

Danielle P: Hi, everyone. My name is Danielle Piatkiewicz with the German Marshall Fund. I am here to give you a brief introduction on the Brussels Forum app called BFconnect. Before we begin, can you guys all get out your devices, tablets, phones, and go ahead and connect to our network? It is Brussels Forum, password brussels2019. If you have not had a chance to download the app, you still have time. You go to your App or Play Store and you can download it. It is called BFconnect. If you have any troubles, we have colleagues outside who are happy to help you.

Danielle P: All right, so the Brussels Forum app will be your access point to all information regarding the forum. This is where you can get the latest news, agenda, and important announcements regarding the forum. We also want to hear about your thoughts, so there is also a message contact point, and also you can write notes here in the pencil area.

Danielle P: The agenda will give you access to all of the information regarding speakers and also bios. Look who is a speaker listed up there, myself. You can click on the session, find the information about the timing and the location as well. You can also bookmark and add notes, and you can get this emailed to you later. We are going to go digital fully for the business cards, so if you want to connect with somebody, you're going to go on to your network section, and you're going to find your barcode, and you can scan somebody else's barcode, and you get all the information after the conference sent to you. If you cannot find that person, you can find them in the list of participants, and you can also send them a message. We want to hear from you throughout the conference; this is very interactive. We're going to have voting, we're going to have questions, we're going to have word clouds. So you're going to be able to interact with the conference by clicking on the participate button, and we look forward to hearing from you. Thank you.

Speaker 1: Ladies and gentleman, please welcome the president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Dr. Karen Donfried.

Karen Donfried: Good afternoon and welcome to all of you to Brussels Forum. I am delighted to say that this is the 14th edition of GMF's signature conference. I am so thrilled at the amazing roster of speakers that we have, at all of you participants. I think we're going to have a great 14th. We have a robust US congressional delegation, an impressive number of ministers and senior officials, and I really look forward to a series of thought provoking discussions over the coming days. I am particularly grateful to the three U.S. ambassadors here in Brussels who have done such a great job supporting us with this conference.

Karen Donfried: The participants among you include folks from our Young Professionals Summit, which represents 28 countries and will bring the voices of the next generation into this forum. It's actually the 10th anniversary of our Young Professionals Summit, so we're happy to welcome alumni here as well. We're also joined by the Transatlantic Inclusion Leaders Network cohort. That's a diverse group of

elected, business, and civil society leaders. Now, I want to let you know that Brussels Forum hit a record this year for female participation. Forty-one percent of you are women, and we're going to keep working on that. Almost half of you are new participants; you're here for the first time, and I hope that you will agree that this is the most engaging platform to debate the transatlantic agenda. And for the rest of you, many familiar faces, welcome back.

Karen Donfried: GMF could not produce Brussels Forum without our partners. Deep thanks to our founding partners, Daimler and the Federal Authorities of Belgium, to our strategic partner, Deloitte, to our forum partners, Boeing, BP, the Brussels Capital Region, Centrica, Microsoft, and the Policy Center for the New South, as well as our associate and dinner partners, all of whom are what helped to make this event a success. I also want to recognize our official Oxford-style debate partner, Intelligence Squared US, and Defense One, our media partner. I am thrilled that we have a terrific group of GMF trustees with us at this Brussels Forum, including the chair of our board, Robin West. I also want to give an enormous thank you to all of my wonderful colleagues at GMF. It is their incredible work, devotion, and creativity that you will see here over the coming days. And a particular and special shout out to the remarkable Nicola Lightner.

Karen Donfried: GMF, for those of you who are new to the forum, has a mission, and it's about strengthening transatlantic cooperation in the spirit of the Marshall Plan — in the spirit of the values that undergird that transatlantic relationship. Our mission statement has not changed since we were founded in 1972, but how we fulfill that mission has because our world is not static and we have to remain relevant to the challenges of this world as it changes and evolves. Brussels Forum was inspired by GMF's desire to provide a transatlantic forum which could help us understand those changes and think collectively about how to respond. We want to have a diversity of voices here. We want to encourage the free flow of ideas. We need to both talk, but we also need to listen. Let's especially try to hear what those with whom we disagree are saying and explore whether we can find common ground. If we do not, transatlantic cooperation cannot flourish. As you're here over the coming days, please share your experiences using the hashtag BrusselsForum and using BFconnect, the app that Danielle just told you about.

Karen Donfried: For those of you who don't yet know what the theme of this year's Brussels Forum is, it is "a world disrupted." We are going to focus on the upheavals and disruptions of the principles and of the practices that have formed the foundation of our transatlantic community. Disruption is not inherently good or bad. It brings both challenges and opportunities, and the disruption of our world order is taking many forms. From trade wars, to the rising tide of nationalism, to the return of geopolitical competition. Disruption challenges the status quo with young leaders marching for action on climate, as well as with the transformational potential of new technologies and innovation. We at GMF are committed to transforming, perhaps even disrupting, convening. We try to introduce new elements into Brussels Forum every year. This year, we're going

to have a cyber simulation on the main stage. And for those of you who have been here before, you may have noticed the timing is different. We moved from March to June, and it's great the sun is shining.

Karen Donfried: As always, we look forward to hearing your reactions to the changes we've made, and also your ideas for how we can spice up Brussels Forum going forward. So, with that, my thanks to all of you for being here, and please help me welcome to the floor Markus Preiss, who is the EU correspondent and bureau chief of ARD. Thank you all.

Markus Priess: Thanks, thank you very much. Thanks, Karen. Thank you very much for this warm and friendly introduction, and to all of you here, welcome to the Brussels Forum 2019. I'm glad to be a part of this conversation, to be a part of this debate. Not only because I was a Marshall Memorial Fellow in 2015, so I had the opportunity to travel the US to better understand the US, but also because without the transatlantic bond, I wouldn't be here at all. I was born in the former eastern part of Germany. I grew up literally in front of the Iron Curtain. I could see the West on the other side, I could see Mercedes cars, I could see Western TV, I could see how people lived there and how we lived in the East. And even at the age of 10, 11, it was absolutely clear for me that I will never make it to the other side. I could walk 10,000 kilometers to the east to Vladivostok, but not one kilometer further to the other side.

Markus Priess: I watched in '87, Ronald Reagan when he called on Mikhail Gorbachev to tear down this wall. It was a very special moment for me, and I have a 10-year-old daughter, today I am wondering when she will watch her first political speech. But here I am, married to a French wife, having kids born in Brussels who are speaking, unfortunately, better French than German. But, so you see, transatlantic relationship is something you can talk about in Brussels circles, in Washington circles, in Berlin circles, but it's also not only about values and this kind of debate; it's something that can transform lives. Mine, it actually did. But those were the days, and today everything seems a little bit more complicated.

Markus Priess: We have a situation where we have... I don't have to quote everything that Donald Trump said in the last two-and-a-half years, from NATO being obsolete to not being obsolete, from Mrs. Vestager being the person who hates the US most. But on the other side, I think we have to acknowledge that also on the European side, we don't speak very respectfully about the United States these days. So, why is it so? Should it... should we just deplore it? Should we just accept it? Or is there any common ground to form a new transatlantic agenda, and how can we reach that point?

Markus Priess: Does transatlantic cooperation still make sense in geographical terms if we see that there's other powers emerging with China? These are the questions we'd like to debate in this first panel. You all expected Federica Mogherini to be here, but during the last months in her office, there is still a lot of things going on and so she's running late. She will be here with us later. But nevertheless, we start

the debate with our panel, and I'd like you all to welcome the president of the Brookings Institution, General John Allen.

John Allen: Thank you.

Markus Priess: Welcome. The foreign minister of Poland, Jacek Czaputowicz.

J. Czaputowicz: Not that bad. Thank you.

Markus Priess: Welcome. And his colleague from Slovakia, Miroslav Lajcak.

Markus Priess: I always struggle with your name. Welcome. So, to get started, I would like Mr. Allen to start. For everybody, it's clear what's in transatlantic relationship for the European, but I think it's more difficult to see what's in transatlantic relationship for the Americans, and so my question is what do you see in transatlantic relationships in a world that's changing? Is it just nostalgia, or is there still value in it? Thank you.

John Allen: Well first, it's great to be back at GMF, and thank you for the introduction and for setting the stage. And Karen, I'm not sure... There you are, thank you for your leadership. It's a magnificent organization and you're leading it magnificently. First, as an American, I can simply tell you that for us, a transatlantic relationship, while it may well be under substantial amount of stress these days, it may not have ever been more important. And this particular panel is called "the new era of geopolitical competition," so I'd like to take a few minutes. I've got several points I'd like to make, I'll try to make them briefly, about how I see the stimuli, which I think we're facing, changing in many ways what this new era will look like. And often at Brookings, we park ourselves in the year 2070, and we look back over 50 years to try to figure out first what 2070 will look like, and how do we get there from today, 50 years earlier?

John Allen: So let me just hit four points in a quick summary, which I think will be helpful to set my comments. And I think we'll touch many of the things we're doing here over the next few days. First, I think, in the aftermath of the Cold War, many of us believed that the arc of history was irrevocably going to deliver much of the world into a dominant political system of liberal democracy — a values-based community of nations. There would be other states, some proto-democracies, and there would be developing states. We'd have competition continued from the authoritarian states, et cetera, but we believed, I think, in many respects that the victory of democracy if you will at the end of the Cold War was going to deliver much of the world into a community with a capitalist-based set of liberal democracies.

John Allen: I don't think that that's the case now. And I think that democracy is under pressure that we've not seen in a very long time. We've seen the drift in US and European politics towards nationalism and populism. We've seen the growth of illiberalism in places in the world. I just came from East Asia, it's not just a

phenomenon in Europe; they're worried about it in East Asia as well. And often this growth of illiberalism has a racist tint to it, or a xenophobic tint to it, and that's very concerning. We should be very worried about that. And as we see, perhaps, democracy under pressure, whereas we see illiberalism growing, it creates space for other political systems to gain traction, to gain power, to gain influence, and to gain reach. And those will be fueled in many respects by the rise of technology.

John Allen: Second point. There is, I think, a very clear emergence of what will become, from 2070's perspective, a bipolar, longterm, generational conflict between the United States and China. Where I thought it was a manageable matter in the context of trade — and I compliment the President, my President, for having taken this on finally — I'm not entirely clear that we haven't positioned ourselves with respect to China, not for a trade war, and trade war just in and of itself is a term that is fraught, but in economic warfare with the Chinese. And I really worry about an economic war with the Chinese. And we're hearing things like China is a threat. We hear that constantly these days. We're hearing that the relationship with China is taking on the clash of civilizations. And then recently we heard someone articulate that China is one of the first non-Caucasian peer competitors that the United States has faced. That's very concerning, and it's frankly ominous.

John Allen: You know, the Chinese actually understand what it's like to have a clash of civilizations and come out second? The Chinese actually know what it's like to be conquered by a racist power that will kill them by the thousands or the millions? So as they begin to respond, we need to be very careful about how we posture our relationship with China and how the rest of the world is expected to react to that posturing. My own experience is if you treat a competitor as an enemy long enough, guess what? That competitor will become your enemy.

John Allen: My third point, quickly, sorry. Emerging technologies will profoundly shape the 21st century. Quantum computing, artificial intelligence in all of its forms, and biotechnology will change this world in ways we cannot yet even imagine. Yet, there still is not a global framework for policy as it relates to these technologies and how we'll harness these technologies, the best of them, and deter the worst of them for the good of all humankind. To his great credit, President Macron talked about that in the context of the G20. The challenge I think we face is that the US and China will see that its bipolar competition may in fact be fueled, exacerbated, perhaps even accelerated by technology, which could inadvertently and unfortunately create a bifurcation of technology that may force nations in the world to have to choose. That's a losing proposition for everyone.

John Allen: And then fourth, whether we know it or not, I think that climate and climate change will be the great global and national security challenge of the 21st century. It's a real problem. It's a real problem because in many respects, the

United States as a government is in a position where it is a climate science denier. And that's an issue! That's a security threat in and of itself.

John Allen: Now, there's three kinds of migration in the world today: there's economic migration, there's conflict migration, and we've seen a lot of that, Europe has experienced a lot of that. And the third type of migration is climate migration. We've barely seen climate migration. But there are conservative estimates that say that by as late as 2070 and the beginning of the 22nd century, we could see a 100 million climate migrants. Let's just say on the low side, the conservative number is 50 million. What does 50 million people on their feet and moving do to the global economy? It's existential in Africa, where a quarter of the world's population will exist by the middle of this century. And as that population begins to move, it will change many things forever, and will create national security risks we cannot even begin to imagine. What happened in Europe, to the polarization of politics, with just two million migrants.

John Allen: So finally, many of these challenges are about choices. Much of this can still be dealt with as you look from 2070 back. There are things that can be done. They're about choices, and these choices are about leadership. We've got to find the leadership necessary, and the will and the capacity to deal with these challenges because most of them are still manageable in the year 2019, 2020. But by 2070, it's not certain that many of these things will not have been... will have reached the point where they're unmanageable. Thank you.

Markus Priess: Thank you, General Allen. Mr. Czaputowicz, now I have it. I think we all share the analysis Mr. Allen just gave us, but can Europe be really a part of that agenda, and are there any ways to tackle those problems together in the situation we are in right now with the very big tensions across the Atlantic?

J. Czaputowicz: Indeed, there are tensions between the European Union member states and the United States, but let me first agree with the General's comment concerning the liberal democracies and the challenge to liberal democracies. I agree with that assessment. However, we used to think that liberalism and democracy is a better system, and this system will win in competition with the authoritarian systems. However, some scholars used to say that authoritarian systems are better prepared to face these challenges because they can extract resources from society and use them in the foreign policy goals. And this is something we have to face, so the question is, is still democracy better equipped in order to fight these authoritarian regimes? I think that the main competitors to the United States, European countries, and the West are Russia and China. These are authoritarian countries.

J. Czaputowicz: Russia is developing military might and threat, create... threatens particularly Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine and Georgia, we know that well. China on the other hand is an economic power and also technological one, and everybody could be surprised why such an authoritarian system is better in creating new technology like 5G or artificial intelligence. So this is a challenge

for democracy. So we can look at the issue from the point of the observer and simply say that this is how the world develops, or we can look at the issue as leaders as you, General, said, and just to mobilize democratic world in order to face that challenge and to prove that indeed, democracy is better. It's a better system; it's our system. So, to do it, we have to have strong transatlantic links in my opinion. So, Poland is of course the member of the European Union, we support the EU foreign policy. Foreign policy we should be united, we should create strong policy.

J. Czaputowicz: But at the same time, being on the eastern flank of Europe and NATO, we are for strong transatlantic links because the European Union alone is too weak politically to face common challenges, which are Russia, China, Middle East, Iran. To face them, we have to be united with our other partners. Who are the partners? Simply other democracies, particularly the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea. So, there is room for cooperation, so Polish foreign policy is to strengthen the European Union, be within the European Union, but at the same we argue at the meetings with Federica Mogherini, with Miroslav Lajcak, that we always should take into consideration arguments of the United States.

J. Czaputowicz: An example is JCPOA and Iran. There is a different positions so to say. Poland is for maintaining JCPOA, but at the same time we understand arguments behind American policy: negative role of Iran plays in the region. And we argue for the discussion. So in our opinion, we should try to strengthen transatlantic links. Without that, we would simply have no influence as a European Union to solve this main geopolitical challenges. So it would be my comment to the first part of the discussion.

Markus Priess: Thank you very much. Mr. Lajcak, Europe is too weak? Do you share the analysis of Mr. Czaputowicz, and what can we do about it?

Miroslav Lajcak: I don't want to turn my back on any part of the audience, which is not easy here, but I'll try. Yes, so let me give you my understanding of current trends of the world. The fact is that the world has changed, and keeps on changing. And it's less stable, less predictable, less manageable, and less secure. And what's also unfortunate, that we are witnessing that rules can be ignored, can be bent, can be violated. And whoever does it can walk away without being punished, or without any consequences, because unfortunately we don't seem to have an authority, either administrative, formal body, or a moral authority that would make it very clear that violating the rules is not acceptable. So this is part of today's realities.

Miroslav Lajcak: The second point is that we are moving from unipolar to multipolar road. What I don't like about this trend is that this process is not managed. It's not controlled, it's spontaneous, or messy. Which means in other words that every country either global or regional, if that country believes that this is the opportunity to grab some other country's piece of territory, or expand the

sphere of influence, this is the time to do it. And this is happening. So multipolar might sound similar to multilateral, but we must not be misled, because multipolar is actually opposite to the multilateral. Because multilateral means based on rules. Multilateral means every country should have its say, its role. Multilateral means removing the barriers and walls. Multipolar does exactly the opposite, creating spheres of influence and basically setting the rules that are dictated by the powerful ones. This is not a good trend. And we should do something about it, and of course we need to stand up for rules and for multilateralism. And there is one natural player who should do it, and that player is missing in this game, which is the European Union.

Miroslav Lajcak: European Union is the system that is built on respecting the rules. European Union has the multilateralism in its DNA, but unfortunately European Union keeps itself busy with itself for too long, as if we can afford being busy with our internal agenda and not trying to have our say and our role in global affairs. We have the potential, we have the power, we just don't seem to the will and the unity and the understanding of the rules. So it's very important for several reasons. First, if we don't want to be a playground but we want to be a player, we have to stand up for what we value. Second, European Union is the only global actor who speaks about values. So, have you forgotten values? And third, if we believe in transatlantic relationship, and we do, the more assertive America, it's more self-confident Europe.

Markus Priess: Thank you very much. But I think many people share the analysis, but also that Europe is busy talking about itself, but if you could decide, what would you do to tackle those problems? What would you do, and what should Europe do tomorrow?

Miroslav Lajcak: Understanding of what is our role. Unity and commitment, that's first. Second, political will. We don't seem to have enough political will in important situations. And third, being able to use the instruments such as our strong economy, our technological advancement, and many other tools that are there. We don't seem to understand that they are here to serve a role, our global role. So if we are not united, if we don't understand, if we don't have an agreement about what's our role in this global world, we cannot be a global player.

Markus Priess: Miroslav, would you be happy if Europe would be more stronger, more coordinated on the global stage? Or would this even create more tension with the US? We see these days the US complaining about even the small steps of military cooperation in Europe starting, and we still get criticism from the US. Is there any will in the US for a stronger Europe?

John Allen: Oh, there's a lot of will in the U.S. For a strong Europe. But there is also a lot of support in the U.S. For Europe as it exists today as well. We need to be very careful about superimposing a whole series of tweets about Europe for representing the will of the American people. And the American people, I believe, are strongly behind a transatlantic relationship. If you want to know



how strong, just look at the votes in the Congress, the Congress represents the American people. Their votes in support of NATO, their votes in support of our work with Europe have been very strong and unambiguous, and that's, I think, a great indicator of how the United States and the American people really feel about the transatlantic relationship.

John Allen: But there are some conditionals that are afield that we've experienced both in the United States and in Europe that have made this focus very difficult. The difficulties associated with the economic crisis of 2008, we still have not completely recovered from that. Globalization has not delivered for much of the American and European population what had been promised. And in frustration, many of the folks who feel themselves disenfranchised, who've never had the opportunity to partake of what the potential of globalization would bring, they've become very disenchanted with their political elites and political institutions, and trust has broken down.

John Allen: And so we're all dealing with that right now. Europe has to deal with it how it can. US has to deal with it how it can. But we have to recognize what those issues are and try to deal with those as we have to work together. And I'll come back to the point I made a few minutes ago, both ministers have talked about it, and that this has got to be a values-based organization. This is the difference between a liberal democracy and an authoritarian regime, and the minister talked about it a moment ago and he answered his own question. But the truth is, an authoritarian regime, for an authoritarian regime, the rule of law, and human rights and the rights of women, free speech, a free and liberal press, those are anathema to the central governments of authoritarian or illiberal regimes, totalitarian of course goes without saying.

John Allen: But as we see greater stress and pressure on the democracies and on this community of liberal states, we have to think about where this is going to take us in the future, we have to take a good, strong appraisal of what the challenges are that we face and determine if we are a values-based community of people, how are we going to come together with the leadership and the resources necessary to deal with these issues?

John Allen: Let me just make one other point. We talk about the West a lot, and we need to get out of that. I'll probably say it again while I'm here. But it's bigger than the West, again, I just came from East Asia, and there are very vibrant democracies in the West for whom human rights and the rule of law is very important, free speech: South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia's a proto-democracy, it's coming along very well, Australia. Those are very powerful democracies. It's not just the West. We become pretty arrogant when we think that we have a corner on all of these values, and so we need to think more globally about a community that's transformational in nature that shares these values and can reinforce what seems to be adrift in our democracies today. And that seems to be the trajectory we have to follow.

Markus Priess: Thank you. Mr. Czaputowicz, you made a lot of notes.

J. Czaputowicz: Yeah, thank you, thank you. That's very important question concerning the role of the European Union and how this role might be increased. I think that there is a discussion going on within the European Union. Minister Lajcak said that European Union is missing, we are still waiting for Federica Mogherini who is responsible for representing us, I hope she will join. But we have a discussion with her, how to improve our role concerning foreign policy, and there are many proposals, one of them, it was a report of the commission just maybe to increase the scope of qualified majority decision making in different aspects of foreign policy. It was not agreed by the ministers. We had a discussion recently, just last meeting of foreign ministers council.

J. Czaputowicz: I think that consensus is very important to maintain, and it would be kind of the only solution. The problem is, I raised also at the meeting, is I would like to pose also to you the question. It is, how Brexit will influence the voting power in qualified majority system of particular states? I asked that question to the Commission, who we expect the explanation, but I think it will be very important influence. And the role of big countries, populous one like Germany, France, will increase whereas middle-sized countries, their role and their voting power will be diminished. It will also somehow threaten the democratic system, the democracy, and the justice of that system. It is something we have to analyze, where we are talking about the qualified majority voting, we have to, I think, answer that issue.

J. Czaputowicz: Another problem is strategic autonomy of the European Union discussion. I think that we cannot and we do not in Poland understand strategic autonomy as a possibility to distance ourselves from transatlantic relations, particularly. So I think that we should invest more in defense in the European Union, but as a kind of supplementary activity to transatlantic links. Not to make it independent from NATO and the United States. So strategic autonomy implies independence, but also from our allies.

J. Czaputowicz: The main issue is here the distance. Sometimes transatlantic relations are presented in the way that we should... that United States, China, Russia are actors outside the European Union. And there is equal distance to these actors. We do not agree with that. Our relations with other democracies, particularly United States, are much closer than the ones with Russia and China. So we have to be careful. But these issues are repeated in the discussions concerning the role of the European Union in the world and external challengers. We cannot accept that the US is the same challenger in the same quality and role as Russia to Europe. So a lot of discussion is going on concerning the role of the European Union, but I think that, again, we have to think in global terms, broader West, and be... look for alliance within this broader West and to see these challenges as Russia and China.

Markus Priess: Yes. Miroslav Lajcak, can we be more sovereign or more independent without also being more independent from the US?

Miroslav Lajcak: Well, that's the point. We have strategies on everything; we just recently adopted a strategy on Central Asia, we have a strategy on Russia, we have a strategy on China. We don't know how to deal with the United States because we've never had to face this dilemma. And now with this government, we all of a sudden realize that our strategic partner and our vision, our values, our commitments, are not necessarily in the same place, and we are lost. We don't know how to deal with it. So we are living... someone said, it was not me, that Europe is in the stage of strategic confusion, and I think there is something about it. We don't know, it's almost a taboo to disagree with the United States. At the same time, when the US abandoned JCPOA, does it mean we have to follow and we have always believed in this? We need to discuss this in a spirit of true transatlantic partnership, but we need to define what we stand for. And we must not be afraid to disagree even with the U.S. When we believe that their action goes against our beliefs and our values.

Miroslav Lajcak: So this is really important, and I believe this would strengthen the transatlantic partnership rather than weak. The second point which I have problems to understand is that we speak a lot about European situation, defense autonomy. I'm surprised when I hear statements about European army. I don't think there will ever be a European army. I believe it can strengthen the European defense and security pillar within the NATO umbrella. We will never have two armies, two military commands, two defense budgets. But somehow instead of discussing this among ourselves on a political level, we are sending signals that I think are making our American friends nervous. Because they don't really know what are we up to.

Miroslav Lajcak: And my last point on Europe's autonomy. We need to be able to be in the lead solving some problems on the global scale. Right now, there is not a single issue, single global problem where European Union plays a role. There are EU in the states, but not European Union as such. Not even in Ukraine. Not even in the Balkans. So how can we claim to be a global player when we cannot demonstrate when it comes to our neighborhood? We know what to do, we know how to handle, and we can ask the others to support and to follow.

Markus Priess: Thank you. Before I open it up to Q&A from all of you, hopefully, just coming back to you, Mr. Allen. You said we shouldn't superimpose a number of tweets from Donald Trump, but on the other hand, we clearly heard that there's no confidence on the European side to really talk to the United States, any hope to influence their direction. Do you see this as a problem if you talk about an alliance?

John Allen: Well, sure. First, I think that the alliance, and we'll have Tod Wolters here in a little bit who's spectacular new SACEUR. The alliance has come a very long way just since the Warsaw Summit in 2016. We had to break the old paradigm, if you

will, of a long term, low-intensity conflict and a counter insurgency, and prepare for the challenges of the 21st century, which was fighting in a multi-domain environment against a real threat. So I think from the 2016 Summit on, NATO has taken some very important steps.

John Allen: Now, it has encountered, and your question is broader, but it's encountered some real skepticism by the president of the United States. That has, I think, made it more difficult for our European friends and partners to feel that the United States remains as committed as it has always been to NATO. That has been exacerbated, I think, in that we've not had a sitting, confirmed Secretary of Defense now since the beginning of this year, through some pretty critical moments. And acting secretaries and assistant secretaries, et cetera, they are what they are, they're acting. They're not official, they're not confirmed, they can't make the kinds of decisions that are necessary.

John Allen: So, from the tweets to the appearance of our political support by not putting in the right kinds of leadership at the right spot, we could very clearly send the message that we're less committed. But I think you'll hear from SACEUR, and I won't put words in his mouth, but you'll also hear from our senior commanders that the relationship with our European partners is still very strong. There are some very real issues we have to deal with, though. The emergence of technology and how the United States intends to embrace technology for its war-fighting purposes, and whether that technology, if embraced, creates a gap in capabilities within NATO, bigger than the gap that exists today.

John Allen: But that's really much less of a political issue, or a cultural issue, than it is a technological issue, and we're going to have to find our way through that. Yeah, the tweets are an annoyance. But in the end, the Washington Treaty, which has created NATO, is a treaty. And while people may have difficulty with NATO at any given time, the United States would have to go through some very, very serious legislative issues to come out of that treaty. So I wish we could see past that and look at the work that the Department of Defense is actually doing with our NATO partners within the context of NATO and take some confidence in that. But I still see, when I look at the Congress of the United States and I see the Congress' unambiguous support of NATO, and very clearly through that unambiguous support for the transatlantic relations, I don't despair.

Markus Priess: Thank you very much. So, and I hope there are some mics in the room now and even more hands to raise to ask questions. Please identify yourself and make it a question.

Christopher: Christopher [inaudible 00:44:10] former GMF fellow [inaudible 00:44:14] and I have a question to General Allen. I think you skipped a little bit, the question of the moderator, what is in it for the United States, and please convince me. It's for me very easy to count what Europe has advantages from the transatlantic partnership. It's for me not so easy to convince Europeans and tell them what's

in it for the United States. And you cannot twist a little bit the question, what should Europeans do in order to be even more valuable for the United States?

John Allen: Well, the United States' view is only that the world... its relationship with the world is only for the United States, then that's... the question is valid. What's in it for the Europeans? Why should the United States even care? And I just don't believe that that's the case. We have always been stronger together. The United States' relationship in any multi-lateral organization has always been transformational. All of us are better because of the presence of the United States in one of these organizations, and when we move towards a bilateral orientation, or we move away or become enormously skeptical of multilateral organizations, then why it should be valuable to the United States is because the great influence the United States has had in the world has not been a function of the United States alone. The influence of the United States has been exerted through the quality of our diplomacy, the strength of our laws, and our relationships with our partners overseas.

John Allen: So, while there are some in the United States and in Washington who may say, why should we spend so much of an effort having a relationship with the Europeans, our capacity to exert our influence in the world for the good has always been far greater and far deeper and farther when it's been in a multilateral sense. So, I think objectively, a solid trade relationship with Europe is completely strategically logical. The size of the population, the commonality of the values, the enormity of the economies. Having a strong multilateral relationship with Europe is strategically logical. But more importantly from my perspective than that, in a world that's become increasingly chaotic, in a world that will become harder to live with as climate change really makes things difficult in the world and as we face climate-related migration.

John Allen: We as a community of nations, a values-based community of liberal democracies that have strongly intertwined economies and strongly held values, that's the only way we're going to get through this. That ought to be the logic for the United States. If you really want to be important in a world, don't go unilateral because you will be isolated. People will make decisions to have relations with the Chinese or the Russians or someone else or another multilateral organization. The logic for the United States should be so overwhelmingly clear that having a relationship with similarly-minded people with strong economies and deeply held values enhances our own security as well as transformationally enhances the community of nations that no one should have to question that. That's what I would say if someone said, what's in it for the United States. It's about the long term influence for the good of the community of nations.

Markus Priess: Thank you, the next question is over here. Also make it question and look at the time, make it a short answer please. Thank you.

Questioner: [inaudible 00:47:31] Ukraine Analytica. I have a question to Minister Lajcak. You talked so strong about the values, principles, and rules, so how will you explain yesterday unprecedented return of the Russian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe without fulfilling any of the obligations that were put against them by the Council of Europe, against the principles of these organizations?

John Allen: I'm glad you got that question.

Miroslav Lajcak: The Parliamentary has decided so. I have no other explanation.

Markus Priess: But do you regret it?

Miroslav Lajcak: Yes and no. The fact is that you should not impose a policy and then retreat from it while nothing has changed. So you should think twice before making these kind of decisions, and once you went into that, you have to stand firm. Second, I believe in dialogue. I believe critical dialogue is better than no dialogue at all. So if I disagree with what you do, how can I tell you if I'm not talking to you? So, U.S. Is talking to Russia, NATO is talking to Russia, everybody's talking to Russia but the European Union. EU has no channel of talking to Russia. Does it make us stronger?

Markus Priess: Thank you very much. Mr. [inaudible 00:48:58] is also here, but we don't have time for that now. Next question goes here. Thanks.

Steve: Markus, thank you. Steve Erlanger, New York Times. A question for Mr. Lajcak and Mr. Czaputowicz. What is wrong with European foreign policy and the role of the high representative? You both represent member countries. Should you scrap it and start again? How do you make it functional? If it's important that Europe stand up for itself, who speaks for Europe? Clearly the high representative can't really.

Markus Priess: We come back to that later. Federica Mogherini is here.

J. Czaputowicz: Share your opinion-

Markus Priess: He mentioned you didn't see anything.

J. Czaputowicz: No, no, no, no. It's very relevant question. Indeed, we discussed at the last meeting of foreign affairs councils how to strengthen the European foreign policy. I think that it is the role of the high representative is very important. There are some different problems. I think that the main issue is that some countries want to play the national role, and it is a competition with the role of the highcCommissioner. I can give you an example, for example, the Normandy format. Dealing with Ukraine, there are four countries, but there is no European Union. After being appointed to foreign minister, I asked Federica, Federica, why you are not there? We have France, Germany, Ukraine, Russia. She

answered, I remember very well, because when it was established, I was not the high commissioner, so it was the answer. But simply ambitions of countries make that role less, so to say, visible.

J. Czaputowicz: Another example, JCPOA. There is a European Union as a side to the agreement, and Poland accepts that role, but at the same time you have different three other countries, France, UK, and Germany, as also party to that agreement. My question is, is Federica representing all countries? But, or excluding these three, they have special rights in that. It was also an important discussion concerning the Security Council, and particularly in Germany, there were some proposals, why not to replace permanent membership of France by the European Union? It would be logical when we think about united Europe and model of federation. It would be logical of course. Of course, France is not happy with this idea, but the discussion was going on. It shows that it is rather intergovernmental organization than a federation.

J. Czaputowicz: However it is often represented as a kind of federation due to some political reasons. But this is a kind of contradiction. I think that we have to be less ambitious in terms of the models and accept that it is an intergovernmental organization and simply coordinate our foreign policy goals. It is done by Federica until now. It is the only way how to deal with that issue. And I must say that important decisions were taken and they are maintained. For example, sanctions against Russia. We got unanimity, we got consensus, and we prolonged that sanction. So it is possible to do that, to coordinate in that role. So it would be my kind of a proposal to the answer.

Miroslav Lajcak: I'll make two points. When I was first appointed foreign minister, it was before Lisbon Treaty entered into force, and I remember we were asked, do you understand that by creation of the position of the high representative, you will all have to step back to make space for the high rep.? And we were all saying, of course. I mean, it comes with the job, with the deal. I see less willingness on the side of the member states to make the space for the high representative. And more willingness to present national positions. And since I have been around for long enough, I know what I am talking about. And second, we have less unity in the European Union. And of course, if we are not united, the high rep. Has no mandate to act on behalf of the European Union. And this is something that worries me a lot, because five years ago, it was a shame if you were the only country because of whom there was no common position of the European Union.

Miroslav Lajcak: Well now, we have member states who are proud to be the only country who prevented the united position of the European Union. So, these are the two ingredients that are needed if we want to have strong European Union foreign policy.

Markus Priess: Thank you very much. Thank you all for a lot of food for thought for the next conversation we will have. Thank you very much, Miroslav Lajcak.

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Miroslav Lajcak: Thank you.

Markus Priess: Thank you. Thank you. And thank you very much John Allen. Thanks.

Markus Priess: So, I'm glad to take it from here with another Marshall Memorial Fellow. Just give us a second, please. And then, please join me in welcoming the ...