Brussels Forum

March 21, 2015

Countering the New Wave of Terrorism at Home and Abroad

Dr. Karen Donfried: Good morning. Welcome to day two of Brussels Forum. It's great to see you all back this morning. I thought we had a terrific start yesterday with the German Defense Minister von der Leyen and Dr. Brzezinski for what I thought was a very rich discussion of European security. And then it got even livelier on the stage with a conversation about Russia. But thanks, all of you, for participating so actively, as well.

I'm sure all of you have noticed the amazing collection of art that is in this hotel. And I just wanted to spend a minute to tell you a little bit more about it. And what we're going to do is start with a short video that will introduce you to how those remarkable pieces of art come together. So let's watch the video.

Video Clip: [Speaking Foreign Language]

Dr. Karen Donfried: That was amazing and I now want to ask you to join me in welcoming this year's featured artist to Brussels Forum, Ms. Isabel de Borchgrave. A very warm welcome and thanks. Thank you so much, it really is spectacular. I've gotten so many comments on all of your work, so it's wonderful to have you featured here.

And now I'm going to unveil the first bit of the mystery, which is not related to the mystery session tomorrow, but several of you have asked about some of the abbreviations that are on the program. You may have noticed that next to Federica Mogherini's name yesterday, it said MMF, and that's Marshall Memorial Fellow. That is GMF's flagship fellowship program, which was created back in 1972 and we are very proud of the alumni of that program of which she is one. So that's that acronym. And you will notice that on this session after Derek Chollet's name, it says MWS. And that is Manfred Wörner, that is another fellowship program that we do, named after a past German Defense Minister and a NATO secretary general. So just so you know what that special GMF language is, I wanted to bring you into the circle. But both of those programs are an expression of GMF's longstanding commitment to leadership development, and so we want to highlight those connections whenever they're there.

So that said, I want to introduce Philip Stephens, who will moderate the next session. Philip is with the *Financial Times* and I'm going to give the floor over to him. Welcome, Philip.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Thank you. Thank you very much. And it's gratifying to see so many people have got up after some late sessions last night. If we needed any reminding of the threat from terrorism, from terrorism that now, you know, we

now see running from the west of Africa right across the Middle East to south Asia. Sadly, it came this week in--with the killings in Tunis.

It's a threat that I think some of our discussions, certainly in one of the Night Owl's last night, of great complexity as well as geographical spread. We, as General Allen said, you know, we find ourselves worrying about how to recreate government in Iraq as Ms. Mogherini said, we see Libya sliding further and further into collapse and then we see the affiliation of lots of these radical extremist, violent extremist groups in West Africa, sort of, on the back of the so-called Islamic State in Syria. So there's huge complexity and the fight is there but it's also here, as it were. We have our own homegrown, as people say, terrorists. So it's a really big and complex subject.

We've got a great panel who can look at all the different dimensions. But I thought before I turn to them, perhaps I'd sort of see how awake everyone is by asking you a few questions. So if you can get out your mobile phones and iPads and whatever, we've got three or four short questions, which will just, I think, give us some of the agenda for our discussion. So I'm going to give everyone, sort of, 30 seconds to work out and get the applications working.

Okay, the first question is a pretty--these questions are not scientific and, you know, a pollster would find all sorts of flaws with them but they're just to get us thinking. This is, I think, question is one particularly for Europeans. We were

talking yesterday about the sort of overturning of the European order by Russian intervention in Ukraine but if we try and look out, what's the biggest--which poses the greater long-term threat to western security? Is it Russian revanchism in Ukraine and beyond or is it Islamist terrorism? So straight, one or two? I think we've got seven seconds, six seconds to go.

Ha, okay. So this is, as far as this group is concerned, this is the real long-term as well as immediate threat.

Second question, who's the enemy in Syria? And I think different people take different views. Is it President Bashar al-Assad? Is it the Islamic State, Daesh? Or is it both? There you go, you got 15, 14 seconds.

Hum, so predictable, most saying both, but interesting only four percent saying it's Mr. Assad. I think a few years ago we might have got a rather different answer to that question.

Third question, okay, this is about civil--the balance between our liberties and the need for our security. So post-Snowden and the ISIS success in recruiting foreign fighters, western governments got the balance between preserving individual freedoms and tracking terrorists with digital surveillance, have they got it right? About right is number one, is too intrusive on freedoms, it's insufficiently comprehensive. So we've got 13 seconds.

So that seems to suggest that we should be doing more to tighten up security, which rather--I mean, that rather surprises me. I thought there'd be more of a balance but we'll go--that's something we're going to have to discuss.

So--but let's go onto the last question. This isn't just a battle about hard security or about intelligence or about surveillance. It's also about communities and this question's specifically about European governments. When we look at foreign fighters going off to Syria, do we think that we've done enough to extend opportunities to the Muslim communities across Europe or is there isolation and terrorism radicalization linked? So have we done enough, yes or no? It's a very straightforward question.

No. Yeah, that's good--that's a very, very strong no, so we don't--we haven't got our things entirely in terms of policing or security. We really have to think about the social structures in our European nations.

Okay, now we've got some of the issues that we'll discuss but not all of them. There will be other things coming up but I'm going to turn to the panel with a question to each of them and I'm going to start with Derek Chollet, who's a senior counselor at the GMF and, until December, was an assistant secretary at the Pentagon and served in the White House and State Department so a very experienced American policymaker and I want to start, Derek, with you with a question we asked at the beginning.

When you look at this from the United States and the U.S. administration looks at the myriad of challenges around the world, it looks at Ukraine, it looks at Russia, it looks at the Middle East, the place it wanted to get out of a few years ago and is now being pulled back into, which does it see? You know, if President Obama was answering that question, does he see Ukraine/Russia as the biggest threat or does he see the rise of Islamist terrorism as the biggest threat to American interests?

Mr. Derek Chollet: So, I think, I don't know if this makes me conventional or really smart but I agreed with the audience on all the questions and I think in particularly the first two in terms of our urgent security threats and our interests. I would argue, and I believe the U.S. argues as a whole, not just the administration but our Congress, that the most urgent security threat to the United States and the most urgent transatlantic security threat is that of Islamic terrorism and specifically ISIL.

Why is that? First, it's the geographic footprint. In Iraq and Syria alone, ISIL covers territory that's roughly the size of the United Kingdom and as we've seen recently, it's metastasizing elsewhere in places like Libya, perhaps even in Tunisia. The resources that ISIS has, it's essentially financially self-sustaining. It's got a large degree of military capability that it has gotten from inside Syria but then also, of course, unfortunately, some U.S. supplied equipment in Iraq.

And then finally, and I know it's on the mind of all the Europeans here, the foreign fighter flow, which is significant. The number of travelers to Syria is greater than the number of travelers we had at any point in the last 10 years to Afghanistan and Pakistan, to Yemen, to Somalia, even to Iraq during the war, so it's very significant. There's 20,000 foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria today and roughly 35-3,600 from Europe. And, to me, that's what explains Europe's willingness to be part of the military effort in Iraq and I think that's, frankly, an underappreciated story in Washington. The willingness of European allies to step up and be part of the U.S. led air campaign in Iraq. We have a different set of allies working with us in the skies over Syria. But this will be a long-term effort and that's why, I think, this is the challenge for all of us. It's certainly a challenge for us for in the United States when it comes to resources and will. It's certainly going to be a challenge for our European friends as we look on the military side of this campaign for something that's going to last for many years.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay, can I just come back and press you though? If that's the case, if it's understood to be the big strategic threat, why is the U.S. half-in and half-out? If you look at, you know, the campaign in Syria, for example, this is, you know, reluctant American interventionism and it almost seems as if, you know, the administration took a decision which may have been right a few years ago that we got to get out of there, we got to just, you know, get back and maybe

look at the Pacific. But circumstances have changed but the administration is still, sort of, hamstrung by that, sort of, decision it's taken then.

Mr. Derek Chollet: Well, the fact that you're going to use the military tool to deal with this threat does not mean you use it to its maximum extent necessarily in every case. I think our view, the view of the Iraqis, the view of our European allies, is that a large ground presence in a country like Iraq would not help us solve the problem. The--

Mr. Philip Stephens: So you they're doing--you think the U.S. is doing enough in terms of military and security intervention in Iraq and Syria?

Mr. Derek Chollet: I do. I do think it's still early days because a key part of the strategy in both Iraq and Syria is to build up the capability in Iraq's case of the Iraqi security forces and help those security forces become more capable and unified. And in Syria, to build up the military moderate opposition, which is a project that's just getting underway and will take years to unfold. So in addition to our direct military action, which we're conducting through airstrikes, we're seeking to build up a ground presence of the Iraqi and Syrian forces.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay. I'm going to turn to Volkan Bozkir, the Turkish European Affairs Minister and I'm going to guess he doesn't agree entirely with that last assertion that the U.S. is doing all it could. So that's my first question to you, but my second question to you is, you know, you're there, you're there on the

border, as it were, and we've seen quite a lot of tension between the U.S. and Ankara and between some European governments and Ankara about how this problem is being handled and, you know, frankly Turkey's been accused sometimes of letting these fighters go through, not doing enough, of being ambivalent sometimes about, you know, the conflict between, say, the Kurds and the extremists. So can you give us your perspective and really explain how it's different from those--that of some of the western governments?

The Honorable Volkan Bozkir: If we just concentrate on Iraq and Syria, well, now we're facing a kind of a different terrorism. I think one of the reasons is that U.S. went into Iraq too late and came out from Iraq too early, leaving behind un-established democratic institutions and the state, which could be called a democratic state rule of law, exists. Also, in Syria of course, when we were warning that if we don't stop it in the beginning when it was Assad versus the opposition forces now it is more than that. It's (inaudible ), Al-Qaeda, the (inaudible) is there. So we were warning that it might become an Afghanistan there where terrorist organizations find a vacuum and come there to show how powerful they are, which is, the case we are facing. In a way, I think the deterrency of the U.S. is not with us anymore because U.S. has given the message that U.S. soldiers cannot be deployed outside of the country because the three sultans, Saddam, al-Qaeda--Osama bin Laden and Gaddafi's gone, so it's very difficult to convince the

U.S. people that U.S. troops will be needed elsewhere and soldiers could be killed. So when we lost this deterrent factor then as there's no other super power in the world other than the U.S., I think, these groups find really a strength in themselves, and that's what we are facing now.

For example, when we talk about this Daesh, they were--they started when U.S. first entered into Iraq in 2003. The beginning is there. I mean, the Saddam's former soldiers, opposition to the U.S. and most of the militants were, in a way, trained in the Abu Ghraib prison and then released there and we are now having a trained ideologically and military trained groups, which I think--

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay. We are where we are but what should the U.S. be doing now?

The Honorable Volkan Bozkir: U.S.--we can't get rid of this by just bombing some points. We need forces on the ground. For Iraq, I think it will be the Iraqi army. The composition of the Iraqi army is now being changed together with the U.S. It was a 95 percent Shiite army, which was considered to be an oppression on the Sunni population there. Now as the structure is being changed, I think, the army can get rid of the Daesh remnants in Iraq. For example, when the Daesh got muscle, it was 2,000 militants versus the 55,000 Iraqi army escaping, leaving behind their uniforms and the wonderful U.S. weapons. And this shouldn't be the case. The army should take over.

But in Syria, it's a different case. We don't have a state there. And, I think the only way out is to deal with that unconventional forces by using unconventional forces, which I think after so many years, we came to the conclusion that we have to train those unconventional forces in Turkey or elsewhere, and then after (inaudible) them, send them to Syria, they can handle that. But what we say is we need a no-fly zone because the asset only has the Air Force superiority now. They don't have a land superiority. If they bomb our forces, which we have trained, equipped, and sent to Syria, then that would be damaging. So no-fly zone, training and equipping the unconventional forces, and if we have a part which is clean from terrorism in Syria, we can send back some of the refugees by constructing houses and so.

Turkey, as you have said, is blamed by letting European fighters to reach the terrorist group. But I mean, we have 39 million tourists coming to Turkey. And we can't check who is a terrorist, who is a tourist, who is coming there for academy class. Once the information flow, intelligence-sharing started, we have stopped 12,500 persons, not all of them from Europe, but from all over the world, to enter into Turkey. And we captured 1,200 people who were already in Turkey, thanks to the information sharing that we are doing our part. Turkey has never really worked together with Daesh, and never will.

Mr. Philip Stephens: I just want to press you just one--on one point. The last time I was in Turkey, in Istanbul, the president gave a speech in which he talked about our Sunni brothers. And you know, one sort of had a feeling that there's a sort ambivalence there in the Turkish--in part, in the Turkish political establishment, about you know, where Turkey stands, visa-a-vie, you know, particularly the Kurds and Daesh.

The Honorable Volkan Bozkir: Well, I think that's a wrong concept you have that, Turkey is always in favor of, first of all, integrity of political integrity, territorial integrity of countries neighboring us. We have never talked about dividing countries according to religious sects. So, in Iraq, this is the case. We have never said Iraq could be separated into pieces. And in Syria, what we are saying that the regime, which is majority Shiite, is going--has to leave, but with that regime, when they were not killing their own people with (inaudible), Turkey had good relations, and (inaudible) is a Shiite.

It is of course, we can't understand it. If it was a Shiite president and we had good relations until he killed his people, that Turkey had a intention of creating a Sunni province in Syria.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay, thank you. Now, we're going to come back from the region to Europe. And I want to ask Shields, who's the coordinator for terrorism for the EU, and therefore has a sort of unique sort of cross-continent, as it

were, perspective. We've had a number of attacks in Europe. We have--we're sending thousands of foreign fighters. Just perhaps, if you just sort of spell out the nature and the depth of the threat. And then I might come back to you and we'll talk about how we should be countering it. But if you could just sort of set out where the threat's coming from, how big it is geographically, also, in terms of the radicalization.

Mr. Gilles de Kerchove: The threat remains serious, but it's much more complex than it was after 9/11, where we had an organization al-Qaeda structured like a multi-national company. We have--to make it a bit simplistic, three main sources of trade.

We have young Europeans, who have no contact with a terrorist organization, who have not traveled abroad. But it gets radicalized either on internet, in prison. If you look at recent attack, what's mainly petty criminal who got radicalized in prison (inaudible), Mohammed Mehta, the brothers (inaudible). They have interaction with Imams and that's the first category. And they are inspired to take the name of the magazine published by AQAP Yemen to mount an attack close to the house in a small scale attack. And we know that even a small scale attack may have an impact.

So that would be the first category. The second is, of course, the very high number, and you said in the thousands, my assessment, we're probably between 4

and 5,000 Europeans, which is huge. I don't suggest that all the returnees will fall into violence, but it's a very high number. And we know why it is worried. These people get military training in Libya and Iraq, they get re-radicalized. They develop a network all over the Arab world, which is (inaudible) coverage of the fight. And I think they will have increased significantly the tolerance to violence.

So that's the second one. And the third one, and I think something we have not to over-estimate is the fierce competition between al-Qaeda and Daesh for the leadership of global jihad. And we may see, at some stage, either in Europe or in some part of Africa, al-Qaeda wanting to mount an attack to show that they are still relevant, they are still in the loop. And that was what this Shiite (inaudible) group, a small group inside (inaudible), a former veteran from Afghanistan. Very, very well trained, working with (inaudible), who's the world expert in explosives from AQAP.

So this is the main three sources. But they are amplified by three or four factors. The first one is, I'm afraid, a very high number probably increases the number of failed state, or failing states and we may come back to that. If we don't handle the returnees in a proper way, they may end up doing what we--the mistake we did with (inaudible) at the end of the war in Afghanistan. We let them--why they lost in (inaudible) and there was the start of the problem for the Pakistani. So

that's the first one. And they may want to move to Yemen, or to Southern Libya or the Sunni. Who knows?

The second one is the growing tension between the Sunni and Shiite. The Sunni world, they lost their champion. Egypt has been in war looking for too long. They see chaos in Syria and Libya, and the rise of Iran more and more. And if ever there is a nuclear deal, Iran will be--will receive billions of dollars, and will be even more the super power in the region. They control Iraq, fully. They control, through the (inaudible), Lebanon. The Houthis in Yemen, and some key parts of the Middle East.

The third aspect is the (inaudible) and don't understand--don't misunderstand what I'm saying. But some of this country have a bit destructured in order to restructure the security of (inaudible). And it's a bit the case point with Tunisia. Because the security service where they observe oppression today Tunisia is less well-equipped than it was four years ago to address the return of thousands of foreign factors.

And finally, we should not forget the ideology. At the end of the day, this has an impact in Europe, a distorted interpretation of Islam, has some impact. It's not just badly integrated second-generation migrants. These are (inaudible) people on which ideology plays a role.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay. I mean, I think that's fascinating, and I mean, I have two questions for you. One, the competition between Daesh and AQ. You said it really play out with them competing to, you know, to be, to do the sort of biggest terrorist act to Europe. I mean, is there a possibility at some stage that they, although there have been clashes in Syria, that there is a, you know, a confrontation, a bigger confrontation between the two groups, directly?

But the second question I have, which is, you know, you mentioned Tunisia, and Libya, I mean, are these European failures as much as anything else? I mean I remember talking to a Tunisian minister last year who was saying how, you know, the promises of trade liberalization, although technically, many of them had done the obstacles of the Tunisians still encountered, and just trying to sell basic produce to Europe were huge.

The access for young Tunisians to European universities where they would, you know, increase their technical skills, but also perhaps absorb some of the liberal culture, was restricted. So, I mean, you know, isn't Tunisia potentially a European failure, and Libya, we sort of went in and, you know, my own Prime Minister and the then French President went off and took the chairs in Benghazi, and then just walked home.

Mr. Gilles de Kerchove: To take the latter, I would agree that probably we have not been up to the challenge of the offspring. And we should have been doing

much more, and much more quickly. As you said, we see young, promising intellectuals in the Arab world going to Kuala Lumpur because they get a scholarship and study Islamic studies, while they would have preferred to study medicine or engineering. I fully agree on this.

So, we should be a bit more open in terms of access to university, free movement of secular migration and free movement of students.

But the good news is that, that was prompted by the various attack to Minister of Foreign Affairs have decided, under the leadership of Ms. Mogherini to engage much more than before in our direct vicinity, in our backyard. Because we know we are faced with a serious problem on the other side of the military. And so, I think in the coming months, you will see a much more active Europe to beef up the resilience and the response of these countries to face the terrorist threat.

As to the first one, I would rather see a sort of takeover by Daesh for either--tactile reasons. Some group wanted to just bet on the winner because that helped them to recruit, and get money, and get people.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay, fine. Well, from our completely unscientific poll, the mood in this room is more security. But I'm sure everyone is aware that, you know, there comes a point where we give up our own liberties in order to make us feel more secure. But what's security without liberty? Where are we? There are huge debates, I think, on both sides of the Atlantic. And we have Susan Herman,

from the National--the U.S. Council for Civil Liberties here, and she's an expert. She's written a great book on this subject. *Taking Liberties*. Hold it up. So if you really want to look into this subject. So, Susan, how does it look? And I know, obviously, the U.S. is, you know, is where you are, but if, you know, if you have any views on the balance in Europe, as well, we'd be interested in that. Where do you think we are in striking that balance between security and liberty?

Ms. Susan Herman: Thank you, Philip. The American Civil Liberties Union only actually acts domestically. So our focus is on U.S. Constitutional law, as well as increasingly international human rights and arms. But we're also now part of a coalition called the International Network of Civil Liberties Organizations, which includes liberty in the U.K. and Hungarian and Irish Civil Liberties Councils and the various other places around the world.

I mostly know about the United States. And so I thought, obviously after 9/11, the United States did a lot in terms of changing our laws to try to counter terrorism. And there are many--we changed our laws about detentions, what were called harsh interrogation techniques, security screening, and many things in addition to surveillance. But because your question focused on surveillance, I think that probably will be our focus for today.

So let me just say something about this poll, about the balance between, you know, liberty and security in terms of do we want more surveillance or less surveillance?

I think to set the table for our later discussion, what I want to do--and it's obvious to everybody what we're hoping will be the benefits of more surveillance, that we'll find out more about what people who are potential terrorists or actual terrorists are doing, and therefore be able to disrupt the plots.

But I think it's more difficult to get a handle on what are the costs of too much surveillance. So what I want to do is I want to divide up the possible costs into four different categories.

Number one, which I think is the most obvious, is the threat to privacy. And that's something I think we'll be discussing. People have questions today about do we still have privacy anyway? And that's a very important discussion. Why should I care what the government knows about me if I'm not doing anything wrong?

I think that connects up, however, to the second major threat, which is the threat to liberty in many ways. Privacy is connected with the freedom of speech, with the freedom of association, and the freedom of religion. And I'm happy during the Q&A to give you examples of what I mean by that, because I think this is not just a matter of what does the government know about me? I think that having, you know, some privacy from the government is a precondition of, you

know, many of the liberties, your freedom of speech, and so forth, that we want to exercise.

The third concern, which is also a very important, is a concern about equality. Philip, you were saying don't we feel that we have to give up some of our liberty in order to be safe? Well, one of the conversations we're having in the United States is who's "we?"

So, I think a lot of people assume that they, themselves, are really not going to be very inconvenienced, they're not going to be locked up, and they're not going to be a major focal point of the government's investigations, it's only going to be the Muslim and Arab men. And so if it's not affecting me, I think it's easier for me to make a decision that's going to give up somebody else's rights. But the fourth, which I think the fourth concern which is maybe the last obvious, is the connection between privacy and democracy. And so I just want to take a minute now and say what I mean by that.

So it seems to me that one of the preconditions for democracy, and this is not just the United States, this is any democracy, is the idea that people run the government, not that the government run the people. So what we have experienced after 9/11 is a kind of an inversion of that premise. So because surveillance has become so super-sized, we're now gotten into a situation where the people have

become increasingly transparent to the government, and the government has become increasingly opaque to the people.

What we saw in the United States was that because of the fear of terrorism in the fall of 2001, I'm sure many of you have heard of the U.S.A. Patriot Act? That not only allowed a lot of surveillance, but it allowed the government agencies to keep secret from people what they were doing. Now what this led to, first of all, was the sense that we just had to trust the government with all decisions about how much surveillance was appropriate. And therefore, you know, people were not really--the public, was not invited to be part of that debate. What that meant was that first of all, the agencies by themselves, they were making law within themselves; and for a long time, this was under the Bush administration, our National Security Agency was actually operating in violation of the existing law that Congress had passed. Because the president didn't want to have a public discussion about what was an appropriate level of security.

The other thing that we learned, thanks to Edward Snowden, was that we didn't know the half of what the government was actually doing. That when you give an agency too much power to conduct surveillance, very well-intentioned people are likely not to see the other part of the balance, because that's not their job. Their job is, how big is the dragnet that we need that we might catch

terrorists? My job is to say, wait a minute, what about the unintended consequences? Is your dragnet too big?

So what we saw were, that very well-intentioned people were using the powers that they were being given --

Mr. Philip Stephens: That's, I'm going to push back, because that's as it was. I mean, things are now changing. And one of the things is we're-- governments are being obliged, in certainly in my own country, and I believe in the U.S., to be more transparent about what they're doing, and the legal constraints on those activities are being tightened. But suppose the question is, you know, if they are transparent, if there are legal constraints, shouldn't they be able to do this? You know, just if you take, in my own country, you know, there's a lot of talk about mass surveillance of the population. It's not really mass surveillance. What people mean is that the government or the agencies hoover up all this data, this metadata. But they only use it when, under strict rules which say okay, they can interrogate that data for certain names. So this isn't mass surveillance; this is we need to collect all the data in order to access information on the activities, say, of known terrorists. You can't get that access unless you have all the data. Now it seems to me that the interrogation of the data, the conditions under which that's done, is much more important than the collection of the data.

Ms. Susan Herman: I would say, first of all, that I think both are important, in terms of the collecting the data. Part of what collecting the data--if the government is collecting massive data, I think that has consequences. And because I don't want to be too lengthy now because I know you want to have a conversation, maybe I'll just sort of lay that aside for now and if people want to talk about, what are the consequences of mass data collection? I think the problem is that we're trying to have a general conversation. And surveillance covers a lot of different kinds of surveillance, as you're saying. It covers not only the mass collection of data and metadata; but it also covers, in the United States certainly, collection of conversations that people are having of all sorts, and subdivided. But the second--the problem that I see is that what you're saying is that there are protections to make sure that all this information is only being used at appropriate times.

First of all, I think that the collection itself does do damage; and second of all, certainly in the United States, we have still not gotten to the point where we have adequate accountability or checks and balances. So I think there's a very real danger of the potential of abuse of the collection of this information; but I think--my going into examples now would be too lengthy for just the beginning.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay. Thank you. I said at the beginning this is a huge and complex subject. We've had four sets, I think, of great insights into different

dimensions of the subject. But rather than me go on sort of questioning, and I could, I could stand here for a couple of hours doing this, I thought it'd be better that we open it up, not just for questions, but for a sort of conversation of people to make points. And I encourage people, not just from Europe or the United States, but the people here from the region itself to chip in and make--and give their views on any of the subjects we'd cover so far. So what I'll try and do is maybe take two or three questions, comments at one go, and then come back to the panel after each of them. So the gentleman here in the front.

Audience Member: Well, thank you very much. I would like to interact with Gilles. I recall, and--

Mr. Philip Stephens: So you're--?

Audience Member: Yes, I'm a former Minister Delegate of Foreign Affairs of Morocco, and we work for a long time with the European Union. I'd like to recall, Gilles, when you came to see me in my office, I think, two years ago, that we have worked, as far as Morocco-E.U. relations on how to fight terror. And at that time we said we have triple dimensions. Of course, today you have expressed them very clearly, the economic development and political reform and so on. The other one is the fight against, you know, exclusion. And the third dimension which is, I think, very important today, is how to deconstruct the jihadist discourse. I think this is what--of course, data is important, exchange of intelligence, but today

the major threat we are facing today is how we can work together to deconstruct the jihadist. Because the situation is getting worse every day, and you know that, you know. Even all our strategies in (inaudible), in Mali, where we're not able to control. Even the French intervention in Mali, for example, it was essential, crucial, to fight against al-Qaeda; but we were not able because we needed a comprehensive and global approach to fight terrorism. And that's why today the villages that I mention is essential. It is up to us to do our own homework at the level of the sovereign countries, of Islamic countries, and we are doing this through the training of (inaudible). I think this is one track that we should explore together. Of course, information, financing, and so on. We know all, we've been working with the EU in this. But today it is a priority for us.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay. Thank you very much. I'm going to take a couple more questions, interventions. The gentleman here, and then the gentleman over there.

Marcus Vinicius De Freitas: Yeah, my name is Marcus Freitas, I'm from Brazil; and, Susan, I wanted to ask you one thing. Once the genie's out of the bottle, how do you control it? And the information that is out there? And the other question that I have for the panel is that I understand there is a responsibility to protect, like if I were going to use the United Nations term, but shouldn't we

develop rules on responsibility while you're protecting? Because I think that's a major issue that we should discuss. Thank you.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Thank you. The gentleman just there.

Ilter Turan: Yes, I'm Ilter Turan from Istanbul Bilgi University. I will make two observations, and the panel might choose to respond to it, should they so desire. The first one is I'm a bit concerned that we are focusing on new terrorism, and at the expense of forgetting old terrorism. And in that context, I'm still wondering what happened to the murders of (inaudible) in Turkey, to whom the government of Belgium extended so much hospitality. We don't know where these people are now. We reasonably can say they're either in Belgium or in Holland. So let us not forget.

This also relates to the other idea, that the perpetuators of other terrorism, which the panel chose not to discuss this morning, are engaging in acts of extortion and other things, in Europe to finance activities in the Middle East. So it's not just sending people, it is financing, and that financing goes as much to the old forms of terrorism that you are familiar with as today. And let me also just register a sentiment as to how things look when you look at it from Turkey. It seems that our European Union friends let their citizens enjoy liberties and when these people come to Turkey then cross over, they expect the Turkish government to limit liberties to help them so they don't assume the responsibility, they expect the

Turks to assume the responsibility. Ladies and gentlemen, we have to assume it together. Thank you very much.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay. Thank you. So we've got three questions, three thoughts, for the panel. We--and I think it's a powerful one, the need to deconstruct the jihadist discourse, to actually take on the ideology, as it were; and I don't think it's just for, you know, governments, this is for communities. The second about the responsibility to protect. And the third, a rather spiky intervention about some of the contradictions in our policies and the sort of dual application of freedoms and the need not to forget old terrorism and the way that financing matters as well as foreign fighters. Now I'm going to leave it actually to the panel to say, you know, is there any--you pick up what you would like from that. So--

Mr. Gilles de Kerchove: Very quickly, I fully agree. I see two different problems: The first is indeed the pure ideology, the hijacking of Islam and so on. We have to do better, both in Europe and in the Arab world. What you do in Morocco to train the Imams and what you're trying to do in the Sahara is impressive. And I think we support your efforts in this respect. And we should do that more. And that raises the question of Internet. Because Internet is now the number one booster of radicalization, and the good news is that in Europe we have tried to balance a bit the negative aspect and the positive side. On the negative aspect, I think we want to be much more engaged with the Internet companies to

remove from the web the illegal content. It's a very tricky issue because we are bit divided on the scope of free speech in Europe. We have First Amendment member states, like the Nordics, where you can say nearly everything, while in some other part of Europe, like Belgium, France or Germany, you cannot deny the Holocaust because that will bring you to a criminal court. So this is a bit tricky. But I think we have made significant progress and we're more engaged with the Internet companies.

On the positive side, I think there is now a growing recognition that we have to improve our strategic communication. We've started doing that with the event in Ukraine, but we need now to be much more strategic in the way we counter the single narrative on the Internet. And we start working on it. I think that's very good news.

As to the--the other part is a spread of radical Islam, very conservative Islam. I have a very serious worry to see countries in Africa who had, I would say, a moderate Sufi (inaudible) Islam turning into the most radical interpretation of Islam. It's not only in the Sahara, remember the impact of the publication of Charlie Hebdo after the attack, 10 people were killed in Niger, churches were burned, and I remember President Issoufou saying, "I don't--when I was a child I was not even aware that I was a Muslim. And now look at the way the country is turning." Same in Mali. Diko, the head of the Islamists in Mali, has a very

important political impact. But it's not only in the Sahara. The Swahili Coast. The Horn of Africa. Northern Nigeria. All these turned into a very, very conservative. So how we address this? So that's the first one.

The second point on PKK, DHKBC, Savange (phonetic), and so on, I think we work very much with Turkey to improve or better relationship in terms of police cooperation, in terms of criminal justice. I would dream to see the opening of Chapter 23, 24, we just discussed that before the panel, because my message to Turkey is, the quicker they adapt the standard to the EU (inaudible) in terms of justice and in terms of law enforcement cooperation, the more we will cooperate. I have done my best in the last years to put--to ask member states to put more pressure on the PKK in Europe, because it's a criminal organization raising money in Europe, and because we wanted to send them the message that there is no alternative but to engage into a peace process. And I'm keen to see that they're finalizing this peace process because it is very important for the Turks, for us, it's a criminal organization we put on the terrorist list, but it's important so for foreign policy reason.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay. Yeah, okay, thank you. I want to go onto the Turkish Minister.

The Honorable Volkan Bozkir: I think we have to separate two things. First is how we deal with terrorism on ground and I think they're using the terminology,

as you have used, Islamic State or Islamic terrorism, I don't think is the correct thing to do because then we are naming something in a wrong wording and causing the rest of the Islamic world to feel bad. We have to fight terrorism on the ground, yes, but of course we have to really define the process correctly.

For example, we're talking about getting rid of Daesh. They have 15,000 to 30,000 militants, so what are we going to do when we are saying eliminating? Are we going to kill them all? Are we going to put them in prison? What are we going to do with them, will be the question when we get rid of the organization. I think this is the aspirin treatment part of it but there is an antibiotic treatment, which I think we have to go to the source which creates terrorism here and elsewhere in the world. I think the source is mostly Europe where I think there are so many people who feel that they are the other and if Europe becomes more inclusive and don't close the doors to ethnic groups, to other religions, to really bring new colors and try to give the impression that these people have hope for the future and also don't feel that they are outside of the circle. We have really good experience in fighting with terrorism. We lost 30,000 lives in Turkey, 100 billion dollars of our resources but we are now trying to finalize a process where we did the same thing. While we were fighting with terrorism on the ground, we gave new opportunities, new cultural rights, new investments to that region, health facilities and those people,

when they started feeling that they are a part of Turkey more than ever, they joined us to finalize this peace process.

So here there is a dilemma but also I think Europe must fight with radicalism and with terrorism. If terrorism and radicalism join each other, that will be an even increased difficulty but to fight with radicalism, I think you can't say, well, here it's a democratic country so radical views can also be expressed so we don't have any mean to stop it. I don't say stop any expression of feelings or views but the mainstream groups, which are using the European values, European standards, should also have to come out and express their views saying that radicalism is bad, saying that terrorism is bad so this is, I think, the panacea and this is the antibiotic treatment.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay. I'm going to come to Derek Chollet and what you want to say but since he's on the home team and I'm going to sort of throw him a nice easy ball as well. Why is it some of us wonder when a lot of the ideology we're talking about and I think this point about you got to confront the ideology is really important, a lot of this ideology derives from the extreme Islamic teachings of the Wahhabis and the U.S. and, you know, other countries go around talking about this moderate Saudi Arabia, our great ally, which is the source in a lot of Europe, Pakistan, elsewhere of this most extreme version of Islam from

which the violent terrorists draw at least (inaudible) and inspiration. So isn't there a sort of small sort of hypocrisy there in the way that we treat this?

Mr. Derek Chollet: I prefer to think of it as an issue we have to work so…

Mr. Philip Stephens: I take small hits.

Mr. Derek Chollet: But I'll get to that. I have a couple thoughts, first on the idea that we can't just kill our way out of this problem. I think anyone involved in the military campaign would completely agree with that, whereas the military component gets most of the attention and is absolutely critical, this is going to have to be a bottom up solution and, unfortunately and this is getting to the point here, there's no silver bullet to that solution. The United States, our partners, have been working on what we call countering violent extremism projects for years now and we still can't seem to get ahead of the challenge. We've had a lot of very innovative ideas. We've had a lot of very meaningful conferences and summits, including one just three weeks ago in Washington, but yet the problem still endures. It's probably one, frankly, that governments are not in a very good position to fix so it's going to be something that will be engaged with the private sector and in the world of ideas in particular.

In terms of the rules of the road, and I heard the question less about responsibility to protect but how we actually do the protection and what I'd like to say is we are trying to establish rules of the road, whether that's on terrorist

financing, which is a key piece of the puzzle. There's a summit at the U.N. General Assembly last fall on terrorist financing to try to tighten our common laws against a lot of the money that flows out of countries like Saudi Arabia into extremist organizations but also, and this gets to your world more, the rules of the road to ensure that as we are fighting terrorism, we are doing so and maintaining our legitimacy.

We're not perfect. We're not there yet. I think President Obama does deserve some credit for trying to address, head on, some of the more controversial issues in our debate about how we are going about fighting terrorism, particularly unmanned aerial systems, drones, and his willingness to talk about that publicly, to try to establish a framework for the use of that military capability into the future, which by the way is not just a capability that the United States operates and uses and sells. Other countries around the world do so and other countries, by the way, that may not be as interested in being part of that international system as we are.

So I think all of this has to add together to the project but unfortunately there's no easy answer here, either on the military side or on the war of ideas or actually on the legitimacy side.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay, Susan.

Ms. Susan Herman: Shall I answer Marcus's question about the genie in the bottle?

Mr. Philip Stephens: Yeah.

Ms. Susan Herman: We thought we got it. You can't put the genie back in the bottle in terms of we just do have less privacy in the modern world but I think that what people often mean by that is that so much information about us is being collected and aggregated by the private sector, the Amazon, Google, Facebook, etc., and it seems to me that whatever we want our laws to be about data privacy generally, and that's a whole other big subject, you know, trading and information, it's different to how the government having and using that information.

For one thing, last time I looked Amazon couldn't arrest me if they didn't like what I was doing. You know, they can't check my tax returns. They can't put me on a no-fly list. So I think the fact that government collects all this information, as I was saying, does have consequences all by itself. Let me give you two examples of how you go too far and affect liberty as well. So PEN, P-E-N, which is the largest international organization of writers and journalists has tried a couple of studies recently. One was domestically within the United States and the other was internationally and they did a survey of all their members to ask whether their habits have changed about what they research, what they investigate, whether they're willing to go on websites and look up things about, you know, security systems at airports that they might want to write about and what they found, roughly, depending on the question, they're very interesting studies, but depending

on the question, something about a third of all their members said, yes, they had in fact changed their behavior. They're not willing to have conversations and e-mails or phone calls. They're not willing to go on websites and they're just not writing about certain topics so that's number one.

Now what Derek was just saying, of course, you know, financing is important but there, too, I think the previous administration really overdid it and investigating Muslim charities, we have a major report that's about the attempt to investigate possible sources of funding from the United States and the FBI was going around door to door and interrogating Muslims about their charitable giving habits and not only is this kind of a blunderbuss approach to try to, you know, do what should be more targeted but it seemed to be that that was actually counterproductive because what they were doing, they were alienating the people they talked to. Attendance in Mosques was down, charitable giving was down, with no appreciable gain in fighting terrorism in this way so I just wanted to say overall there was a very interesting report from the Human Rights Council in June about digital privacy and about the international human rights, you know, not the American law and what they said is we really have to look not just at whether surveillance is possibly going to disrupt terrorism but we have to look at, is it proportional? What are we actually getting? You know, how much of it is

necessary? And what's effective? And I think that is a conversation we barely scraped the surface of in the United States and I hope you have a better one here.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Very quickly, what about what goes on the net, as it were? You know, should people be able to post anything at any time? You know, or, you know, should there be constraints as we have in Europe, I mean, as Gilles said most conspicuously in relation to the Holocaust and other things in my own country, you know, anti-racism legislation, where is that balance? Should people, you know, extremists be able to just post what they like?

Ms. Susan Herman: I think, and I would love to just talk individually more with anybody who would like to continue this conversation, but I think the United States understanding of our first amendment, freedom of expression, is somewhat different from what…

Mr. Philip Stephens: Yeah.

Ms. Susan Herman: …you have in Europe. I've run into this in the past so I'll give you one small example. There was a man from Saudi Arabia who was an exchange student at the University of Idaho and shortly after 9/11 the FBI decided, I think quite mistakenly, that he was part of a sleeper cell at Idaho because he had been involved in contributions to Muslim charities so he was prosecuted for material support of terrorism because he was running a chat room and talking about Jihadist ideas and letting Jihadists explain their own point of view in addition

to other people posting things about how that's not all of Islam, that's really not representative. He was prosecuted for a crime and in Idaho, which is quite your rural, you know, kind of right-wing state, the jury acquitted him because, you know, they were told that our first amendment protects people who are saying things. So, again, I think our first amendment standards are, you know, perhaps different.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay. Okay. Fine. So we're going to have another round and the lady there and then the lady here and then the gentleman there.

Female: Thank you so much, Stephen. My name is Risolta (phonetic?) which I am from Chatham House in London but I come from the region, a country called Ukraine where actually the conflict, the crisis as it's called here, it's called anti-terrorist operation in Kyiv and there is about 40,000 mercenaries that are fleeing through the border from Russian state supported by 12,000 Russian soldiers on the ground. On the other hand, we have Kyiv government that is trying to protect the frontier from spread of what they call terrorism. I understand that the vote in the beginning of the session was saying this is not as much threat as Islamic terrorist to Europe because I guess it's not threatening exactly the territory of the European Union but I have a question perhaps to American colleague about how do you explain the strategy of President Obama where you are providing military assistance in the Middle East but at the same time when you have quite capable

state with quite capable army, you are reluctant to support in the same time playing in Putin's protracted conflict strategy. Thank you.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay. The lady here?

Ambassador Assia Bensalah Alaoui: Thank you. Ambassador Assia Bensalah Alaoui from Morocco. My question goes to Mr. de Kerchove because he mentioned that Europe should do more with the North African, the Mediterranean at large. I'm surprised because yesterday, Ms. Representative--the high representative was supposed to talk about the other aspect that was tackled by the European summit and she never had the chance to even mention what has been decided because the whole session was eaten by Ukraine. I understand that Ukraine is a priority but I would like to ask you how far, how deep, European Union is ready to go to tackle the problem where everybody seemed to be totally stalled. Is it just a revamping of a neighborhood policy and business as usual or is it really, really to tackle the problem with the complexities that have been mentioned and with the huge challenge it spills in on both the Mediterranean and to the eastern Middle East?

Mr. Philip Stephens: Thank you. The gentleman there?

Hirotsugu Aida: I'm Hiro Aida from Japan's Kyoto News. I am a columnist for the news agency and my question is addressed to maybe Susan Herman. You just mentioned kind of a difference between Europe and America about the

freedom of speech and also I think it (inaudible) to the freedom of religion in Europe and U.S. and this question has something to do with the radicalization of the young people Muslim population here in Europe. How do you see the so-called (inaudible) of France, you know, the secularism of French policy? I was just wondering, you know, it seems to be not a freedom of religion but a freedom from religion and that may be alienating a Muslim population here in Europe particularly in France and, you know, the young people cannot go to school or so-called public sphere with scarves or even Christians cannot go there with, you know, the crosses and so how do you see that kind of a situation in Europe and what's the American point of view? Maybe talk as point of view about secularism in Europe. That's my question (inaudible) too long.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Thank you. This is going to be the last round and I see two other people. I'm going to take those so there'll be five all together, and then come back for a final sort of word from the panel. So there's the lady right back there.

Ms. Leila Alieva: Right, yes. Thank you very much. I actually wanted to-- my name is Leila Alieva, I'm from the country which surprised, I think, Eastern Partnership last year by unprecedented crackdown on liberal civil society. Why I'm attracting your attention that (inaudible) is a country you reach with oil and gas, which is quite unique among Eastern Partnership states. Also has a Muslim

population and it's a fantastic case study. In order to understand the root causes of terrorism beyond the territory of Eastern Partnership and other cases. And in that regard, I would like to support what you said about Saudi Arabia and sources of terrorism.

Exactly what we were observing last year is that the government tried to basically finish with civil society, which has a liberal foundation and which works with the west. The most pro-western forces overnight. And you understand what will happen to the gap which it created now. We have 500, at least, fighters in Syria that will be coming back quite soon. And, you know, that's a very good case study. And this is what E.U. is doing by totally ignoring this, at least what I heard.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay.

Ms. Leila Alieva: Yes. And that basically bringing the border of terrorism much closer to European Union.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay.

Ms. Leila Alieva: And I wanted to get the--

Mr. Philip Stephens: Can we--I think we're going to end it just there, thank you very much. Now, yesterday when Steven Erlanger of *The New York Times* was chairing a panel, I spend most of it waiving my hand madly, trying to get in a question and he blindly ignored me. So he--I just saw him sort of wave his hand gently like that, so Steven Erlanger.

Mr. Steven Erlanger: Now I'm ashamed. But I have terrible eyesight, I apologize. Anyway, I just wanted to say very briefly, because we're running out of time, I mean, Europe will cope with this problem. The post-colonial period has been pretty short. And the way Europe has had to deal with a Muslim population that's pretty new to it, I think, you know, it's taken American 200 years and we're not very good at it yet. So I think, you know, people of goodwill will adjust. The problem is, and I haven't heard too much about this, what has helped to create this vacuum that Islamic radicalism has filled? It is us. It is our failed policies. It's our breaking apart of Libya, like the Great Gatsby, carelessly leaving it behind. It's our moral failure in Syria to respond to--our assumption from the beginning that Assad would fall by magical thinking. Not understanding that he was not Gaddafi, that Gaddafi would've won without NATO intervention, so why would Assad lose? It's our failure to support the Magrad (phonetic) properly. And perhaps it's our failure to push our allies in Israel hard enough to deal responsibly with the clear problem of the Palestinian fate. So this is part of our problem, too. Thank you.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Thank you. So five questions and I will summarize them shortly but badly. We won't armor government in Ukraine while we will arm lesser forces in the Middle East. Libya--I'm showing my own prejudice with my emphasis here as--are we really--Libya, North Africa, are we really serious or are

we just going to say this and just, you know, as the Ambassador said, just revamp the neighborhood policy and forget about it again?

I thought there was a great phrase from a Japanese colleague about the meaning of (inaudible) in France, not freedom of religion but freedom from religion and is this the way to go? A warning about Azerbaijan and how repression in countries such as Azerbaijan, which we sort of, you know, there was a period when we worried about democracy in countries like that. Now we sort of forget about it, but this will come back to haunt us. And Steven Erlanger's eloquent metaphor of Gatsby-esque approach to the region. And this gentleman keeps going like this to me, which means we have to wind up, which means you only have about a minute each, so don't try and answer everything, just maybe choose one from that selection. And actually, I'm going to go in reverse order, so we'll start with Susan.

Ms. Susan Herman: Okay. Thank you for the question. As I think you know, the United States is a very religious country and, in-fact, our position is very different from that of France and we really, you know, honor, you know, the right of every individual to express their own religion. But where I want to go with my remaining 40 seconds is to sort of ask a more general question. We were talking before about freedom of speech and there being possibly different cultural norms. So far, as Derek was suggesting, we have been having fierce debates within the

United States about what's the balance between freedom of religion and security and surveillance and privacy and all this. And what I really wonder--my question to all of you is, can we have and should we be striving for international standards and norms about that?

So we have one debate within the United States. There is a case that is being appealed from the investigatory policy tribunal in the U.K. to the European Court of Human Rights by Liberty and several of these other organizations about digital privacy, you know, Prism and all the collection. So, you know, the EU may have one forum for answers to these questions. You know, Turkey may have another. And given that, I think we do have some cultural differences and backgrounds. Should we be having this debate on more of a global scale, you know, how much of this should be happening internationally, or do we just have to each struggle with these problems on our own?

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay, Gilles, one minute. That was brilliant. That was one minute, one minute.

Mr. Gilles de Kerchove: I can confirm probably she had no time to dwell on this but Ms. Mullaney when we discussed how to react to the various attack and how we should address the challenge of Libya. So that will be translated into much more political engagement, vis-à-vis the Gulf, vis-à-vis this balance Sunni Shia

that I've mentioned before, and a lot more assistance to beef up the resilience of the country to face a common threat.

So on (inaudible), I think the more I see the rights of extremism, the more I think probably we should reflect on the French approach. On the failure, yes, I can only but confirm that, sadly. And finally, on privacy, we try to broker a common ground with the U.S. on privacy through a sort of umbrella agreement on how to deal with privacy on both sides of the Atlantic, so that's one step.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay. Minister?

The Honorable Volkan Bozkir: I think we have to define secularism correctly. A person cannot be secular. He can--she can be Muslim, Christian, Buddhist or atheist. The state can only be secular and it is the responsibility of the state to make sure that every citizen, no matter what religion they believe, should practice their religion properly and the state should be the guarantee. So I think what France is doing is to create secular people is wrong. Turkey is a country 99 percent Muslim population and we are a secular country where we try to have everybody practice their religions correctly and fully.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Thank you. Derek.

Mr. Derek Chollet: So on the Ukraine question, I mean, the blithe answer is there's no one-size-fits-all solution for problems. I will just observe that last year, when I was in government, and a year ago this month, as we were dealing with the

Ukraine crises and all focused on the Ukraine crisis, the ISIL crisis, which I don't know that we actually called it ISIL crisis at that point, was unfolding as Ramadi and Fallujah and other towns in Iraq were falling. And we were all watching it from afar and playing around at the margins and it wasn't until Mosul fell in the summer that all of us, the transatlantic community, sort of moved onto that problem. And it's a broader issue than just U.S. military support, of course, because last summer, as we were still watching Ukraine very carefully, we were also all working together, the U.S. and European allies, on getting tons of ammunition, lethal assistance, to the Peshmerga to stop the flow of ISIL in the race to Baghdad.

Let me close on Erlanger's point. I've recently left government, so forums like this are part of my therapy and the 12-step program I'm in. And I guess, Steve, I'd have to say it's, you know, certainly, I would redo some things but I can't say it's all about us. I think if there's one thing that is the burdens of a government official is that you learn a healthy dose of humility about our role and how much influence we actually have when it comes to problems that are as deep as Libya, for example, where we had a lot of well-meaning assistance, but the Libyan government wasn't up to it, or Iraq. So doesn't mean we should give up.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay.

Mr. Derek Chollet: But I think a healthy dose of humility is required, as well.

Mr. Philip Stephens: Okay. I think this brilliant panel I don't think would claim to have answered every question. I do think, certainly from my perspective and I'm sure from yours, that it's illuminated many of the paths that we should be taking, so I think we should thank them heartily. Thank you.

Mr. Ian Lesser: Good morning. I am Ian Lesser from GMF here in Brussels and our thanks to you, Philip, for this really extraordinary discussion on what I think you'll agree is a very complicated but also very troubling topic. We'll have an opportunity to talk about some of these other themes that you've all raised later this evening in the breakout dinners.

Before we go to our coffee break, I just wanted to make an announcement, which is that I know a lot of you were looking forward to hearing the Greek finance minister, Varoufakis today. I hope you'll understand and forgive him, he has some things to take care of in Athens, so he won't be with us. We're sorry about that. But it does mean that you'll have a little extra time before we go to the breakout dinners this evening, as well.

So we're going to take a coffee break now. We'll be back to reconvene here at eleven o'clock to talk about energy. Thank you.