiles to make grand bargain. By abandoning it, maybe they may want to get security assurance. So, they are willing to abandon it.

Or, another premises is, no, they don't want to be like Iraq, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, or Libya of Gaddafi. So they are now change their mind [inaudible 00:53:46] calculation, and they will persistently push forward Nuclear program and there by they will be a Nuclear State and they will never change.

If hypothesis is ... the second hypothesis correct, I wonder if talking with North Korea at this moment, is good idea or not.

Xenia: Great question. Hold that thought. I want to bring [Kami 00:54:21], he's had plenty of time to think about it. I want to bring [Kami 00:54:21]

Kami: Thank you [inaudible 00:54:16] bringing in a NATO bureaucrat into this conversation. Now, three things-

Xenia: He knows an awful lot about [inaudible 00:54:23] and such, yes.

Kami: No but the ... three things. First of all on the issue of whether the Europeans are relevant or irrelevant, maybe a note of caution both to our American Friends and our Asian friends, which is, it is difficult at times to have in the same ... literally in the same sentence, a first part of the sentence, which is, pay much more attention to this region and what's happening there and stop ignoring the region.

And when a European says "yes indeed that's important and we've have ideas or things to bring to the table." The answer is, oh, but you are completely irrelevant. So, I think there is a need to [crosstalk 00:55:00] build up that conversation also in the transatlantic fashion on Asian security in general and Korean peninsula in particular.

Having said all of this, of course, the relevance of you or NATO in that conversation is limited, you might remember that the NATO secretary General went to Seoul and Tokyo in the middle of the ... peak of the crisis, partially to demonstrate solidarity to partners and the close partnership that is there.

The second thing I would say which is what you alluded to when you said by the way the threat is here as well, for the audience, the closest NATO capital to North Korea in terms of missile range is Tallinn. And here the Estonians say "Why us again."

But the reality ... and it's much closer than Washington and so on. And even if you do the math, closer than the West Coast. So, in way we have to think about that because that we can completely ignore it even though there are no direct threats and we shouldn't you know get over excited about the notion that we are under a missile threat as we speak.

So all of this leads to think about that. And also in terms of the close Asian partners and the relationship with the Asian partners which has to do with security and the transatlantic relationship because, should things go right or wrong, there is a transatlantic dimension to the relationship and our ability to talk to each other.

Xenia: Thank you [Kami 01:01:45]. I'm going to bring in one other question over here and then I'm going to come back to the panelists. So, thinking caps on.

Laura: Hi, Laura Rosenberg at GMF, I worked on North Korea in both the Bush administration and the Obama administration. I feel like in this conversation we are projecting more of a policy or a strategy on the Trump administration than actually exists.

If you read the accounts of how the decision was made to accept the invitation for a meeting, it wasn't ... at least according to the reporting that's come out, it wasn't a White House decision or the administration decision. It was the president's decision and his alone.

It's not entirely clear to me if there are preconditions or not, Tori I think you indicated that it appears that there is not. We have different messages coming from the White House podium as to whether or not there are.

I'm deeply concerned by this lack of clarity about whether there is a policy, whether there is a strategy. I think it's generous at best to call these negotiations. Basically, there's been discussion of having a meeting and that's about it.

And while I believe deeply in standing closely with our South Korean allies, I also think it's important to remember that we have to be about US interests. Part of that is standing with the alliance. But having Moon Jae-in, with all due respect to him, be our lead negotiator with Kim Jong-un, doesn't really sound to me as a former American diplomat, like the way I'd like to see policy and our diplomacy conducted.

And the last point I would make is one of the most concerning things to me as well about the ... how the decision making apparently went down is, that our Japanese allies weren't informed or consulted with in advance.

And so I guess my question is then, given what we do know about what is apparently the environment for this, what are the pitfalls and how do we guard against them because we are where we are, but how do we hedge against the pitfalls that we see ahead here.

Tori:

So, I'm going to fire on my good friend Laura Rosenberg, because I think the Obama administration critique that, oh my God this isn't being done the way it should be done, and proper processes would be so much more weighty if the Obama administration had handled this problem in the last eight years, their administration.

Yes, the president's reckless and yet he has actually taken an important initiative that gets him out of the bind he put himself in, which is to say North Korea can't be deterred and time's running out of the hourglass.

The two big contradictions in his policy were that, a policy of slow strangulation of the North Korean government is one that requires time, and that does appear to be working. They've got two rounds of unanimous UN Security Council resolutions, that are quite biting on the North Koreans. They got the Russians and the Chinese to agree ... you could actually board suspect ships. That's a huge diplomatic achievement and it should have been done a long time ago and it wasn't.

Second thing is to respond to the Japanese journalist concerns. I share your view that there's lots of downside side risk, and Laura rightly points that out as well. But, there's also lots of upside opportunity. And there are three really important reasons the administration ought to be in negotiations with the North Koreans on almost any terms.

The first is that North Korea is the most isolated country in the world and we understand very little about what's going on there. This is a problem with a very slim margin of error and a great likelihood that we're going to get a lot of things wrong. So talking to the North Koreans could help us understand better what's going on. That's useful in and of itself.

The second thing is that I cannot imagine that America's closest friends and allies, the South Koreans, and the Japanese are going to agree to proceed with the administration's strategy of a preventative strike on the North Korean facilities, without an extended period of negotiations that proves to all of us that we have no alternative for that.

The third big reason is, my mom's not going to want to do that either until she is persuaded that there's no alternative to doing this. Negotiations are essential to persuade free societies to go to war, and so we ought all to be in favor of the guy who after all got elected to make American foreign policy ... making American foreign policy.

Kohno:

I fully agree with what you said. It's the brighter side of the future. Let me make a couple of comments on role of Europe. You said well, unfortunately enough, my government ... my country doesn't have any communication to North Korea. But the in case of Europe, there are at least 47 countries who are having diplomatic relationship with North Korea. How to utilize this communication line between European countries and North Korea. That we have to think about it in the future.

Of course, as I said before, we have to maintain our pressure campaign as this is a good result came up so we have to keep doing that. But not by the intermediary roles by the Europe, but, join us ... we are on the same boat, to keep up pressure upon North Korea. But there should be some rooms where the European countries can play a role as you have a communication line with North Korea.

Well somebody mentioned about the lack of communication between Japan and North Korea, and we are informed by the United States of the recent latest progress by South Korea and also the United States.

Well I have no concern about that. We have a very excellent communication between President Trump and Prime Minister Abe. They have been communicating, even a few days ago, they had a very lengthy telephone

conversation and there is no misunderstanding between United States and Japan on this particular issue I'd like to say that.

Speaker 5: If I could build on [Massa's 01:03:14] point on the Europe question. Again this may be slightly kind of nontraditional diplomacy, but I think that we should think about role differentiation.

This is a very difficult long term, multi-faceted kind of problem. If you like, over the last 12 months or so, there's already been role differentiation between the US and South Korea. Playing, probably unintentionally, kind of a good cop bad cop kind of strategy where obviously Seoul is the good cop and the US is a bad cop and it's ended up in this moment one are accepting those offers.

So, I think that Europe can play a role. The fact that there are several European embassies in Pyongyang is one thing, North Korean diplomats over here as well.

But maybe in the bigger picture if I can kind of be grand for one second and make an appeal. I'm Korean British by the way, my nationality is British and so, while I still can, I'm going to say, fellow Europeans if we're if we're going to reboot the liberal order, do some of these things that Bob Kagan was talking on the first day.

Reboot the liberal order, lead promotion of enlightenment values, fulfill European potential, and the European vision and these kind of things, I think that it's very important, it's a long term project. But Europe can't just be for Europeans, for European issues, European interests and so on.

Nowhere more so than North Korea should European values be applied. North Korea is the most illiberal country in the world. It's the most closed, systematically repressive country in the world. North Korea is the antithesis to European vision and European values, and so in order to fulfill and develop a positive renewed European identity and values, I think that Europe needs to be involved deeply in various different ways on North Korea for those reasons as well.

Tori: I want to amplify one point very quickly, about [Kami's 01:05:18] point about Europeans because it's a point he taught me, which is that, a number of Europeans are signatories ... were participants in the Korean War and would be potential signatories to any future peace treaty between North Korea and the United States.

Xenia: So this is truly a transatlantic issue. Stephen.

Speaker 6: Tori maybe, to my old colleague but maybe to other members of the panel. I know, is an ideal outcome from a North Korean point of view and the Chinese point of view that you have these negotiations, United States is humiliated, North Korea gets to keep its weapons. From China's perspective the position of

the United States is weakened. If you look at the big players, isn't that an outcome that you would prefer? And Trump has walked right into this trap.

Xenia: Hold the answer Tori I'm going to get two other questions out, because we're running out of time and I want to get as many as I can on the table. Christophe. [crosstalk 01:06:23]

Christopher: Christopher [inaudible 01:06:21] I would be interested in the judgment what role China is playing. How you would judge, how constructive they are or not and the question behind for me is, this is one of the big big issues which can make a super power or they can fail the test to become a super power.

Given the enormous influence which China has economically on North Korea, I would have expected that they could play a bigger role and this comes in a time when generally in the West, the doubts, whether China is a national interest power or has a responsibility ... sees a responsibility, a greater responsibility the doubts are mounting as far as I see. So I think this is a very significant moment which decides how China will be seen in the world.

Xenia: Thank you Nancy I'm coming over to you. Okay, that's it. I'm getting four questions then I'm stopping. Nancy.

Nancy: Thanks. I want to go back. I want to bring the people of North Korea back into this. I spent 14 years going in and out of North Korea and without question enormous change especially economically, and Pyongyang is a very different city than it used to be.

But there's still a crushing control and crushing isolation, and I want to get your sense of where you think that might be going, especially at a time where Kim Jong un seems to be increasing the legitimacy of his regime with some pretty large PR coups, with the Olympics, with the nuclear tests and maybe now with this summit. How do you see any of that translating into what I think everybody hopes would be change for the North Korean people?

Xenia: Yeah and you know, can we treat North Korea like a normal power where we've got leverage and we've got chits essentially? Steve.

Steve: Steve Clemons with The Atlantic. I've been surprised by the discussion that there hasn't been more critique of Donald Trump's lack of empathy or concern for other countries as to extent of threats while he's pounding the table and saying this is our concern and we demand the world pay attention.

And I'm wondering at what point people think that this could be America's Suez crisis at some point, where we set ourselves up in a situation where we may have Japan on one hand, we may have others but fundamentally, we're all pretending that the rest of the world shares the same concerns.

And I would turn Christophe's point on its head, that China can sit very comfortably with regard to however this comes out, China is going to be fine. But America, North Korea gives China strategic depth with the United States with this, and it's the United States in the vice not China in the vice. No one else is in the vice.

But I've been interested in just that tantrum the Donald Trump tends to pull and those speeches he gives where he doesn't communicate to the rest of the world, that America will be there when they have a next existential challenge, but we want them to worry on what he's defining as our existential challenge.

Xenia: Thank you Steve. We've got just a few minutes each so I'm going to do in reverse order. Answer the questions that you want, make any final comments. But I also, if we can at the same time, put the question back up. And I'd like people to get out their mobile telephones, and I'd be interested to see whether views have changed at all. But [Kohno 01:09:47].

Kohno: On the issue of China, a very important member of the Security Council and also that member of the six party talks. China has been playing a very important role and follow the resolutions things and as you may all know that 90% of the trade of North Korea is with China, and they are taking very strict economic measures and that has been very effective for these pressure campaign as of today.

I'd like to say a bit about the people of North Korea, this is my ... this is nothing to do is the recent situation but my own personal experience when I visited North Korea about fifteen, sixteen years ago twice. I had a chance to meet with the ordinary people in North Korea.

Am I ... this is a very important point, but I felt very strongly that we can get along with these people. We have a kind of a meeting of mind with the needy people, pregnant lady, elderly people, orphanage people and so on.

Unlike other issues in the international society, this issue, North Korean issue is a rather simple issue. This is the mother of Nuclear Missile. Once we solve this issue and for us Japan, we have a humanitarian issue called abduction to solve this issue, and degradation of the past, at the Second World War things.

Then, I am very much confident, we can nicely get along with Korean people. That is my tiny bit of hope.

Xenia: Excellent, we like [crosstalk 01:11:53]

Tori: [crosstalk 01:11:54] those difficult issues.

Xenia: We love hope. Tori, give us more hope.

Tori: That I cannot do on the subject, but to answer Stephen [crosstalk 01:12:03]

Xenia: [inaudible 01:12:03] give us more [crosstalk 01:12:04] Tori.

Tori: I absolutely agree with your critique. The administration adopted a strategy that maximizes the political value to North Korea possessing nuclear weapons. A much smarter strategy, would have been to say that since 1953, American strategy has been that any act of violence by the North Koreans ... an attack by North Korea on the United States or its allies, will result in military retaliation that the regime leadership will not survive.

And we should have continued to have that as our strategy because that minimizes the value to them of crossing the nuclear threshold, and it maximizes the likelihood of carrying Japan and South Korea along on whatever we feel we need to do.

But the administration did not adopt that strategy and the one they have adopted plays us into a binary choice of either acknowledging a nuclear armed North Korea and the political value of that, or, destroying the North Korean nuclear infrastructure with all of the attendant consequences.

So I agree there were a lot better outcomes, given the range of choice at this moment. I think the best outcome is giving North Korea the political stature they want, hope that the Chinese will actually work with us to open up North Korea, because the best outcome for everybody is regime change in North Korea.

Xenia: [inaudible 01:13:40] Last word.

Speaker 5: So the question on North Korean people and thank you for that. You know, it is true that there is no organized opposition in North Korea. There's not a single known dissenter North Korea. There's not a single person that we can point to who we can say that person inside the country is speaking with a different voice to the North Korean government. I think that that's unique in the world.

However, there is positive economic change. There is a decentralization of kind of the economy, a growth of a constrained and in many ways camouflaged but nonetheless capitalist economy, there is important information and media changes. North Korean people are getting more access to media and information from the outside world and so on. This is leading to overall positive social and cultural change I believe.

So, in terms of whether change and opening of North Korea are possible and so on, my answer would be that actually the train has left the station. Change and opening of North Korea is already happening-

Xenia: Yay!



Speaker 5: A lot of that, yeah that's the hopeful point, a lot of that is people driven. It's a long way from where we wanted to be, a lot of these changes because of North Korea as the way that it is, it's hard to see, but it's nonetheless happening.

And I work with North Korean refugees, and when we speak with them, you know people who left 10 years ago, five years ago this year, we see how those kind of changes are playing out. And so, that's the hope on this issue and I think that fundamentally, in order to solve all of these issues around North Korea, we do need to see a different change transformed North Korea as a country. Thank you.

Xenia: Fantastic. Let me stop there. Let me just quickly look at the screens. Rather from my perspective, depressingly, we think this is more of the same, but I suppose it could be worse, we could have higher numbers on the second scenario that's actually gone down. Less people think that it will lead to escalation and new conflict.

Thank you all for sticking around, for being here. apologies from me that we went to have a couple of minutes. Apologies from me, GMF, that we went over a couple of minutes.

But let ... Will you join me in thanking our panelists very much. Thank you all.

Speaker 7: Ladies and gentlemen please welcome the executive editor of Defense One, Mr Kevin Barron.

Kevin Barron: Thank you. Well thank you everyone. Thank you for sticking around, you've made it to the end. This is it. This is the final panel and we have the great task of wrapping up everything that we've heard.

Section 3 of 3

[00:52:00 - 01:16:19]

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