

MARSHALL SEMINAR BERLIN

Leading Toward an Inclusive Economy and Workforce

December 10-13, 2014

Berlin, Germany

G | M | F The German Marshall Fund
of the United States

STRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

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WELCOME

I warmly welcome you to the 2014 Marshall Seminar Berlin for GMF Alumni. This strategic seminar brings an economic lens to GMF's Leadership, Diversity and Inclusion Initiative, building on the inaugural Washington Seminar on Diversity, Inclusion and U.S. Foreign Policy held for GMF alumni in 2013. In introducing this program, I would like to underscore GMF's full commitment to advancing inclusive leadership, which is essential to a vibrant transatlantic partnership.



We are parties to unprecedented technological advances and resulting shifts in the business ecosystem. At the same time, this is a period of dramatic demographic change with aging Western nations, high rates of mobility, and birth rates at a peak in the global south. These conditions call for thoughtful calibration on the part of leaders across sectors in order to create inclusive economies and workplaces. Today we are witnessing on both sides of the Atlantic persistent unemployment, and the specter of a 'lost generation' that is not engaged in the work force in a sustained and meaningful way. Issues of inequity as well as a disharmony between education systems and workplace requirements only intensify this concern.

Through the Marshall Seminar, you will have the opportunity to explore leadership strategies to solve the economic challenges of our time. You will engage face to face with some of Germany's most innovative leaders in business, education and government who are shaping the workforce and the businesses of the future. I am thrilled that Berlin will serve as the setting for these discussions. Germany stands out as a trendsetter in maintaining its economic edge, and has become a magnet for global talent, at the same time working to ensure that homegrown talent is effectively leveraged.

This seminar builds on GMF's strong and long-standing presence in Germany, as well as over 30 years of leadership innovation to create an immersive learning experience of the highest caliber. I am confident that contacts gained through the Marshall Seminar will inspire you to set new goals on your leadership journey. I thank you for joining the seminar, enriching the discussions through your own experience and leadership approaches, and continuing to shape the trends that will drive positive change in Europe and the United States.

With best regards,

Karen Donfried
President
The German Marshall Fund of the United States

HOTEL INFORMATION

Maritim Hotel Berlin

Stauffenbergstraße 26


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Phone +49 (0)30 2065-0

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info.ber@maritim.de



Located in the heart of Germany's capital, the Maritim Hotel Berlin occupies a prime spot on the city's Tiergarten park in the tranquil diplomatic quarter, close to the "Kurfürstendamm" and the "Potsdamer Platz". This luxury hotel recaptures the glamorous flair of the roaring '20s and affords guests all of the modern comforts one can expect from a four star superior hotel.

Country Profile

Germany serves as a uniquely powerful case study for an inclusive economy and workforce due to its intelligent calibration of education and training programs in consultation with the private sector; commitment to innovation; strong social services; and welcoming approach to global talent. At the same time, Germany is still embarking on its “diversity journey,” working to improve social cohesion of diverse populations within its polity and to maintain vigilance in countering racism and xenophobia.

Germany also foreshadows some of the demographic challenges that are increasingly faced by wealthy nations. The 15th most populous country in the world, Germany currently has a population near 81 million. Yet with projected aging, a low birth rate, and a low level of immigration, it is projected that Germany’s population will decline to 64.7 million by 2060. In 2013, 34.2% of Germany’s population was age 55 and over. By 2050, it is projected that approximately 6% of the population alone will be aged 80 and above. Germany’s birth rate is one of the lowest in the world at 1.36 children per woman. In 2008, there were 13,000 more emigrants from than immigrants to Germany, some of whom returned to their respective homelands, yet Germans also chose to leave for the US and Switzerland, among other countries. Germany is understandably taking measures to encourage immigration. In August 2012, Germany implemented the European Union’s Directive on Highly Qualified Workers to ease immigration regulations from countries outside of the EU. Furthermore, initiatives for dual citizenship aimed primarily at Germans of Turkish descent might soon become a reality.

Yet Germany sustains the 4th largest economy in the world by GDP. Economic policy makers must grapple with the decreasing size of the work force in developing policies for Germany to remain at the forefront of technological innovation and creativity, and provisions of the social safety net. The social security system is experiencing strain, indicating the need to accelerate a welcoming culture for working age immigrants, full to leverage existing younger diverse populations within Germany, and full to embrace the full range of inclusive strategies that begin with increased educational opportunity for Germany’s youngest inhabitants.

At the international level, European integration has been a defining factor in German policy making for half a century. Since the beginning of the debt crisis, Germany has faced high expectations regarding its political leadership and vision for the future of Europe, its economic policies and its financial contributions. In addition, Germany is closely allied with the United States which looks to Germany not only as a valued ally and trading partner, but also as a leader within the European context. Germany is well positioned due to these strong external economic relations, but also must manage expectations and strive to keep Europe moving forward free and whole.

Country Data

Geography

Area: 357,022 sq. km

Cities (2010): *Capital* – Berlin (3,460,725), *Other cities* – Hamburg (1,786,448), Munich (1,353,186), Cologne (1,007,119), Frankfurt (679,664)



Terrain: widely varies, from the mountains of the Alps in the south, to the shores of the North Sea and Baltic Sea in the northwest and northeast respectively; forested uplands in the central region; low-lying lands in the northern region; rivers include the Rhine, Danube, and Elbe

Climate: generally temperate/cool and marine; cool, cloudy and wet winters; moderate, warm summers

People

Population (2014 est.): 80,996,685

Population growth rate (2014 est.): -0.18 %

Median age: 46.1 years

Ethnic groups: German 91.5%, Turkish 2.4%, other (largely Greek, Italian, Polish, Russian, Serbo-Croatian, Spanish) 6.1%.

Religions: Protestant 34%, Roman Catholic 34%, Muslims 3.7%, unaffiliated or other 28.3%

Language: German (official); Low German/Low Saxon (far northern Germany), Middle German (most popular, consists of Standard German), and High German (southern Germany); Lower Sorbian, North Frisian, Sater Frisian, and Upper Sorbian are recognized as regional languages (European Charter for Regional or Minority Language)

Unemployment (2013 est.): 5.3%

Gini Index (2010): 29

Population below poverty line (2010 est.): 15.5%

Government

Type: federal republic

Branches: *Executive* - President (chief of state), Chancellor (head of government), and Cabinet or 'Bundesminister', (Federal Ministers). *Legislative* - bicameral legislature consists of the Federal Council or 'Bundesrat' (69 votes; state government sit in the Council, each with three to six votes in proportion with population, required to vote as a

block); and the Federal Parliament or 'Bundestag' (630 seats). *Judicial* – Federal Court of Justice (127 judges; 25 Senates, subdivided); Federal Constitutional Court or 'Bundesverfassungsgericht' (2 Senates, subdivided)

Budget: \$1.626 trillion

Public Revenues (2013): 45.3% of GDP

Budget Surplus (2013): 0.1% of GDP

Public Debt (2013): 79.9% of GDP

Relevant Political Parties: Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU), Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), The Left (LINKE), Alliance '90/The Greens (GRÜNE), Alternative for Germany (AfD), Free Democratic Party (FDP)

Principal Government Officials

President – Joachim Gauck

Chancellor – Angela Merkel

Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs – Frank-Walter Steinmeier

Federal Minister of Defense – Ursula von der Leyen

Federal Minister of Finance – Wolfgang Schäuble

Mayor of Berlin – Klaus Wowereit

Economy

GDP (2013 est.): \$3.227 trillion

GDP Growth Rate (2013 est.): 0.5%

Per capita GDP (2013 est.): \$39,500

Labor Force: 44.2 million

Commercial Prime Lending Rate (2013): 2.8%

Stock of Domestic Credit (2013): \$4.457 trillion

Industries: iron, steel, coal, cement, chemicals, machinery, vehicles, machine tools, electronics, automobiles, food and beverages, shipbuilding, textiles

Agriculture: 0.8% of GDP

Industry: 30.1% of GDP

Services: 69% of GDP

Inflation Rate (2013): 1.6%

Trade (2013): Exports – \$1.493 trillion, Imports – \$1.233 trillion

LEADERSHIP DEPLOYMENT AT GMF

Fellowships

The Marshall Memorial Fellowship (MMF) is the flagship leadership development program of GMF. Created in 1972 to introduce a new generation of European leaders to the United States, MMF grew in 1999 with a companion program that includes sends emerging North American leaders to Europe. By convening, facilitating intellectual exchange and sharing of best practices, networking, and exposure to other polities, economies, and cultures, MMF offers capacity building opportunities essential for today's challenges and opportunities. GMF awards 75 Marshall Memorial Fellowships each year to the best and brightest from all sectors, including business, government and civil society. Fellows are selected through 21 regional processes that span 32 countries. These emerging leaders go through 6 months of preparation for transatlantic understanding and development of relations and 24 days of policy immersion across the Atlantic. The MMF alumni network now includes 2,500 leaders.

Begun in 1982 and co-sponsored by the German Marshall Fund and the Armed Forces Office of the German Defense Ministry, the annual Manfred Wörner Seminar selected 30 young Americans and Germans in January of every year to examine German and European security policy and to discuss U.S.–German and U.S.–European security interests. The ten-day seminar serves –which takes place in Bonn, Cologne, and Berlin in May of each year –deepens understanding between participants from both countries and offers an excellent opportunity to broaden professional networks. The GMF alumni community includes 600 MWS participants. The Transatlantic Inclusion leaders Network (TILN) trains young, diverse elected leaders from the United States and Europe in the policy setting of Brussels Forum. TILN young elected form a dynamic network: introduced to top policymakers; empowered with the skills, confidence, and connections to compete for higher office; and ready to engage in public service at higher levels of responsibility. The TILN network now includes 60 leaders.

Networks

Alumni of GMF's leadership programs combined number over 3,000 members. Alumni on the Move continue to advance to positions of leadership in the U.S. and Europe. Prominent alumni serve in cabinet posts, and as members of American legislatures and European Parliaments; as leaders of corporations and financial institutions; and as the heads of NGOs and as prominent members of the media. See attached for the complete list of prominent alumni of GMF leadership programs.

GMF's Transatlantic Leadership Seminars (TLS) enables leaders from business, government, and civil society to manage the rapidly changing environment of the 21st century. It achieves its mission with direct exposure to key actors and trends driving change inside and around Europe and the United States. The seminar relies on GMF's extensive network of partners and 30-plus years of strategic convening to provide an expert-guided, seven-day study tour of the highest quality. Previous TLS Seminars include 2014's "Global North-South Cooperation – Tapping

New Opportunities for Development and Growth,” and the 2013 Seminar to the Balkans called “The Balkans 20 Years after the War: Leadership Lessons on Democratization, Reconciliation, Emerging Markets, and Structural Reform “.

GMF offers a series of 2-3 day Marshall Seminars for leadership alumni, place-based leadership seminars which offer deep exploration of specific leadership issues in a city that best showcases the dynamics of that issue. Seminars explore leadership strategies and allow participants to engage with the city’s most innovative leaders across sectors. Participants contextualize changes in their own spheres of influence, and gain new knowledge and contacts to drive trends in Europe and the United States. This series includes the fall 2013 Washington Seminar on diversity and U.S. foreign policy; the winter 2014 Berlin Seminar on economic and workforce development; the spring 2015 Brussels Seminar on NATO and transatlantic security issues; and an upcoming Detroit Seminar on leading through economic crisis.

GMF also offers an array of networking and convening opportunities for GMF leadership alumni. The Bilbao Urban Leadership Dialogues (BUILD) is a GMF partnership with Bilbao International to bring together leaders committed to advancing innovative solutions to urban and regional policy challenges. GMF also partners with NATO to bring a series of NATO Dialogues on global security themes to cities around the U.S. to raise awareness of transatlantic security cooperation in leadership constituencies outside Washington, D.C.

Development

GMF is committed to providing the GMF leadership alumni with opportunities to connect to issues and developments that shape the transatlantic community. GMF provides the resources and support to make ideas for ongoing engagement come to life through the annual Alumni Leadership Projects competition. GMF seeks to support alumni convening that advances transatlantic engagement and understanding and individual or small group project sponsorship that advances transatlantic cooperation. Past project winners have been on any topic of relevance to alumni professions, their local community, or that help society-at-large to benefit from transatlantic discourse and cooperation.

Throughout all of its fellowship and alumni programs, GMF supports fellows and alumni to develop their thought leadership by exercising their analytical and reflective skills through the submission of policy analysis and written or photo essays on the GMF Blog. Exercising their thought leadership trains fellows to leverage their experiences with GMF to achieve greater impact in the community as a whole. The TLI teams also produces original analysis and content on the topic of leadership development that advances GMF’s long track record of international leadership development expertise.

AGENDA

Wednesday, December 10

Participants arrive in Berlin, Germany

- 16:45** **Gather at GMF Berlin Office**
Location: Voßstr. 20
 10117 Berlin
- 17:00-17:45** **Welcome to the Marshall Seminar Berlin**
Kevin Cottrell, (MMF '08), Director, Transatlantic Leadership Initiatives,
GMF
- 17:45-17:55** **Program Overview and Logistics**
Melanie Whittaker, Program Officer, Berlin Office, GMF
- 18:00-18:15** **Opening Remarks**
Terri Givens, University of Texas, Austin; Author of “Legislating
Equality: The Politics of Antidiscrimination Policy in Europe”
- 18:15-19:30** **Panel Discussion: Innovating for Inclusion**
Niombo Lomba, (MMF '03), City Councilor, City of Stuttgart and Head
of Staff of the State Counsellor for Civil Society and Civic Participation,
State Government Baden-Württemberg
John Quintero, (MMF '10), Principal, South by North Strategies, Ltd.
Armgard von Reden, (APSA '85/86), Professor for Gender & Diversity
Studies, Hannover
Hans-Jürgen Schmitt, Human Resources Manager, Deutsche Bank
Moderator: Terri Givens
- 20:00-22:00** **Deutsche Bank Welcome Reception**
Location: Unter den Linden 77
 10117 Berlin
Networking with German GMF leadership program alumni

Welcome

Heike MacKerron, Director, Berlin Office, GMF,
Hilger Pothmann, Deutsche Bank, Head of Human Resources

Inclusive Economies: Strategy Session with Executive Leaders

Thorben Albrecht, (MMF '08), State Secretary, Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs

Thierry Déau, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Meridiam

Hilger Pothmann, Deutsche Bank, Head of Human Resources

*Moderator: **Henrike Landré** (MWS'02); Managing Director, Coconets GmbH*

Followed by Q & A

Thursday, December 11

8:30-10:15 Security Perspectives: Recruitment, Retention, and Advancement of Diverse Personnel

Ntagahoraho Burihabwa, President, Deutscher Soldat e.V.

Jochen Christe-Zeyse (APSA '83/'84), Vice President Advanced College of the Police Force, Brandenburg

Location: Maritim Hotel Berlin
1st floor

*Moderator: **Ines Michalowski**, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin*

10:45-14:00 Brillat Savarin School

Location: Flagship vocational school of Berlin
Buschallee 23a, 13088 Berlin

*Welcome & Tour of Vocational College: **Rudolf Enste**, Principal*

Panel discussion: Workforce for the Economy of the Future

Gerrit Buchhorn, Managing Director, DEHOGA Berlin

Thomas Funke, Head of the Entrepreneurship Department at RKW Kompetenzzentrum

Özcan Mutlu, MdB, Die Grünen/Bündnis '90

Kai Ruhl, Teacher, OSZ Brillat Savarin

*Moderator: **Astrid Ziebarth**, Migration Fellow, Europe Program, GMF*

Lunch tabletop discussions with students and faculty

14:30-15:45

Inclusive Economies: the Consumer

Gerd Billen, (MMF '87), State Secretary Federal Ministry for Justice & Consumer Protection

Location: Federal Ministry for Justice & Consumer Protection
Mohrenstrasse 37, 10117 Berlin

16:00-17:15

Optional Break Out Tours

Participants may choose any of the tours below or return to the hotel.

- a. Walking Tour of Historical Berlin
- b. Visit to the National Gallery
- c. Visit to the Holocaust Memorial and Memorial to the Sinti and Roma victims of National Socialism

18:50

Depart hotel for state representation

19:00-22:00

Passing the Torch: Next Generation Diversity in Germany's Leadership

Location: State Representation of Baden Württemberg
Tiergartenstr. 15
10785 Berlin

Welcome to Baden-Württemberg

Representative of Baden-Württemberg

Inclusive Leadership Strategies

Lora Berg, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, GMF

GünTank (TILN '13), Commissioner for Integration, District Office
Tempelhof-Schöneberg; Berlin

Advancing a Diverse German Media

Ali Aslan (AoCiF '10), TV Host & Journalist

Getting Past Racism: Face to Face

Mo Asumang, Actress, Filmmaker & Diversity Leader

Followed by Q & A

Friday, December 12

- 9:00-10:30** **Global Thinking about Economic Choices**
Alfredo Valladao, Professor, Science Po
Location: GMF Berlin Office
Moderator: Adnan Kifayat, Transatlantic Resident Fellow, GMF
- 10:30** **Depart GMF Berlin Office for SAP Innovation Centre**
- 11:30-15:00** **Into the Economic Future: SAP Innovation Center**
Hosted by Janet Wood, Executive Vice President of Talent and Leadership, SAP
- 15:15-16:45** **Exploring Potsdam – tour choices:**
a. Christmas Market at Crown Estate Bornstedt
b. Visit of Sanssouccis Palace
- 17:30-19:00** **Educating Forward**
Cornelia Quennet-Thielen, (MMF'87), State Secretary Federal Ministry for Education and Research
Location: GMF Berlin Office
Introduction; Kevin Cottrell (MMF'08), Director, Transatlantic Leadership Initiative, GMF
- 20:30** **Dance Party: Visit to Clärchen's Ballhaus - Optional**

Saturday, December 13


- 9:00-12:00** **Think Differently about Diversity & Inclusion**
Location: GMF Berlin Office
Philipp Breil, Design Thinking Coach - What Would Harry Do?
Lea Voget, Design Thinking Coach, ConnectingInfos

The aim of Design Thinking is to promote a special innovation culture. The revolutionary concept of the Design Thinking approach is to group participants in small multi-disciplinary teams so they can uncover unexpected innovations by combining their different points of views.
- 12:15-13:15** **Leadership Insights – Program Debrief with Kevin Cottrell**
Location: GMF Berlin Office

A light lunch buffet will be served.

SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES

Thorben Albrecht, State Secretary, The Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, MMF '08



Thorben Albrecht is the permanent state secretary at the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Prior to this position, Mr. Albrecht served the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in various capacities. Most recently, he was the head of the policy department of the SPD Executive Committee. He also served as the head of office of SPD Secretary-General Andrea Nahles and the head of office of the deputy chair of both the SPD Andrea Nahles and Rudolf Scharping. Additionally, Mr. Albrecht was a deputy member of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). Mr. Albrecht has also held the position of federal executive secretary and international secretary for the Federal Young Social Association. Mr. Albrecht is a member of the United Service Workers Unions, Social Democratic Party, and German Foreign Affairs Associations. He holds a master's degree in history.

Ali Aslan, TV Host & Journalist, AoCIF'10



Ali Aslan was the host of the international talk show "Quadriga" on Deutsche Welle TV, reaching 200 countries and 100 million viewers each week. A frequent public speaker, Mr. Aslan has worked as a broadcast journalist for leading networks (CNN, ABC News, etc.) in New York, Washington DC, Istanbul, Barcelona and Berlin. He served for two terms as a Policy and Media Advisor to the Federal Government (Foreign Ministry and Ministry of the Interior). He is a co-founder of the "German Islam Conference" to improve the integration of Muslims into German society. Aslan has been named a Young Leader by the American Council on Germany, the BMW Foundation, the German Marshall Fund, the Bertelsmann Foundation and others. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation recognized him as one of 40 German "Thinkers of Tomorrow" under the age of 40. He is the first German recipient of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations International Fellowship and a member of the Körber Network Foreign Policy. Mr. Aslan holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, and a Master of Science in Journalism from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. He received his Bachelor of Science from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service.

Mo Asumang, Filmmaker, Actress, and TV Presenter



Mo Asumang is an internationally acclaimed film director and producer, writer, actress, and television presenter. Over the course of her career, which began in television in 1996, she has become a cultural leader distinguished for her brave documentaries and television shows, combining creativity and activism to address racism. Her efforts include workshops and lectures on discrimination and social inclusion in Germany, Africa, the United States, and Europe. Her latest documentary “The Aryans” (2014) is a journey into the madness of racism, in which she engages German neo-Nazis, as well as leading members of the Ku Klux Klan in the Midwest. USA

Today compares Ms. Asumang to President Obama, calling them “kindred souls,” and Roman Polanski recently featured her as Condoleezza Rice in his movie “The Ghost Writer.” Her work offers unique insights into the complexity of dissuading individuals from racist pursuits.

Gerd Billen, Secretary of State, The Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, MMF’87



Gerd Billen has served as Secretary of State in the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection since January 2014. From 2007 to 2013, he was executive of the consumer advice center in Berlin. Billen became head of the Otto group in 2005, taking the lead of the environmental and social policy sector. Prior to this, he served as federal manager of the nature conservancy association (NABU) from 1993 to 2005. From 1983 until 1985, Billen served as press officer of the federation of citizens’ initiatives for the environmental protection. From 1973 to 1979, Billen studied social, nutritional as well as budget sciences at the Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität in Bonn, after which he started to work as a freelance journalist.

Philipp Breil, Design Thinking Coach - What Would Harry Do?



Philipp Breil studied Psychology (M.Sc.), Energy- and Environmental Management, Design Thinking and Neuro- Linguistic Programming. Since 2012 he has been working as a Design Thinking coach and general group process facilitator. With Design Thinking he supported a variety of organizations, from governmental agencies and the World Bank Institute to start-ups and alike. Next to Design Thinking Philipp flexibly uses Theory U and other collaborative group methods like Open Space and pro Action Cafe.

Ntagahoraho Zacharia Burihabwa, President, Deutscher Soldat e.V.



Born in Germany to parents of Burundian descent, Ntagahoraho Zacharia Burihabwa grew up in Kenya and joined the Federal Armed Forces of Germany following his high school graduation in May 2000. He then served as an officer in the armored infantry branch before leaving the army in 2012 holding the rank of Captain. Prior to becoming a reserve officer after his 12 years of active duty, he founded an association with other fellow German soldiers – mainly with foreign backgrounds – under the label Deutscher Soldat e. V. in 2011. The association over which he still presides aims at highlighting the growing multiethnic reality in the Federal Armed Forces and its implications for society as a whole in order to positively influence the rather critical debate on immigrants in Germany. The first student at the Helmut-Schmidt-Universität/University of the Federal Armed Forces in Hamburg to complete two full masters' degrees with distinction (2008) – one in History and the other in Educational Science –, he enrolled as a doctoral candidate at the University of Antwerp, Belgium in September 2011. He is currently in the final stages of his Ph.D. in Development Studies and will be taking up a position with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the United Nations Secretariat in New York in early 2015.

Jochen Christe-Zeyse, Vice President, Advanced College for the Police Force, Brandenburg, APSA '83/'84



Jochen Christe-Zeyse has served since 2008 as Vice President, Advanced College for the Police Force, Brandenburg, and plays a key role in recruitment. He is also a member of the Project Management Team as well as Dissemination Coordinator for the EU-Project COMPOSITE since 2010. From 1999 to 2008, he taught in the German Police Academy in Munster, lecturing on Leadership, Organizations and Economics. Mr. Christe-Zeyse studied in both Germany and the U.S. Following graduation, he had the opportunity through the German Marshall Fund's APSA fellowship to work as a Legislative Assistant in the U. S Congress in Washington D. C., and to serve as an assistant to Dr. Herta Däubler-Gmelin. He also worked for member Gerd Weimer in the federal state parliament of Baden-Württemberg. From 1996 to 1999, he became speaker in the Ministry of Interior of Baden-Württemberg. During this period, he also worked as a lecturer in the administration on economics and political science.

Thierry Déau, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer



Thierry Déau is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Meridiam, a leading independent global investor and asset manager specializing in public and community infrastructure founded in 2005. He began his career in Malaysia with the construction firm GTM International. He then joined France’s Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations where he held several positions with its investment and development subsidiary Egis Projects, moving up from project manager, then director of concession projects to his appointment as Chief Executive Officer of Egis in 2001. During his tenure at Egis he headed up international operations for the Egis Group executive committee, served on its risk management committee, and acted as member and chairman on the boards of several subsidiaries. He is a graduate of France’s engineering school, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées.

Thomas Funke, Head of the Entrepreneurship Department, RWK Kompetenzzentrum



Dr. Thomas Funke has headed the entrepreneurship department of a think tank of the German Federal Ministry for Economics since 2013. Before that he served as Assistant Professor and founder of the Entrepreneurship Center Network at Vienna University of Business and Economics. In addition he was founder and head of operations of the Research Studio eSPARK, a studio that supports entrepreneurs in the very early stages. In his academic career he was based in the US, Hong Kong and Austria.

Terri Givens, Associate Professor, University of Texas, Austin



Terri E. Givens is Associate Professor in the Government Department at the University of Texas at Austin. She was formerly Vice Provost, Director of the Center for European Studies. She received her Ph.D. from the University of California, Los Angeles, and her B.A. from Stanford University. Her academic interests include radical right parties, immigration politics, and the politics of race in Europe. She has received fellowships from the Wilson Center, the Ford Foundation, and others as well as grants to support her research. Her book, *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe*, was published in 2005 with Cambridge University Press. She joined in editing the book *Immigration Policy and Security*. Her book *Legislating Equality: The Politics of Antidiscrimination Policy in Europe* appeared in spring 2014 with Oxford University Press. Her articles are widely published. She is an active member of the American Political Science Association, the European Union Studies Association, and the Council for European Studies.

Henrike Landré, Managing Director, Coconets , MWS '02



Dr. Henrike Landré is founder and Managing Director of Coconets, the new business area of the medium-sized company VSP Direktmarketing KG, a renowned family business led by her brother Volker Paepcke and herself. Coconets is based on her long-term working experience as consultant for companies, organizations and non-profit associations in the U.S. and Germany, offering advice in the areas of knowledge and project management, research and development, network organization and community-building. From 2008 to the present, she has served as Co-Chair / Co-Founder of the UN Studies Association in Berlin. Prior from 2003-2008, she served as Senior Fellow with the Düsseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy and as an independent consultant. She also participated in the Peace and Security Funders Group from 2001-2004. Dr. Landré earned her Ph.D. in Political Science from the Universität Hamburg.

Ines Michalowski, Senior Researcher, WZB



Ines Michalowski is a senior researcher in the migration, integration, and trans-nationalization program at the Berlin Social Research Center (WZB). Her research focuses on internationally comparative research on immigrant integration. Ms. Michalowski also specializes on the topic of religious diversity within the military and other public organizations. She received her Ph.D. in 2007 jointly with Münster and Sciences Po in Paris. She has done research in the Netherlands as well as in France and has an impressive publication record. Her research includes a close look at the political and juridical incorporation of Islam in European Member states in comparison it to what is happening in the United States in this regard.

Özcan Mutlu, Member of the German Bundestag, MMF'06



Özcan Mutlu has served as a Member of the German Bundestag since 2013, as well as spokesperson for education and sports. He studied electrical engineering at TFH Berlin (1989 to 1993, earning a degree in telecommunications engineering. He became Member of the Berlin House of Representatives (spokesperson for education politics) from 1995 to 2013, and was member of the Berlin-Kreuzberg borough council from 1992 to 1999. He joined Alliance 90/The Greens in 1990 and became a Member of the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation general assembly. He also served as a mentor with the “School without Racism – School with Courage” project, reading helper in Berlin primary schools, and initiator of the twinning initiative between the Berlin district Kreuzberg and the Istanbul district of Kadiköy. He co-founded the German-Turkish Europaschule.

Hilger Pothmann, Regional Head of HR, Business Region East (Germany)



Hilger Pothmann began his professional career in 1985 at Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt region. Following his apprentice- and internal traineeships he moved into the HR function in 1989. Hilger Pothmann has been holding positions as HR business partner – since 1993 in managerial roles - in several regional and international organizational units of the firm, covering retail-, commercial- and investment banking as well as Infrastructure (incl. New York, London, Toronto). Since 2008 he has been responsible as Regional Head of HR, covering a large

part of the German region of Deutsche Bank Group.

Besides being a founding member of the Goinger Kreis e.V. in 2004, he has been a voting member at the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) since 2010, supporting the development of U.S. HR Standards. In this context, he was also initiator and founding member of the German DIN mirror committee to ISO TC 260 (developing global standards for human resources management).

Cornelia Quennet-Thielen, State Secretary and Department Head, The Federal Ministry of Education and Research, MMF'87



Since 2008, Cornelia Quennet-Thielen has been State Secretary and Department Head at the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. Previously, she was Director General at the Office of the Federal President from 2004. Prior, she worked at the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, reaching the post of Director for Policy Issues from 1999 on. Cornelia Quennet-Thielen is a lawyer. In 1985 she served as state judge in Rhineland Palatinate, after studying law in Freiburg and Trier. She received the German National Academic Foundation scholarship, and studied abroad as a World Fellow at Yale University. She is a member and the

president of the Administrative Commission of the German Council of Science and Humanities, the Leibniz Association Senate, and the Administrative Council of the Deutsches Museum in Munich. She chairs the German-Polish Research Foundation Board of Trustees, and sits on the Board of Trustees for both the German Historical Museum and the Roland Berger Foundation. She represents the BMBF in the senate of the Helmholtz Association, the Max Planck Society, and the Board of Trustees of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin.

Hans-Jürgen Schmitt, Regional Head of HR North



Hans-Jürgen Schmitt studied Business and Economics at the Bundeswehr University, Hamburg and left the Army as captain after 14 years of service to then join Deutsche Bank in 1988. After a traineeship he moved into a HR function in Frankfurt. Shortly after the reunification of Germany he became responsible for setting up the HR department in Schwerin. In 1998 he moved to Hamburg to take on an executive position focusing on retail banking. In 2011 he took over the Team Lead HR Advisory for Region East in Berlin. In November 2014 he became the Regional Head of Human Resources North.

Alfredo Valladão, Professor, Sciences Po



Alfredo Valladão is a Brazilian-born political scientist and professor at the Institut d'études politiques de Paris (Sciences Po). He is also the president of the advisory board of EUBrasil Association, a member of the board of trustees of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, and a senior research associate at the European Union Institute for Security Studies. As a journalist, he is a columnist for Radio France International and regular contributor to the BBC and CBN. Previously, Dr. Valladão served as coordinator of the working group on EU-Mercosur Negotiations, and he launched and coordinated – in partnership with the Brazilian representation of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung – the Annual International Conference of Fort Copacabana on “Defense and Security European-South American Dialogue.” Dr. Valladão is a distinguished author and editor of twenty collective books on regional integration and bilateral trade negotiations, as well as eight books and reports on bilateral defense and security issues.

Lea Voget, Design Thinking Coach, ConnectingInfos



Lea Voget is a Design Thinking Coach, training leaders in innovative new approaches to problem solving. An information technology expert, she studied IT Systems Engineering (M.Sc.) and Design Thinking at the Hasso Plattner Institute in Potsdam and at the University of California, Irvine. She has been working as a Design Thinker and Design Thinking Coach on projects in Germany, China, Kenya and South Africa. Just recently, Lea cofounded ConnectingInfos (www.connectinginfos.com), a software product which helps to keep track of information with in innovation projects, acting as an intelligent team memory.

Armgard von Reden, Lecturer, Leibniz University of Hannover, Public Affairs Strategy & Privacy Consultant, APSA '85/86



Armgard von Reden is a lecturer at the Department of Informatics and IT at the Leibniz University of Hannover and a partner in the consulting firm von Reden & Ahrenkiel. She joined IBM in 1987 and served as Director of Government Programs for Germany, Russia and the CIS countries from 2002 – 2011, also responsible for university relations, corporate social responsibility, and standards organizations. Heading a team of 35, she represented IBM in associations such as the International Chamber of Commerce and the OECD with a focus on Data Protection. From 2001 until 2010 she was also Chief Privacy Officer for IBM in Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA). Prior to 2001 she was deputy head in the IBM Government Programs Office in Brussels for EMEA. She also chaired IBM German Women's Leadership Council and has been teaching courses on diversity and cross-cultural management, as well as digital economy and data protection, since 2010. She served as Head of the Communication Department for the President of the German Bundestag from 1992 until 1994. Prior to joining IBM she worked in the US Congress as a Legislative Assistant in the House of Representatives and Senate, was a freelance journalist in the US for the German media and the London Economist, and taught at Georgetown University in Washington DC. Armgard von Reden holds a M.A. and a Ph.D. from Göttingen University in Politics, Sociology and History and also studied Chemistry.

Gün Tank, Commissioner for Integration, District Office Tempelhof-Schöneberg, Berlin, TILN'14



As Commissioner for Integration for Berlin (Tempelhof-Schöneberg), Gabriele Gün Tank advises the city government in all matters regarding migration policies within the district. She graduated in 2001 from Marmara University, Faculty for Communication Science, in Istanbul with a Master Degree in journalism. From 2000 – 2001 she served as an editor and freelancer at "apparat multimedia GmbH" in Berlin. In 2002, she entered a traineeship in Public Relations with the DGB (Confederation of German Trade Unions), followed by a traineeship in the office of Member of Parliament Eckhardt Barthel from 2002-2003. She advanced to become Eckhardt Barthel's advisor from 2003-2004. In 2005, she served the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) group in the German Parliament as Junior Counselor at the chairman's planning group for domestic policy issues, integration and culture. From 2006 – 2007, she served as policy advisor to Parliament Member Mechthild Rawert. In 2007, she became Commissioner for Integration, the position she holds today.

Janet Wood, Executive Vice President, Head of Global HR – Talent and Leadership, SAP




Janet Wood is executive vice president of Talent and Leadership at SAP. She and her team are responsible to attract, develop and enable leaders and employees to achieve personal and professional excellence and contribute to exceeding SAP's strategic goals. Centers of Excellence (CoE's) under her responsibility include: Executive Recruiting, Leadership Experience, Talent & Organizational Insight, Organization Development & Design, Executive Rewards & Equity, Global Total Rewards, Integrated Talent Management and Talent Experience. She has recently relocated to Germany. In her former roles, Wood was executive vice president of Global Strategic Service Partners and executive vice president of Global Maintenance

GTM. Wood joined SAP from Business Objects, leading the overall integration of Business Objects into SAP after the acquisition in 2008. Prior, Wood was vice president of Business Development at Crystal Decisions. She has also held various management positions at IBM. Wood is active in her community as a partner in BC Social Venture Partners. She also mentors employees at SAP as well as external protégés. Wood holds a bachelor's degree in business administration from the University of Alberta, Canada.

PARTICIPANTS

Sabah Abid, City Council Member, Høje Taastrup, Denmark, TILN'14



Sabah Abid is a member of Høje Taastrup City Council, a student assistant at the Danish Institute for Human Rights, and a master's student of Public Administration at Roskilde University. She also works part time for the Danish Institute of Human Rights, where she focuses on issues of equality in Danish public administration. Prior to her recent election, Ms. Abid chaired an integration council that advised the city council on which she now serves. In 2012, she worked as an part-time intern in the Danish Embassy in Cairo, Egypt, during that country's presidential election. She holds a Bachelor's degree in International Development Studies. Ms. Abid participated in GMF's Transatlantic Inclusion Leaders Network in 2013. She is fluent in Danish, English, Urdu and Hindi and has preliminary knowledge of Arabic.

Marta Angerri, Secretary General, Círculo de Economía, Spain, MMF'08



Marta Angerri is the secretary general of the Círculo de Economía from Barcelona. Her organization provides a space for the development of ideas and opinions in Spain. The plurality of its affiliates, which is its greatest asset, allows approach its mission in an inclusive way and promote collective action. Ms. Angerri is responsible for conferences and seminars on democracy, market economy, and Europe. She also coordinates the working groups for the Opinion Notes, a key product of Círculo de Economía. Previously, Ms. Angerri led the Institutional Relations Office of the Presidential Department of the Catalan Regional Government, where she managed relations with the Catalan Parliament and the Catalan and Spanish Administrations. Her professional experience also includes a tenure as the Chief of the Cabinet of Institutional Relations of the Catalan Government's General Secretariat for Youth.

Mihai Cazacu, Senior Expert for Loss Protection, OMV Petrom SA, Romania, MMF'12



Mihai Cazacu is a senior expert for loss protection at OMV Petrom SA. Previously, he worked as an asset protection & recovery executive for CHEP, Brambles Limited. Before joining the corporate sector, Mr. Cazacu had a distinguished career at the Ministry of Administration and Interior, where he specialized in cases involving human trafficking. For two years, he was seconded by the New Scotland Yard for the first European Joint Investigation Team, serving as the Romanian Coordinator on major human trafficking case. Mr. Cazacu graduated in Law from the "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" Academy in Bucharest. He is active in civil society, as a member of both advisory boards and project teams.

Jean Colombani, Journalist and Special Advisor to Minister of Health, Greece, TILN'12



Jean Colombani is a journalist and a special advisor to the Greek Minister for Health. He worked as a correspondent for several major media outlets including FRANCE24, Le monde - Hellas, and Aljazeera. He interviewed the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the former President of Libya and President of the African Union Mouamer Alkadafi. Mr. Colombani is a member of the Journalist Association of Greece and was the chair of the Immigration Union of Greece. His previous work in the public sector include projects with the Ministry for Public Order in Greece and work on an education bill in Morocco. Mr. Colombani graduated in Political Sciences and International Studies from the French University of Amiens, after

which he continued his studies at the School of Professional Journalism in France. He is proficient in Greek, French, English, Romanian, Russian, Italian, Spanish, and Arabic.

Nevena Crljenko, Manager of Government Affairs, Philip Morris International, Croatia, MMF'13



Nevena Crljenko serves as the manager of Government Affairs at the Philip Morris International (PMI) Management SA Operations Center in Lausanne, Switzerland. Previously, she was manager of Regulatory Communications for Central Europe – South, based in Zagreb, Croatia. Before joining PMI, Ms. Crljenko was a Chevening Scholar and completed her master's degree in Politics and Communication at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Her previous professional experience includes Executive Director of Academy for Political Development (APD), a civil society organization that contributes to the quality of political processes in Croatia by educating young leaders and motivating them to participate in public affairs. She

is still active in APD as a General Assembly Member. Ms. Crljenko also served as coordinator of the European Association of the Schools of Political Studies of the Council of Europe, marketing and general manager in the publishing industry, and Director of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Zagreb Book Fair.

Nicole de Beaufort, Strategy and Communications Consultant, USA, MMF'13



Nicole de Beaufort is a strategy and communications consultant who works with foundations and social impact organizations to create inspired storytelling and to develop knowledge that leads to greater understanding and results. Nicole's professional experience includes a wide range of management, strategy and communications functional roles for clients as diverse as startup foundations to universities and county governments and luxury services trade associations. Most recently, Nicole served as a senior executive for a nonprofit education coalition in Detroit. Prior to that, she directed communications at the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, ran a consultancy called Fourth Sector

Consulting, and rose through the ranks in several public relations agencies in Washington, D.C. A resident of Detroit, Nicole enjoys travel, serving on the board of 826michigan (a literacy and tutoring organization), and cultivating inclusive women's leadership networks.

Sophie Derkzen, Reporter, Vrij Nederland, The Netherlands, MMF'14



Sophie Derkzen currently works as a reporter for the Dutch opinion magazine *Vrij Nederland* in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. She started off covering domestic politics, but nowadays writes longer, investigative stories about socio-political topics in Dutch society, focusing on the social security and health care system. In 2013, she participated in the International Journalists Programme and worked as a guest editor for the German newspaper *Die Zeit* in Hamburg and Berlin. Derkzen holds two master's degrees from the University of Leiden, one in history of political debate and one in journalism and new media. Previously, she studied theatre at the Amsterdam School of the Arts and followed an academic semester in French Language and Culture at the University of Paris IV Sorbonne.

Stefano Feltri, Journalist, Il Fatto Quotidiano, Italy, MMF'15



Stefano Feltri is an Italian journalist for the daily *Il Fatto Quotidiano* where he has been in charge of the Economics and Finance section since 2009. He also is a TV political commentator, specialized in Italian politics and the Eurocrisis. In recent years, he worked for Radio24, a business radio network, and *il Foglio* and *il Riformista*, two national daily newspapers. He published several books including "Il candidato," "Il giorno in cui l'euro morì" and "La lunga notte dell'euro." He holds bachelor's and master's degrees in Economics from Bocconi University in Milan. He is a 2012 alumnus of the U.S. State Department International Visitors Leadership Program for

European Young Leaders and will participate in the Marshall Memorial Fellowship in 2015.

Carlo Ferrara, Head of Environmental Management, ENEL Group, Italy, MMF '13



Carlo Ferrara is currently the head of environmental management at the international energy utility ENEL Group. His responsibilities include definition of environmental policies, key performance indicators, and targets for the Group; definition of guidelines for environmental data consolidation and reporting; and contributions to strategic planning and guidelines for environmental issues. Previously, Mr. Ferrara worked for ENEL's Beijing office as the head of carbon strategy development in China for eight years. Back then, he identified and supervised CO2 emission reduction projects aligned with the Kyoto Protocol. Prior to ENEL, Carlo was a project manager at the Sino

Italian Cooperation for Environmental Protection of Italian and Chinese Ministers for the Environment. Carlo holds a bachelor's degree in Economic and Social Sciences and a master's degree in Environmental Economics from Luigi Bocconi University in Milan. He also delivers lectures at Essex University and Bocconi University on carbon market and energy issues.

Francisco Gonima, Strategist and Consultant, USA, MMF'09



Francisco A. Gónima is a social sector strategist, community engagement facilitator, organizational development consultant and executive coach based out of San Antonio, TX. For the last eight years of private practice he has worked leaders & entrepreneurs on systemic change, leadership development, and civic engagement strategies at federal, state, and local levels, as well as the private sector. Prior to that, he spent nearly a decade as a disaster management and leadership development "intra-preneur" with the American Red Cross in Colorado and at their National Headquarters in Washington, DC. Francisco serves as the Collective Impact Coach/Facilitator for San Antonio's Excel Beyond the Bell Out of School Time Coalition, which

convenes over 30 member agencies to develop evidence based strategies for bringing high quality youth development programs. He is a member of Leadership San Antonio, the San Antonio Hispanic Chamber of Commerce Leadership Committee, the Rey Feo Consejo Educational Foundation, and Co-Chairs the San Antonio 2020 Voter Turnout Working Group. He was the 2012 Lumina Foundation Coaching Fellow for San Antonio's DiploMas Latino Student Success Partnership. He is the recipient of several national management excellence and diversity champion awards from the American Red Cross. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Latin American Studies/Government from The University of Texas at Austin.

Igor Janke, President, Freedom Institute, Partner, Bridge, Co-Owner, Salon24.pl, Poland, MMF'03



Igor Janke is the president of Freedom Institute, an independent Polish think tank, partner at Bridge, a communication consultancy company, and co-owner of the biggest Polish bloggers platform Salon24.pl, which gathers well known journalists, academics, and politicians, as well as a few thousands ordinary citizens, to comment on public live in their blogs. Mr. Janke has a distinguished career in journalism. He worked as a political reporter and cultural editor for “Zycie Warszawy,” and deputy chief editor of “Express Wieczorny.” He was chief editor of the Polish News Agency, political editor of “Rzeczpospolita,” and anchor of several television and radio political shows. Mr. Janke interviewed President Barack Obama for Salon24.pl and authored three books: one on the Polish political scene, one, a biography of Viktor Orban, and one on the history of an anti-communist underground movement, “Solidarity Fighting.”

Marc Lauterfeld, General Council Real Estate, Union Investment Group, Germany, MWS'03



Marc Lauterfeld is general council real estate for Union Investment Group in Hamburg. His responsibilities include all legal affairs of Union Investment’s €25 billion real-estate portfolio, which consists of investments in more than 20 jurisdictions. Prior to this, Mr Lauterfeld served as the chief financial officer and chief operating officer of BEA Union Investment in Hong Kong. Before Hong Kong, he was an assistant to the Executive Board of Union Investment in Frankfurt/Main and a member of Union Investment’s Legal Department. As a banker at Deutsche Bank, Mr. Lauterfeld received a Konrad Adenauer Scholarship and studied law in Bonn and Lausanne. Previously, he was a Visiting Fellow at King’s College London. He holds an MBA from SMI Steinbeis University Berlin, an LLM from University of London, and is a fully qualified German lawyer (Rechtsanwalt). Mr. Lauterfeld teaches at the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and at the Academy of Justice of North-Rhine Westphalia.

José Alberto Lemos, Journalist, Portugal, MMF '89



Jose Alberto Lemos has been a journalist since 1980. He started his distinguished career as a reporter for a national daily from his hometown of Porto, *Jornal de Noticias*. From the *Jornal* he joined the founding team of *Publico*, which by the early 1990s became the most influential daily in Portugal. For both outlets, he covered foreign affairs, reporting from summits, the American and Russian elections, armed conflicts, and diplomatic negotiations. At *Publico*, he was a senior reporter, editor, and deputy director. Mr. Lemos is also a founding member of SIC, the first Portuguese private media network, and a long serving staff member of RTP, the Portuguese public broadcasting company, where he was a program director of a news channel and director of a public radio. Mr. Lemos has a degree in Philosophy and has recently graduated from a course at the Portuguese National Institute of Defense.

Andras Lőke, Founder and Editor in Chief, Ittlakunk.hu, Jugnary, MMF '94



Andras Lőke is the founder and editor-in-chief of *Ittlakunk.hu*, a group of hyper-local websites covering 23 Budapest neighborhoods with a monthly viewership of 700.000. Through 2009 and 2010, he assisted the Swiss Ringier Group in creating a high quality Sunday newspaper in Hungary. Previously, he spent more than two decades as a writer and editor at *HVG*, a Hungarian weekly economic and political magazine. Mr. Lőke is the chairman of the board of Transparency International Hungary since 2010 and he chairs the Gőbolyös Soma Foundation for investigative journalism since 2010. He received his master's degree in Oriental Studies from the Eötvös Loránd University or EL TE in Budapest.

Niombo Lomba, Head of Staff of the State Counsellor for Civil Society and Civic Participation of the State Government of Baden-Württemberg, Germany, MMF '03



Since 2011, Niombo Lomba has been head of staff of the State Counsellor for Civil Society and Civic Participation of the State Government Baden-Württemberg. 2009 – 2014 she was an elected city councilor of Stuttgart, the capital of Baden-Württemberg and dealt with topics like economy, culture, Europe on local level and civil society as well as participation. Prior to that, Ms. Lomba was a public relations and public affairs consultant and a corporate external affairs manager for *Celesio AG*, a trading company and service provider for pharmaceuticals. She is a member of Alliance 90/The Greens in Germany and was actively engaged within the party not only as a city councilor, but in various activities e.g. from 2000 to 2002 as a member of the national executive committee. Besides her political activities she supports civil society actively and voluntarily, for example as a secretary of *Misalisa e.V.*, an NGO for development assistance in the region of Bas-Congo and as vice-chairperson of the Theater *Rampe*, a ranked top three Off-Theatres in Germany in 2014. Ms. Lomba, holds a master's degree and has studied political science, communication science, and psychology.

Vasilios Margaris, Chairman and CEO, Capital Markets Experts S.A., MMF '05



Vasilios Margaris is the Chairman and C.E.O. of Capital Markets Experts S.A. (Greece). He studied Economics in the Aristotelian University of Thessaloniki, as well as computer programming at a private college. He holds the Level 5 Certificate of Chartered Management Institute of London, the IMESE MBA certificate and Master Degree on Banking from the Patrai Open University of Greece. Till the end of 2008, he was the General Director of Thessaloniki Stock Exchange for almost 10 years, a member company of the Hellenic Exchanges Group of Companies. He has worked as Executive Advisor, Financial Director, Administrative Director and Director of Internal Control at the groups of companies VICTORIA, Macedonia-Thrace Bank, Kosmocar Volkswagen - AUDI, Intersalonica and lately at GT Securities. In 2002 he was member of the National Committee of the Ministry of Development assigned with the implementation of the Digital Entrepreneurship in S.E. Europe. In 2006 he was appointed in the National Committee of the Ministry of Finance for the economic strategy of Greece in S.E. Europe. In 2006 and in 2007 he participated in NATO's "Young Leaders' Forum" in Riga/Latvia. Between 2009 and 2013 he was member of the Board of Directors of Thessaloniki Stock Exchange Center S.A. He was teaching International Capital Markets, as scientific collaborator of Technological Training Institute of Western Macedonia. He also publishes articles on international diplomatic and economic issues in newspapers and electronic media in GREECE.

Hon. Ursula Mogg, Germany, MMF '90



Ursula Mogg served as a member of the German Bundestag from 1994 to 2009 and was deputy defense policy spokeswoman for the SPD parliamentary group. She was a member of the Committee of Inquiry into Events Related to the Iraq War and Struggle against International Terrorism. She served on the Defense Committee and the Subcommittee on the United Nations. She was a substitute member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. She was also a Member of NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Since retiring, Ursula Mogg stays active as a lecturer. She is also working in honorary capacities, like her membership at the SPD headquarters in Berlin.

Elizabeth M. Phu, Director for Oceania and East Asian Security Affairs, the National Security Council, USA MWS'03



Elizabeth M. Phu is director for Oceania and East Asian security affairs on the National Security Council (NSC). She previously served at the NSC as director for Southeast Asian affairs in 2007-2009. At that time, Ms. Phu coordinated the U.S. Government's response to the Saffron Revolution and Cyclone Nargis in Burma and accompanied President Bush to Australia, South Korea, Thailand, and China. She came to the White House from the Office of the Secretary of Defense as director for Global Threats, where she was responsible for policy development and implementation to combat maritime piracy, terrorism finance, and transnational organized crime from 2010-2013.

She started in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2000 and has held positions in non-proliferation, Southeast Asia, and NATO policy. Ms. Phu earned a master's degree from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, where she was awarded the Commandant's Award for Excellence in Research in Writing. Ms. Phu also has a Master of Pacific International Affairs from the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego. She earned her Bachelor of Arts with high honors from the University of California, Berkeley. Ms. Phu completed the Department of Defense's Executive Leadership Development Program and has received a number of awards, such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service. Ms. Phu was a Council of Foreign Relations Term Member in 2009-2014.

Damon Shelby Porter, Senior Adviser on Technology, Telecommunications, and Innovation for Governor Jeremiah Nixon, USA, MMF'06



Damon Shelby Porter is an authority on telecommunications public policy. Named a “Rising Star” in 2011 by KC Business magazine, he serves as senior adviser on technology, telecommunications, and innovation for Governor Jeremiah Nixon. He also serves as managing director for the administration’s \$350 million public-private initiative expanding broadband accessibility, a national model for strategic planning which led to the first Google Fiber gigabit project in Kansas City. Previously, Damon worked in the public and private sectors including as director of public affairs for a Fortune 500 telecommunications company, earning six nationally recognized professional awards. He also served as chief of staff for two speakers of the house, an assistant attorney general, senior adviser on education policy and an associate for a communications firm. Damon was named transition chairman for Missouri State Treasurer Clint Zweifel in 2008. Damon was a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and is a member of the American Council on Germany. He participated in the 4th World Young Leaders Forum in Beijing and the 16th Transatlantic Session in Berlin. He was a Marshall Memorial Fellow of the German Marshall Fund in 2006. He earned his law degree from The Catholic University of America, and holds a bachelor of arts in communications from Marymount University where he was twice elected student body president. He is a member of the Missouri Bar. An advocate for the arts and culture, Damon has served as a board director of Studios, trustee of the Kansas City Symphony and an advisory member of the Nelson Atkins Museum of Art.

John Quintero, Founder and Principle, South by North Strategies Ltd., USA, MMF' 01



John Quintero is the founder and principal of South by North Strategies, Ltd., a research consultancy specializing in economic and social policy. He also is the author of the book *Running the Numbers: A Practical Guide to Regional Economic and Social Analysis* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2014). Over the course of his career, Quintero has directed applied research projects into matters of labor economics, workforce development, regional policy, social insurance, and postsecondary education, and his writings on policy matters have appeared in numerous publications. Starting in 2015, Quintero will serve as a visiting lecturer with the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. Quintero is a graduate of the University of Notre Dame and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Kauser Razvi, Account Executive, UPD Consulting, USA, MMF' 13



Kauser Razvi has spent the last 16 years working in the public sector supporting organizations as they transform through innovative programs and technology. She is currently an account executive for UPD Consulting, a public sector management consulting company focused on public sector organizational transformation. She joined UPD after founding consulting company Strategic Urban Solutions a decade ago and having overseen its operations in Chicago and Cleveland. Prior, Ms. Razvi served as an assistant chief information officer for the City of Chicago, designing and implementing numerous systems for public use across the city, including a citywide Geographic Information System (GIS) that drew honors as the best in the state. Her ideas have provided architecture for schools systems, housing agencies, and non-profits, including a data-dense and innovative \$8 million after-school program serving urban teens. In Cleveland, Ms. Razvi designed the blueprint establishing a multimillion nonprofit that attracts immigrants and new residents and connects them to the community and the economy. She has also worked with Cleveland Public Library on a project called Literary Lots that uses the power of children's storybooks and storytelling to transform underutilized and vacant urban spaces. Her clients include many public-sector agencies and nonprofit organizations. Ms. Razvi holds an undergraduate degrees in journalism and sociology and a master's degree in urban planning.

Iwona Ryniewicz, Head of Communication and Marketing Strategy, BRE Bank, Poland, MMF '94



Iwona Ryniewicz heads communication and marketing strategy for BRE Bank – mBank - the fourth largest bank in Poland. Ms. Ryniewicz has been in finance since 1998. She held executive positions in corporate communication and marketing at AXA and CITI bank. Previously, she was a journalist and the editor-in-chief of the largest economic weekly in Poland, "Gazeta Bankowa." Ms. Ryniewicz graduated from both the Warsaw School of Economics and the University of Warsaw.

Ionuț Sibian, Executive Director, Civil Society Development Foundation, Romania, MMF '09



Ionuț Sibian is the executive director of the Civil Society Development Foundation (FDSC) and has been promoting development cooperation in Romania ever since 2004. He served as the president of the Federation of Romanian Development NGOs (FOND) and has been an elected member of the Romanian delegation to the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) ever since his country joined the European Union in 2007. He serves as the president of the Western Balkans Committee of the EESC and is the founder of the Civic Innovation Fund, a grant making program that supports partnerships of for-profit and non-profit organizations in Romania. Ionuț Sibian has a master's degree in International Relations from the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies and a master's degree in East-European Studies from the European Union.

Matthew Summy, Vice President, External & Government Affairs, the Greater Chicago Region, Comcast, USA, MMF'09



Matthew Summy is the Vice President, External & Government Affairs for the Greater Chicago Region of Comcast. He has two decades of experience in economic development, community investment and public policy advocacy. Prior to his leadership at Comcast, Matthew served as president & CEO of the Illinois Science & Technology Coalition (ISTC), where he developed public-private partnerships to secure resources for research, development and innovation. He has also held senior positions with the State of Illinois, the City of New York and worked as an aide in the United States Senate. Matthew has served as a 2009 Marshall Memorial Fellow and in 2010 completed a fellowship awarded by the America Council of Young Political Leaders. He holds an MPA from New York University and a BA from the University of Iowa.

Program Staff

Kevin Cottrell, Director, Transatlantic Leadership Initiatives, GMF, MMF'08



Kevin Cottrell is the director of Transatlantic Leadership Initiatives at the German Marshall Fund (GMF) where he leads a team of experts and public diplomacy-oriented activities in 50 communities across the U.S., Europe, and North Africa. He is also responsible for GMF's alumni networks and programs for nearly 3,000 global business, government, and NGO executives. Activities include the flagship Marshall Memorial Fellowship (MMF); Manfred Wörner Seminar (MWS); Asmus Fellowship; Leadership, Diversity, and Inclusion Initiative; Marshall Seminars for Alumni; and the Transatlantic Leadership Seminar series. Cottrell also co-leads the Bilbao Urban Innovation and Leadership Dialogues (BUILD) to advance the global engagement of cities through civic leadership and strategy. Cottrell regularly advises and facilitates dialogue on international leadership exchange, leadership development, public diplomacy, diversity and inclusion, global engagement, and civil society-building strategies. Prior to GMF, Cottrell served as vice president of the Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce overseeing business and civic leadership programs. He has also held leadership positions with LEAD San Diego, University of California San Diego, and San Diego State University addressing cross-border urban and civic leadership issues. Cottrell is a past recipient of the Senator Margaret Chase Smith Fellowship in public policy, was a visiting scholar at Universidad de las Américas in Mexico City, and a 2008 Marshall Memorial Fellow. Cottrell is also a member of the Pacific Council on International Policy.

Lora Berg, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, GMF



Lora Berg is currently detailed to the German Marshall Fund from the U.S. Department of State with the goal of advancing diversity and inclusion best practices in the transatlantic space. In this capacity, she develops partnerships with other institutional actors on the international stage to inform and strengthen positive discourse around diversity and inclusion, and to develop leadership programs with a focus on rising, diverse young leaders. Ms. Berg has served at the U.S. Embassies in Tunis, Rabat, Jeddah, Riyadh, Bratislava, Paris, and Brussels. Most recently, Ms. Berg served as senior advisor in Washington to the Special Representative to Muslim Communities. Ms. Berg manages the Transatlantic Inclusion Leaders Network for young diverse elected officials, and has curated such major convening as the "Diversity, Inclusion and U.S. Foreign Policy" discussions among 100 corporate, government and NGO diversity leaders that took place at the Department of State in June, 2012, and "Mission Critical, Transatlantic Security and Diversity," a convening of policy makers, military leadership and rising young diverse military leaders that took place on Capitol Hill in October, 2013. Ms. Berg holds master's degrees in International Relations and in Poetry from Johns Hopkins University; she speaks French and Arabic, as well as some Spanish and Slovak.

Adnan Kifayat, Transatlantic Resident Fellow, GMF



Adnan Kifayat is a senior resident fellow at GMF, where he advises on efforts to strengthen leadership development and Next Generation strategies in the transatlantic region and programming the OCP Policy Center Atlantic Fellowship in Europe, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. He also contributes to the continued development of GMF's Leadership, Diversity and Inclusion Initiative. Adnan has held senior positions at the White House, State Department, and Treasury Department, where he established partnerships with strategic allies to cooperate in trade, finance, development, counterterrorism and national security. He has helped develop innovative and sustainable mechanisms to counter the spread of violent extremism and prevent the flow of funds to terrorist organizations. Until recently, Adnan served as Secretary of State John Kerry's acting special representative to Muslim communities. As senior advisor to the undersecretary of state for public diplomacy, he led the development and deployment of the Public Diplomacy 2.0 Initiative, helping transform the State Department into a new media-savvy institution. His work at the Treasury Department resulted in initiatives and agreements to promote financial cooperation between the United States and key partners, in the Middle East, G8, and Asia. He served as an alternate executive director of the African Development Bank and served twice on the National Security Council staff to coordinate counterterrorism and economic issues across the Middle East and Africa. Prior to government, Adnan created strategies for Cargill to access Central Asian and Latin American agribusiness markets, and designing programs for Delphi International to promote U.S. business and civil society engagement around the world.

Heike MacKerron, Director, Berlin Office, GMF



Heike MacKerron is the director of GMF's Berlin office. Mrs. MacKerron first joined GMF in 1993 as a program officer responsible for research support programs for German academics and the study tour program for grantees in East Germany. Prior to this position she was the program officer for immigration policy. Before coming to GMF, Mrs. MacKerron worked as a marketing specialist for the European office of Nichiman Company and the Western German State Bank in Düsseldorf, and she was office manager of the European office of YouOne Construction Company. She is a member of the German Council on Foreign Relations and the New Traditions Network of the U.S. Embassy in Berlin. She is also an advisory board member of the Council on Public Policy in Bayreuth, the USable project of the Körber Foundation in Hamburg, and Partner für Berlin. MacKerron received her Master's Degree from the Free University of Berlin and simultaneously worked as a researcher for a German Science Foundation project on educational and political challenges of integration of Turkish school children in Berlin.

Filip Vojvodic Medic, Senior Program Officer, Transatlantic Leadership Initiatives, GMF



Filip Vojvodic Medic is a senior program officer with The German Marshall Fund of the United States, where he manages programming and partnerships for a range of leadership development seminars and fellowships, including the Marshall Memorial Fellowship, the Transatlantic Leadership Seminar, and the Brussels Seminar on Global Security. His expertise includes program management and development, small and medium size grantmaking, and advertising. Previously, Filip was a program officer with the Balkan Trust for Democracy, where he issued grants to civil society organizations that worked on democratic consolidation and regional reconciliation in the Balkans. Before joining the Balkan Trust, he worked in film and television production for the Red Art Workshop. Filip graduated in History and Politics from the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Adelaide. His interests include civic engagement, democratic transition and consolidation, and foreign policy and security issues in Europe's eastern and southern neighborhood. Filip is fluent in English and Serbo-Croatian and proficient in French.

Melanie Whittaker, Program Officer, GMF



Melanie Whittaker is currently a Program Officer in GMF's Berlin office. In this capacity she works on Transatlantic Leadership Initiatives managing the Alumni Leadership Projects, overseeing the MMF selection and programming for Germany, and on a broad spectrum of events for Berlin. Prior to joining GMF she worked in the hotel industry, holding various managerial positions in Germany, England and the United States. Melanie obtained a BSc in Politics and International Relations from the London School for Economics and Political Science. She also holds a Certificate for Human Resources Management from Cornell University. For the period 2014-2018 she was selected as a lay judge at the Regional Court for Berlin. She is fluent in German and English, and proficient in French.

Astrid Ziebarth, Migration Fellow, Europe Program, GMF



Astrid Ziebarth is a fellow with the Europe Program, based in the organization's Berlin office focusing on migration & society topics. She oversees the three signature projects: 1) the Migration Strategy Group on Global Competitiveness, a high level platform for key stakeholders to exchange on designing coherent policies for the recruitment of talent also considering the development of the sending country; 2) Transatlantic Trends Immigration (TTI), a public opinion poll on migration and integration in Europe and the United States; and 3) the Transatlantic Forum on Migration and Integration (TFMI), a young leaders network for professionals working on immigration, integration, and diversity matters. In the past, she coordinated GMF's grantmaking initiative, the Transatlantic Study Team on Climate Induced Migration from 2009-11. Prior to joining GMF in September 2005, Ziebarth worked with the Smithsonian Center for Folklife and Cultural Heritage and the Goethe Institut in Washington, DC. She holds a master's in American studies, sociology, and anthropology from the Free University Berlin, and serves on the editing board of the journal "Migration and Development." In her private capacity, Ziebarth serves as an active board member of DeutschPlus, a non-profit association aiming to close the representation gap of minorities in relevant institutions in Germany.

Lukas Maderner, Intern, Germany

Laetitia Werquin, Intern, Belgium

FURTHER READING

Workforce of the Future

<http://blog.gmfus.org/2014/12/01/workforce-of-the-future/>

The new Social Europe Guide - available now

<http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=1070&furtherNews=yes>

Global Diversity and Inclusion - Fostering Innovation Through a Diverse Workforce

http://images.forbes.com/forbesinsights/StudyPDFs/Innovation_Through_Diversity.pdf

Wordplace Innovation Policies in European Countries - A Report to KOWIN

<http://www.ukwon.net/files/kdb/0f4aebcbc007683b62ac4aff825f5219.pdf>

Inclusive Leadership: Critical for a Competitive Advantage

http://www.berlitz.com/SiteData/docs/BerlitzWPI/2b6dd531f5ed23d1/BerlitzWP_InclusiveLeadershipFinal.pdf

The future of Europe's economy - Disaster or deliverance?

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/pdfs/CER-report-18.9.13.pdf>

The Future of the U.S. Economy: 2050

<http://money.usnews.com/money/business-economy/articles/2010/02/02/the-future-of-the-us-economy-2050>

Angela's Assets

<http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2015/01/angela-merkel-profile>

Leading Growth and Innovation through Demographic Change

By Kevin Cottrell, Megan Doherty, and Lora Berg

Transatlantic Take, Analysis from the German Marshall Fund of the United States, October 17, 2014

WASHINGTON—In August, data expert Randy Olson overlaid maps of U.S. counties to see where racial and ethnic diversity was highest. His map showed that high levels of diversity correlated notably with high growth areas. This link between diverse populations and growth and innovation is something civic leaders in the United States and Europe increasingly recognize. More and more leaders from Denmark to Chicago, Barcelona to Berlin are emphasizing diversity as central to their growth and innovation objectives.

Al Jazeera English recently identified Houston as newly at the top of their list of the most diverse cities in the United States. In her 2014 State of the City address, Houston Mayor Annise Parker said, “The Houston I know is accepting, tolerant, diverse, understanding, inclusive, open-minded, and unbiased.” She committed to establishing a “Human Rights Ordinance” for the city, and cites the context of a region that in four years has created over 364,000 jobs, exported \$470 billion in goods, and in the past two years led the nation in export growth. She assesses the Houston region’s power in international business as due in part to leveraging its diverse ties at home and around the globe.

In California, Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti likewise emphasizes the positive in demographic change and global engagement. Recently, he blogged about the resolutions of the U.S. Conference of Mayors that highlighted the need for more international trade agreements and “policy changes that will increase the number of U.S. citizens from the pool of eligible, lawful, permanent residents.” The Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs has also recast immigration reform, with the view that “immigrant integration strengthens regional economies.”

On the other side of the Atlantic, the Council of Europe formed its growing “Intercultural Cities” group in 2008. Its vision statement asserts that there is a net “gain from the entrepreneurship... associated with cultural diversity, provided they adopt policies and practices that facilitate intercultural interaction and inclusion.” Participating leaders benefit from peer reviews, governance, and practice related to diversity, assessing such indicators as commitment, education, neighborhoods, public services, employment, civic life, public spaces, conflict resolution, language, media, international outlook, and welcoming of new arrivals.

In Denmark, Copenhagen has moved up in the index each year, aiming, per its integration plan, to be “the most inclusive city in Europe.” Copenhagen’s immigrant background population almost doubled in the past ten years from 11.5 percent to 22.2 percent. The integration plan reads, “Diversity must be used to create more dynamic development, in order to prepare Copenhagen for globalization.” This is not to suggest that there is no backlash to rapid change in Denmark, but that there is a clear trend toward greater inclusivity.

Yet while many leaders utilize the power and potential of diversity, more remains to be done to counter exclusionary practices on both sides of the Atlantic that could threaten to undermine recent gains and the underpinnings of civil society and democracy. This requires

clarity and direction from heads of government to press forward on inclusion practices and to fight democratic backsliding.

At the same time, non-government actors can also play a role in sharing inclusion and global engagement strategies across the Atlantic. The German Marshall Fund of the United States, for example, facilitates such exchange through its Bilbao Urban Innovation and Leadership Dialogues (BUILD) and its Transatlantic Inclusion Leaders Network. The Maytree Foundation based in Toronto works in both Europe and North America to increase diversity on boards in all sectors of cities through its diversity initiative.

Responding to, and taking advantage of, demographic change has in fact become an imperative for growth. Regions lose ground when they turn their backs on the opportunities of diverse populations. Diversity and inclusion has become a cornerstone of 21st century effective leadership, and new tools — such as gathering and mapping demographic data, and new modes of communication to engage stakeholders, and to network at the global level — are now available. Leaders at all levels have the potential to prepare their constituencies better than ever before to leverage demographic change and increase global engagement — in order to lead rather than be left behind.

Superdiversity can result in real economic benefits—but it also raises concerns about social cohesion


By Paul Spoonley

Massey University, New Zealand, and IZA, Germany, World of Labor, Evidence-based policy making

ELEVATOR PITCH

Empirical studies have found that achieving superdiversity — a substantial increase in the scale and scope of minority ethnic and immigrant groups in a region — can provide certain economic benefits, such as higher levels of worker productivity and innovation.

Superdiversity can also provide a boost to local demand for goods and services. Other studies have found that these benefits can be compromised by political and populist anxieties about ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity.



KEY FINDINGS

Pros

- Studies find a diversity dividend of higher productivity and innovation for regions and cities with large immigrant populations.
- Diversity creates an environment for the cross-fertilization of ideas that contributes to creativity and innovation.
- Investments and increased local aggregate demand created by diversity encourage product and process innovation.
- Super diversity reflects and contributes to new global connections and a local or international cosmopolitanism.

Cons

- Super diversity challenges the assumptions and practices of a shared civic culture and citizenship, and raises concerns about social cohesion.
- Anxieties about the growing diversity of labor markets and communities have been associated with discrimination and anti-immigrant politics.

AUTHOR'S MAIN MESSAGE

Superdiversity can lead to positive social and economic benefits for welcoming communities and economies. However, the benefits can be compromised by the anxieties and hostility of some community members. The scale and growth of cultural diversity have implications for social cohesion, economic performance, and social mobility. Policy is critical in addressing these dimensions to realize the potential of superdiversity. Governments can support intercultural dialogue, adopt anti-discrimination laws, improve credentials recognition, promote language training and job search techniques, and ameliorate disadvantage that impedes social mobility.


MOTIVATION

Many countries have seen major increases in immigrant arrivals since the 1980s (see Figure 1). In traditional immigrant-receiving countries such as Australia, Canada, Israel, and New Zealand, 25% or more of the population are foreign-born. Even in countries that have historically not relied on immigration for skills or population growth, such as France and the UK, the foreign-born populations makes up as much as 12% of the population.

As a result, ethnic and immigrant diversity has become a salient characteristic of many countries and cities. The presence and dynamics of these large minority ethnic and immigrant communities are collectively referred to as “superdiversity” [1]. The term is also used to indicate a more complex interplay of variables (such as immigration status, rights, divergent labor market experiences, gender and age, spatial distribution, and local responses).

Superdiversity

Superdiversity typically refers to having a large number or percentage of immigrants and people of different ethnicities in a society or area. Superdiversity can also refer to religious or linguistic diversity, especially as these have implications for a shared civic culture or economic outcomes. Equivalent terms are hyperdiversity, diversification of diversity, and deep diversity.



This paper highlights some of the positive and negative factors that arise from superdiversity and looks at whether superdiversity provides societies with real economic benefits. Inevitably, the answer is mixed. This is due, in part, to limitations of the research and policy literature on immigrant settlement and integration, which does not always provide empirical evidence directly related to the contemporary circumstances of superdiversity. In addition, the policy issues are inherently complex and provoke concerns about societal cohesion (some reasonable, but some that reflect an anti-immigrant prejudice) that often represent a challenge to communities and countries.

DISCUSSION OF PROS AND CONS

Diversity and innovation

New levels of immigration in recent decades, along with the resulting rise in ethnic diversity, have raised fundamental questions about the benefits of diversity, especially true when it reaches superdiversity levels. One obvious policy issue is whether this diversity is associated with economic benefits (a “diversity dividend”), particularly at the city or regional economic level. Do immigration and enhanced levels of ethnic diversity yield economic benefits?

There is growing evidence of verifiable benefits, especially in studies of the links between diversity and productivity, creativity, and innovation. A complicating factor is the possibility that other influences besides diversity also contribute to this association. For instance, self-selection might propel people who are “more entrepreneurial and less risk-averse” to migrate. Or, where high-skilled migrants make up a good part of the mix, “occupational diversity might be just as important as cultural diversity” [2].

However, the research literature does suggest that there are benefits from immigration and ethnic diversity alone. A study exploring the association between diversity and creativity and innovation in the US found that areas that were open and tolerant were able to attract more talent and, as a consequence, exhibited higher levels of innovation [3]. While the study focused on sexual orientation (“Gay Index”) as a key marker of diversity, it also explored the role of immigration, along with more orthodox input factors (such as research and development spending, venture capital, and start-up firms). The study offered three conclusions:

1. Regional growth in the US is driven by immigration.
2. An openness to outsiders attracts entrepreneurial individuals and firms, including immigrants (described as “innovative outsiders”).
3. Immigrants play a key role in innovative areas such as Silicon Valley.

The study found no strong statistical association between the percentage of foreign-born residents in a region (“Melting Pot Index”) and the number of patents granted per capita (“Innovation Index”). Nevertheless, it showed convincingly that diversity — involving a mix of artists, gays, and ethnic minorities — is associated with resourceful, highly self-reliant communities that are tolerant of newcomers, and who are motivated to build networks and mobilize resources. A study of superdiversity and urban economic performance in the UK reached a similar conclusion.

This connection between immigration (especially the doubling of foreign-born residents in developed countries since 1980) and innovation has been the subject of a number of other

studies. One study used data for 12 European countries to test whether an increase in immigrants was associated with higher levels of innovation [2]. It found that “innovation levels are...positively associated with the cultural diversity of the migrant community,” while noting that “this effect...only operates beyond a minimum level of diversity.”

Diversity can provide a boost to local aggregate demand for goods and services [2]. New investment encourages product and process innovation, just as migrants, especially skilled migrants, add to the capital stock of host regions. The “benefits of size, density, and diversity in large cities yield higher returns to capital.” Diverse areas provide an environment conducive to the cross-fertilization of ideas that contributes to innovation. Even after controlling for the effect of other factors that enhance innovation, “the positive contribution of diversity survives; hence a diverse society enhances the creativity of regions.”

Another study – which also used data for 12 European countries – examined the relationship between diversity and productivity, and reached similar conclusions [4]. A key finding is that cultural diversity has a positive effect on both production and consumption. Using data for the US, the study found that Americans are also more productive in a culturally diverse environment. In Europe, diversity (here defined as the foreign-born share of the population, using a fractionalization index) is positively correlated with productivity. Moreover, the study concluded that causation runs from diversity to productivity.

Each of these studies suggests that there is a “diversity dividend” – an economic benefit of higher productivity and innovation – for immigrant-receiving regions and cities. But while the level of diversity is an important factor, the nature of immigration is also relevant, from the source countries to the level of worker skills and experience.

While many studies have identified positive economic benefits from diversity, other studies have examined the economic costs of immigrant-related (and other forms of) ethnic heterogeneity. One study asked the question: “Is ethnic diversity ‘good’ or ‘bad’ from an economic point of view?” [5]. For example, when there is considerable heterogeneity and fragmentation in a society, are there trade-offs between diversity and, in particular, the provision of public services? Looking at US cities, the study concluded that there are certain costs, including lower or less efficient provision of public goods, as well as less trust and an unwillingness to redistribute income.

Diversity, inequality, and social cohesion

The potential economic benefits aside, superdiversity can pose a challenge to shared civic culture and values. Citizenship implies a degree of commitment to shared values and practices as part of membership of a national community. Issues of integration and equity also arise, as well as the willingness of local and national authorities to recognize and protect minorities and encourage integration.

Shared values and practices have been under pressure, both in countries with modest levels of immigration and in countries, regions, and cities where immigrants and ethnic minorities constitute a substantial proportion of the population. As a consequence, research and policy interest in settlement outcomes and in relations between native-born populations and immigrants and minority ethnic groups has intensified, especially as these factors often constitute barriers to the acceptance of superdiversity. There are important distinctions to be

made between country-specific histories of immigration and the way in which immigration is seen as contributing to—or undermining—national and local interests.


Persistent inequalities between immigrant and native-born populations

Canada is an example of a superdiverse society (a quarter of all Canadian residents were born in another country). It is also home to a number of superdiverse cities—most notably Toronto, where 45% of the population is foreign-born. Despite the early adoption of multicultural policies (in the 1970s) and a prevailing national narrative that values immigration and immigrants, persistent inequalities between majority and minority ethnic groups have prompted concerns about outcomes and equity.

Researchers have found evidence for the existence of both objective and perceived ethno-racial inequalities in Canada [6]. Obstacles to immigrant success appear to have increased, as is reflected in the “downward trend in the employment rates and earnings of successive cohorts of newly arrived immigrants, both male and female.”

In 1981, immigrant men earned average wages equivalent to almost 80% of the wages earned by native-born men. By 1996, that ratio had fallen to just 60%. For immigrant women, average earnings dropped from 73% of the wages earned by native-born women to 62% (Figure 2).

These drops in relative wages came despite rising education levels among immigrants. This disadvantaged position of immigrants, which was unrelated to their skills, suggests that the Canadian labor market was not adequately recognizing immigrant skills and experience. The income gap between the native-born population and immigrants was largest for visible immigrants, those who are distinctive in terms of physical appearance compared with the majority white host population.



The low income levels appeared to have slowed immigrant integration only slightly [6]. Statistically more influential for immigrant integration was the level of trust between immigrant and other communities, combined with the immigrants’ experiences of discrimination and feelings of vulnerability. These effects applied not only to the first generation of immigrants, but remained significant for the integration of the second generation. The benefits of diversity were thus undermined by poor economic outcomes and the effects of discrimination and low levels of trust.

Public attitudes toward immigration

The negative effects of discrimination are typically reflected in public attitudes towards immigrants. A study that summarizes the results of public opinion polls in 13 countries found significant variation in attitudes toward the level of immigration (whether it should be increased, stay the same, or be decreased) and the belief that immigrants improve a society by bringing new ideas and enriching the culture [7].

Where immigration is part of a nation-building effort (as in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand), attitudes tended to be more positive toward immigrants. For example, in Australia and Canada (and to a lesser but still significant extent in New Zealand), about a quarter of those who responded indicated that they wanted to see the level of immigration increased. This contrasts starkly with European countries, where the percentages of people who wanted to see immigration increase were in single digits. About one-third of Australian and Canadian respondents believed that immigration should be decreased, while in France, Germany, and the UK, two-thirds (or more) responded in the same way.

Attitudes about the benefits of immigration also varied considerably. Survey respondents in Switzerland were most likely to agree that immigration provides benefits, followed by respondents in Canada and New Zealand. The figures ranged from a high of 76% (in Switzerland) to a low of 33% (UK).

Government promotion of diversity

In situations of superdiversity, evidence indicates that government policy needs to address particular challenges: integration and social cohesion, economic performance, and social mobility [8]. The Cities for Local Integration Policy (CLIP) network provides an extensive list of policy options as part of a good-practice guide to promote integration and social cohesion [9]. In particular, they recommend that governments address a range of factors, including inclusive intercultural dialogue and the adoption of anti-discrimination law and policies, and provide support for migrant organizations. An important element is addressing negative attitudes and discrimination as contributing factors to community tension and exclusion.

Negative attitudes about the benefits of immigration, combined with discrimination, inhibit positive settlement outcomes and contribute to community tension. This raises the question of whether national and local authorities have been (or can be) influential in promoting the acceptance of immigrants and diversity, especially where communities are indifferent or even hostile to immigrants.

The European Union's Attitudes to Migrants, Communication, and Local Leadership (AMICALL) project examined how local authorities in six European countries (Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK) have responded to the challenges of immigrant integration, especially given anti-immigrant attitudes. In 2004, EU member states agreed that integration was a "dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States." The project sought to identify strategies for local authorities to promote integration, given the presence of large immigrant communities in some EU countries, as well as strong anti-immigrant attitudes (indicated by disagreement with the statement that diversity is a positive attribute and agreement that multiculturalism has reached its limit).

The AMICALL project discovered that local authorities are contributing to integration, even where national authorities have been reluctant to promote integration policies. There are substantial challenges in addressing anti-immigrant attitudes. The research concluded that strong leadership was required, along with a strong and inclusive local identity, two-way communication with citizens, and partnerships with stakeholders. It also noted, however, that evaluation and impact assessments of what works were lacking in the European context.

A second factor in the successful settlement of immigrants and acceptance of diversity is related to economic performance and outcomes. Governments can enhance economic outcomes for immigrants through:

- credential recognition;
- transition programs that provide relevant qualifications or work experience;
- language training; and
- job search techniques or business start-up support, as well as by encouraging firms to employ migrant job-seekers.

Vancouver provides a case study of a superdiverse city and the way in which federal and local government combine to enhance the economic integration of immigrants.

A third factor, social mobility, is directly related to economic outcomes, but research also links mobility to the social capital that is available to immigrants and to neighborhood effects such as the ethnic or socio-economic character of residential areas [8]. Impoverished and segregated communities have been associated with limited mobility, low levels of trust, and political radicalization (immigrant and anti-immigrant). Local and national government policies play an important role in ameliorating disadvantage and enhancing social mobility.

Superdiversity and culture

Superdiversity extends as well to issues of culture, including religion and language. Superdiversity has important implications for the use of language, especially an official language, and the notion that there are inevitably native speakers and a mother tongue. The plurality of language communities and the diversity of language use affect a range of communal and institutional practices and policies.

For example, in a superdiverse state like California, the question of the use of the Spanish language—such as whether it should be a formal or recognized language of California and what that would mean in practice—has been very divisive, despite the fact that Latinos now constitute a majority-minority in the state. Superdiversity is testing and altering the way in which a language is socialized—in both formal and informal settings—and the normative assumptions about language use. New technologies and online networking are adding to the complexity of the politics of language use.

Religious diversity has also increasingly characterized contemporary migration issues. The September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC, for example, increased anxieties in Western countries about non-Christian religions and the accommodation of newcomers' religions. A review of religious diversity highlighted the ways in which "Islam has become a symbol of religious and cultural otherness, illiberalism and pre-modernism,"

particularly for Europeans and North Americans [9]. As a consequence, large Muslim populations have “become problematic for many people in the West.”

According to this review of religious diversity, the anxiety about religion extends beyond concerns about superdiversity to concerns about the place of religion more broadly in modern liberal democracies [10]. Thus, it reflects not only the particularities of specific countries and communities, but also their historic experiences with immigration. Superdiversity, as well as immigration generally, has become increasingly associated with religious diversity and difference, and has produced new anxieties among communities of immigrant-receiving countries.

LIMITATIONS AND GAPS

The academic study of superdiversity has so far been confined to a limited number of countries, mostly those in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The literature also lacks a firm definition of what constitutes superdiversity in a country or region. One study uses a cultural-ethno-linguistic measure of cultural diversity. But there is a much larger literature on cultural diversity that examines superdiversity in the context of societal processes and outcomes.

Moreover, if ethnicity is used as the defining characteristic of superdiversity, then the way ethnic identity or immigrant status is recorded becomes an important concern. For example, some European countries record children born in the country to immigrant parents as “immigrants,” while countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand reserve this definition strictly for those who are foreign-born.

The quality of the data and the way in which ethnicity is recorded not only make country comparisons more difficult, but also make it difficult to establish causality. More countries and cities are becoming superdiverse as global migration flows add to the presence of already established local ethnic minorities. Evidence on the positive benefits of superdiversity is critical to the public debate.

SUMMARY AND POLICY ADVICE

The term “superdiversity” was coined to help explain the implications of the rapid growth in recent decades of immigrant and ethnic minority communities in many regions around the world. Academic researchers and policymakers are interested in understanding the implications of superdiversity for the nature of social interaction and the functioning of core institutions. There is evidence to indicate that the presence of superdiversity is a contributor to open and innovative societies and cities. At the same time, higher levels of diversity pose challenges, especially where the state or host communities expect conformity and immigrant assimilation. How societies ought to approach growing diversity has become a charged and politically sensitive issue.

Policy issues concern the benefits and outcomes of greater diversity: Does diversity contribute positively to economic and social development? What policies are required to successfully settle immigrants? And what is needed to help host communities adjust? The populism of anti-immigrant sentiments does not contribute to reasoned policy debates and often precludes policy options.

In situations of superdiversity, evidence indicates that government policy needs to address the challenges of integration and social cohesion, economic performance, and social mobility. To promote integration and social cohesion, governments can support inclusive

intercultural dialogue, adopt anti-discrimination law and policies, support migrant organizations, and address negative attitudes and discrimination that contribute to community tension and exclusion.

Governments can work to enhance economic performance and outcomes for immigrants through credential recognition, transition programs that provide relevant qualifications or work experience, language training, and job search techniques or business start-up support, as well as by encouraging firms to employ migrant job-seekers. Local and national government policies also play an important role in ameliorating disadvantage and enhancing social mobility, which is directly related to economic outcomes and social capital.

The Quiet German

The astonishing rise of Angela Merkel, the most powerful woman in the world.

BY GEORGE PACKER, *The New Yorker*



Herlinde Koelbl has been photographing Merkel since 1991. Koelbl says that Merkel has always been “a bit awkward,” but “you could feel her strength at the beginning.”

A summer afternoon at the Reichstag. Soft Berlin light filters down through the great glass dome, past tourists ascending the spiral ramp, and into the main hall of parliament. Half the members’ seats are empty. At the lectern, a short, slightly hunched figure in a fuchsia jacket, black slacks, and a helmet of no-color hair is reading a speech from a binder. Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and the world’s most powerful woman, is making every effort not to be interesting.

“As the federal government, we have been carrying out a threefold policy since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis,” Merkel says, staring at the binder. Her delivery is toneless, as if she were trying to induce her audience into shifting its attention elsewhere. “Besides the first part of this triad, targeted support for Ukraine, is, second, the unceasing effort to find a diplomatic solution for the crisis in the dialogue with Russia.” For years, public speaking was visibly painful to Merkel, her hands a particular source of trouble; eventually, she learned to bring her fingertips together in a diamond shape over her stomach.

The Reichstag was constructed under Kaiser Wilhelm I and Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, in the eighteen-eighties, when a newly unified Germany was making its first rise to preëminence in Europe. Two days before the end of the First World War, with a Bolshevik revolution spreading across the country, a social-democratic politician interrupted his lunch inside the Reichstag, stood at a second-floor balcony, and declared the end of imperial

Germany: “Long live the German republic!” The Reichstag was the turbulent seat of parliament through the Weimar era and into the start of Nazi rule, until, on the night of February 27, 1933, a suspicious fire broke out in the session chamber and nearly gutted the building. Germany’s new Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, rushed to the scene with his aide Joseph Goebbels and blamed the fire on the Communists, using the crisis to suspend civil liberties, crush the opposition, and consolidate all power into the Nazi Party. Parliament voted to render itself meaningless, and the Nazis never repaired the damaged building. At the end of the Second World War, the Soviets saw the Reichstag as the symbol of the Third Reich and made it a top target in the Battle for Berlin, laying heavy siege. A photograph of a Red Army soldier raising a Soviet flag amid the neoclassical statuary on the roof became the iconic image of German defeat.

During the Cold War, the Reichstag—its cupola wrecked, its walls bullet-pocked—was an abandoned relic in the no man’s land of central Berlin, just inside the British sector. The Wall, built in 1961, ran a few steps from the back of the building. A minimal renovation in the sixties kept out the elements, but the Reichstag was generally shunned until the Wall came down, in 1989. Then, at midnight on October 3, 1990, President Richard von Weizsäcker stood outside the Reichstag and announced to a crowd of a million people the reunification of Germany, in freedom and peace. Berlin became its capital.

For the next decade, until the Bundestag began convening there officially, the Reichstag was reconstructed in an earnestly debated, self-consciously symbolic manner that said as much about reunified Germany as its ruin had said about the totalitarian years. The magnificent dome, designed by Norman Foster, suggested transparency and openness. The famous words on the colonnaded entrance, “DEM DEUTSCHEN VOLKE” (“To the German People”)—fabricated out of melted-down French cannons from the Napoleonic Wars and affixed during the First World War—were preserved out of a sense of fidelity to history. But, after parliamentary argument, a German-American artist was commissioned to create a courtyard garden in which the more modest phrase “DER BEVÖLKERUNG” — “To the Populace,” without the nationalistic tone of the older motto—was laid out in white letters amid unruly plantings. During the Reichstag’s reconstruction, workers uncovered graffiti, in Cyrillic script, scrawled by Red Army soldiers on second-floor walls. After another debate, some of these were kept on display as historical reminders: soldiers’ names, “Moscow to Berlin 9/5/45,” even “I fuck Hitler in the ass.”

No other country memorializes its conquerors on the walls of its most important official building. Germany’s crimes were unique, and so is its way of reckoning with the history contained in the Reichstag. By integrating the slogans of victorious Russian soldiers into its parliament building, Germany shows that it has learned essential lessons from its past (ones that the Russians themselves missed). By confronting the twentieth century head on, Germans embrace a narrative of liberating themselves from the worst of their history. In Berlin, reminders are all around you. Get on the U-Bahn at Stadtmitte, between the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe and the Topography of Terror Gestapo museum, and glance up at the train’s video news ticker: “80 years ago today PEN Club-Berlin forced into exile.” Like a dedicated analysand, Germany has brought its past to the surface, endlessly discussed it, and accepted it, and this work of many years has freed the patient to lead a successful new life.

At the lectern, Merkel continues addressing parliament, recounting a meeting, in Brussels, of the Group of Seven, which has just expelled its eighth member, Russia, over the war in Ukraine. “We will be very persistent when it comes to enforcing freedom, justice, and self-determination on the European continent,” she says. “Our task is to protect Ukraine on its self-determined way, and to meet old-fashioned thinking about spheres of influence from the nineteenth and twentieth century with answers from the global twenty-first century.” Merkel has reached her rhetorical high point—signalled by a slowing of her monotone and a subtle hand gesture, fingers extended. To the non-German speaker, she could be reading out regulatory guidelines for the national rail system.

The Chancellor finishes to sustained applause and takes a seat behind the lectern, among her cabinet ministers. Merkel has lost weight—bedridden last winter after fracturing her pelvis in a cross-country-skiing accident, she gave up sausage sandwiches for chopped carrots and took off twenty pounds—and her slimmer face, with its sunken eyes and longer jowls, betrays her fatigue. She’s been Chancellor since 2005, having won a third term last September, with no challenger in sight.

After the Chancellor, it’s the turn of the opposition to speak—such as it is. The ruling coalition of Merkel’s Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats has eighty per cent of the seats in the Bundestag. The Greens, who did poorly in last year’s election, have had trouble distinguishing their agenda from Merkel’s, and often lend her support. On this day, the role of opposition is left to Die Linke, the leftist party of mostly former East German politicians, which has just ten per cent of parliament. Sahra Wagenknecht, an orthodox Marxist in a brilliant-red suit, steps behind the lectern and berates Merkel for her economic and foreign policies, which, she says, are bringing Fascism back to Europe. “We must stop abusing a highly dangerous, half-hegemonic position that Germany slid into, in the ruthless old German style,” Wagenknecht declares. She then cites the French historian Emmanuel Todd: “Unknowingly, the Germans are on their way to again take their role as bringers of calamity for the other European peoples, and later for themselves.”

Merkel ignores her. She’s laughing about something with her economics minister, Sigmar Gabriel, and her foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, both Social Democrats. While Wagenknecht accuses the government of supporting Fascists in Kiev, Merkel gets up to chat with her ministers in the back row. She returns to her seat and rummages in an orange-red leather handbag that clashes with her jacket. When she glances up at Wagenknecht, it’s with a mixture of boredom and contempt.

The speaker ends her jeremiad, and the only people to clap are the members of Die Linke, isolated in the far-left section of the chamber. One by one, Social Democratic and Green parliamentarians come forward to defend Merkel. “How can you connect us Germans to Fascists?” Katrin Göring-Eckardt, a Green leader, asks, to applause. Another woman from Die Linke throws a quote of Bertolt Brecht at Göring-Eckardt: “Who does not know the truth is simply a fool, yet who knows the truth and calls it a lie is a criminal.” Göring-Eckardt is outraged. The vice-president of the Bundestag orders the woman from Die Linke to observe protocol. Merkel keeps ignoring the exchange, at one point turning her back, at another leaving the hall. Later, German news accounts will speak of high drama in the normally drowsy Bundestag, but Merkel’s body language tells the story: the drama has been provided by an insignificant minority. Chancellor Merkel has the parliament under control.

The historian Fritz Stern calls the era of reunification “Germany’s second chance” — a fresh opportunity to be Europe’s preëminent power, after the catastrophic period of aggression that began a century ago. Merkel seems perfectly matched to the demands of this second chance. In a country where passionate rhetoric and macho strutting led to ruin, her analytical detachment and lack of apparent ego are political strengths. On a continent where the fear of Germany is hardly dead, Merkel’s air of ordinariness makes a resurgent Germany seem less threatening. “Merkel has a character that suggests she’s one of us,” Göring-Eckardt told me. Germans call the Chancellor Mutti, or Mommy. The nickname was first applied by Merkel’s rivals in the Christian Democratic Union as an insult, and she didn’t like it, but after Mutti caught on with the public Merkel embraced it.

While most of Europe stagnates, Germany is an economic juggernaut, with low unemployment and a resilient manufacturing base. The ongoing monetary crisis of the euro zone has turned Germany, Europe’s largest creditor nation, into a regional superpower — one of Merkel’s biographers calls her “the Chancellor of Europe.” While America slides into ever-deeper inequality, Germany retains its middle class and a high level of social solidarity. Angry young protesters fill the public squares of countries around the world, but German crowds gather for outdoor concerts and beery World Cup celebrations. Now almost pacifist after its history of militarism, Germany has stayed out of most of the recent wars that have proved punishing and inconclusive for other Western countries. The latest E.U. elections, in May, saw parties on the far left and the far right grow more popular around the Continent, except in Germany, where the winners were the centrists whose bland faces — evoking economics professors and H.R. managers — smiled on campaign posters, none more ubiquitous than that of Merkel, who wasn’t even on the ballot. American politics is so polarized that Congress has virtually stopped functioning; the consensus in Germany is so stable that new laws pour forth from parliament while meaningful debate has almost disappeared.

“The German self-criticism and self-loathing are part of the success story — getting strong by hating yourself,” Mariam Lau, a political correspondent for the weekly newspaper *Die Zeit*, told me. “And Merkel had to reëducate herself, too. She’s part of the self-reëducation of Germany.”

Among German leaders, Merkel is a triple anomaly: a woman (divorced, remarried, no children), a scientist (quantum chemistry), and an Ossi (a product of East Germany). These qualities, though making her an outsider in German politics, also helped to propel her extraordinary rise. Yet some observers, attempting to explain her success, look everywhere but to Merkel herself. “There are some who say what should not be can’t really exist — that a woman from East Germany, who doesn’t have the typical qualities a politician should have, shouldn’t be in this position,” Göring-Eckardt, another woman from East Germany, said. “They don’t want to say she’s just a very good politician.” Throughout her career, Merkel has made older and more powerful politicians, almost all of them men, pay a high price for underestimating her.

Merkel was born in Hamburg, West Germany, in 1954. Her father, Horst Kasner, was an official in the Lutheran Church, one of the few institutions that continued operating in both Germanys after the postwar division of the country. Serious and demanding, he moved the family across the frontier just a few weeks after Angela’s birth — and against his wife’s wishes — to take up ecclesiastical duties in the German Democratic Republic. That year,

almost two hundred thousand East Germans fled in the other direction. Kasner's unusual decision led West German Church officials to call him "the red minister." Joachim Gauck, a former East German pastor and dissident, who, in 2012, was elected Germany's largely ceremonial President, once told a colleague that people in the Lutheran Church under Communism knew to stay away from Kasner, a member of the state-controlled Federation of Evangelical Pastors. By most accounts, Kasner's motives were as much careerist as ideological.

Angela, the oldest of three children, was raised on the outskirts of Templin, a cobblestoned town in the pine forests of Brandenburg, north of Berlin. The Kasners lived in the seminary at Waldhof, a complex of around thirty buildings, many from the nineteenth century, belonging to the Lutheran Church. Waldhof was—and remains—home to several hundred physically and mentally disabled people, who learned trades and grew crops. Ulrich Schoeneich, who managed the estate in the eighties and knew the Kasners, described Waldhof under the East Germans as a grim place, with up to sixty men crammed into a single room, and no furniture except cots. Merkel once recalled seeing some residents strapped to benches, but she also said, "To grow up in the neighborhood of handicapped people was an important experience for me. I learned back then to treat them in a very normal way."

Merkel's upbringing in a Communist state was as normal as she could make it. "I never felt that the G.D.R. was my home country," she told the German photographer Herlinde Koelbl, in 1991. "I have a relatively sunny spirit, and I always had the expectation that my path through life would be relatively sunny, no matter what happened. I have never allowed myself to be bitter. I always used the free room that the G.D.R. allowed me. . . . There was no shadow over my childhood. And later I acted in such a way that I would not have to live in constant conflict with the state." During her first campaign for Chancellor, in 2005, she described her calculations more bluntly: "I decided that if the system became too terrible, I would have to try to escape. But if it wasn't too bad then I wouldn't lead my life in opposition to the system, because I was scared of the damage that would do to me."

Being the daughter of a Protestant minister from the West carried both privileges and liabilities. The Kasners had two cars: the standard East German Trabant, an underpowered little box that has become the subject of kitschy Ostalgia, and a more luxurious Wartburg, their official church car. The family received clothes and food from relatives in Hamburg, as well as money in the form of "Forum checks," convertible from Deutsche marks and valid in shops in large East Berlin hotels that sold Western consumer items. "They were elite," Erika Benn, Merkel's Russian teacher in Templin, said. But the Church retained enough independence from the state that the Kasners lived under constant suspicion, and during Angela's childhood religious organizations came to be seen as agents of Western intelligence. In 1994, an official report on repression in East Germany concluded, "The country of Martin Luther was de-Christianized by the end of the G.D.R."

Angela's mother, Herlind, suffered the most in the family. An English teacher who imparted her passion for learning to Angela, Herlind wrote to the education authorities every year asking for a job, and every year she was told that nothing was available, even though English teachers were in desperately short supply. "She always felt oppressed by her husband," Schoeneich, the Waldhof manager, told me.

Angela was physically clumsy — she later called herself “a little movement idiot.” At the age of five, she could barely walk downhill without falling. “What a normal person knows automatically I had to first figure out mentally, followed by exhausting exercise,” she has said. According to Benn, as a teen-ager Merkel was never “bitchy” or flirtatious; she was uninterested in clothes, “always colorless,” and “her haircut was impossible — it looked like a pot over her head.” A former schoolmate once labelled her a member of the Club of the Unkissed. (The schoolmate, who became Templin’s police chief, nearly lost his job when the comment was published.) But Merkel was a brilliant, ferociously motivated student. A longtime political associate of Merkel’s traces her drive to those early years in Templin. “She decided, ‘O.K., you don’t fuck me? I will fuck you with my weapons,’ “ the political associate told me. “And those weapons were intelligence and will and power.”

When Angela was in the eighth grade, Benn recruited her for the Russian Club and coached her to compete in East Germany’s Russian-language Olympiad. During skits that the students practiced in the teacher’s tiny parlor, Benn had to exhort her star student to look up and smile while offering another student a glass of water in Russian: “Can’t you be a little more friendly?” Merkel won at every level, from schoolwide to countrywide, a feat that she managed three times, to the glory of Frau Benn, a Party member with small-town ambitions. In her tidy apartment in Templin, Benn, who is seventy-six, proudly showed me a victory certificate from 1969. “I have the Lenin bust in the cellar,” she said. Not long before Horst Kasner died, in 2011, he sent a newspaper clipping to a colleague of Benn’s, with a picture of Merkel standing next to Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin. To Benn’s delight, Putin was quoted expressing his admiration for the first world leader with whom he could converse in his mother tongue.

In 1970, an incident exposed the fragile standing of the bürgerlich Kasner family. At a local Party meeting, the Russian Club’s latest triumph was announced, and Benn expected praise. Instead, the schools supervisor observed acidly, “When the children of farmers and workers win, that will be something.” Benn burst into tears.

Merkel studied physics at Leipzig University and earned a doctorate in quantum chemistry in Berlin. She was allowed to pursue graduate studies, in no small part because she never ran afoul of the ruling party. Ulrich Schoeneich, who became Templin’s mayor after reunification, expressed bitterness to me that Merkel hasn’t been challenged much on her accommodation with the East German system. Schoeneich’s father, Harro, was also a Protestant minister, but, unlike Kasner, he openly dissented from the state. Ulrich Schoeneich refused to join the Free German Youth, the blue-shirted “fighting reserve” of the ruling party which the vast majority of East German teen-agers joined, including Angela Kasner, who participated well into adulthood. “Not just as a dead person in the files but as the officer responsible for agitation and propaganda,” Schoeneich told me, referring to a revelation in a controversial recent biography, “The First Life of Angela M.” He added, “I’m convinced that she could get her doctorate only because she was active in the Free German Youth, even in her postgraduate days. Most people say it was forced, but I demonstrated that you didn’t have to join it.” Merkel herself once admitted that her participation in the Free German Youth was “seventy per cent opportunism.”

Schoeneich wasn’t permitted to finish high school, and he spent much of his early life in the shadow cast by his family’s principled opposition. Angela Kasner had other ideas for her future, and became, at most, a passive opponent of the regime. Evelyn Roll, one of Merkel’s

biographers, discovered a Stasi document, dated 1984, that was based on information provided by a friend of Merkel's. It described Merkel as "very critical toward our state," and went on, "Since its foundation, she was thrilled by the demands and actions of Solidarity in Poland. Although Angela views the leading role of the Soviet Union as that of a dictatorship which all other socialist countries obey, she is fascinated by the Russian language and the culture of the Soviet Union."

Rainer Eppelmann, a courageous dissident clergyman under Communism, who got to know Merkel soon after the fall of the Wall, refuses to criticize her. "I don't judge the ninety-five per cent," he told me. "Most of them were whisperers. They never said what they thought, what they felt, what they were afraid of. Even today, we're not completely aware what this did to people." He added, "In order to be true to your hopes, your ambitions, your beliefs, your dreams, you had to be a hero twenty-four hours a day. And nobody can do this."

After 1989, when the chance came to participate in democratic politics, these same qualities became useful to Merkel, in a new way. Eppelmann explained, "The whisperer might find it easier to learn in this new life, to wait and see, and not just burst out at once—to think things over before speaking. The whisperer thinks, How can I say this without damaging myself? The whisperer is somebody who might be compared to a chess player. And I have the impression that she thinks things over more carefully and is always a few moves ahead of her competitor."

In 1977, at twenty-three, Angela married a physicist, Ulrich Merkel, but the union foundered quickly, and she left him in 1981. She spent the final moribund decade of the G.D.R. as a quantum chemist at the East German Academy of Sciences, a gloomy research facility, across from a Stasi barracks, in southeastern Berlin. She co-authored a paper titled "Vibrational Properties of Surface Hydroxyls: Nonempirical Model Calculations Including Anharmonicities." She was the only woman in the theoretical-chemistry section—a keen observer of others, intensely curious about the world.

People who have followed her career point to Merkel's scientific habit of mind as a key to her political success. "She is about the best analyst of any given situation that I could imagine," a senior official in her government said. "She looks at various vectors, extrapolates, and says, 'This is where I think it's going.'" Trained to see the invisible world in terms of particles and waves, Merkel learned to approach problems methodically, drawing comparisons, running scenarios, weighing risks, anticipating reactions, and then, even after making a decision, letting it sit for a while before acting. She once told a story from her childhood of standing on a diving board for the full hour of a swimming lesson until, at the bell, she finally jumped.

Scientific detachment and caution under dictatorship can be complementary traits, and in Merkel's case they were joined by the reticence, tinged with irony, of a woman navigating a man's world. She once joked to the tabloid Bild Zeitung, with double-edged self-deprecation, "The men in the laboratory always had their hands on all the buttons at the same time. I couldn't keep up with this, because I was thinking. And then things suddenly went 'poof,' and the equipment was destroyed." Throughout her career, Merkel has made a virtue of biding her time and keeping her mouth shut.

"She's not a woman of strong emotions," Bernd Ulrich, the deputy editor of Die Zeit, said. "Too much emotion disturbs your reason. She watches politics like a scientist." He called her

“a learning machine.” Volker Schlöndorff, the director of “The Tin Drum” and other films, got to know Merkel in the years just after reunification. “Before you contradict her, you would think twice—she has the authority of somebody who knows that she’s right,” he said. “Once she has an opinion, it seems to be founded, whereas I tend to have opinions that I have to revise frequently.”

Every morning, Merkel took the S-Bahn to the Academy of Sciences from her apartment in Prenzlauer Berg, a bohemian neighborhood near the city center. For several stretches, her train ran parallel to the Wall, the rooftops of West Berlin almost in reach. Sometimes she commuted with a colleague, Michael Schindhelm. “You were confronted every day, from the morning on, with the absurdity of this city,” he told me. Schindhelm found Merkel to be the most serious researcher in the theoretical-chemistry section, frustrated by her lack of access to Western publications and scientists. Whenever her colleagues left the building to cheer the motorcade of a high-profile guest from the Communist world on its way from Schönefeld Airport, she stayed behind. “She really wanted to achieve something,” Schindhelm said. “Others just liked sitting in that comfortable niche while the country went down the drain.”

In 1984, Schindhelm and Merkel began sharing an office and, over Turkish coffee that she made, became close. They both had a fairly critical view of the East German state. Schindhelm had spent five years studying in the Soviet Union, and when news of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika policy seeped into East Germany, through West German television, Merkel questioned him about the potential for fundamental change. They both felt that the world on the other side of the Wall was more desirable than their own. (Years later, Schindhelm, who became a theatre and opera director, was revealed to have been coerced by the Stasi into serving as an informer, though he apparently never betrayed anyone.)

One day in 1985, Merkel showed up at the office with the text of a speech by the West German President, Richard von Weizsäcker, given on the fortieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War. Weizsäcker spoke with unprecedented honesty about Germany’s responsibility for the Holocaust and declared the country’s defeat a day of liberation. He expressed a belief that Germans, in facing their past, could redefine their identity and future. In the West, the speech became a landmark on the country’s return to civilization. But in East Germany, where ideology had twisted the history of the Third Reich beyond recognition, the speech was virtually unknown. Merkel had procured a rare copy through her connections in the Church, and she was deeply struck by it.

Being an East German meant retaining faith in the idea of Germany even though many West Germans, who needed it less, had given up on reunification. As East Germany decayed, its citizens had nothing else to hold on to, whereas Westerners had been taught to suppress feelings of nationhood. “People were really lacking identity—there was an enormous vacuum to making sense of your existence,” Schindhelm said. Merkel’s excitement about the speech showed that “she had a very particular passion for Germany as a country, its history and culture.”

The next year, Merkel was granted permission to travel to Hamburg for a cousin’s wedding. After riding the miraculously comfortable trains through West Germany, she returned to East Berlin convinced that the socialist system was doomed. “She came back very impressed, but she came back,” Schindhelm said. “She stayed not out of loyalty to the state but because she had her network there, her family.” Merkel, in her early thirties, was looking forward to

2014—when she would turn sixty, collect her state pension, and be allowed to travel to California.

Merkel's second life began on the night of November 9, 1989. Instead of joining the delirious throngs pouring through the Wall, which had just been opened, she took her regular Thursday-evening sauna with a friend. Later, she crossed into the West with a crowd at the Bornholmer Strasse checkpoint, but instead of continuing with other Ossis to the upscale shopping district of Kurfürstendamm she returned home, in order to get up for work in the morning. Her actions on that momentous night have been ridiculed as a sign of banality and a lack of feeling. But, in the following months, no East German seized the new freedoms with more fervor than Merkel. Few irreducible principles have been evident in her political career, but one of them is the right to the pursuit of happiness. "There aren't many feelings that she's really into, but liberty and freedom are very important," Göring-Eckardt, the Green leader, said. "And this is, of course, linked to the experience of growing up in a society where newspapers were censored, books were banned, travel was forbidden."

A month after the Wall fell, Merkel visited the offices of a new political group called Democratic Awakening, which were near her apartment. "Can I help you?" she asked. She was soon put to work setting up the office computers, which had been donated by the West German government. She kept coming back, though at first hardly anyone noticed her. It was the kind of fluid moment when things happen quickly and chance and circumstance can make all the difference. In March, 1990, the leader of Democratic Awakening, Wolfgang Schnur, was exposed as a Stasi informer, and at an emergency board meeting Rainer Eppelmann, the dissident clergyman, was chosen to replace him. Merkel was asked to handle the noisy crowd of journalists outside the door, and she did it with such calm assurance that, after the East German elections that March, Eppelmann suggested Merkel as a spokesman for the country's first and last democratically elected Prime Minister, Lothar de Maizière.

"She was fleissig—the opposite of lazy," Eppelmann recalled. "She never put herself in the foreground. She understood that she had to do a job here and do it well, but not to be the chief. Lothar de Maizière was the chief." De Maizière already had a spokesman, so Merkel became the deputy. "The No. 1 press speaker showed off while she did all the work," Eppelmann said. In this way, she earned de Maizière's trust, and he brought her with him on visits to foreign capitals. He once described Merkel as looking like "a typical G.D.R. scientist," wearing "a baggy skirt and Jesus sandals and a cropped haircut." After one foreign trip, he asked his office manager to take her clothes shopping.

In the early nineties, Volker Schlöndorff began attending monthly dinners with a small group that included Merkel and her partner, Joachim Sauer, another scientist. (They married in 1998.) Some participants were from the East, others from the West; at each meal, the host would narrate his or her upbringing, illuminating what life was like on one side of the divide. Schlöndorff found Merkel to be an earnest but witty conversation partner. One evening, at the extremely modest country house that Merkel and Sauer had built, near Templin, she and Schlöndorff went for a walk through the fields. "We spoke about Germany, what it is going to become," Schlöndorff recalled. "I was trying irony and sarcasm, which didn't take with her at all. It was as if she were saying, 'Come on, be serious, matters not to be joked about.' "

Merkel's decision to enter politics is the central mystery of an opaque life. She rarely speaks publicly about herself and has never explained her decision. It wasn't a long-term career plan—like most Germans, she didn't foresee the abrupt collapse of Communism and the opportunities it created. But when the moment came, and Merkel found herself single and childless in her mid-thirties—and laboring in an East German institution with no future—a woman of her ambition must have grasped that politics would be the most dynamic realm of the new Germany. And, as Schlöndorff dryly put it, "With a certain hesitation, she seized the day."

Reunification really meant annexation of the East by the West, which required giving East Germans top government positions. Merkel's gender and youth made her an especially appealing option. In October, 1990, she won a seat in the new Bundestag, in Bonn, the first capital of reunified Germany. She got herself introduced to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and de Maizière suggested that Kohl bring her into his cabinet. To Merkel's surprise, she was named minister of women and youth—a job, she admitted to a journalist, in which she had no interest. She wasn't a feminist politician, nor was economic parity for the former East her cause. She had no political agenda at all. According to Karl Feldmeyer, the political correspondent for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, what drove Merkel was "her perfect instinct for power, which, for me, is the main characteristic of this politician."

Kohl, then at his height as a statesman, presented Merkel to foreign dignitaries as a curiosity, belittling her by calling her "mein Mädchen"—his girl. She had to be taught how to use a credit card. Cabinet meetings were dominated by Kohl, and though Merkel was always well prepared, she seldom spoke. But inside her ministry Merkel was respected for her efficient absorption of information, and feared for her directness and temper. According to her biographer Evelyn Roll, she acquired the nickname Angie the Snake, and a reputation for accepting little criticism. When, in 1994, Merkel was given the environment portfolio, she quickly fired the ministry's top civil servant after he suggested that she would need his help running things.

In 1991, Herlinde Koelbl, the photographer, began taking pictures of Merkel and other German politicians for a study called "Traces of Power." Her idea was to see how life in the public eye changed them in the course of a decade. Most of the men, such as Gerhard Schröder, a Social Democrat who became Chancellor in 1998, and Joschka Fischer, who became his foreign minister, seemed to swell with self-importance. Merkel remained herself, Koelbl told me: "in her body language, a bit awkward." But, she added, "You could feel her strength at the beginning." In the first portrait, she has her chin slightly lowered and looks up at the camera—not exactly shy, but watchful. Subsequent pictures display growing confidence. During the sessions, Merkel was always in a hurry, never making small talk. "Schröder and Fischer, they are vain," Koelbl said. "Merkel is not vain—still. And that helped her, because if you're vain you are subjective. If you're not vain, you are more objective."

Democratic politics was a West German game, and Merkel had to learn how to play it in the methodical way that she had learned how to command her body as a "little movement idiot" of five. She became such an assiduous student that some colleagues from the former East found it unsettling. Petra Pau, a senior member of the Bundestag from Die Linke, once caught Merkel saying "we West Germans." But what made Merkel a potentially transformative figure in German politics was that, below the surface, she didn't belong. She

joined the Christian Democratic Union after Democratic Awakening merged with it, ahead of the 1990 elections; the C.D.U. was more hospitable than the Social Democrats were to liberal-minded East Germans. But the C.D.U. was also a stodgy patriarchy whose base was in the Catholic south. “She never became mentally a part of the C.D.U., until now,” Feldmeyer, of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, said. “She is strange to everything in the Party. It is only a function of her power, nothing else.”

Alan Posener, of the conservative newspaper *Die Welt*, told me, “The things that motivate the heartland of the C.D.U. don’t mean a thing to her” — concerns about “working mothers, gay marriage, immigration, divorce.” The same was true of the transatlantic alliance with America, the cornerstone of West German security: Posener said that she studied its details in “the C.D.U. manual.” Michael Naumann, a book publisher and journalist who served as culture minister under Schröder, said, “Her attitude toward the United States is a learned attitude.” Dirk Kurbjuweit, a biographer of Merkel and a correspondent for *Der Spiegel*, said, “Merkel really is a friend of freedom, because she suffered under not being free in the G.D.R. But in the other way she’s a learned democrat — not a born democrat, like Americans.”

West German politicians of Merkel’s generation were shaped by the culture wars that followed the upheavals of 1968, which didn’t touch her at all. Over dinner one night in the mid-nineties, Merkel asked Schlöndorff, a former radical, to explain the violence perpetrated by the Baader-Meinhof Group. He told her that young people had needed to break with the authoritarian culture that had never been repudiated in West Germany after the defeat of the Nazis. The more he explained, the less Merkel seemed to sympathize — she wasn’t against authority, just the East German kind. What did kids in the West have to protest about? She didn’t always hide a feeling that West Germans were like spoiled children.

For all the catching up Merkel had to do in her political education, being East German gave her advantages: she had learned self-discipline, strength of will, and silence as essential tools. Feldmeyer said, “The G.D.R. shaped her in such an extreme and strong way as no one who grew up in the Federal Republic can imagine. Everything was a question of survival, and it was impossible to make errors if you wanted to succeed.”

Early in her career, Merkel hired a young C.D.U. worker named Beate Baumann to run her office. Baumann, who remains her most influential adviser, was the perfect No. 2 — loyal, discreet to the vanishing point, and, according to some insiders, the only aide who addressed the boss with complete candor. “Baumann could not be a politician, and Merkel didn’t know the West,” Bernd Ulrich, of *Die Zeit*, who knows both women well, told me. “So Baumann was her interpreter for everything that was typically West German.” Fed up with Kohl’s smug bullying, the two women practiced a form of “invisible cruelty”: they played hardball but relished their victories privately, without celebrating in public and making unnecessary enemies. Their style, Ulrich said, is “not ‘House of Cards.’” On one rare occasion, Merkel bared her teeth. In 1996, during negotiations over a nuclear-waste law, Gerhard Schröder, two years away from becoming Chancellor, called her performance as environment minister “pitiful.” In her interview with Herlinde Koelbl that year, Merkel said, “I will put him in the corner, just like he did with me. I still need time, but one day the time will come for this, and I am already looking forward.” It took nine years for her to make good on the promise.

In 1998, amid a recession, Schröder defeated Kohl and became Chancellor. The next summer, Volker Schlöndorff, at a garden party outside his home, in Potsdam, introduced Merkel to a movie producer, half-jokingly calling her “Germany’s first female Chancellor.” Merkel shot Schlöndorff a look, as if he had called her bluff—How dare you?—which convinced him that she actually wanted the job. The producer, a C.D.U. member, was incredulous. Schlöndorff said, “These guys whose party had been in power forever could not imagine that a woman could be Chancellor—and from East Germany, no less.”

In November, 1999, the C.D.U. was engulfed by a campaign-finance scandal, with charges of undisclosed cash donations and secret bank accounts. Kohl and his successor as Party chairman, Wolfgang Schäuble, were both implicated, but Kohl was so revered that nobody in the Party dared to criticize him. Merkel, who had risen to secretary-general after the C.D.U.’s electoral defeat, saw opportunity. She telephoned Karl Feldmeyer. “I would like to give some comments to you in your newspaper,” she said.

“Do you know what you want to say?” Feldmeyer asked.

“I’ve written it down.”

Feldmeyer suggested that, instead of doing an interview, she publish an opinion piece. Five minutes later, a fax came through, and Feldmeyer read it with astonishment. Merkel, a relatively new figure in the C.D.U., was calling for the Party to break with its longtime leader. “The Party must learn to walk now and dare to engage in future battles with its political opponents without its old warhorse, as Kohl has often enjoyed calling himself,” Merkel wrote. “We who now have responsibility for the Party, and not so much Helmut Kohl, will decide how to approach the new era.” She published the piece without warning the tainted Schäuble, the Party chairman. In a gesture that mixed Protestant righteousness with ruthlessness, Kohl’s Mädchen was cutting herself off from her political father and gambling her career in a naked bid to supplant him. She succeeded. Within a few months, Merkel had been elected Party chairman. Kohl receded into history. “She put the knife in his back—and turned it twice,” Feldmeyer said. That was the moment when many Germans first became aware of Angela Merkel.

Years later, Michael Naumann sat next to Kohl at a dinner, and asked him, “Herr Kohl, what exactly does she want?”

“Power,” Kohl said, tersely. He told another friend that championing young Merkel had been the biggest mistake of his life. “I brought my killer,” Kohl said. “I put the snake on my arm.”

In 2002, Merkel found herself on the verge of losing a Party vote that would determine the C.D.U.’s candidate for Chancellor in elections that fall. She hastily arranged a breakfast with her rival, the Bavarian leader Edmund Stoiber, in his home town. Disciplined enough to control her own ambitions, Merkel told Stoiber that she was withdrawing in his favor. Schlöndorff sent her a note saying, in effect, “Smart move.” By averting a loss that would have damaged her future within the Party, Merkel ended up in a stronger position. Stoiber lost to Schröder, and Merkel went on to outmaneuver a series of male heavyweights from the West, waiting for them to make a mistake or eat one another up, before getting rid of each with a little shove.

John Kornblum, a former U.S. Ambassador to Germany, who still lives in Berlin, said, “If you cross her, you end up dead. There’s nothing cushy about her. There’s a whole list of alpha males who thought they would get her out of the way, and they’re all now in other walks of life.” On Merkel’s fiftieth birthday, in 2004, a conservative politician named Michael Glos published a tribute:

Careful: unpretentiousness can be a weapon! . . . One of the secrets of the success of Angela Merkel is that she knows how to deal with vain men. She knows you shoot a mountain cock best when it’s courting a hen. Angela Merkel is a patient hunter of courting mountain cocks. With the patience of an angel, she waits for her moment.

German politics was entering a new era. As the country became more “normal,” it no longer needed domineering father figures as leaders. “Merkel was lucky to live in a period when macho was in decline,” Ulrich said. “The men didn’t notice and she did. She didn’t have to fight them—it was an aikido politics.” Ulrich added, “If she knows anything, she knows her macho. She has them for her cereal.” Merkel’s physical haplessness, combined with her emotional opacity, made it hard for her rivals to recognize the threat she posed. “She’s very difficult to know, and that is a reason for her success,” the longtime political associate said. “It seems she is not from this world. Psychologically, she gives everybody the feeling of ‘I will take care of you.’”

When Schröder called early elections in 2005, Merkel became the C.D.U.’s candidate for Chancellor. In the politics of macho, Schröder and Fischer — working-class street fighters who loved political argument and expensive wine, with seven ex-wives between them — were preëminent. The two men despised Merkel, and the sentiment was reciprocated. According to Dirk Kurbjuweit, of *Der Spiegel*, Schröder and Fischer sometimes laughed “like boys on the playground” when Merkel gave speeches in the Bundestag. In 2001, after photographs were published of Fischer assaulting a policeman as a young militant in the seventies, Merkel denounced him, saying that he would be unfit for public life until he “atoned” — a comment that many Germans found strident. During the 2005 campaign, Fischer said in private talks that Merkel was incapable of doing the job.

At the time, Schröder’s Social Democrats ruled in a coalition with the Greens, and the public had grown weary of prolonged economic stagnation. Through most of the campaign, the C.D.U. held a large lead, but the Social Democrats closed the gap, and on Election Night the two parties were virtually tied in the popular vote. Alan Posener, of *Die Welt*, saw Merkel that night at Party headquarters — she seemed deflated, flanked by C.D.U. politicians she had once disposed of, who didn’t conceal their glee. Merkel had made two near-fatal mistakes. First, just before the Iraq War — unpopular in Germany, and repudiated by Schröder — she had published an op-ed in the *Washington Post* titled “Schroeder Doesn’t Speak for All Germans,” in which she stopped just short of supporting war. “One more sentence for Bush and against Schröder, and she would not be Chancellor today,” Ulrich said. Second, many of her advisers were free-market proponents who advocated changes to the tax code and to labor policies which went far beyond what German voters would accept. After fifteen years, she still didn’t have a fingertip feel for public opinion.

On Election Night, Merkel, Schröder, Fischer, and other party leaders gathered in a TV studio to discuss the results. Merkel, looking shell-shocked and haggard, was almost mute. Schröder, his hair colored chestnut and combed neatly back, grinned mischievously and effectively declared himself the winner. “I will continue to be Chancellor,” he said. “Do you

really believe that my party would take up an offer from Merkel to talk when she says she would like to become Chancellor? I think we should leave the church in the village" — that is, quit dreaming. Many viewers thought he was drunk. As Schröder continued to boast, Merkel slowly came to life, as if amused by the Chancellor's performance. She seemed to realize that Schröder's bluster had just saved her the Chancellorship. With a slight smile, she put Schröder in his place. "Plain and simple—you did not win today," she said. Indeed, the C.D.U. had a very slim lead. "With a little time to think about it, even the Social Democrats will come to accept this as a reality. And I promise we will not turn the democratic rules upside down."

Two months later, Merkel was sworn in as Germany's first female Chancellor.

Those who know Merkel say that she is as lively and funny in private as she is publicly soporific—a split in self-presentation that she learned as a young East German. (Through her spokesman, Merkel, who gives few interviews—almost always to German publications, and all anodyne—declined to speak to me.) In off-the-record conversations with German journalists, she replays entire conversations with other world leaders, performing wicked imitations. Among her favorite targets have been Kohl, Putin, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, former Pope Benedict XVI, and Al Gore. ("Ah have to teach mah people," she mimics, in a Prussian approximation of central Tennessee.) After one meeting with Nicolas Sarkozy, the French President, during the euro crisis, she told a group of journalists that Sarkozy's foot had been nervously jiggling the entire time.

Schlöndorff once asked Merkel what she and other leaders discuss during photo ops. The Chancellor described one such moment with Dmitri Medvedev, who briefly interrupted Putin's fifteen-year reign as Russia's President. She and Medvedev were posing for the cameras in Sochi when, gesturing toward the Black Sea, she said, in the Russian she had learned from Frau Benn, "President Putin told me that every morning he swims a thousand metres out there. Do you do things like that?" Medvedev replied, "I swim fifteen hundred metres." To Schlöndorff, the story showed that, "even when she is involved, she is never so totally involved that she could not observe the way people behave and be somehow amused by it."

"She is a master of listening," the longtime political associate said. "In a conversation, she speaks twenty per cent, you speak eighty per cent. She gives everybody the feeling 'I want to hear what you have to say,' but the truth is that her judgment is made within three minutes, and sometimes she thinks another eighteen minutes are wasted time. She is like a computer—'Is this possible, what this man proposes?' She's able in a very quick time to realize if it's fantasy."

Nor is she above embarrassing her minions. Once, in a hotel room in Vienna, in the company of Chancellery aides and foreign-ministry officials, Merkel was telling comical stories of camping trips she'd taken as a student. Her aides fell over themselves laughing, until Merkel cut them short: "I've told you this before." The aides insisted that they'd never heard the stories before, but it didn't matter: Madame Chancellor was calling them sycophants. After last year's elections, she met with the Social Democratic leader, Sigmar Gabriel, who is now her economics minister. Gabriel introduced Merkel to one of his aides, saying, "He's been keeping an eye on me for the past few years. He makes sure I don't do anything stupid in public." Merkel shot back, "And sometimes it's worked."

“Schadenfreude is Merkel’s way of having fun,” Kurbjuweit said.

Throughout her Chancellorship, Merkel has stayed as close as possible to German public opinion. Posener said that, after nearly losing to Schröder, she told herself, “I’m going to be all things to all people.” Critics and supporters alike describe her as a gifted tactician without a larger vision. Kornblum, the former Ambassador, once asked a Merkel adviser about her long-term view. “The Chancellor’s long-term view is about two weeks,” the adviser replied. The pejorative most often used against her is “opportunist.” When I asked Katrin Göring-Eckardt, the Green leader, whether Merkel had any principles, she paused, then said, “She has a strong value of freedom, and everything else is negotiable.” (Other Germans added firm support for Israel to the list.)

“People say there’s no project, there’s no idea,” the senior official told me. “It’s just a zigzag of smart moves for nine years.” But, he added, “She would say that the times are not conducive to great visions.” Americans don’t like to think of our leaders as having no higher principles. We want at least a suggestion of the “vision thing” — George H. W. Bush’s derisive term, for which he was derided. But Germany remains so traumatized by the grand ideologies of its past that a politics of no ideas has a comforting allure.

The most daunting challenge of Merkel’s time in office has been the euro-zone crisis, which threatened to bring down economies across southern Europe and jeopardized the integrity of the euro. To Merkel, the crisis confirmed that grand visions can be dangerous. Kohl, who thought in historical terms, had tied Germany to a European currency without a political union that could make it work. “It’s now a machine from hell,” the senior official said. “She’s still trying to repair it.”

Merkel’s decisions during the crisis reflect the calculations of a politician more mindful of her constituency than of her place in history. When Greek debt was revealed to be at critical levels, she was slow to commit German taxpayers’ money to a bailout fund, and in 2011 she blocked a French and American proposal for coordinated European action. Germany had by far the strongest economy in Europe, with a manufacturing base and robust exports that benefitted from the weakening of the euro. Under Schröder, Germany had instituted reforms in labor and welfare policies that made the country more competitive, and Merkel arrived just in time to reap the benefit. Throughout the crisis, Merkel buried herself in the economic details and refused to get out in front of what German voters — who tended to regard the Greeks as spendthrift and lazy — would accept, even if delaying prolonged the ordeal and, at key moments from late 2011 through the summer of 2012, threatened the euro itself. The novelist and journalist Peter Schneider compared her to a driver in foggy weather: “You only see five metres, not one hundred metres, so it’s better you are very careful, you don’t say too much, you act from step to step. No vision at all.”

Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, who was Germany’s defense minister between 2009 and 2011, said that Merkel took a “Machiavellian” approach to the crisis. She had the stamina to keep her options open as long as possible, and then veiled her decisions behind “the cloud of complexity.” Guttenberg said, “This made it easier for her to change her mind several times rather dramatically, but at the time no one noticed at all.” In the end, under pressure from other European leaders and President Obama, Merkel endorsed a plan for the European Central Bank to prevent Greek sovereign default by buying bonds — much as the Federal Reserve had done during the U.S. financial crisis. In exchange, the countries of southern Europe submitted to strict budget rules and E.U. oversight of their central banks. Merkel

realized that she could not allow the euro-zone crisis to capsize the project of European unity. “If the euro falls, then Europe falls,” she declared. The euro was saved, but at the price of ruinous austerity policies and high unemployment. Across much of Europe, Merkel—that Protestant minister’s daughter—is resented as a rigid, self-righteous puritan, while support for the E.U. has fallen to historic lows.

Merkel’s commitment to a united Europe is not that of an idealist. Rather, it comes from her sense of German interest—a soft form of nationalism that reflects the country’s growing confidence and strength. The historic German problem, which Henry Kissinger described as being “too big for Europe, too small for the world,” can be overcome only by keeping Europe together. Kurbjuweit said, “She needs Europe because—this is hard to say, but it’s true—Europe makes Germany bigger.”

Yet Merkel’s austerity policies have helped make Europe weaker, and Europe’s weakness has begun affecting Germany, whose export-driven economy depends on its neighbors for markets. The German economy has slowed this year, while European growth is anemic. Nevertheless, Germany remains committed to a balanced budget in 2015, its first since 1969, and is standing in the way of a euro-zone monetary policy of stimulating growth by buying up debt. In recent weeks, with global markets falling, a divide has opened between Merkel and other European leaders.

After 2005, Merkel had to mute her free-market thinking at home in order to preserve her political viability. Instead, she exported the ideas to the rest of the Continent, applying them with no apparent regard for macroeconomic conditions, as if the virtues of thrift and discipline constituted the mission of a resurgent Germany in Europe. Merkel is obsessed with demography and economic competitiveness. She loves reading charts. In September, one of her senior aides showed me a stack of them that the Chancellor had just been examining; they showed the relative performance of different European economies across a variety of indicators. In unit-labor costs, he pointed out, Germany lies well below the euro-zone average. But the population of Germany—the largest of any nation in Europe—is stagnant and aging. “A country like that cannot run up more and more debt,” the senior aide said.

Stefan Reinecke, of the left-wing daily *Die Tageszeitung*, said, “Half an hour into every speech she gives, when everyone has fallen asleep, she says three things. She says Europe has just seven per cent of the world’s people, twenty-five per cent of the economic output, but fifty per cent of the social welfare—and we have to change this.” Merkel frets that Germany has no Silicon Valley. “There’s no German Facebook, no German Amazon,” her senior aide said. “There is this German tendency, which you can see in Berlin: we’re so affluent that we assume we always will be, even though we don’t know where it will come from. Completely complacent.”

It makes Germans acutely uneasy that their country is too strong while Europe is too weak, but Merkel never discusses the problem. Joschka Fischer—who has praised Merkel on other issues—criticizes this silence. “Intellectually, it’s a big, big challenge to transform national strength into European strength,” he said. “And the majority of the political and economic élite in Germany has not a clue about that, including the Chancellor.”

The two world leaders with whom Merkel has her most important and complex relationships are Obama, who has won her reluctant respect, and Putin, who has earned her

deep distrust. When the Wall fell, Putin was a K.G.B. major stationed in Dresden. He used his fluent German and a pistol to keep a crowd of East Germans from storming the K.G.B. bureau and looting secret files, which he then destroyed. Twelve years later, a far more conciliatory Putin, by then Russia's President, addressed the Bundestag "in the language of Goethe, Schiller, and Kant," declaring that "Russia is a friendly-minded European country" whose "main goal is a stable peace on this continent." Putin praised democracy and denounced totalitarianism, receiving an ovation from an audience that included Merkel.

After decades of war, destruction, and occupation, German-Russian relations returned to the friendlier dynamic that had prevailed before the twentieth century. German policymakers spoke of a "strategic partnership" and a "rapprochement through economic interlocking." In 2005, Schröder approved the construction of a gas pipeline that crossed the Baltic Sea into Russia. He and Putin developed a friendship, with Schröder calling Putin a "flawless democrat." In the past decade, Germany has become one of Russia's largest trading partners, and Russia now provides Germany with forty per cent of its gas. Two hundred thousand Russian citizens live in Germany, and Russia has extensive connections inside the German business community and in the Social Democratic Party.

As a Russian speaker who hitchhiked through the Soviet republics in her youth, Merkel has a feel for Russia's aspirations and resentments which Western politicians lack. In her office, there's a framed portrait of Catherine the Great, the Prussian-born empress who led Russia during a golden age in the eighteenth century. But, as a former East German, Merkel has few illusions about Putin. After Putin's speech at the Bundestag, Merkel told a colleague, "This is typical K.G.B. talk. Never trust this guy." Ulrich, of *Die Zeit*, said, "She's always been skeptical of Putin, but she doesn't detest him. Detesting would be too much emotion."

When Putin and Merkel meet, they sometimes speak in German (he's better in her language than she is in his), and Putin corrects his own interpreter to let Merkel know that nothing is lost on him. Putin's brand of macho elicits in Merkel a kind of scientific empathy. In 2007, during discussions about energy supplies at the Russian President's residence in Sochi, Putin summoned his black Lab, Koni, into the room where he and Merkel were seated. As the dog approached and sniffed her, Merkel froze, visibly frightened. She'd been bitten once, in 1995, and her fear of dogs couldn't have escaped Putin, who sat back and enjoyed the moment, legs spread wide. "I'm sure it will behave itself," he said. Merkel had the presence of mind to reply, in Russian, "It doesn't eat journalists, after all." The German press corps was furious on her behalf—"ready to hit Putin," according to a reporter who was present. Later, Merkel interpreted Putin's behavior. "I understand why he has to do this—to prove he's a man," she told a group of reporters. "He's afraid of his own weakness. Russia has nothing, no successful politics or economy. All they have is this."

In early 2008, when President George W. Bush sought to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, Merkel blocked the move out of concern for Russia's reaction and because it could cause destabilization along Europe's eastern edge. Later that year, after Russia invaded two regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Merkel changed her position and expressed openness to Georgia's joining NATO. She remained careful to balance European unity, the alliance with America, German business interests, and continued engagement with Russia. Kaiser Wilhelm I is supposed to have remarked that only Bismarck, who tied Germany to a set of countervailing alliances, could juggle four or five balls. Bismarck's successor, Leo von

Caprivi, complained that he could barely manage two, and in 1890 he ended Germany's treaty with Russia, helping set the stage for the First World War.

When, this past March, Russia annexed Crimea and incited a separatist war in eastern Ukraine, it fell to Merkel to succeed where earlier German leaders had catastrophically failed.

The Russian aggression in Ukraine stunned the history-haunted, rule-upholding Germans. "Putin surprised everyone," including Merkel, her senior aide told me. "The swiftness, the brutality, the coldheartedness. It's just so twentieth century — the tanks, the propaganda, the agents provocateurs."

Suddenly, everyone in Berlin was reading Christopher Clark's "The Sleepwalkers," about the origins of the First World War. The moral that many Germans drew was to tread carefully — small fires could quickly turn into conflagrations. During a discussion about the First World War with students at the German Historical Museum, Merkel said, "I am regarded as a permanent delayer sometimes, but I think it is essential and extremely important to take people along and really listen to them in political talks."

Merkel ruled out military options, yet declared that Russia's actions were unacceptable — territorial integrity was an inviolable part of Europe's postwar order — and required a serious Western response. For the first time in her Chancellorship, she didn't have the public with her. In early polls, a plurality of Germans wanted Merkel to take a middle position between the West and Russia. A substantial minority — especially in the former East — sympathized with Russia's claim that NATO expansion had pushed Putin to act defensively, and that Ukrainian leaders in Kiev were Fascist thugs. Helmut Schmidt, the Social Democratic former Chancellor, expressed some of these views, as did Gerhard Schröder — who had become a paid lobbyist for a company controlled by the Russian state oil-and-gas giant Gazprom, and who celebrated his seventieth birthday with Putin, in St. Petersburg, a month after Russia annexed Crimea. The attitude of Schmidt and Schröder deeply embarrassed the Social Democrats.

A gap opened up between elite and popular opinion: newspapers editorializing for a hard line against Russia were inundated with critical letters. Merkel, true to form, did nothing to try to close the divide. For most Germans, the crisis inspired a combination of indifference and anxiety. Ukraine was talked about, if at all, as a far-off place, barely a part of Europe (not as the victim of huge German crimes in the Second World War). Germans resented having their beautiful sleep disturbed. "The majority want peace and to live a comfortable life," Alexander Rahr, a Russian energy expert who advises the German oil-and-gas company Wintershall, said. "They don't want conflict or a new Cold War. For this, they wish the U.S. would stay away from Europe. If Russia wants Ukraine, which not so many people have sympathy with, let them have it." In a way, Germany's historical guilt — which includes more than twenty million Soviet dead in the Second World War — adds to the country's passivity. A sense of responsibility for the past demands that Germany do nothing in the present. Ulrich, of *Die Zeit*, expressed the point brutally: "We once killed so much — therefore, we can't die today."

Germans and Russians are bound together by such terrible memories that any suggestion of conflict leads straight to the unthinkable. Michael Naumann put the Ukraine crisis in the context of "this enormous emotional nexus between perpetrator and victim," one that leaves

Germans perpetually in the weaker position. In 1999, Naumann, at that time the culture minister under Schröder, tried to negotiate the return of five million artifacts taken out of East Germany by the Russians after the Second World War. During the negotiations, he and his Russian counterpart, Nikolai Gubenko, shared their stories. Naumann, who was born in 1941, lost his father a year later, at the Battle of Stalingrad. Gubenko was also born in 1941, and his father was also killed in action. Five months later, Gubenko's mother was hanged by the Germans.

"Checkmate," the Russian told the German. Both men cried.

"There was nothing to negotiate," Naumann recalled. "He said, 'We will not give anything back, as long as I live.' "

Merkel takes a characteristically unsentimental view of Russia. Alexander Lambsdorff, a German member of the European Parliament, said, "She thinks of Russia as a traditional hegemonic power that was subdued for a while and now has reëmerged." Ukraine forced Merkel into a juggling act worthy of Bismarck, and she began spending two or three hours daily on the crisis. Publicly, she said little, waiting for Russian misbehavior to bring the German public around. She needed to keep her coalition in the Bundestag on board, including the more pro-Russian Social Democrats. And she had to hold Europe together, which meant staying in close touch with twenty-seven other leaders and understanding each one's constraints: how sanctions on Russia would affect London's financial markets; whether the French would agree to suspend delivery of amphibious assault ships already sold to the Russians; whether Poland and the Baltic states felt assured of NATO's support; the influence of Russian propaganda in Greece; Bulgaria's dependence on Russian gas. For sanctions to bite, Europe had to remain united.

Merkel also needed to keep open her channel to Putin. Even after the E.U. passed its first round of sanctions, in March, it was not German policy to isolate Russia—the two countries are too enmeshed. Merkel is Putin's most important interlocutor in the West; they talk every week, if not more often. "She's talked to Putin more than Obama, Hollande, and Cameron combined have over these past months," the senior official said. "She has a way of talking to him that nobody has. Cameron and Hollande call him to be able to say they're world leaders and had the conversation." Merkel can be tough to the point of unpleasantness, while offering Putin ways out of his own mess. Above all, she tries to understand how he thinks. "With Russia now, when one feels very angry I force myself to talk regardless of my feelings," she said at the German Historical Museum. "And every time I do this I am surprised at how many other views you can have on a matter which I find totally clear. Then I have to deal with those views, and this can also trigger something new." Soon after the annexation of Crimea, Merkel reportedly told Obama that Putin was living "in another world." She set about bringing him back to reality.

A German official told me, "The Chancellor thinks Putin believes that we're decadent, we're gay, we have women with beards"—a reference to Conchita Wurst, an Austrian drag queen who won the 2014 Eurovision song contest. "That it's a strong Russia of real men versus the decadent West that's too pampered, too spoiled, to stand up for their beliefs if it costs them one per cent of their standard of living. That's his wager. We have to prove it's not true." It's true enough that, if Merkel were to make a ringing call to defend Western values against Russian aggression, her domestic support would evaporate. When eight members of a European observer group, including four Germans, were taken hostage by pro-Russian

separatists in April—practically a *casus belli*, had they been Americans—the German government simply asked Putin to work for their release. Merkel was playing the game that had been successful for her in German politics: waiting for her adversary to self-destruct.

On at least one phone call, Putin lied to Merkel, something that he hadn't done in the past. In May, after Ukrainian separatists organized a widely denounced referendum, the official Russian statement was more positive than the stance that Merkel believed she and Putin had agreed on in advance. She cancelled their call for the following week—she had been misled, and wanted him to sense her anger. “The Russians were stunned,” the senior official said. “How could she cut the link?” Germany was the one country that Russia could not afford to lose. Karl-Georg Wellmann, a member of parliament from Merkel's party, who sits on the foreign-affairs committee, said that, as the crisis deepened and Germans began pulling capital out of Russia, Kremlin officials privately told their German counterparts that they wanted a way out: “We went too far—what can we do?” In Moscow restaurants, after the third vodka, the Russians would raise the ghosts of 1939: “If we got together, Germany and Russia, we would be the strongest power in the world.”

On June 6th, in Normandy, Merkel and Putin met for the first time since the crisis began, along with Obama, Hollande, Cameron, and Petro Poroshenko, the newly elected President of Ukraine, to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of D Day. News photographs showed Merkel greeting Putin like a disapproving hostess—lips pursed, eyebrows arched—while Putin's hard features came as close to ingratiation as is physically possible. In the optics of power, she was winning. “This political isolation hurts him,” her senior aide said. “He doesn't like to be left out.” (Russia had just been suspended from the Group of Eight.) Later, before lunch, Merkel orchestrated a brief conversation between Putin and Poroshenko. On the anniversary of D Day, Germany's leader was at the center of everything. As Kurbjuweit put it, “That was astonishing, to see all the winners of the Second World War, and to see the loser and the country which was responsible for all this—and she's the leader, everyone wants to talk to her! That is very, very strange. And this is only possible, I think, because it's Merkel—because she's so nice and quiet.”

The final ball Merkel has to keep in the air is the American one. Her opinion of Barack Obama has risen as his popularity has declined. In July, 2008, as a Presidential candidate, Obama wanted to speak at the Brandenburg Gate, in Berlin—the historic heart of the city, a location reserved for heads of state and government, not U.S. senators. Merkel rebuffed the request, so instead Obama spoke about European-American unity at the Victory Column, in the Tiergarten, before two hundred thousand delirious fans—a crowd Merkel could never have mustered, let alone mesmerized. “What puts her off about Obama is his high-flying rhetoric,” the senior official said. “She distrusts it, and she's no good at it. She says, ‘I want to see if he can deliver.’ If you want to sum up her philosophy, it's ‘under-promise and over-deliver.’”

In Obama's first years in office, Merkel was frequently and unfavorably compared with him, and the criticism annoyed her. According to Stern, her favorite joke ends with Obama walking on water. “She does not really think Obama is a helpful partner,” Torsten Krauel, a senior writer for Die Welt, said. “She thinks he is a professor, a loner, unable to build coalitions.” Merkel's relationship with Bush was much warmer than hers with Obama, the longtime political associate said. A demonstrative man like Bush sparks a response, whereas Obama and Merkel are like “two hit men in the same room. They don't have to talk—both

are quiet, both are killers.” For weeks in 2011 and 2012, amid American criticism of German policy during the euro-zone crisis, there was no contact between Merkel and Obama—she would ask for a conversation, but the phone call from the White House never came.

As she got to know Obama better, though, she came to appreciate more the ways in which they were alike—analytical, cautious, dry-humored, remote. Benjamin Rhodes, Obama’s deputy national-security adviser, told me that “the President thinks there’s not another leader he’s worked closer with than her.” He added, “They’re so different publicly, but they’re actually quite similar.” (Ulrich joked, “Obama is Merkel in a better suit.”) During the Ukraine crisis, the two have consulted frequently on the timing of announcements and been careful to keep the American and the European positions close. Obama is the antithesis of the swaggering leaders whom Merkel specializes in eating for breakfast. On a trip to Washington, she met with a number of senators, including the Republicans John McCain, of Arizona, and Jeff Sessions, of Alabama. She found them more preoccupied with the need to display toughness against America’s former Cold War adversary than with events in Ukraine themselves. (McCain called Merkel’s approach “milquetoast.”) To Merkel, Ukraine was a practical problem to be solved. This mirrored Obama’s view.

On the day I spoke with Rhodes, July 17th, the TV in his office, in the White House basement, showed the debris of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 strewn across a field in eastern Ukraine. The cause of the crash wasn’t yet clear, but Rhodes said, “If it was a Russian shoot-down, and Americans and Europeans were on board, that’s going to change everything.” In Germany, the change happened immediately. The sight of separatist fighters looting the belongings of dead passengers who had been shot out of the sky hit Germans more personally than months of ugly fighting among Ukrainians had. A civilian airliner, Dutch victims: “People realized that the sentimental attitude toward Putin and Russia was based on false assumptions,” a German diplomat said. The idea of maintaining equidistance between Russia and the West on Ukraine vanished. Though the crisis was beginning to hurt the German economy, Merkel now had three-quarters of the public behind her. In late July, the E.U. agreed on a sweeping new round of financial and energy sanctions.

Since then, Russian troops and weapons have crossed the border in large numbers, and the war has grown worse. In a speech in Australia last week, Merkel warned that Russian aggression was in danger of spreading, and she called for patience in a long struggle: “Who would’ve thought that twenty-five years after the fall of the Wall . . . something like that can happen right at the heart of Europe?” But, on the day she spoke, the E.U. failed to pass a new round of sanctions against Russia. Guttenberg, the former defense minister, said, “We are content with keeping the status quo, and kicking the can up the road—not down—and it keeps falling back on our feet.”

The close cooperation behind the scenes between Washington and Berlin coincides with a period of public estrangement. Germans told me that anti-Americanism in Germany is more potent now than at any time since the cruise-missile controversy of the early eighties. The proximate cause is the revelation, last fall, based on documents leaked by Edward Snowden to *Der Spiegel*, that the National Security Agency had been recording Merkel’s cell-phone calls for a decade. Merkel, ever impassive, expressed more annoyance than outrage, but with the German public the sense of betrayal was deep. It hasn’t subsided—N.S.A. transgressions came up in almost every conversation I had in Berlin—particularly because Obama, while promising that the eavesdropping had stopped, never publicly apologized. (He conveyed

his regret to Merkel privately.) “Tapping her phone is more than impolite,” Rainer Eppelmann, the former East German dissident, said. “It’s something you just don’t do. Friends don’t spy on friends.” (American officials I spoke with, though troubled by the effects of the breach, rolled their eyes over German naïveté and hypocrisy, since the spying goes both ways.)

German officials approached the Americans for a no-spy agreement, and were refused. The U.S. has no such arrangement with any country, including those in the so-called Five Eyes—the English-speaking allies that share virtually all intelligence. German officials claimed that the U.S. offered membership in the Five Eyes, then withdrew the offer. The Americans denied it. “It was never seriously discussed,” a senior Administration official said. “Five Eyes isn’t just an agreement. It’s an infrastructure developed over sixty years.”

“I tend to believe them,” the German diplomat said. “The Germans didn’t want Five Eyes when we learned about it. We’re not in a position, legally, to join, because our intelligence is so limited in scope.”

In July, officials of the German Federal Intelligence Service, or B.N.D., arrested a bureaucrat in their Munich office on suspicion of spying for the U.S. He had been caught soliciting business from the Russians via Gmail, and, when the Germans asked their American counterparts for information on the man, his account was suddenly shut down. Brought in for questioning, he admitted having passed documents (apparently innocuous) to a C.I.A. agent in Austria for two years, for which he was paid twenty-five thousand euros. The Germans retaliated, in unprecedented fashion, by expelling the C.I.A. station chief in Berlin. Coming soon after the N.S.A. revelations, this second scandal was worse than a crime—it was a blunder. Merkel was beside herself with exasperation. No U.S. official, in Washington or Berlin, seemed to have weighed the intelligence benefits against the potential political costs. The President didn’t know about the spy. “It’s fair to say the President should expect people would take into account political dynamics in making judgments about what we do and don’t do in Germany,” Rhodes said.

The spying scandals have undermined German public support for the NATO alliance just when it’s needed most in the standoff with Russia. Lambsdorff, the E.U. parliamentarian, told me, “When I stand before constituents and say, ‘We need a strong relationship with the U.S.,’ they say, ‘What’s the point? They lie to us.’” Germany’s rise to preëminence in Europe has made Merkel a committed transatlanticist, but “that’s useless now,” Lambsdorff said. “It deducts from her capital. Rebuffing Washington is good now in Germany.”

Obama was concerned enough to dispatch his chief of staff, Denis McDonough, to Berlin in late July, to mollify German officials. During a four-hour meeting, they agreed to create a framework for clearer rules about spying and intelligence sharing. But the details remain to be worked out, and barely half the German public now expresses a favorable view of the U.S.—the lowest level in Europe, other than in perpetually hostile Greece.

In a sense, German anti-Americanism is always waiting to be tapped. There’s a left-wing, anti-capitalist strain going back to the sixties, and a right-wing, anti-democratic version that’s even older. In the broad middle, where German politics plays out today, many Germans, especially older ones, once regarded the U.S. as the father of their democracy—a role that sets America up to disappoint. Peter Schneider, the novelist and journalist, expressed the attitude this way: “You have created a model of a savior, and now we find by

looking at you that you are not perfect at all—much less, you are actually corrupt, you are terrible businessmen, you have no ideals anymore.” With the Iraq War, Guantánamo, drones, the unmet expectations of the Obama Presidency, and now spying, “you actually have acted against your own promises, and so we feel very deceived.”

Beneath the rise in anti-Americanism and the German sympathy with Russia, something deeper might be at work. During the First World War, Thomas Mann put aside writing “The Magic Mountain” and began composing a strange, passionate series of essays about Germany and the war. They were published in 1918, just before the Armistice, as “Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man.” In it, Mann embraced the German cause in terms of national character and philosophy. He allied himself, as an artist, with Germany—“culture, soul, freedom, art”—against the liberal civilization of France and England that his older brother Heinrich supported, where intellect was always politicized. German tradition was authoritarian, conservative, and “nonpolitical”—closer to the Russian spirit than to the shallow materialism of democratic Europe. The war represented Germany’s age-old rebellion against the West. Imperial Germany refused to accept at gunpoint the universal principles of equality and human rights. Though Mann became a vocal supporter of democratic values in exile during the Nazi years, he never repudiated “Reflections.”

Several people in Berlin suggested that this difficult, forgotten book had something to say about Germany in the age of Merkel. The country’s peaceful reunification and its strength through the euro crisis might be returning Germany to an identity that’s older than the postwar Federal Republic, whose Basic Law was written under heavy American influence. “West Germany was a good country,” Georg Diez, a columnist and author, told me. “It was young, sexy, daring, Western—American. But maybe it was only a skin. Germany is becoming more German, less Western. Germany has discovered its national roots.”

Diez didn’t mean that this was a good thing. He meant that Germany is becoming less democratic, because what Germans fundamentally want is stability, security, economic growth—above all, to be left in peace while someone else watches their money and keeps their country out of wars. They have exactly the Chancellor they want. “Merkel took the politics out of politics,” Diez said.

Merkel, at sixty, is the most successful politician in modern German history. Her popularity floats around seventy-five per cent—unheard of in an era of resentment toward elected leaders. Plainness remains her political signature, with inflections of Protestant virtue and Prussian uprightness. Once, with a group of journalists at a hotel bar in the Middle East, she said, “Can you believe it? Here I am, the Chancellor! What am I doing here? When I was growing up in the G.D.R., we imagined capitalists with long black cloaks and top hats and cigars and big feet, like cartoons. And now here I am, and they have to listen to me!” Of course, there’s something calculated about her public image. “She’s so careful not to show any pretensions—which is a kind of pretension,” the senior official said.

Merkel still lives in central Berlin, in a rent-controlled apartment across a canal from the Pergamon, the great neoclassical antiquities museum. The name on the brass buzzer is her husband’s—“PROF. DR. SAUER”—and a solitary policeman stands outside. Dwarfed by her vast office in the massive concrete-and-glass Chancellery, Merkel works at an ordinary writing table just inside the door, preferring it to the thirteen-foot black slab that Schröder installed at the far end of the room. “This woman is neurotically busy,” the longtime

political associate said. “She sleeps never more than five hours. I can call her at one o’clock at night. She’s awake reading bureaucratic papers, not literature.”

Merkel entertains guests at the Chancellery with German comfort food — potato soup and stuffed cabbage. When she eats at her favorite Italian restaurant, it’s with just a few friends, and she doesn’t look up from the conversation to greet her public, who know to leave her alone. When her husband calls the Philharmoniker for tickets (Merkel and Sauer are music lovers, with a passion for Wagner and Webern) and is offered comps, he insists on giving his credit-card number, and the couple take their seats almost unnoticed. A friend of mine once sat next to Merkel at the salon she frequents, off Kurfürstendamm, and they chatted about hair. “Color is the most important thing for a woman,” the Chancellor, whose hair style is no longer the object of ridicule, offered.

Earlier this year, President Joachim Gauck made headlines when he called on Germany to take its global responsibilities more seriously, including its role in military affairs. It was the kind of speech that Merkel (who had no comment) would never give, especially after a poll commissioned by the foreign ministry in May showed that sixty per cent of the public was skeptical of greater German involvement in the world. German journalists find Merkel nearly impossible to cover. “We have to look for topics in the pudding,” Ulrich Schulte, who reports on the Chancellor for *Die Tageszeitung*, said. The private Merkel they admire and enjoy but are forbidden to quote disappears in public. Any aide or friend who betrays the smallest confidence is cast out. The German media, reflecting the times, are increasingly centrist, preoccupied with “wellness” and other life-style issues. Almost every political reporter I spoke with voted for Merkel, despite the sense that she’s making their work irrelevant. There was no reason not to.

Meanwhile, Merkel has neutralized the opposition, in large part by stealing its issues. She has embraced labor unions, lowered the retirement age for certain workers, and increased state payments to mothers and the old. (She told Dirk Kurbjuweit, of *Der Spiegel*, that, as Germany aged, she depended more on elderly voters.) In 2011, the Fukushima nuclear disaster, in Japan, shocked Merkel, and she reversed her position on nuclear power: Germany would phase it out through the next decade, while continuing to lead the world’s large industrial economies in solar and wind energy. (A quarter of the country’s energy now comes from renewable sources.) Meanwhile, she’s tried to rid her party of intolerant ideas — for example, by speaking out for the need to be more welcoming to immigrants. Supporters of the Social Democrats and the Greens have fewer and fewer reasons to vote at all, and turnout has declined. Schneider, a leading member of the generation of ’68, said, “This is the genius of Angela Merkel: she has actually made party lines senseless.”

This fall, in elections held in three states of the former East Germany, a new right-wing party, Alternative for Germany (AfD), showed strength, capturing as much as ten per cent of the vote. AfD wants Germany to withdraw from the euro zone and opposes Merkel’s liberal policies on gay marriage and immigration. In moving her own party to the center, Merkel has created a space in German politics for a populist equivalent to France’s Front National and the United Kingdom Independence Party. If the German economy continues to slow, Merkel will find it hard to float unchallenged above party politics as Mutti, the World Cup-winning soccer team’s biggest fan.

For now, the most pressing political question in Berlin is whether she’ll stand for a fourth term, in 2017. Joschka Fischer described Germany under Merkel as returning to the

Biedermeier period, the years between the end of the Napoleonic Wars, in 1815, and the liberal revolutions of 1848, when Central Europe was at peace and the middle class focussed on its growing wealth and decorative style. “She is governing Germany in a period where the sun is shining every day, and that’s the dream of every democratically elected politician,” Fischer said—but “there is no intellectual debate.” I suggested that every Biedermeier has to end. “Yes,” he said. “Mostly in a clash.”

A political consensus founded on economic success, with a complacent citizenry, a compliant press, and a vastly popular leader who rarely deviates from public opinion—Merkel’s Germany is reminiscent of Eisenhower’s America. But what Americans today might envy, with our intimations of national decline, makes thoughtful Germans uneasy. Their democracy is not old enough to be given a rest.

“We got democracy from you, as a gift I would say, in the forties and fifties,” Kurbjuweit told me. “But I’m not sure if these democratic attitudes are very well established in my country. We Germans always have to practice democracy—we’re still on the training program.” Kurbjuweit has just published a book called “There Is No Alternative.” It’s a phrase that Merkel coined for her euro policy, but Kurbjuweit uses it to describe the Chancellor’s success in draining all the blood out of German politics. “I don’t say democracy will disappear if Merkel is Chancellor for twenty years,” he said. “But I think democracy is on the retreat in the world, and there is a problem with democracy in our country. You have to keep the people used to the fact that democracy is a pain in the ass, and that they have to fight, and that everyone is a politician—not only Merkel.” ♦

NOTES

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