

Announcer: Welcome the Vice President and Director of the Brussels office at the German Marshall Fund, Dr. Ian Lesser and the moderator of Intelligence Squared U.S., Mr. John Donovan.

Ian L.: Good to see you all again. We've really been looking forward to this, because I think if you think about what we've been doing for the last few days, day and a half, this in a sense is the crystallizing argument, if I could put it that way.

Ian L.: And on behalf of JMF, if I just wanted to say how delighted we are to be able to do this again with Intelligence Squared.

John D.: It's our pleasure. Thank you.

Ian L.: It's really a great pleasure. For those of you who saw this last year, either here or watched it, it was a great experience. And Brussels Forum is all about putting together objective debate. And there are structured debates, there are free floating debates. We wanted to do something more structured, more professional and when we thought about doing that, there really was no better partner, because you really know how to do this so very, very well.

Ian L.: I'm going to let John talk about all of this, but just to say that, for those of you who are familiar with Oxford, the Oxford Union, Oxford style debates, there have been some really historic ones over time. It has really made history on occasion. So there's history to this process.

Ian L.: But also, there's a question of the choice of the proposition. We had a couple of other possibilities, we debated them, not as formally as we're going to do here, and we decided this was the one.

Ian L.: So without further ado, John, let me turn it over to you and we look forward to hearing what you all have to say about this. Thank you.

John D.: Thanks so much, Ian, thank you. It's really a pleasure to be here for the second time. I just want to take a couple of minutes and explain the way in which this thing that we're doing is a little bit different from everything else that's happening.

John D.: A couple of things, one is, one of them is that we've done now on Intelligence Squared 160 plus debates. And we produce them as a television program and a radio program and a podcast. And we're doing that now. Everything that's happening here will be part of a podcast.

John D.: And for that reason, I want to explain that we have certain formalities that you'll see us going through, certain kinds of introductions. I'll be saying things from time to time, like I'm John Donovan and I'll be right back, but I will not actually go anywhere. So I just want you to get the picture of what's happening in that.

John D.: And for that reason also, it's important for a couple of reasons for the audience, especially that hears this by podcast to know that you are here. The reason is that we are asking you to be the judges of the quality of the arguments made here today. We're going to ask you to vote, both before the debate and after the debate to tell us which side you have found the most persuasive.

John D.: For that reason, I want to let you know, we do encourage applause for points that you like to hear. It tells the debaters that you're doing well and it also in a sense, gives voice to you to the podcast audience that will ultimately listen to this, to know that there really were live people in the room, making the decision about who was most persuasive.

John D.: So I'd like to ask you to register your first vote. And you do that through the app, through the Brussels Forum app. You go to the button participate and scroll down slightly and it will come to the word debate. And from there, it will give you the choice to tell us whether you are for the resolution, the transatlantic relationship has been irreparably damaged, or against it, or whether you're undecided. And undecided is a perfectly reasonable and understandable position for a variety of reasons and often comprises a large part of our starting vote. But we'll see where things go at the end.

John D.: And again, at the end of the debate, we have you vote a second time and we give victory to the team whose numbers have changed the most in percentage point terms, between the first and the second vote. And if you're watching this on screen out in the library, we include you of course in this vote. You don't have to be physically in the room for this, we just ask that if you're watching in the library, you stay with us through to the end, so that we get your second vote. If we don't get both votes, we don't count your first vote.

John D.: So feel free again, go to the app, participate, debate, and that will set you up to vote. There are going to be times throughout the day when not only do I like it if you applaud points that you like, but also there are going to be times for the atmospheric of our podcast, when I'm going to require your entirely spontaneous applause.

John D.: And I will signal that. I hope it's going to be real obvious. For example, when I introduce the debaters and I do one of these, I think that's a very obvious sign that it's a ta-da moment and I'd like you to applaud to welcome them on, and also for our official beginning.

John D.: But before we do the official, official beginning, let's just bring the debaters to the stage and welcome them individually with those bursts of applause. Please welcome to the stage, Federiga Bindi, Constanze Stelzenmüller, John Mearsheimer, Carla Norrlof.

John D.: Again, I want to remind you, the way for you to vote before we lock out the system in a few minutes, go to the app and choose participate and then debate

and register your vote. I'm reminding you one more time at the end of the debate, we're going to ask you to vote a second time. We will do a quick calculation and announce the winner based on the upward movement between the first vote and the second vote in both cases.

John D.: So all of that has been preliminary. Now, we're going to begin the part that will actually be heard by podcast. So I would really welcome to launch us, one more burst of that spontaneous applause.

John D.: 70 plus years, that is how long Europe and the United States have held together one of the most impressive and historic strategic partnerships ever. Frequently, it's been quarrelsome, but basically, it's been fundamentally a family.

John D.: But might that be about to change in this era of populism taking root in Europe and other places? And in the United States, some people using the slogan, America First. Or is it fundamentally still sound? Are the fundamentals still there, such as shared values and common interests and most of all, trust?

John D.: I'm John Donovan, this is Intelligence Squared U.S. We are at the German Marshall Fund's annual Brussels Forum. We will take on these questions by putting on a debate around this resolution, the transatlantic relationship has been irreparably damaged.

John D.: As always, our debate will go in three rounds and then the live audience here in Brussels will vote to choose the winner. And if all goes well, civil discourse will also prove triumphant.

John D.: Let's start by meeting our debaters first. Please welcome, because it's on tape, I get to back up and fix mistakes and it's as though these glitches never happened. It's wonderfully empowering. First, let's meet our debaters please, ladies and gentlemen, welcome federated Federiga Bindi. Federiga, you're a professor at the University of Rome Tor Vergata, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, director of the foreign policy initiative at the Institution for Women Policy Research, you advised four different Italian governments so far, published a lot of books, most recently, Europe and America: The End of the Transatlantic Relationship? Thanks so much for being here with us.

Federiga B.: Thank you so much for having me.

John D.: Thanks, Federiga. Let's meet your partner. Please welcome, ladies and gentlemen, Constanze Stelzenmüller. Hi, Constanze Stelzenmüller, welcome to Intelligence Squared.

Constanze S.: Thank you.

John D.: You're an expert in transatlantic relations, German foreign policy you're a senior fellow at the center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. Before that,

you were a senior transatlantic fellow and Berlin office director with the German Marshall Fund. It's great to have you here.

Constanze S.: Thank you. That's great.

John D.: Now, let's meet the team arguing against the resolution. Please first welcome John Mearsheimer. Hi, John, you've debated with us a few times before. So I want to say welcome back.

John M.: Glad to be here, John.

John D.: You're a professor at University of Chicago, a political scientist and New York Times bestselling author. Your most recent book is *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities*. John, thanks so much for joining us.

John M.: My pleasure.

John D.: And your partner, please. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome Carla Norrlof. Hi, Carla, you're the author of *America's Global Advantage: U.S. Hegemony and International Cooperation*. You're an associate professor of political science at University of Toronto. You research international cooperation with a special focus on great powers. Thanks so much for joining us at the Brussels Forum.

Carla N.: Thank you.

John D.: Here they are, ladies and gentlemen, the four debaters getting ready to start on this resolution, the transatlantic relationship has been irreparably damaged. I made the move too subtly, but I think you're getting the sense of it. We won't need to do too much more of that.

John D.: Let's move on to the debate. As I said before, we go on round one, round one, we go in three rounds, and round one is comprised of opening statements that will be made by each debater in turn. They will be six minutes each and up to speak first for the resolution, the transatlantic relationship has been irreparably damaged, Federiga Bindi, professor at the University of Rome Tor Vergata, the floor is yours.

Federiga B.: Thank you so much, John, thank you GMF and IQ Squared for having me, it's good to be back in Brussels and the Brussels Forum. I'm humbled, honored and as likely terrified, I should say, because for the past two days, all we have been saying was, yes, we have problems in the transatlantic relations, but we're going to fix them. And Constanze and myself are going to argue exactly the contrary. Unfortunately, this is beyond fixable.

- Federiga B.: So what we're going to do is we split the work a little bit, I'm going to dive into the past. I'm a professor, history matters, I always tell my students, while Constanze will dig more into current times.
- Federiga B.: So if we look back in perspective in transatlantic relations, EU-U.S. relationship, and forgive me if I use EU sometimes improperly when I should say EC or EEC. But if you look back, we see highs and lows in the relationship.
- Federiga B.: Example of the highs are certainly the post World War Two period, or the period right after 9/11. The only time Article Five have ever been invoked. If we look at the lows, certainly the 1970s stand up, Middle East has been an issue of content for a long time. Think of the differences on the Arab-Israeli war, think of, with relatively little enthusiasm, the Europeans treated Camp David.
- Federiga B.: But also think of the slowness and difficulties with which Europeans responded to the USSR invasion of Afghanistan. Or martial law in Poland or Sigonella or the differences over the Moscow Olympics. So there were lots of troubles, which of course, I know you're thinking, see? We had troubles before. We're going to fix them once again.
- Federiga B.: But no. And why is no? In my opinion, it goes back to one special year, 1989. So for a little history, in 1989, I was an undergraduate at Sciences Po, one of the very, very first Erasmus, it was called Erasmus Free Mover at the time, spending the year there.
- Federiga B.: I was especially... all the unrest that was taking place during the summer and the fall. So Sciences Po organized these conferences every Thursday afternoon, [inaudible 00:12:20], who was a specialist of Germany would comment current affairs.
- Federiga B.: And it was the 9th of November 1989. And for those of you who have at Sciences Po, imagine [French 00:12:38], 2,000 kids packing [French 00:12:40]. And it was about two minutes before seven and [inaudible 00:12:46] was finishing his pitch. And he said, maybe in two decades, maybe Communist won't be there anymore. We don't know.
- Federiga B.: And in that moment, the operator, people who stay at the door rushed in. They said, [French 00:13:01], we are here because the Berlin Wall came down, and what came down in that moment was the amphitheater. Imagine 2,000 kids, all nationalities, screaming, hugging, kissing, the Germans were crying. I mean, I still have goosebumps when I think about it, it was, by all means, the defining political event of a generation. One that was changed forever.
- Federiga B.: And then I went on, and I went to do my PhD at the UI and I started teaching American kids in Florence. And the kids were referring to 1989 as the year we won the Cold War. I was like, no, what are you talking about? There is no winner. That's the end of an anomaly in history.

Federiga B.: But then I went to the U.S. and realized that that was part of a general narrative, a narrative on which neo-con like Wolfowitz or Perla jumped in to advocate for a new unilateral world where the U.S., the winner of the Cold War world had a right duty to intervene. And once they got the chance to go into government with GW, they actually enacted that. And GW realized that relationship with Europe need to be fixed in his second term. But bridges had been tear down.

Federiga B.: And then came Obama. And remember his triumphal tour in Europe organized by our former colleague, Phil Gordon? The Europeans loved Obama. But the fact that they loved Obama the person did not mean they loved American policies. By then, 20 years of rather useless wars, had mined what Woodrow Wilson referred to as American moral exceptionalism.

Federiga B.: And what I've never been able to properly explain to my American colleagues in France, it's the American moral exceptionalism, the American dream, Hollywood, public diplomacy programs like JMF, Fulbright, the State Department visitors. Any of the Europeans who have not been on one those programs, raise your hands. I mean, this is what made us dream about the U.S. This is what Fede Mogherini yesterday referred to as why we got in love with the U.S.

Federiga B.: The real strength of the U.S. is this imaginary and with the words imaginary was no more there. And with people and in politics alike, it takes a lot of work to earn respectability, to earn trust, and it takes a jiff to lose it, and to rebuild it, it takes a long time.

Federiga B.: And I leave it to my friend Constanze to tell you where we are now. Thank you very much.

John D.: Thank you, Federiga Bindi. Our resolution again, is the transatlantic relationship has been irreparably damaged, our next debater will be speaking against the resolution. Please welcome from the University of Toronto, Professor Carla Norrlof.

Constanze S.: I thought it was both of us, [inaudible 00:16:16].

Carla N.: Thank you very much Intelligence Squared for inviting me to this event. And thank you very much GMF have as well, it's a pleasure to be here. So we are in strong agreement that the transatlantic relationship is not irreparably damaged. I am going to be focusing on the American interests underpinning the relationship, John will be discussing European interests.

Carla N.: I think it helps to go back to defining what the transatlantic relationship is. It's a political security community, a zone of peace, in which disagreements are settled peacefully, without recourse to war. The primary institutional expression of this zone of peace, of this community is NATO. In order for the transatlantic relationship to collapse, we basically need to see a collapse of NATO.

Carla N.: That's not happening. President Trump is a threat and has threatened the relationship. We do not deny that. But he is unlikely to follow through on the most important threats, because it's not in the United States' interest to do so.

Carla N.: The United States has profound security interest in maintaining the relationship. NATO isn't a burden. It's a pillar of us power. NATO is the blue chip in the United States' vast global security network. In fact, it's one of the primary advantages that the United States has and will have long term against systemic rivals like China and Russia.

Carla N.: Europeans are also increasingly doing the kinds of things that the United States wants them to do. It's increasingly aligning on U.S. foreign policy objectives, labeling China a systemic rival, for instance, ramping up the fight against terrorism, increasing defense spending.

Carla N.: Even if President Trump wanted to pull the United States out of NATO, Congress, his closest advisors overwhelmingly continue to support NATO. Economically as well, there are extraordinarily powerful links between the United States and Europe. The United States and Europe are each other's main trade and investment partners. In fact, it's the largest trade and investment relationship in the world.

Carla N.: You will say, well, what about the looming trade war? The United States' trade deficit with the European Union is \$150 billion. That's half the size of the United States' trade deficit with China. It's not worth a trade war. Especially not one that the United States is unlikely to easily win.

Carla N.: There's another important wedge issue and it's the Iran nuclear deal crisis, which kind of blends economic and security issues. Europeans want to maintain the deal, the United States wants to abandon the deal. And in order to pressure Europeans to abandon the deal, the United States has imposed sanctions on Europeans doing business with Iran. It's a form of financial deterrence that's extremely effective in the short term, because the United States can weaponize the dollar centered financial system to advantage.

Carla N.: And the long term, however, it's counterproductive. It's counterproductive because it discourages the use of dollars, and it encourages other countries to devise alternative payment systems, as the Germans have begun efforts to do.

Carla N.: I also want to talk a little bit in closing about a social interest that the United States has in maintaining this alliance. When we talk about the transatlantic relationship, we really take for granted that we're talking about America on the one hand, and on the other side, we're talking about countries north of Spain. We're not talking about African countries also facing the Atlantic.

Carla N.: There's a strong perception of common values and a strong desire to maintain a shared European ancestry. I think that this is a very powerful generator of a we feeling, that is essential to keeping this community alive. Thank you very much.

John D.: Thank you, Carla Norrlof, and a reminder of where we are, we are halfway through the opening round of this Intelligence Squared U.S. debate. I'm John Donvan, we have four debaters, two teams of two fighting it out over this resolution. The transatlantic relationship has been irreparably damaged.

John D.: You've heard the first two opening statements, and now onto the third, I give the floor to Constanze Stelzenmüller, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Constanze S.: Thank you very much. Thanks again for including me in this amazing event and this great lineup. It feels disturbingly like a cross between a thesis defense and the NBA Finals. So I'll do my best.

Constanze S.: I have been asked here to defend together with my partner Federiga Bindi, the thesis that the transatlantic relationship is irreparably damaged. And since this room is full of people who know me, I have a confession to make, which of course is that I wish it were otherwise. How could it be otherwise? And I also don't quite think that we're there yet.

Constanze S.: So what I am going to describe to you is my worst case vision of a dawning dystopia of international relations, a disordering so profound, an unraveling of order so dramatic, including its transatlantic pillar, that we are incapable of stopping it and incapable of turning it back. So let me first review the damage before I explain why this time is different than any other time.

Constanze S.: I see an extraordinary confluence of power failures on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States, I see high stakes, high risk simultaneous brinksmanships on some several continents at the same time. Breathtaking. On top of that, I see a U.S. administration using or threatening instruments of economic coercion, tariffs and sanctions like no administration has done before. Not in this quantity, not in this quality, not as far as we can see, with so little of an ultimate plan.

Constanze S.: And I don't see America winning. In fact, for now, I see it losing. What I do see is America alienating its allies and its friends. And what I fear ultimately, is the undermining of American credibility and American legitimacy across the globe. And that ought to strike fear into all of us.

Constanze S.: Now, I don't think the European side is much better, although I think we have a little less agency than America does still. As we saw in the European elections, we've managed to keep the populace at bay, but barely, haven't we? The truth is, that we have seen this continent in which we stand today, gravely weakened, shaken, by a series of successive crises following the global financial crisis. We are divided profoundly within our polities and across Europe on matters of security, on matters of social welfare, on matters of economic policy and growth

and on matters of immigration. I see a Europe that is surrounded by mounting crises and conflict and that appears to me to be speechless and powerless in the face of America First.

Constanze S.: So why is this time different? Why is this not the same as all the other crises that Federiga just described to us? I have three reasons for you. My first reason is that the disordering isn't just happening in faraway places of which we know nothing. Sea levels rising in the Seychelles, or drug crises in Russian prisons, no, the disorder is happening at home in our own polities, rising social inequality, rising economic inequality, political polarization.

Constanze S.: And it seems to me a degradation of governance, in the places where we feel them closest to home, schools, hospitals, roads, bridges. And yes, of course, our national politics. Let's keep in mind that a German politician was murdered at the beginning of this month, the first political murder by right wing extremists in the history of my country since 1945.

Constanze S.: My second argument is that I think I see us all paralyzed in face of the authoritarians and the populace. Not the ones in Brazil and in China, but the ones at home, who are cheapening, denying, undermining the fundamental values of representative democracy, and a rules based international order.

Constanze S.: And my third reason, and it pains me to say this, because I have deep affection for the country that I have been living in for the last half decade and I have many American friends in this room. But my third reason is that the chief of these challenges is currently President of the United States of America.

Constanze S.: So to conclude, my concern is that what we are about to face is what you could call a Silent Spring of international governance. To borrow the title of a very famous book there by the American ecologist Rachel Carson, a disordering so profound, that we are unable to stop it and unable to turn it back.

Constanze S.: Thank you.

John D.: Thank you, Constanze Stelzenmüller. And our final debater in this opening round will be speaking against the resolution, Chicago Professor John Mearsheimer.

John M.: Thank you, John. What I'd like to do is build on Carla's excellent presentation about the importance of interest by asking a very simple question to start, that I think lies at the heart of the resolution. And that simple question is, what is the glue that holds the transatlantic relationship together? What's the glue? And our argument is that the principal glue, are common interests. What Carla and I are saying is that the United States on one side and the Europeans on the other side, have a common interest in keeping the transatlantic relationship intact.

John M.: Now, there's no question that values and trust matter, they're part of the glue, for sure. But what really matters the most is the interest of the states that are involved in this relationship. Interests almost always trump trust and values. That's because statesmen are mainly concerned with the prosperity and security of their citizens, and they will do what is ever necessary to protect those citizens.

John M.: Just to give you two examples that highlight the fact that interests trump things like values, in 1941, December 1941, the United States allied itself closely with the murderous regime of Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union. Why did we do that? Because it was in our interest for the purpose of defeating Nazi Germany. We sacrificed values for interests.

John M.: Think about America's relationship today with Saudi Arabia, our long-standing relationship with Saudi Arabia. Is there any country on the planet that has values that are more antithetical to American values? I can't think of one, maybe North Korea. But in the case of Saudi Arabia, we have had remarkably close relations with them for a really long time. And the question is why? And the answer is very simple. Because it's in our interest. Why did we lie with Joe Stalin? Because it was in our interest.

John M.: Now, this is not to deny that there are certain cases where your values and your interests line up. But when your interests and your values clash, you go with your interests. So what really matters here, when we think about whether or not this transatlantic relationship is going to hold over time is the question of whether we both, the Americans and the Europeans, have a vested interest in keeping this thing intact.

John M.: Now, what Carla did is she explained to you quite clearly why it's in America's national interest to keep the transatlantic relationship alive. Now, what I want to do is explain to you why it's in Europe's interest. And I think the case is quite straightforward. First of all, it's in Europe's economic interest to continue to trade with the United States. It's in Europe's interest to think very carefully about how to deal with China and to work with the United States on the economic front to deal with China.

John M.: But I actually believe that's not the main reason that it's important for Europeans have a very close relationship with Uncle Sam. The real reason is security. And the fact is that Europeans have a deep seated interest in keeping the United States of America firmly implanted on the European continent. I'm talking about the American military here.

John M.: Many people wonder why there has been no war in Europe since the Cold War ended. Why has Europe and so peaceful? A lot of people say it's because of the EU and the success of the EU. This is fundamentally wrong. The reason there's been no trouble in Europe is because the United States is here, the United

States serves as a pacifier. I have never heard a single European leader say that he or she would like to see the United States leave Europe.

John M.: And in fact, when I tour Europe these days, what I find is that many European elites are worried that Uncle Sam is going home. Why? Because they understand intuitively, they will rarely say it out loud, because it's not politically correct. But they understand we are the pacifier. And keeping us here is very important for maintaining security in the heart of Europe.

John M.: And for those of you who believe there's a Russian threat out there, and my experiences talking to Europeans tells me that almost every one of you believes that, contrary to me, and I don't matter in this case, right? The fact is, you want the Americans here, you want NATO here, you all understand that the American president means NATO, you want NATO, you want the Americans here to deal with the Russians, should they get aggressive in Eastern Europe.

John M.: So all of this is to say the United States really matters greatly for the security of Europe, not to mention economics as well. And therefore, Europeans have a deep seated interest in keeping us here. And as Carla said, the Americans, given their view of their role in the world and as you will know, we're very interested in running the world, and Europe is part of that whole enterprise, we have a deep seated interest in staying here.

John M.: So what we have here is a situation where America's interests and Europe's interests still match together to make a case for staying in Europe, and keeping the Americans here and maintaining the transatlantic relationship for the foreseeable future.

John D.: Thank you, John Mearsheimer, and that concludes the first round of this Intelligence Squared U.S. debate where our resolution is, the transatlantic relationship has been irreparably damaged. Now, we move on to round two and round two is where the debaters speak with one another directly, prompted initially by questions for me, and then we move on to questions from you, our live audience here at the Brussels Forum.

John D.: I want to say one thing about taking questions from the audience. Part of the nature of this exercise is we adhere strictly to the idea that in this [inaudible 00:35:03] debate, these two things teams are trying to prove or disprove the resolution as stated. I think it can be very tempting to ask questions that start talking about solutions. That's not the mission here. That would be a panel discussion. This is a competition to prove this point one way or the other. So in formulating your questions, think about that.

John D.: Also, please don't debate with the debaters. The goal is to ask a question that will get them to debate more deeply on the actual resolution itself and please don't make speeches. By that, I mean, I really want you to ask a question... you'll feel it naturally. If a question mark lives naturally at the end of whatever you've

said, you've nailed it. I'm okay if you take a sentence or two to state a premise, but I really mean a sentence or two. And if you watch our record of debates, I turn down a lot of questions. So keep that in mind as well. And that'll be coming up in a few minutes after we get started.

John D.: So we move on to round two and round two is where the debate address one another directly and take questions from me and from you, our audience here in Brussels. Our resolution is this, the transatlantic relationship has been irreparably damaged. On the side arguing for the resolution, Federiga Bindi and Constanze Stelzenmueller. We have heard them describe the current situation as the Silent Spring of international governance. They argue that while there have been strains before, in fact, this time is different. There is a significant power failure on both sides of the ocean, that the tenor of discord has reached levels never seen before.

John D.: They make the argument that the disordering is different this time, that the elites are paralyzed in the face of those who are challenging the fundamentals of liberal democracy. And they point very specifically to what they describe as the problem of Donald Trump himself. They say that the thing that held the Alliance together, when it was most effective, the Cold War, ended in a way that the United States misinterpreted, in a sort of moment of triumphalism, which has not been conducive to the continuing health of the relationship.

John D.: The side arguing against the resolution, John Mearsheimer and Carla Norrlof argue that it's not so different this time. They make a very strong argument that common interests will trump values, they're not saying values don't matter, but in the end, the common interests will trump that, that that is the glue that holds together the relationship. They point out that NATO is the essential skeleton of that relationship, and that NATO is not going anywhere, nor will the relationship dissolve, ultimately, they say, because it's just not in the interest of either side.

John D.: On the United States side, there are too many economic links and actually that that goes both ways. But that basically Europe also needs the United States here for its security, and that interest is just too strong to ultimately threaten the overall relationship.

John D.: So there's a lot to dig into here. I want to start with a question going first to Federiga Bindi, your opponents have made the case, an interesting case that the commonality of interests, of real politic interests are so strong that that will ultimately prevail and is just too powerful an influence to be diminished. And that therefore, the relationship will persist in a healthy way. [crosstalk 00:38:34].

Federiga B.: It's interesting you asked me this. I, zillions of years ago, I wrote my PhD thesis on the national interest. And the hardest part in writing about national interests, I compared clearly to case studies, Italy and Portugal at the time, but the hardest part is actually defining the national interest.

Federiga B.: I mean, our opponents laid down a perfect rational analysis, which would make very happy some of our colleagues. But the reality is that the national interest not only is hard to define, not only by us academics, but most of all in government and the changes across time and across circumstances. And at the end of the day, what counts more is not the interest, per se, which is an esoteric term, but the perception of national interest.

Federiga B.: And I completely agree that the U.S. matters, that U.S. is the pacifier. The question is that the perception of the U.S. national interests have been changing.

John D.: All right, let me take it to John Mearsheimer.

John M.: I actually don't think that's true, Federiga. I think that it is quite clear that the vast majority of American policymakers and members of the foreign policy elite believe that the United States has a vested interest in maintaining peace in Europe. And by staying in Europe, we keep the peace.

John M.: And there two reasons for that. One is, we believe that it is economically important to keep the peace in Europe, because if a war breaks out in Europe, that will have disastrous consequences for the international economy. And secondly, it's widely believed that we will get dragged in. So why not just stay there to begin with, prevent war, rather than leave and have to come back?

Federiga B.: I'm completely convinced that it's in my interest to win the lottery and retire before time. But that doesn't happen, that doesn't mean it's going to happen. And you're playing exactly what Constanze said. It's unilateral. It's alienating, what you're saying, which is exactly what Constanze said, you might want to elaborate on that.

John D.: Let's invite Carla to comment first.

Carla N.: Yeah. So I think that we probably do not want to get into too much of an academic debate about interests. And one can say the same thing for values. What we mean by interest is that there are some shared goals, there are security goals and there are economic goals. And we try to put a little bit of meat on the bones to describe what those look like.

Carla N.: When it comes to values, this is also a kind of morphous term, right? So some people think that democracy is a value. Sometimes values are more synonymous with something that resembles norms or principles. So I think that the more specific we are about what we're talking, I think that will kind of push forward the debate.

John D.: Constanze, to a certain degree, there's a lot of overlap in what both sides are saying, but you have made this argument that what's going on is different this

time, it's fundamentally different. So can you push that point in response to what you're hearing so far?

Constanze S.: Two things. I want to push back with all due respect against John's point, that we need American military in Europe to stop us from killing each other. Forgive me, John, but that's ludicrous. I think that that is just the least likely thing to happen in Europe right now.

John D.: Did somebody start to clap? Because we're good with that as I said in the beginning.

Constanze S.: Okay, that was not necessary, but thank you.

John D.: No, actually, it is necessary.

Constanze S.: Thank you. All right. But look, I mean, it is actually insulting. I mean, you are surrounded here by Europeans who have grown up with each other, traveled in each other's countries, whose parents have married each other, and who have worked in each other's countries. Some of us have double nationalities. And some of us have Green Cards.

Constanze S.: To say to us that we still need GIs in Europe, so that this place won't explode is ludicrous.

John M.: Then why do you want NATO?

Constanze S.: No, wait, for a different reason. Because you need us to, and I'm coming to that. So I've been reading both of your papers, yours, Bound to Fail, your several ones really good. Both of you talk about economic interdependence. You in fact, point out, Carla, that economic independence works both ways. You seem not to be willing to consider that.

Constanze S.: The truth is that we are a great power economically and you need us and in fact, without us you are weaker in the world with regards to China, with regards to Russia and elsewhere.

John M.: That supports our point.

Constanze S.: First point. No, no, first point. No, no, no, because you are destroying, you are trying to undermine the EU or not you, John Mearsheimer, but this American administration. I take that back.

John D.: Let's let them jump in a little bit in response to-

Constanze S.: No. Wait, one final point if I may, the final point here is, and I know that you're not going to like this one, but I'm going to make it anyway, which is that you

also need us in security terms. You have first order strategic interest in Europe, that your troops in Europe protect and you would be less able to protect them, you will be less able to pursue those goals if you weren't in Europe, and if we weren't letting you.

John M.: But you're making my argument.

Constanze S.: And we're not saying you're not protecting us too. But you're protecting us against external risks, not internal.

John D.: Constanze, I want you to yield, you said a lot out there, let your opponents respond to some of that.

John M.: Look, I believe that the reason European elites, European policymakers have been so deeply committed to maintaining NATO, and are so afraid that NATO is going to collapse, is they understand that the United States serves as a pacifier. As I said, when I was making my initial comments, it's not politically correct to say that, because they know that people like you will jump down their throat.

John M.: But the fact is that intuitively-

Constanze S.: I'm still over here. I'm not jumping, don't worry.

John M.: Intuitively, people understand that the United States is the pacifier and it also can deal with the Russian threat, which people worry about.

Federiga B.: This is exactly the American view that does not understand what the European Union is all about. I'm sorry, you continue to see it as something completely different. Just an economic entity.

Federiga B.: It reminds me, when, remember, when we were working on the single market? New York Times and other papers would write, the single market was never going to happen, because the Europeans are unable to do it. Europe, the Europeans were never going to have a Europe, because Europeans... the Europeans had wars, we still have people who went through the wars. And there was a commitment never to do that again. And that came from the Europeans, by the Europeans. It was supported at the time by the American administration.

Federiga B.: If you remember, Acheson came to Europe, came to Paris the day before Schuman would pronounce his Schuman declaration, but then the Schuman declaration had already been agreed between the French and the German. I mean, this is Europeans. This is what you didn't-

John D.: Let Carla come on.

- Carla N.: So I think that it's one thing to argue that Europe does not need the United States in order to prevent war amongst European countries.
- Constanze S.: You follow me there.
- Carla N.: But that's quite a separate question from Europe not having an interest in the United States being committed to NATO?
- Constanze S.: Absolutely.
- Carla N.: Because there is the Russian threat. And there are other common goals that NATO and through the United States, can secure. And so it doesn't seem to me that you're actually addressing our main argument, that there are these common security interests. And we've kind of addressed the American interest in maintaining committed to NATO, because that's what's in dispute.
- Constanze S.: Happy to.
- John D.: Two things I want to say, first is I'd like to address the question to you, I feel that your side is getting a little bit more air time. So I'm going to be cutting off a little bit earlier to give this time a little bit more equal time. But the next question goes to you.
- John D.: Do respond to what Carla just said, because I know you're ready to go for that.
- Constanze S.: Absolutely. So I mean, I absolutely agree with you, Carla, and John, that we have a common interest in maintaining NATO. Not so that the Europeans don't kill each other, but because we have shared external challenges.
- Constanze S.: Now, the problem is that this U.S. administration, not America overall, but this U.S. administration is doing things in security policy and in its trade policy, that undercut the trust and cohesion of the Alliance, because they are increasing the insecurity of the world and of the region around Europe, thereby undermining European security. And because they are undermining actively and quite malignantly, one of the key factors in European stability that backstops NATO in a lot of important ways, and that is the European Union, the European Union provides the political, social and economic resilience that you need in a security environment, where adversaries are using instruments short of war. Hybrid warfare, propaganda, buying politicians, funding political parties, all these kinds of things. And it's an act of self-harm, because it undermines American interests.
- John D.: John Mearsheimer, can you respond to that?

- John M.: It seems to me that much of what you say concedes our point, that there is a need for NATO, that we have a mutual interest in sustaining NATO. So that is mana from heaven for us.
- John M.: Now, your argument that President Trump is a problem is basically correct. I'm not going to defend his policies with regard to putting sanctions on allies in Europe, his attitude towards the EU, his attitude towards NATO. He is definitely a bull in a china shop. Nobody would deny that.
- John M.: But the question you have to ask yourself is just how much damage can he do? And the fact of the matter is, as Secretary Stoltenberg said yesterday, if anything, America is increasing its commitment to NATO. The United States is not in a position to destroy the European Union. It can cause some problems with tariffs, but there are even limits there, and the United States and President Trump are ultimately going to be forced to work with the Europeans to deal with the Chinese problem.
- John D.: So I want to go to the audience questions in just a moment. Again, the way that will work, if you just raise your hand, I'll call on you and someone will come to you with a microphone. If you can wait till the mic arrives. It'll be another three or four minutes or so. The mic arrives, just stand up, tell us your name and ask a question.
- John D.: But before we do that, I want to ask Federiga this question, your opponents have cast this out and so far we've been arguing the question of common interests in a sort of real politic way. But they made an opening statement that the values, while they might matter, don't matter that much. But can you make an argument that the values issue does matter, which gets us to a common commitment to liberal democracy, for example, which seems to be under threat in some parts of Europe and perhaps in some parts of the United States?
- John D.: Are you brushing aside and conceding their argument that the values are not the critical thing?
- Federiga B.: No, the values is exactly what made the U.S. attractive to us. I mean, what made the U.S. the beacon of hope, and that everybody looks at. If you take the values away, there is nothing left. Because as I said, the interest changes across time. Just think of the definition of national interest. Morrow, T. Roosevelt and Wilson, they had mentally a different definition of what was the American national interest.
- Federiga B.: The national interest is linked to the moment, the values is a process that goes across centuries.
- John D.: And you think that is eroding as we speak.
- Federiga B.: Yes, it is. Very much so.

John D.: You feel the same, Constanze?

Constanze S.: I do. Let me try and make a slightly different argument from Federiga, just to add on to her excellent points, which is that I want to make both a moral argument and a less moral argument for values. One is, yes, I'm sorry, but representative democracy is to me the system that has proven to be best at preventing cruelty, at preventing cruelty from the majority to minorities, and I as a German, know where of I speak.

Constanze S.: And so it is a system that I wish to preserve and if I am faced with an American president and other American officials who on a daily basis discredit those values, I have a problem with the Alliance. And I think that also translates into a toxic relationship within NATO in the future.

John D.: I didn't mean to interrupt your-

Constanze S.: May I may I make the other point just very quickly? Which is that the other thing that we forget, I think, as we admire the authoritarians in Russia and China, because somehow they seem to be keeping their countries together, and we're afraid we're not, representative democracies remain the best at repairing, at recognizing the flaws in their systems and at preparing them. That is the one thing of which I am convinced and where I'm going to contradict my own position. That is the hill on which I die. That is what we are best at.

Constanze S.: And if I am faced with allies who deny that fact, that divides us.

John D.: Okay, Carla, before we move on to our next questions, so the argument that you've just heard that in fact, the corrosion of values, which I think you might be conceding, I'm not sure, but whether you are or not, they're arguing that the corrosion of values is dispositive. And I think you are saying, would outweigh common interest, because as they said, the common interests come and go. What's your response to that?

Carla N.: So I think that a lot of the features that you've pointed to within the United States, some of those problems also exist in European countries. So inequality and populism, in particular, extreme right populism, extreme right political parties are very much a problem in Europe.

Carla N.: And so I'm not convinced that there is an erosion in the relationship between America and Europe that you've shown me. What kind of values are you thinking about that have been so eroded that affect fundamentally this relationship?

John D.: Let's take 30 seconds, if you can do that, because I do want to move on to audience questions. But I do want to hear the answer to that question.

- Constanze S.: It's so hard to know where to start. Look, simply just look at the news images from today. Vladimir Putin and President Trump sitting together and laughing about the fake news, when 58 journalists have been murdered in the reign of Vladimir Putin. Journalists are at risk around the world and the President of the United States and the President of Russia are laughing about this. How does that not undermine the Alliance?
- John D.: Okay, let's go to some audience questions. Again, if you just raise your hands, I'll start right in the front row and a mic will come. If you can stand up and tell us your name, please.
- Audience: My name is Jerry Green from California and I emphasize California, so Americans don't all look alike. We actually have a debate between two North Americans and two Europeans. The question is, how permanent are the cultural consequences of a malignant administration, which is only two years old and will not live forever?
- John D.: What a great question. So you're saying this time it's different. The question is saying it might be different this time, it's not going to last that long. What's your response to that?
- Constanze S.: Well, I worry that the reasons that I just described are not limited to leaders and their personalities and their impact. I was talking about structural reasons. I was talking about the profound dysfunctionalities of our politics, of our governance at home, and our inability to repair them.
- Constanze S.: And that's why I'm concerned that a change in government or in party in 2020 in the United States, won't change the situation that we're in. And I also really want to reinforce the point, but it is one that I made in my opening statement, that we have the populace in Europe as well, but they're only in government in Hungary and to some degree in Poland, if my Polish friends here will forgive me.
- John D.: Federiga you wanted to join?
- Federiga B.: I just came back from California, I totally want to move there. But the value of a presidency in the U.S. goes beyond politics. It's an example. And what we are witnessing today is a total change in ethics. And I can tell you as a woman, for a woman, even I haven't been long living in the U.S., you can feel it on your skin that things have changed.
- Federiga B.: There are things that two years ago would be judged completely unacceptable, that today, nothing happens. I mean, think of the border, think of the kids that have been separated. Think of the kids who are dying in the custody of a government. I mean, two years ago, had it happened during the previous administration, it would have been a revolution. And today it's just well, six kids is dead.

- Federiga B.: So the more our more values are being eroded and if God forbids these last six more years, there is not going to be a way back from that.
- John M.: I mean, the question on the table is whether or not this is going to lead to irreparable damage in the transatlantic alliance. I mean, what's happening here is we're putting being put in a position where we have to defend Donald Trump.
- John D.: I don't think that's the case. I don't think you were being asked to do that.
- Constanze S.: We don't, nobody is forcing you.
- John D.: I think you were given a description that actually clearly answered the question that's been floating around, what is this dissolution of values? And is it a cancer that's permanent?
- John M.: No, but to talk about what the Trump administration is doing and what we don't like has to be linked to the claim that this is going to undermine the transatlantic relationship, and they're not making that argument at all. And to the extent that they talk about the transatlantic relationship, they give out arguments that support our position.
- John D.: Are you making that argument?
- Federiga B.: No, absolutely not.
- John D.: I do want to get to more questions. So can you answer? And I know it's hard. 30 seconds? 35.
- Constanze S.: Look, the point I'm making, very simply, in one line is that the actions of this government are so toxic and so disruptive and so destructive, that they will undermine the cohesion and the allegiance that we feel in the Alliance.
- John M.: There's no evidence of that.
- Constanze S.: Yes, there it.
- John M.: Look at what's happening to NATO, as Secretary Stoltenberg said yesterday, if anything, the American commitment in Europe is increasing.
- Constanze S.: Granted. But if you blow up our entire surroundings as you reinforce NATO's Eastern deterrents and defenses-
- John M.: We have been blowing up your surroundings for over a decade now.
- Constanze S.: I rest my case. Thank you.

- Federiga B.: That's exactly our point.
- John D.: Let's go on to other questions.
- John M.: It's had no effect on the transatlantic relationship.
- Constanze S.: Yes, it does.
- Federiga B.: That's exactly our point. The relationship before, this has been going on for 20 years, but at least the relationship, there was a decency at the level of leadership which doesn't exist anymore, and it permeates the whole society. It is a cancer for the whole society.
- John D.: Did I feed the word cancer into this conversation? As a moderator, I'm not supposed to do that. Why don't you step forward, please and tell us who you are.
- Audience: Yeah. Nathalie Tocci from the Institute for International Affairs. So to get this debate going beyond the interest values, Trump, no Trump sort of paradigm, my question really is whether you're not missing in particular, you, John and Carla, the broader structural story to all this.
- Audience: Now, indeed-
- John D.: Is that the question?
- Audience: No, let me get to the question. Very quickly. So Americans may indeed have an interest, certainly Europeans have an interest to seeing Americans remain in Europe, and Americans may indeed have that interest, too. But given that their big strategic challenge is China moving forward, perhaps not today or tomorrow, but will the United States have the ability to remain in Europe as it is today?
- John D.: Thank you, Carla. Do you want to take that?
- Carla N.: I think that's a great question. And I think that the Europeans' willingness to do more on terrorism is actually enabling the United States to pivot more towards China. Europeans' spending increasingly more on the defense will also free up resources for the United States to focus attention elsewhere.
- John D.: John, quickly.
- John M.: Yeah. Just very quickly to build on Carla. I think that it is possible 30 or 40 years now, from now, if China continues to grow at an impressive economic rate, that it will become so powerful militarily, that the United States will have no choice

but to pivot completely out of Europe and put virtually all its military assets in Asia.

John M.: But that's a long way off. And for the foreseeable future, the United States clearly has the capability to contain China in Asia and at the same time, maintain substantial forces in Europe.

John D.: I want to give your opponents, if you want to, a chance to respond, or we can move on to another question.

Constanze S.: No, why don't we go on?

John D.: You're going to take a pass? Okay, let's take another question from this side. Thanks.

Audience: Hi, my name is Navar Sara [inaudible 01:01:01]. As a Brit, I want to bring Brexit into this debate. So we're assuming that they're just two actors, but actually, Europe is multifaceted, and EU is a large part of Europe, but it's not Europe as a whole? How do you feel the UK's withdrawal from the EU will impact the transatlantic relationship? Thank you.

John D.: Let's take that first to Federiga.

Federiga B.: Well, first of all, we still don't know whether Brexit is going to take place at all. We can take bets in it today and see who wins. But that being said, whether the UK exits or not, it's a weak actor. Even if it stays, it is way weaker than it used to be, which undermines the strength of United States' arguments within Europe, because traditionally, the relationship has played in favor, the special relationship has played in favor of the U.S. and they don't have it. So this is part of the general disintegration trends we're talking about.

John D.: Other side? John?

John M.: I'll just say very quickly, I think that Britain is still going to have extensive economic relations with the European continent and the United States. And in terms of security, Britain is not pulling out of NATO. And that is what matters the most, as Carla pointed out in her opening comments.

John D.: Okay, I want to remind you that we are in the question and answer section of this Intelligence Squared U.S. debate. I'm John Donovan, but you know that, your moderator, we have four debaters, two teams of two debating this resolution, the transatlantic relationship has been irreparably damaged. Sir, the mic is coming from your left hand side.

John D.: By the way, I just want to say in terms of how the questions are working, they're fantastic. So what the person in front of you did, that's how it should go. Starting with you, sir, thank you.

Audience: Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, German Marshall Fund, question to Carla and John, when the United States first entered Europe in 1917, it confronted great powers. It was a great power war, same thing in the Second World War. Please adjust your argument, your interest based argument of the United States staying in Europe to the reality of European absolute decline. Isn't it the case that the U.S. interest in Europe is much weaker than it used to be, and couldn't America care less about Europe?, even if you're was threatened by Russia?

John D.: John or Carla.

Carla N.: You want to go ahead?

John D.: Go ahead, John. We just haven't heard from you.

Carla N.: Sorry?

John D.: You go ahead.

Carla N.: So I'm actually not really a declinist. I don't think that the United States is in decline to the extent that people presuppose.

Constanze S.: He meant Europe.

Audience: The claim is that Europe is in decline, not America.

Carla N.: So Europe is in decline and therefore, your question is?

John D.: As I understood the question, doesn't that provide less incentive for the United States to give a damn?

Constanze S.: Yeah, exactly. Very good.

John D.: That's it. Just cutting to the chase, sorry. It's what I do.

Carla N.: Okay, that's just so surprising to me and I assume the opposite, because usually, the argument is that the United States is in decline, and so Europeans can actually do more to tend to their own security.

John D.: Okay, I'm going to go on to another question. Sir?

Audience: I'm with GMF too. And it seems-

- John D.: It sounds like the fix is in with the... yeah.
- Audience: The fix is in. The question is, actually, the transatlantic relationship has been irreparably damaged, not the transatlantic Alliance, the transatlantic relationship. And I respectfully submit that the transatlantic, that the United States, much of our relationship post 1945 and the Marshall Plan was based on moral legitimacy. And in Europe, the United States has lost its moral legitimacy. And that is what I think is the profound change and is irreparably damaged.
- John D.: You've noticed a deliberate choice in our words in our resolution. So thank you for doing that. And I'd like to take it to John Mearsheimer.
- John M.: Yeah, I don't think that the American commitment to Europe was based on moral values. The American commitment to Europe from roughly 1949 forward was based on pure strategic interest. The fact of the matter is, we wanted to get out of Europe after World War Two, and we left in good part. And during the 1950s, the historiography shows very clearly, the Eisenhower administration wanted to leave.
- John M.: One of the reasons that we promoted the European coal and steel union was so that the Italians, the British, the French, and the Germans could come together, form a cohesive whole, and they could deal with the Soviet Union and we could go home, it was pure strategic interests. What drives American foreign policy over time is nothing but naked strategic interests, and we cover it up all the time with moral rhetoric that's very popular here in Europe, but has very little to do with how we actually behave.
- John D.: Okay, let's hear from your opponents.
- Federiga B.: I'm sorry, John, but to say that the European community has been promoted by the U.S. is grossly representing history and reality. The United States learned the day before, with the nationals on visiting in the home of the then U.S. ambassador to Paris, he was informed by Schuman and Monnet what was going to happen, and they supported it because they saw the strength of the project, because they saw it would reinforce Europe against Communism.
- Federiga B.: But it was not initiated by the U.S. By all means, this is an all European initiative. Because the Europeans understood, and Jean Monnet brought in his memories really well, but many others, people are like Spinelli as well brought, they understood that the only way to stop a war was to put the Europeans, work together, on what were at the time, the two most important issues. Because Cole at the time had the same important voice today.
- Federiga B.: But that was a European initiative, it was not a promoted initiative and the U.S. supported, supported the process of European integration after they handed the administration.

John M.: I disagree on the history. But I would just say to you, if you're correct, you're telling a story where European interests and American interests came together, not values.

John D.: And that concludes round two of this Intelligence Squared U.S. debate where our... I don't know if you heard what I said, that we have to wrap that round. So because you were clapping, so I need to do this line. And that concludes round two of this Intelligence Squared U.S. debate where our resolution is, the transatlantic relationship has been irreparably damaged.

John D.: And I'm actually delighted to see that there were so many people wanting to ask questions, you'll have a lot of opportunity in the mixing afterwards with our debaters. So thank you. I'm sorry I couldn't get to all of you.

John D.: Now, we move on to round three and round three are closing statements by each debater in turn. These will be two minutes each, they will once again each debate or once against stand and address you, and making her closing statement in support of the resolution, the transatlantic relationship has been irreparably damaged, Federiga Bindi, professor at the University of Rome Tor Regata.

Federiga B.: Thank you, John. Thank you, everybody, for being with us and for asking and supporting us. You remember, in the beginning, I said, we love the U.S.? I do love the United States dearly. And our former colleague, Jeremy Shapiro and Phil Gordon wrote an article recently and they said that the EU is like a battered wife, who can't get over the fact that her husband doesn't love anymore. And I don't know about that. But what I know is that when we put in our analysis, love and beliefs, and we let them guide us, chances are the analysis is not correct.

Federiga B.: Add to this the fact that we are small human beings in a much larger course of history. So Constanze talked about the troubles, which are oppressing us, that reminds me, the late years of the Roman Empire. In 395, when Theodosius decided to split the Empire into parts and give it to his sons, he thought he was doing a good thing for the Empire. Instead, it doomed it, it was the beginning of the end, but he did not understand it at the time.

Federiga B.: Fast forward, I, as an academic in the family, I inherited my great grandfather's library. He was a scholar of colonialism. So I basically paid rent, just to keep the books there. And it's fascinating to read those books. At the end of the colonial empire, the belief of the colonialists was that colonialism was good, and for good.

Federiga B.: And luckily, it was not. The reason why the UK, one of the reasons why the UK did not enter in the European coal and steel community is because they had the Empire and they thought that would last forever. But if you read historians like Niall Ferguson, it was clear at the time that colonialism was doomed.

Federiga B.: So what I'm saying, I don't like it, but a cycle has finished, where we're going next? I don't know.

John D.: Thank you, Federiga Bindi. Our next speaker will be speaking against the motion, again, the floor to Carla Norrlof, professor at the University of Toronto.

Carla N.: So I think that we've strayed somewhat from the central question, which is what counts as irreparable damage, and we ventured into a conversation about values and morality. And I don't think that those things are irrelevant, and neither my partner here nor I, care to defend the particular ethics of the Trump administration.

Carla N.: But it seems to me that the United States has throughout the years and certainly, since the second Bush administration, we've had this conversation about the moral rectitude of the United States. And it's in the nature of great powers to be held to certain standards and I'm not saying that they shouldn't be. But sometimes it's simply the dissatisfaction of the great power pursuing its own fundamental interests, when they do not align with their partners' interests.

Carla N.: I still fail to see how the values and what the Trump administration, actually the concrete steps that they have taken so far, how it has damaged the fundamentally strong relationship between America and Europe. We might not like the way that the Trump administration and President Trump in particular is behaving, or the way that he negotiates, but how actually has it damaged this particular relationship to the point of it becoming irreparable? I do not see that. Thank you very much.

John D.: Thank you, Carla Norrlof. Our next speaker making a closing statement, Constanze Stelzenmüller, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution to make her closing statement against the resolution.

Constanze S.: Thank you very much. And thank you for this very rich and fascinating debate. The reason why I closed my opening statement with a reference to Rachel Carlson's Silent Spring, was that I think we need to begin thinking of international relations, not as just great power competition, not just as economic interdependence, which we all consider separately, but as an ecosystem where all these things flow together and where very small events and very small failures can have ultimately catastrophic consequences. That is what I worry about.

Constanze S.: And I also don't want to pin the problems that we are talking about on individuals or even one single administration, whether in America or here in Europe. Although there would be enough to keep us going.

Constanze S.: My concern is, and that comes to your point, Carla, of why do the values matter? Because of the people who are responding to the breaking of the

taboos, because of the people who are feeling enabled, who are surging gleefully, raucously and marching on the streets because they think their time has come. Whether that's Neo-Nazis in Dortmund or in Eastern Germany, or whether it's thugs with tiki torches in Charlottesville, whether it is a German Neo-Nazi who holds a gun, a pistol to the head of a German elected politician and pulls the trigger.

Constanze S.: These people feel enabled by these taboos being broken. And that is what distinguishes this moment in our relationship, and not in the Alliance, which we will not be able to keep separate from that fact. Thank you.

John D.: Thank you, Constanze Stelzenmüller. And now making his closing statement against the resolution, John Mearsheimer professor at the University of Chicago.

John M.: Well, needless to say, I disagree with Constanze.

Constanze S.: With everything.

John M.: I know she's shocked to hear that. But the fact of the matter is that the shifting of the tectonic plates that she describes both in terms of the international system and in terms of domestic politics, just hasn't taken place. The United States remains a vibrant liberal democracy. Does it have problems, even though Donald Trump is the President? Yes. But the United States has had lots of problems over time. When I was a young kid, McCarthyism was in the air. And in many ways, the politics in the United States were more poisonous then, than they are today.

John M.: I'm not denying for one second that Donald Trump is a real problem. But he is one person, he is one person. And there is huge opposition in the United States to him. And when I come here to Europe, and go to places like Britain and travel around the continent, I think in most places, liberal democracy is alive and well, reflected in the comments of you two.

John M.: So I think the crisis you see is just not there. At least yet. Maybe it will be, but I don't see evidence of that. And in terms of the international system, I think the tectonic plates are moving somewhat with the rise of China. But I think the rise of China may present an excellent opportunity for the United States and Europe to work together to deal with the Chinese economic threat. So let's see what happens there.

John M.: But the idea that the system is changing, the international system is changing in ways that undermine the Alliance, I find that just hard to understand. So I think over the long term, what you're going to see is a vibrant transatlantic relationship. It will change somewhat, for sure. But I think it will remain firmly intact, and it certainly won't be irreparably damaged, which is what the motion calls for.

John D.: Thank you, John Mearsheimer. And that concludes round three of this Intelligence Squared U.S. debate where our resolution is, the transatlantic relationship has been irreparably damaged.

John D.: Now, it's time to learn which side you feel has been most persuasive in its arguments. I want to ask you to go a second time to the app, the Brussels Forum app, participant button and then the debate button. If you're in the library as well, those in this room and those watching in the library can both participate in this vote.

John D.: And I want to explain again, that when we tabulate the results in a minute or two, we give victory to the team whose numbers have moved up the most in percentage point terms. So it's the difference. It's the Delta, that determines our winner.

John D.: While you're doing that, I just want to say a couple things.

Constanze S.: I hope we lose.

John D.: One is, at Intelligence Squared, we aim for, we set out our founders' vision, Rob Rosencrantz did put this together, in order to raise the level of public discourse by bringing intelligent issues to a competitive format that energizes it, but with a set of rules and expectations that keeps the whole process civil and respectful. And the four of you were spectacular at that. I just want to thank you very much for that.

John D.: I also want to say that it was a pleasure to have a series of spectacularly good questions from all of you. And I'm sorry, as I said before, I couldn't get to everybody. I hate it when I have to reject questions. It's painful for everyone and you didn't put me in that situation. So thank you very much for that.

John D.: And finally, it's been such a pleasure working with the German Marshall fund for the second year in a row. Ian and I want you to know that your team is spectacularly good to work with. I've used the word spectacularly a lot in the last two minutes, but it's the truth. It's been really a pleasure to be part of this event.

John D.: So we're going to be tabulating the results and I get the results by an iPad in just a minute. But while we're doing that, this is not for the competition. But we're we were curious about your views on the thing that I'd like to ask all of you, since it came up pretty apparently throughout the course of the debate that Donald Trump is not most Europeans' favorite option for President. But we're in a place where two dozen people are running for the Democratic nomination.

John D.: Is there anybody that any of you see in the current prominent Democratic lineup, who you think actually might step up to the process in a way that could be good for the relationship? I'll start with you, Federiga.

Federiga B.: This is really one of the cases where the passion and the love makes me less objective in analysis. I have a clear, preferred candidate, which is Biden. It's hard for me to... But what I can tell you is that when we had the elections in 2016, at the time, it was community with North Carolina, and for me, it was clear, where is Kathy? Kathy is not here, remember once we had a dinner with friends, and Kathy was there, and to me, it was clear that Trump was going to win. And that was completely unseen.

Federiga B.: And you had these little things, there were not as many back yard signs as you had with the previous election, so you could smell it. And that being said, I am deeply worried and I would love for the Democrats to close the primaries this summer, and just fight the current president.

John M.: If a Democrat won, what would be the effect on the transatlantic relations, if a Democrat won?

Federiga B.: They didn't.

John M.: No, no, I'm saying in 2020, if your chosen candidate Biden won, what would be the effect on the transatlantic relationship?

John D.: I guess we're back in the debate.

John M.: That's right.

John D.: The votes are in.

Federiga B.: If he wins, because my bets are where I don't want the elections to be, and the two more years, even only two more years of this could be too much.

John D.: Carla, on the question of the Democrats.

Carla N.: On the question of the Democrats, I do not have a preferred candidate. I'd actually like to take this opportunity to address something else that was said before, which is, I'm not North American. I work in North America, but I'm actually Swedish. So there are three Europeans and one North American here.

John M.: I was outnumbered.

John D.: John, I know you're saying it's irrelevant, but curious to see if you have a Democrat you would like to... I don't know your personal politics. I'm not asking you if you are a Democrat or a Republican. Just if you had to choose a Democrat that you'd like to see up there, would you like to talk about that?

- John M.: I actually would like to see Bernie Sanders win, in large part, because I think the greatest problem the United States faces today and Europe faces is economic inequality. And I think if we don't do something to address that problem-
- Federiga B.: Let me ask you a question, what would be the consequences on transatlantic relations?
- John M.: Actually, that's an excellent point. Because he may be the one candidate who has the most isolationist tendencies.
- Federiga B.: You're conceding.
- John M.: That's because the cameras are turned off.
- Constanze S.: I have to say that because I think the reasons for the decline of the relationship is structural, it doesn't matter that much. And I can imagine a Democratic version of Trump, although I don't see one in the circular firing squad, that is the current Democratic lineup.
- Constanze S.: I finally want to do a defense of Donald Trump, because he's been criticized several times here, including by me, which is that I think that he's actually showing us our weaknesses, all of us, in a very important way. He holds up a mirror to us and in that, I see a possibility of change, and of adaptation that is necessary. So I'm actually somewhat grateful. Thank you, Donald.
- John D.: All right. I just want to do a tiny little commercial for us at Intelligence Squared, I want to let you know we now have done more than 165 debates. And you can see all of them. And a lot of them relate to foreign policy and complex and complicated alliances. We've done a number of debates on Iran, China, Russia, you can just go to iq2us.org and watch them all, or listen to our podcasts.
- John D.: And thank you for also your participation in raising the energy level in the room. 100 from now, you can tell your great grandchildren to listen to this podcast and those are your hands clapping. So you made history.
- John D.: So I now have the final results. The final results have come in. Remember, once again, you voted before you heard the arguments, again after you heard the arguments, you voted again. And we give victory to the team whose numbers have changed the most between the first and the second vote.
- John D.: Here are the results. On the resolution the transatlantic relationship has been irreparably damaged, before the debate, in polling the live audience 20% agreed with the resolution. 73% were against, 7% were undecided. In the second vote, again, the transatlantic relationship has been irreparably damaged, the team, their first vote was 20%, their second vote was 24%. They pulled up four percentage points. That's the number to beat. The team arguing against the

resolution, their first vote was 73%. Their second vote was 71%, they lost two percentage points.

Federiga B.: Yes.

John D.: That means that the team winning the debate is the team arguing for the resolution, in favor of the motion-

Federiga B.: Well done.

Constanze S.: Damn. I didn't want to win this. I did not want to win.

John D.: The transatlantic relationship has been irreparably damaged. My congratulations to them. Thank you from me John Donovan and Intelligence Squared U.S. We'll see you next time. Thank you, everybody.

Constanze S.: But we didn't really move the needle.

John D.: Thank you everybody, this was really a pleasure and hope to see you again. Thank you, thank you very much.

Audience: [crosstalk 01:24:51].

Ian L.: This is not as consequential as the debate, unless you're hungry. Unless you're hungry. [inaudible 01:25:12] John, thank you very, very much again, and thanks to all of your staff from us, and really a terrific-