

Brussels Forum

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Night Owl: Is Europe Losing its East?

Ms. Sharon Stirling-Woolsay: Ladies and Gentleman please welcome Andrei Sannikov.

Mr. Andrei Sannikov: Thank you. Good evening. I was told if I keep it to one sentence introduction, they will allow me to speak later. So I'll keep it very short. You are about to see the preview of the movie called Dangerous Acts, Starring Unstable Elements. It's about my country, Belarus. It's about my friends, Belarus Free Theater. It's a great country. It's about tragedy of this country living under the ruthless dictatorship in Europe. It's about free people of Belarus fighting this dictatorship for the free country. I hope that you will see and understand the fragility of the values on the dictatorship. And I hope that you will get the message of necessity to protect these values and to help us to protect these values. I don't say, enjoy this movie, I say, feel this. Thank you.

[movie]

Mr. Pavol Demes: Good evening, my name is Pavol Demes, I am senior fellow with the German Marshall Fund from Bratislava. And it's my privilege that I have a chance to spend the next 10-15 minutes with the two heroes of this film. I was probably selected because

for me within GMF, Belarus, Ukraine, together with colleagues (inaudible) are their team, and the Balkan team, uh, led by Gordon Adellich. This is part of the territory where GMF has spent a lot of time, energy; and I happened to be at that Square. And happened to be at the last performance of free theater. Ever since I am persona non grata to Belarus. Andrei Sannikov who was featured in that film spent 16 months in prison after that movie. And we are lucky that there are Americans like Madeleine Sackler who never been to Belarus but did a great movie. Madeleine, why did you do this? And what will happen? Because this was preview movies much longer?

Ms. Madeleine Sackler: Yeah, so what you just saw was the first 15 minutes or so of a feature length film. And obviously you're a somewhat unusual audience for a film like this. You know, the real goal of this film is to reach a mainstream audience. So we've been very fortunate that the film was picked up by HBO in the States, and we'll be seeing some theatrical and broadcast runs around the rest of the world, in addition to the film festivals. So we actually just came from London where the film opened the Human Rights Watch Festival there. And we'll be going for a screening at the Hague later this week. And then the film opens in theaters next Friday in London and will continue its run from there. So we are very excited to

share the beginning of the film here; but there's more that makes sense after that. There's an ending.

Mr. Pavol Demes: Excellent. Thanks very much, Madeleine, for showing us preview. And Andrei, three questions to you. Has anything changed since the movie was done? We had Tom Stoppard at the Brussels Forum three years ago, two years ago. You couldn't be here because you were in jail, and last year you appeared here at Brussels Forum. What is different today in Belarus?

Mr. Andrei Sannikov: The situation has gotten worse, and unfortunately the dictatorship that existed in Belarus is becoming even more ruthless. But since you asked what changed and what happened in Belarus, Maidan happened in Belarus because after seeing the pictures of the square and the peaceful demonstration, you probably understand the feelings that we have by then started when Maidan developed, but Maidan achieved victory, and that was happening in Belarus.

And even irrespective of the fact that hundreds if not thousands of Belarusians who are in Maidan, and one of the victims, I want to sound his name, Mikhail Zhyzneuski, was one of the first victims of Maidan. So that's what happened not only to Ukraine but to us, as well. And I think it is something that we have really cherish.

Otherwise, we still have political prisoners. We still have my colleague, also presidential candidate, Nicolai Khalezin (phonetic), in prison. We still have our well-known human right defender Ales Bialiatski (phonetic) in prison at (inaudible).

Mr. Pavol Demes: Surely Ukraine resonates at this year's Brussels Forum, and Tod Lindberg will come soon with a quartet of great speakers and discuss Ukraine and eastern partnership. How--can Belarus become Crimea?

Mr. Andrei Sannikov: It's--you know, Belarus, Lukashenko, you heard it, and it's true, and it's a tragedy, he is there for 20 years. And he has started to build his system of dictatorship from the very beginning, almost from the very beginning. And it's not the question about Crimea. It's not the question about the reputation of this or that historic precedent. The question is what can we all do today to save people in Belarus, save people in Ukraine, save people in Russia because I think that unfortunately, we have to be not only very realistic and sober, but we have to presume the worst-case scenario.

For me, since you mentioned Crimea, with the annexation of Crimea, Kremlin started to realize its plans to destroy Europe. For me that's what we are talking about. And I think that there is a comparison, and there is no comparison.

Mr. Pavol Demes: Last question, and then there is opportunity for two questions from audience. You heard today answers of three secretary generals, current, and two former ones of NATO. You heard Ukrainian minister of foreign affairs and several others referring to Ukraine and what should be done. From your point of view, you live now in Warsaw in exile. You can't be in your homeland. You surely follow Ukraine for a long time since you used to be deputy foreign minister in your country, and you as young diplomat were part of preparation of Budapest agreement, which was about this--I mean removing nuclear weapon from Ukraine. Were you satisfied with some of the suggestions of what the West should do vis-à-vis Ukraine?

Mr. Andrei Sannikov: Well, you know, it's--I would like to repeat what I said earlier in the morning, that there is a very powerful school of thought and strategies very knowledgeable, very well aware of the situation in the region of the former Soviet Union, that somehow they do have--they do produce a lot of impact on decision-makers, on policymakers.

But somehow the obvious result of these strategies is that we are always surprised. And it started with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the tendency continues today. We were surprised. The west was surprised when the Soviet Union collapsed. We had this

feeling that it will happen, but apparently not everybody.

That's why the chicken Kiev special for George Bush the senior. And it continues today. Everybody was surprised when Yanukovych made a U-turn. Then everybody was surprised when Maidan started. Then everybody was surprised that Maidan prevailed. Then everybody was surprised that Russia invaded Crimea and Ukraine. So we have to stop this because this is a moment of truce today.

If you want to know some answers, study the recent history of Belarus. Ask us what will happen and don't comfort yourself that it will dissolve by itself, you know, because the situation is quite dangerous. But at the same time, it's quite promising. We can really turn the history and make it normal history for my country, for Ukraine. Today we all depend on Maidan.

Maidan, you know, Maidan, we never had such a phenomenon. Maidan created a world phenomenon, universal phenomenon. And the whole world, even Syria, the tragedy of Syria, even Arab spring could not compare with Maidan because Maidan gave so much encouragement to all people all over the world. And that's why whatever Russian representatives would say, the world is on the side of Ukrainian, and politicians must help to preserve this encouragement, to preserve

this feeling, to preserve this movement, which will help us also. Thank you.

Mr. Pavol Demes: Very good. I think that with this you gave several good thoughts for Vitalii Klychko and others, who will come on stage, but if there are two questions from the audience either to Andrei or Madeleine about the movie, and then Tod Lindberg will bring his quartet, and we'll continue night owl sessions. I saw some hand over there. Please introduce yourself and put your question or comment.

Mr. Dan Runde: I'm Dan Runde. I first learned about Belarus in 2005 through the hand of Pavol Demes, and I was proud to work at USAID and help get that program started when I was in the Bush administration. So I'm so happy to see you, Andrei, and I really honor our relationship, and I still am going to make good on my dream, and you know what I'm talking about. I have a dream of in a post-Lukashenko Belarus of sitting in a café and drinking coffee with you and eating lots of cake. So you're all invited when it happens. You're all going to--on me, it's on me, and we can just take no, but we're going to do this someday.

But the specific question is, Andrei, what do you need us--what does the United States and Europe need to be doing more of to help get freedom in Belarus. Should we be finding more assistance for dissidents? Do we need to be putting additional sanctions on the

leadership of Lukashenko? What more could we be doing to bring about a Maidan in Minsk?

Mr. Pavol Demes: Andrei, if--and second question goes over there.

Mr. Roland Freudenstein: Thank you, Pavol. I'm Roland Freudenstein from the Wilfred Martens Centre for European Studies here in Brussels. And, you know, the one part of the film that impressed me most was Andrei's quote--besides all the artistic performances--was Andrei's quote about (inaudible). And my question is how does that relate to the talk about geopolitics, about, you know, geopolitics in the sense of Pruzinsky (phonetic), Kissinger, about like geography playing such an important role? Isn't it the power of ideas that counts and not the geographic location of a country? I mean, is this really an east-west conflict, or is this a conflict between people who want to live in a kind of rule-of-law-based society versus sleazy authoritarianism?

Mr. Andrei Sannikov: Thanks. I don't know why you ask questions when you know all the answers. Exactly that. It's what's needed: more assistance for democratic forces, more assistance for free media, no gains for the dictator. I have two words: engage the people; disengage the dictator. And then we will see the results.

As for these geopolitics, you know, that's what I was talking about. By now we should have been living in a world where the arc of stability going through Germany, France, Poland, and Ukraine. It never included Belarus, and nobody ever asked us were it possible. If we were asked when these ideas were floating, we would say no, without Belarus, it's not possible because if you take history, you will see that the crucial role was played by Belarus, the area of Belarus, in every war, in every major war, in conflict, in trade, everywhere.

So to build some artificial security architecture, it will not happen, will not be possible, and simply will not be possible. So again in answering your question, maybe now it's time to really listen to what we are saying and help us to help you to realize the situation and the remedies, tools and instruments for the situation.

Mr. Pavol Demes: Okay, I think we are the end of our session, but there are two ladies in the room, which I do not want to ask to speak, but if you could just stand because you are heroes of this story, Natalia Kaliada, who was seen in the film. And Irina Krasovskaya, who is keeping Belarus alive all the time at Brussels Forum. Where is Irina?

Mr. Andrei Sannikov: Pavol, seems you started to reveal the secrets. There is also Daniella Kaliada. Please stand up.

Mr. Pavol Demes: Where is Daniella Kaliada? Here she is. Okay, thank you very much, and seeing as everybody was saying few nice words about Craig Kennedy, without Craig, we would never start Belarus program. It required Craig, Carol (phonetic), Bill (phonetic) and many others to open up program for GMF, and we are very grateful that we can continue to do this. Until then, Randy (phonetic) and all of us will be invited to chapter of Brussels Forum, which will be in Minsk at one point. Thank you very much to the audience. Thank you.

Mr. Tod Lindberg: Let me invite my team up to the dais. This is a night owl session. But custom, night owl sessions are off the record. We're breaking that custom this year. We're going to keep this on the record, and we're going to try to have as much interaction as possible and make it as broad as possible.

But also since it's night owl session, the custom includes drinking. And so there is some wine, and we'll invite you to please help yourselves to that. Meanwhile, I'm going to bring everybody up all at once.

And we'll get started as best we can. I'll introduce the panelists when I call on them. I wanted

to begin with--I wanted to begin just with a--by reading to you something that my friend and Hoover Institution colleague and our former ambassador in Moscow wrote recently on his Facebook page, on March 15th, this was.

And I thought it was an extraordinary statement by a former American diplomat, especially one so recently deployed. Mike (phonetic) wrote: I am very depressed today. For those of us Russians and Americans alike who have believed in the possibility of a strong, prosperous, democratic Russia fully integrated into the international system and as a close partner of the U.S., Putin's recent decisions represent a giant step backwards. Tragically, we are entering a new period with some important differences but many similarities to the Cold War. The ideological struggle between autocracy and democracy is resurgent; protection of European countries from Russia aggression is paramount again. Suring up vulnerable states including first and foremost Ukraine must become a top priority and for the U.S. and Europe. And doing business with Russian companies will once again become politicized. Most tragically in seeking to isolate the Russian regime, many Russians with no connection to the government will also suffer the effects of isolation. My only hope is that this dark period will not last as long as the Cold War.

(Inaudible). We'll begin with, Vitalii Klychko joining us from (inaudible), Chairman of the Ukrainian Democratic alliance for reform. We've talked a lot already about Ukraine, but I think maybe you are uniquely positioned to tell us a little bit about what the mood and feeling among Ukrainians is now. Where are we? Where are we going to be going?

Mr. Vitalii Klychko: First of all good evening ladies and gentlemen. (Inaudible) chance to enjoy the panel. Right now is a most dramatic time in Ukraine--in the history of Ukraine. From one side we have--we are--we're happy. We doesn't [sic] doesn't have dictatorship anymore. Dictator left and democratic movement in Ukraine won on one side. From another side we talk about intervention in Crimea. We talk about instability in Ukraine which organized not just in the Ukraine. We are more than sure it is outside from Ukraine (inaudible) management and mood. We have very mixed feeling, but it's actually very painful what happens to it now in Ukraine. Right now is as the Russian intervention in Crimea destroyed the system of European security. It's not just a problem of Crimea. It's not just a problem in Ukraine. It's a problem of whole European security. Just a couple of days ago I was in East Ukraine. I visit Donetsk. I visit (inaudible). It's so interesting. So many people make meetings for united Ukraine and some meetings make people raise

Russian flags. It's (inaudible) to stop the people, they--I call political tourists. They come from Russia and support some movement to unite some east region of Ukraine to Russia.

From beginning it's everybody has to understand a very short story. From the beginning it was a movement against a free European movement. And government doesn't see--don't want to see. Don't want to make correction and to--the movement was against the government, but the politician in Ukraine doesn't have to present good quality of lives. It can't present justice. Starting to play some game. Ukraine came from different part of historical part. Different language, part of Ukraine. Some parts of Ukraine speak Russian. Some parts of Ukraine speak Ukrainian. We have a different story and they are starting to talk. It's our language. It's not our language. It's our history. It's not our history. It's our nation. It's not our nation. It's not our nationality. It's not our nationality. And it's--the war is starting. It' started not yesterday. It started a long time ago. A media war. There's a Russian media war starting long time ago. And present everything what happens in Ukraine but in a bad light. In kind of nationalist, aggressive people, extremist come to power. It's not true. The people come from all of Ukraine to main square.

This was European moment for here because we expect in November last year. (Inaudible) signed a (inaudible) agreement in--actually we can make changes in our country and do in exactly the same way because the Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary show a good example of reform of changes. And we hope. I am very unhappy to talk about Ukraine as the most corrupted country in Europe. That is true. We--people told enough. Enough. Leave with corruption. Enough. Leave with our rules. Enough. Leave with our future. And the first time I think so in the history people died in Ukraine fighting for democracy under the flag of European Union.

Today, the main reason why I am very unhappy is the Russian Federation. Because the government changed and Russian Federation have a great idea to build--to rebuild Russian empire. Actually it is to rebuild the empire it is impossible without Ukraine. Its Ukraine is a very important part. But the Ukrainian government is a new government. It's pro European, pro democratic, and the Russians are not really that. And they were interested to make this stabilized situation in Ukraine. Actually, what happens in Crimea and what happens right now in the east of Ukraine is a huge influence in Russian Federation. No question. And our main goal, right now, we (inaudible) happy. Today we signed political part of cessation agreement. This

means it's the first very important step (inaudible). We have to do it a lot. A lot of changes. A lot of reform. And we show. We show for--in the short period of time for people who make--who take in part in Crimea Referendum, they do a mistake. If we make reform. If we make good standards of life, and build infrastructure in Ukraine, new roads it will be a good example because Ukraine has a huge potential and I hope we do it right now everything to build European standards of life its main goal of millions of Ukraine--a million Ukrainian. And we can do that.

Tod Lindberg: Thanks, Vitalii, that's great. Let me transfer to Linas Linkevičius, the Foreign Minister of Lithuania. Linas, you have had a frontline perspective on a lot of the questions we're looking at today. Obviously, we're in a period of crisis in a way that we arguable haven't been. Although we'll be turning to David in a minute and talking a little bit about the 2008 example. But maybe you could offer us your perspective, and maybe provide a little historical context for the discussion of this question of is Europe losing its east?

Linas Linkevičius: Good evening as well. I'm asking myself some questions I'd like all of us to ask ourselves. We can continue endlessly these intellectual discussions, but as we speak, the wrong thing is happening. And let me notice that these things

happening not for the first time. Even not this century not the first time. And when we--so my point is that-- and question is why this is happening, first of all? And second, what we should do in order to prevent? It's very easy. We would be able to--honestly that would be fantastic.

First of all, why it's happening. I believe lessons are not learned. And let me start just not with 1938, not with the (inaudible). Let me start by 2008 in Georgia. And when I said that not once, that time we were very concerned as usually, deeply concerned. Also we had some meetings. We also made very important statements. I remember a meeting of foreign ministers of 2000--2008, December when we made it quite clear what we would like to see in Russia at that time to do. What we demanded them to do. What we asked them to do, and nothing was done, frankly speaking. Not a single item was fulfilled. What is my point? Why others should respect our decisions if we are not consistent ourselves, sometimes? And this is also a lesson.

So now a second attempt. Of course we cannot (inaudible) 100 percent what's happening. There are some discrepancies. But never the less the scenario is more or less similar. And my question is, what if, again that we'll end up as one can say, a couple of sore faces. Maybe some--some sort of say (inaudible) in defeat with regard to the (inaudible) now in

suspension, something else, and then back to normal in some time because we are used to that. We are very pragmatic. We are very practical. And this is really-- I'm not saying that we should be aggressive. No. Not at all. I'm also not proud that we are now introducing this language of sanctions. Because sanctions (inaudible) sound like last resorts when you are talking to your counterpart and he is not listening, or listening but not understanding. So then sanctions are introduced. So something is wrong in our system. Also it reminds me existing U.N. Security Council (inaudible) Relations. Also not possible sometimes to take decisions. If we are talking not on Crimea, but let's remember Kosovo. Let's remember when NATO jumped in too late, one can say. Also without clear message or clear (inaudible) of U.N. Security Council and it last so long genocide took place in the middle of Europe and we did nothing. With all of this international discussions. All of these forums, organizations in place, no one can do nothing, and that also concerns me more than the situation which is now even, because to prevent what's happening is important. But how to prevent this precedent to take place in the future because we have a lot of possibilities to (inaudible) this happening. Because a lot of (inaudible) conflicts around and it's not so difficult to look for them and to find them.

So our task is, of course to make full use of what we do have now. Not to underestimate our opponents sometimes. Very briefly on Eastern partnership Program, that was definitely not just another technical discussion on economical integration of political cessation. It was your political process, definitely. And sometimes we were underestimating this because rules are clear to everyone. I also said, not once we are playing soccer (inaudible) game. Rules are also understandable but other side also playing a little bit raggedy [sic], a little bit resting [sic]. And we have a school [sic] like this. I'm not calling again to, of course, fair game is important but my point is let's take it seriously and let's say that our opponents not always playing fair game. And here we are in the situation when slogans are very right; our statements are very good, that partners have right to choose the way to go, choose alliances. It's good that we're saying we have to respect this choice but today it's very seriously the issue stands that we have to defend the choice.

The choice not ours but our partners, because otherwise credibility of our system, of our organizations were supposed to be built on the foundation of values and principles. It's a bit undermined sometimes. And I'm afraid that it will not act to the extent efficiently. We will have more

events, more Crimeas. That's also bad news, I'm sorry to say this. So, for me, very important to answer these questions, at least to think what we can do using existing leverages and mechanisms and those who are to think very seriously what to be done in our system in order to make sure that world peace order will not be challenged anymore.

Mr. Tod Lindberg: Thanks, Linas. I want to turn to David Usupashvili, the chairman of the Georgian parliament. David, was 2008 parallel to 2014? Do you see a straight line and where does it point from here?

Mr. David Usupashvili: Well, I guess we Georgians feel a little bit guilty with our Ukrainian friends. It seems that together with others, we did not enough in order to prevent this happening. Because even today when we heard very encouraging, great speeches of three secretary-generals of NATO, and when the question was posted, what makes it different, events of 2008 and events now and why then the world reacted as it reacted; I guess we did not hear promising answer from this question.

Because, yes, there was virtually no difference what happened in 2008. Russia's aggression was also tied to some process, which was not in the plans of Mr. Putin, and that was NATO promising to Georgia that Georgia will become NATO member on Bucharest summit. And that was the timing when Russia acted. Now, it was

related to the Association Agreement--again, another project, another free choice of another free country to make it future. The preparation then and now were very similar. People who observe the situation then would remember many things. I will mention just one.

As early as in April 2008, as soon as Bucharest summit declared that Georgia will become NATO member, the authorities of Stalopolcry [sic] adopted a law and expanded its jurisdiction over Kvaisi. So, it was happening there and we were observing. We were seeing that things were coming soon. There were military exercises at the border of Georgia and so on, so on. I will not talk on the other issues of that conflict, but, of course, there are similarities.

And there was military invasion. There was bombing of Georgian cities. There was everything. There was ethnic cleansing, bombing of whole villages in South Ossetia, producing another tens of thousands of internal displaced persons.

So, what happened after? I, of course, we remember very well, Georgians, that on the level of rhetorics, we were hearing almost the same things. NATO suspended the NATO-Russia council interaction, there were talks that the Sochi Olympics would be boycotted. There were other issues related to G8 and so on, so on. And where we end it? Let's remember what was the world looked like before Sochi Olympics. We Georgians decided to go

there in Sochi. And now I can tell this, because there's no reason to continue playing.

We invented reasons why we are going to Sochi, we Georgians. We invented reasons, saying that, well, sports should connect and this is demonstration of our good will and so on, so on. We invented these reasons in order to save our face and probably face of democratic world. Because when we checked among our friends, nobody else, no single country, no single leader, was going to boycott those games, or even raise the issue that in 10 kilometers from that location, there's occupied of Hazia [sic], where Russia is building its military bases, not observing the major part of the Sarkozy (inaudible) Agreement and so on and so on.

This issue was already well forgotten. That's why we decided to go. Because if we did not go, we would downgrade the problem of occupation of Georgian territories to Georgian-Russian dispute over something. Because rest of the world, we are concerned about gay rights in those months, which are very, very, very important. But probably sometimes we are more busy with some popular issues than more, real substantial issues.

I can tell you more. Now, as we are sitting here, it's Georgia who is punished by the council of Europe for two years. We have a sanction and council of Europe is not going to have any major event in Georgia. Why?

It's because of these occupied territories. Because we said to one Russian Duma member who is violating the law on occupied territories and, as Mr. Klychko was saying, political tourists, yeah? We have a lot of them in Sukumi [sic] as well. And we did not allow him to enter to Georgian territory. And because of that, because we restricted freedom of movement of a member of a parliament, of member of state, of consul of Europe, Georgia received two years' punishment while the consul which occupies that territory, which is not allowing the people--hundreds of thousands of people who lost their homes to go to their places--is not allowing us, Georgian members of the Georgian parliament to go there, well, that country is not punished.

So, we need to draw some lessons from this situation. And we are not in the position to come here in the heart of Europe and kind of give some instructions or lessons how to behave and what to do and so on. Because if there was no Europe, if there was no NATO, if there was not USA, there would be no Georgia at the moment. And the very fact that we still exist, this is because of these institutions and people who are in this hall and in other capitals. But probably all these things could be avoided now and it was possible.

Because, again, the effect that Russia still occupies Georgian territories, it's not only violation of the very basic principles of international law. This is something else and it was very clear, too observant to see. Just pose the question: why Russia would need independent South Ossetia in the middle of Georgian state. What's the reason? Who knows anything about this geography there? And so one could say that Abkhazia could be interesting for some of the reasons, at least for touristic destination or something. Why this small land in the heart of Georgian state? What's the meaning to announce there's independent state? There's only meaning that this is the platform, (inaudible), the territory from which another jump. What happened? And it was so easy and so easy to look to the map and to see that it's just tiny corridor. The direct distance is about 35 kilometers. This is between the occupation line of South Ossetia, and on the other side there are Russian military bases. Equipment and the weapons are arriving there more and more. And the Gyumri military base in Armenia. So, this 30 kilometers is this tiny corridor, which still connects Europe to Caspian region: Azerbaijan, Central Asia and that regions. If that is closed--and that was closed during the war--in 2008, because one bridge was blowed up and it was done.

So, my question is and was, and our questions was and is, if Mr. Putin understands the strategic

importance of this small, tiny land, let alone Georgians there, European aspirations there, whatever expressed willingness to join Europe, NATO many times during many referendums, well, we are joking. We conducted our referendum for joining NATO 11 years ago. We are still knocking on the door and we don't know what happens there. Mr. Putin did the only things during 11 days from appointing the referendum in Crimea and absolving the territories.

So, I believe at least now we all need to be more responsive to the problem. And the response, if it is directed towards sanctions and other measures against Russia, I don't think that this will be enough, or effective enough. There must be measures for not losing Eastern Europe until it is still available. And to have more creative approach to the things from European Union and from NATO. Because, again, it is still possible but very soon we could see those same Russian soldiers backed by nuclear weapons in other territories as well. And we could have another confidences and other discussions. Until those territories are free from Russian soldiers, we need to act. This is the lesson from 2008 and this is the lesson from Crimea.

Mr. Tod Lindberg: OK. Thanks, David. Let me turn to Kurt Volker, who's now the head of the McCain Institute at Arizona State University. We all know him as a

former U.S. ambassador to NATO. Kurt, where do we go from here?

Mr. Kurt Volker: I think that's the key question. The title of this panel, I think, was Have We Lost Europe's East?

Mr. Tod Lindberg: Yes.

Mr. Kurt Volker: I think the answer is, the only answer is, not yet, but we could. And so we better make sure that we don't. And that's--you started this off--I guess I need to talk about the role with the United States, the role with Europe. You started this off with Mike McFall's blog post. I think everything that was said in there could have been said about six, seven years ago. The only thing that's different is that they hadn't invaded Crimea yet. But everything else we knew. And so when you talk about the role of the U.S. or the role of Europe, the first thing is to ferret out the truth. You know, what do we actually see with our own eyes? What do we know? We see Putin cracking down on democracy domestically, shutting down NGOs, closing political space, putting pressure on neighbors, invading Georgia and the two years of pressure on Georgia that led up to that. We knew all that. So, the first thing is to be clear about that. And I don't think that we lived up to that standard recently but now I think we will.

Second responsibility or role for the United States in Europe is to be clear about values, to be an advocate, to be speaking up on behalf of human rights, freedom, democracy. Don't let those things pass without comment. Let people know that we're on their side and push back when people are against them. And, again, I think that's something that we need to relearn and to do.

The third responsibility is to try to help protect the environment, and by that I mean a security environment, a political environment where the people of Central and Eastern Europe and far Eastern Europe caucuses get to make their own decisions about what their countries are going to be. It's not the case that the U.S. or you can do that for them. It can't make Ukraine govern a certain way. It can't make Georgia govern a certain way or anywhere else. But when there is outside pressure on that political and security space such as we have seen from Russia, part of our responsibility is to try to push to keep that space open so those people have a chance. So, I think in those areas, that's our role.

Now, you apply that to today, and we have a problem. Putin has already taken the military out of the box, so we're trying not to. We're trying to operate on the basis of sanctions and travel bans and political pressure, but he's already put the military

out there. When people say there's no military solution to this there will be military solution to this today if we just leave it as it is because that's a Putin-driven military solution, so we have to really be aware of where we stand. Putin, in his goals has been more bold. In his lines, he has drawn them much more sharply. His tools are much more blunt, and his tempo is much faster. That's what we have to grapple with when we talk about a policy response. We've got to be faster. We've got to be more clear about our goals, and we've got to be stronger about pushing them.

I'm going to pause there because it's getting late. If we have a chance to come back to a question that Anne-Marie Slaughter asked earlier about the differences between Georgia and Ukraine, I'd like to come back to that.

Mr. Tod Lindberg: Well, we'll see if we can get to that. I thought we'd try a little word cloud. If I could ask the control room to put up the question, and I'll ask you to take out your electronic devices. I wanted to ask you the word that comes to your mind in answer the question, what does Putin want? As soon as we get our word cloud presentation up we'll invite you to start by typing in your one-word answer to this admittedly complex question. Please do so now, and let's see what comes up.

Meantime, I wanted to see if I could find a couple of points on which there is any disagreement on the (inaudible)?

Mr. Linas Linkevičius: I don't think people know how to do it.

Mr. Tod Lindberg: Well, we've got some interesting things popping around. "Empire" is catching on in the crowd, "the reconstitution of empire power." "Gay rights" was mentioned. All right. "Power." "Empire." "Hard power." I think that's the message of the day. Now, I wanted to ask--and it's a little difficult to (inaudible). Is Congressman Turner present with us? No. Okay, okay. In that case, we are going to open the floor to questions, and let me start with Sasha Vondra. Sasha, you will identify yourself for everyone.

Mr. Sasha Vondra: Yes. Sasha Vondra. I remain to stay silent today, but with--I thought reading the letter by Michael McCall I think I can reveal the--some see my secret here. In fact, it will be five years right now when something happened in the GMF offices. Latheron Osmos (phonetic), thank God that he was there with us in Spring 2009. Myself, Adam Rockfeld (phonetic), István Gyarmati, and few other folks, we were drafting here the concept of this later-famous letter to Obama. This was a letter to one President Obama who just declared reset that it will not be a

walking [sic] in Paradise with some practical recommendations.

Then I was invited in June to the White House and--for a discussion with Michael McCall, and those of you have known Michael. He knows how to be emotional, so it was for the first time and the last time when I had a real dispute in the White House. It was almost physical, you know. He went ballistic in one moment because I was advocating the letter. He was advocating the reset, and at one moment he told me that--and the letter was signed by Václav Havel, Lech Walesa, and others so--that we are the men of the 20th century and that we are living in the 21st century.

Since that past year, five years has passed, and we could hear a lot of folks on both sides of the Atlantic lamenting that Putin is playing according to the rules of the 19th century. It reminds me, you know, I have--somebody was talking about the Erasmus generation. I have my Erasmus student [sic] in my school. They are great, but they do not know anything about history, so a couple of days ago we were playing Yalta 1945 according--the real notes when, for example, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was lamenting that Stalin is playing according to 19th century rules, too, while skeptical Churchill did understand how things are done in Europe and in the East in particular. It leads me to a question to the panel whether you believe, you know, in

dealing with the East and in dealing with Russia in particular, whether the equipment of the 21st century is enough because look, it's serious. If Putin is playing according to the 19th century rules and enjoy an 80% of support [sic] among his public, so it's first off at least considering whether we should enrich our arsenal also with some older practices, too.

Mr. Tod Lindberg: Let me take another question.

Vladislav Nazemz: Good evening. My name is Vladislav Nazemz. I am an economist from Moscow, Russian Federation. I would like to congratulate Mr. Klychko. Is a very good presentation. I should say that I 100 percent condemn Putin actions in Crimea because for years the Ukrainians organized quite well a government in Crimea. The Crimean Tartars, for example, a minority, enjoyed quite good treatment under Ukrainian government, and so I think that the aggression in Crimea was really unprecedented. It has no--any grounds for be made except of Putin's drive towards the restoration of empire.

My question goes to our Georgian friend. Is it possible not to see the difference between the situation in Crimea where the peaceful who was engaged by Ukrainians for more than 20 years and the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia where the Georgians themselves--(inaudible) in 1992 when the Georgians were--when initiated the aggression against South

Ossetia? Well before Putin went--came to power in Russia in 2000 Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we are a de facto independent states, and they gained this independence during the war with Georgia. Russians, in my opinion--in my humble opinion, Russians in South Ossetia defended the South Ossetia civilians which--and they do not do the same these days in Crimea. The situation for me is 100 percent different, and when I condemn Putin's behavior in Crimea--100 percent, I repeat--I was quite--I expressed several times my solidarity with Russian actions in South Ossetia in 2008. Can you comment on difference maybe difference in Putin's behavior, maybe on the difference in behavior of your governments--respective governments of Georgia and Ukraine--in this situation? Thank you so much.

Mr. Linas Linkevičius: Shall I answer?

Mr. Tod Lindberg: Yes, if you care to.

Mr. David Usupashvili: Well, my answer would be no comment, but--

Mr. Tod Lindberg: Well, you could leave it at that.

Mr. David Usupashvili: No, I will still answer because that's the problem. That's the problem, and I would advise everybody who thinks like that to think once again. Abkhazia won the war with Georgia. Statement. Do we won who won the war with Georgia? Who we are fighting in Sukhumi? Who separated the people who we are fighting? Who took out the Army from Georgia

and weapon--was it weaponry from Georgian Army? Who gave it to others there, and what was happening there? You know, this kind of simplistic understanding of the situation, that's the precondition of what you are seeing in Crimea because if you were 100 percent on the side of Putin, yeah, that's what makes Putin Putin inside Russia. Because there are 80 percent of Russians who now believe that Putin is right on 100 percent vis-à-vis Crimea. That's the problem, and if anybody does not see that, well, I don't think that we Georgians are able to re-convince or to bring any other arguments there.

What was going on in Svinwali (phonetic) region? What was happening there? Russian Peacekeepers keeping peace there, being there for peace for about 18 years? That was the reason? That's how great Putin was behaving in South Ossetia, being concerned about human rights, and it's just Ossetians whose rights are concerning Mr. Putin. It's not to Crimeans or others, and their rights are not concerning for him. Well, this is the reason, again, why Putin is Putin.

Mr. Tod Lindberg: Thanks. Vitalii, let me ask you. Do you see the situations as essentially similar, Georgia 2008, Crimea 2014?

Dr. Vitalii Klychko: You're actually right. The Russian media works well. This propaganda work much worse than in Soviet time. I have followed friends in

Moscow. They very intelligent, like politic very much [sic], but if I talk with my friends in Russia they ask me what was going on in Kiev in Ukraine. It's ridiculous there. It's nationalistic and fascistic people. It's--I told I'm sorry [sic]. I look, like, ridiculous. As a people fighting for the future, my people don't agree to live with this rule of lies.

Exactly this propaganda work in East and Crimea, the work--the propaganda work very good in Russia, and right now in this situation what we have--actually Ukrainian military base wait too long. They wait without action, without defend [sic], and actually today the last information the Russians gave to all ships, all Ukrainian ships in the, like, Crimea region and more and more military bases--to wait. We have to move away. We have to save the base, or we have to save the people, the military people, officer and soldier and send to continental part of Ukraine, or the people--the military have to defend himself, defend the territory because we want to ensure that Crimea still Ukrainian territory. We not accept this referendum. Referendum was anti-constitutional against all rules of Ukraine. How can happens 97 percent waiting for Russia, 300,000 (inaudible) doesn't take part couple of cities? They don't want to take a part in this referendum. It's--they decide long time before referendum--decision was taking a long time before referendum. That why I

was just a couple of days ago in military base in different part of Ukraine. I was very surprised. Good mood, and people and soldier and officer talked. We are ready to defend our country. We are ready to defend our future. We are ready to fight, but we are not aggressives. We can't--we're ready to stop aggressors.

What happened next, the main goal of Putin; power, empire. But main goal not Crimea. Main goal not Danesk (phonetic) or (inaudible). The main goal, the capital of Ukraine, Kiev, or whole country. And if I talked right now nobody securing Europe. It can happen with any country after Ukraine. Couple hundred years ago, the Poland was part of Russian Empire. The next can be (inaudible) and that's a country. This also happens.

And that's why it's a question of secure not just for Ukraine and for whole region and for whole European country. Thank you.

Tod Lindberg: (Inaudible) come in, let's get some more questions. Yes. Yes, go ahead.

Linus Linkevičius: Yes. Just (inaudible) started to say which century we are where we are in which century. And I believe before answering the question what (inaudible) leadership would like to achieve, we should think about--a bit about our cultural interactions (inaudible), because my point is that it's a bit--was premature to call for strategic partnerships; because we have been seeing things a bit different way.

And sometimes the organizations, they belong. They are good organizations, but the organization's way do not belong or do not have veto right their own organizations. And then we had started to say in the world that to speak about new security architecture sounds very convincing, but that was perceived like new architecture without NATO, with European Union, without possibility to build this organization on the foundation of values and principles. That was my point.

And we were warning, but some of our colleagues said but maybe it's a good idea. And another meanings, let's say peace keeping. Not necessarily those are the best peace keepers who are taking pieces of land and keeping. It's not necessarily the case. And--

Tod Lindberg: Yes.

Teresa: Teresa (inaudible), European Institute of Asian Studies. One of the questions I'm surprised no one has raised when you talk about the difference between what happened in Ukraine and in Georgia is nuclear weapons. Ukraine gave up their nuclear weapons. That's a big, you know, give. And the whole world is standing by, and the ripples from what's happening in Crimea and Ukraine are passing through the world and turning into tsunami, for example, in Asia. What will this mean for North Korea? What will this mean for even negotiations in Iran? What about Taiwan, who's been

kind of promised protection from the U.S. if they never built a nuclear weapon?

So I think there's a huge butterfly effect taking place here, and I am surprised that no one's even mentioned it. So how do you feel this will--

Tod Lindberg: Well, we'll consider (inaudible). Kurt, do you want to address the fallout, excuse me--

Kurt Volker: Sure.

Tod Lindberg: --of the nuclear question.

Kurt Volker: Pick up that and a couple. I think you're absolutely right. So I think that any country that now has nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapons program is going to be much less likely to be willing to give them up if they think that it's their only real source of security. So I think that's the first thing.

The second thing, I just wanted to add on to the question about Georgia, differences from Ukraine. I think another difference--one was the mandate that had the Russian forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia before the invasion anyway. A second difference was a tendency among many people, especially in Europe but also elsewhere, to blame the Georgian government and to blame the Bush Administration for being too provocative to create this condition.

And then a third difference is that the result thus far has been annexation in Crimea as opposed to supporting unrecognized, except for Russia, independent

states and Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But the similarity is Putin and his strategic objectives of what he's doing in his neighborhood. And I think that's the key thing to take away from them.

Charles Grant: Charles Grant from the Center for European Reform. I want to come back to Belarus, where I spent most of this week and put a question to Vitalii Klychko, but also if we can persuade Carl Bildt to chip in here, about the EU.

One observation, one quick question. The observation is this; it seems to me the Belarus economy is getting weaker and weaker. The current account deficit could be six or seven billion dollars this year. This means that Lukashenko's ability to maintain his country's independence from Putin is reducing. Putin's leverage is perhaps rising, and the independence of Belarus is seriously under threat more than it has been.

My question is what the EU should do about this, if anything? I picked up in Belarus from government officials a desire to try and tentatively engage with the EU. I picked up on the EU side some similar desire to do this. Clearly, Belarus is not going to move towards democracy. They might release political prisoners. Should we try and engage in Europe with Belarus to help its economy to keep it out of Russia's clutches or should we say no because you're not a

democracy, so tough we're not going to help? What's the answer?

Tod Lindberg: That was for--

Charles Grant: That was for (inaudible).

Tod Lindberg: Okay. Carl, I know you had your hand up.

Carl Bildt: (Inaudible).

Tod Lindberg: I understand, but apparently you've been drafted in (inaudible) response.

Carl Bildt: (Inaudible) I commend on what Charles said. But first, the fundamental difference between Georgia and Crimea or Ukraine is that in Georgia there was a conflict. I mean, mind you, the war in 2008 was a war and the Russians did invade, but it was a frozen conflict coming from the early '90's.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia was outside the control of the Georgian government. And then (inaudible) but he gave his version and I essentially agree with that particular version. The war could--technically, the Russians won. Strategically, they lost; because their main aim was not to get control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. They already had that to some extent. Their main aim was to get regime change into (inaudible) and they failed.

The difference with what we are faced with now is there was no conflict in Crimea. There was nothing. It was a fairly peaceful place. And if you look at the

opinion polls that were undertaken, the majority of the people identify themselves as Russians. They were. A lot of affinity with Russia. They felt culture, history, whatever. But if you ask the opinion polls prior to this conflict whether they wanted to be part of Russia or part of Ukraine, they were sort of reluctantly happy. Not happy with everything in Ukraine.

If you go to people in Northern Sweden, they complained about Goran all the time. And in same way, they were complaining about Kiev in (inaudible). But there was virtually no feeling for getting away from Ukraine and getting--so it was--there was no conflict. The conflict was created by Russia with the invasion. That's a fundamental difference.

Tod Lindberg: Carl, we will not count that as-- against the question that you will get to ask momentarily, but first I want to turn it over to Lee.

Lee Feinstein: Thanks very much. Lee Feinstein, German Marshall Fund. I was the ambassador to Poland until fairly recently. First, if I may, just a very brief comment on Kurt's point, who I usually agree with. But in case I think we want to be very, very careful about the lessons we draw about the Budapest declaration; because the circumstances around 1994 were really very different.

And we were in a circumstance where we wanted to withdraw the weapons back to Russia. We were actually less concerned about the inheritors of those weapons potentially using them. So I think this kind of Steven Walt idea that--or John Mearsheimer that you keep nuclear weapons and that keeps people out.

I'm not sure that that really applies broadly. And I've real questions as to the degree to which it would apply to this situation. So I wouldn't want to--I'd want to be very careful before we start putting forward that hypothesis.

But I did want to ask a question for Mr. Klychko, and ask you candidly, just in your judgment, what are the next steps for the opposition broadly speaking? What's necessary for the opposition to do between now and the hoped for election on May 25th to be successful and to build the kind of transformation that you've outlined?

Vitalii Klychko: Sorry, we not anymore opposition. We coming to the (inaudible), but anyway the question, what we make next. Very important. Right now, stabilize situation in Ukraine. First point. The second point; the Russians do everything to unstabilize situation in the (inaudible) of Ukraine to send the people that why weak laws abort of Ukraine between Ukraine and Russia.

First point. The second point; it's very important to make right now clear vertical. In May 25th, we have

president election in Ukraine. It's very important to have (inaudible) power in Ukraine as president, who's responsible for the country. That's the next step.

Regarding Crimea; it actually was very important is Budapest (inaudible) in 1994. It's good example for another country regarding nuclear weapons. It's good example to have nuclear weapons as weapons which can support the country from another country. And right now the question to the United States--they was part of this agreement, Budapest agreement--Budapest declaration--Great Britain--and to keep the words--the agreement and if Russia break all the rules in this game.

Regarding Crimea; main goal, it's (inaudible) territory and we have to make demilitarized territory of Crimea. All military base, Russians have to move from Crimea. And the question of time when we return back Crimea to Ukraine, but we still--Crimea is territory of Ukraine. We not accept this (inaudible). It was against the rules, against all international rules, against constitution of Ukraine. The decision. Thank you.

Tod Lindberg: Right behind the counter. Thanks. Yeah.

Mr. Giga Bokeria: Thank you. (Inaudible), UNM (inaudible) part of Georgia for my Secretary of (inaudible). I think Carl Bildt had a very good

observation this morning, which now has been confirmed by our Russian economist friend's comments that there's a difference between how Putin acted in Georgia and Crimea.

In Georgian, Russia, not only Putin, has prepared all of this chemistry for 15 years and has worked meticulously to build up the legend and excuse for invasion. While in Crimea, they acted very quickly without any preparation, much more bluntly. And unfortunately one of the conclusions clearly is that this boldness came out, at least partially out of the perception in Crimea that they paid a very low price for 2008 invasion, very low price. And that's a very unfortunate fact to say the least.

I think we should come back to the 2008, not only at the moment when the invasion happened, but in (inaudible) because it was an important moment. (Inaudible) especially spoke about a historic decision which summit (inaudible) maybe Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO if they choose so.

But I think again, perceptionwise, the summit delivered, let's say so, a dual effect. The fact that Georgia and Ukraine were not given map and the resistance of very important players in Europe created the perception in Crimea that at least partially a huge part of (inaudible) very important countries were ready

to accept that former Soviet Union short of Baltic states is Russia's backyard.

I'm not saying it was intended so. I'm not saying that those countries who objected to Georgia's map were intending to send the signal, but unfortunately it was seen like that. And the danger is now if the reaction towards this very blunt, very open military aggression, occupation, annexation of Ukraine--if the direction is not quick enough and not strong enough--and there was enough talk about that this morning, so I won't repeat that (inaudible) is a good start, but far from enough to hurt Putin's regime for sure.

But I want to bring back the NATO issue. And there's Minister Linkevičius is here and there's Kurt Volker who knows a lot. So I want to ask both of them the Minister is somebody who is inside the club now and go to somebody who knows a lot about it. Where is the game play with NATO enlargement now? Because if the next time it comes and there is no clear signal for Georgia in this case because Georgia continues its course on NATO aggression and for Ukraine if it chooses to--

Mr. Tod Lindberg: Okay. We've got the question on the table. That's great. Let's--

Mr. Giga Bokeria: What would happen then?

Mr. Tod Lindberg: --it's getting late, and I really want to get some answers.

Mr. Giga Bokeria: Thank you.

Mr. Tod Lindberg: I've got a couple people I want to get in. Yes. Well, it's getting early. All right. Fine. Let's pick a question here.

Mr. Anton La Guardia: Anton La Guardia, The Economist, I don't have a statement, but I have a couple of questions (inaudible).

Firstly to Kurt, you said something which I want to make sure we understand correctly. You said the lack of a Western military option means a military solution by default. What do you actually mean by that? What do you mean--what do you think the West or Europe or America should do about--on the military side?

To Vitalii Klychko, your government, now that you're no longer in opposition, is being asked to do some very profound economic reforms by the United States, the European Union, and the IMF, including abolishing subsidies for fuel. Is that something that a government in your--in the position of the current government can actually engage in? Is that something they can do? Is that not too difficult to do?

To Mr. Linkevičius, if you could replay the videotape again, what would you have done that's different in the run-up to Vilnius?

Mr. Tod Lindberg: Shall we start with those?

Mr. Linas Linkevičius: Okay. Starting with what Giga Bokeria said, I already mentioned that in my view

as well lessons were not learned, and that was also kind of part of the situation we have now. When it comes to Georgian case [sic], I'm convinced that this is really--I know what will happen in consensus-building process, but sometimes I also can repeat that we are doing sometimes too soft, too little, and too late. This is true, and that's lagging behind the events. This is really instead of acting on time and clearly, so that's important to mention.

When it comes to Georgian case [sic] I'm convinced that Georgia has in possession now all necessary tools with regard to NATO membership. It was said in 2008. It was repeated later. Georgia will be NATO members, so those who are doubting whether they will be they can look at this decision. When they will be--when will be read definitely, but they have all tools in their possession. They have NATO-Georgia Commission. They have dialogue, Annual National Programme. They have everything. Annual National Programme has a structure same as Membership Action Plan. For those who like membership action plan more I doubt it's necessary for Georgia because they really do have everything--what they need to have. Their success will depend on political momentum when political decision will be made, so I would advise Georgians to look--to work hard, to continue with reforms, and time will come. I have no doubt. When it will come, I don't know but

sooner than later. You will be really eligible to be NATO members, and we will support you, of course, I hope with all our colleagues as well.

This is the answer to your question about video. No, video would be the same probably. I was very happy. I shouldn't say that I was happy with the Ukrainian case. Of course, we are all sad with what happened, but I'm happy that we made this program, Eastern Partnership Program, alive and with a future although there were doubts that it probably will be stopped or will be crashed because of these challenges. No, it's not the case. I'm happy because of Georgia and Moldova because they really made a very important step during initial (inaudible) agreement during Vilnius summit, and now I have no doubt in summertime we'll sign this agreement. If we'll do that--possible, of course. That will be also extension for Ukraine which they signed part of the secession agreement, but in due course and soon. And I would wish you to do that as soon as possible to accomplish all single mechanism including (inaudible) and start reforms immediately. You and Georgians and Moldovans, that will be irreversibility of the process, so I'm saying that video is the same.

Video disclosed the situation, true, and also involved more my friends in the lies in this debate because at the beginning of our story--in beginning of July in just few countries we're talking about Eastern

Partnership. Others were neutral or also to say--I shouldn't say indifferent but were not very active. Now more and more countries involved. We're sharing ownership, and this is good news. Also, I hope motivation also is here, but at the same time I still believe we could do more, really. Our proactive approach is really needed rather than wait-and-see approach because wait-and-see approach is prevailing up to now. We are waiting until something will be done automatically. At the same time with opponents, you see how they are active in making all leverages and tools which are not acceptable in 21st century, so we really should review our strategy to be more active. This is not about the video of the past. This is about the video of the future.

Mr. Tod Lindberg: Vitalii on the road ahead?

Dr. Vitalii Klychko: Very short answer for this question. Yes, Ukraine government ready to reduce--to make the prices higher. We understand that, and very important the Prime Minister announce already this news. It's very important point to explain for the people why we do that as a reform, and people have to understand it's important to make our economy compatible with another one.

Mr. Tod Lindberg: One more question. I'm afraid we're running out of time.

Natalia Kaliada: I'm sorry. It's not the question. My name is Natalia Kaliada, and I just want to comment on a Belarusian question because it was not answered if I got correctly. Maybe I didn't hear the answer (inaudible) anyone else, but as we started from Belarus and slowly moving to the end of the panel. I believe it would be absolutely perfectly to comment on it. I honestly can't believe that there is a discussion about engagement from European Union side, and when Belarusian government is saying that they want to be engaged I really can't believe that it's happening again.

I think it's a nightmare because this is exactly what was happening in 2010 when all European politicians, including Radosław Sikorski, coming to Belarus before the elections saying that we are very happy to engage with Belarusian dictator. Two thousand people got arrested in about a month, I believe, so when we had the presidential elections it was the bloodiest crackdown in the history of Belarus with people in jails, tortured, taken from cells from KGB, stripped, stretched, electroshocked, still people are in Belarusian jails.

In December, when all Ukrainian events started to happen, we personally started to write letters to European and American politicians saying put sanctions now otherwise people will be killed in the Ukraine.

What happened? Waited, people killed, sanctions in place. Are we going to repeat it again? It's not possible. The only solution here is just do your job to the end. Just deliver that. It's Eastern Europe, and it's not solved yet. It's not possible to believe that all of it just happened in two-hour-and-a-half [sic] flight from Brussels. People are still fighting. People are still dying. They are dying in jails. They are dying in the streets, so even though the politicians don't like sanctions, so finally it came that particular moment: either you do it or there will be war.

Mr. Tod Lindberg: Well, our topic tonight has been "Is Europe losing its East?" In a way, it's been the topic for the entire day. I think that there is a detectable, palpable energy level to the discussion that we've been having over the course of this day, and I think that's because of the awareness that the stakes are very high and that this is worth, so to speak, a fight, not necessarily in the sense of a military confrontation between East and West but certainly in the sense of resistance to an aggressor. With that in mind, I would like to ask the control room just to put up one question that we can vote on on the way out today. That question is, Putin vs. Klychko: Who you got? We'll be voting for 15 seconds. Vitalii, go ahead.

Mr. Linas Linkevičius: But he's not running for Russian President.

Dr. Vitalii Klychko: Very interesting because exactly is the same question we have couple of months ago, but instead Putin was (inaudible).

Mr. Linas Linkevičius: But he's not running for Russian presidency. He's running for Ukrainian.

Mr. Tod Lindberg: Well, I think--

Mr. Linas Linkevičius: It depends. It's boxing or wrestling?

Mr. Tod Lindberg: --I think we have a confrontation going on.

Mr. Linas Linkevičius: Boxing or wrestling?

Mr. Tod Lindberg: All right. Well, the winner, and still champion--okay. Thanks to Kurt, to David, to Linas, to Vitalii, and thank you all.