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Mystery Session: Soft Power Strikes Out, Hard Power Strikes Back

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Okay. Grab a seat. Grab a seat, everybody. Okay. We're ready for our mystery session, Soft Power Struck Out, Hard Power Hits Back. And we're really happy to bring back a longtime veteran of Brussels Forum and GMF convening, Nik Gowing of the BBC. Nik, the show is yours.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Thank you, Craig. Good morning, everybody. Well, this is a mystery session by common consent because, Crimean style, you've all voted overwhelmingly for one subject. It's hard and soft power which is that title of Soft Power Struck Out, Hard Power Hits Back. We're going to try and work out what that means.

But we've got about an hour or just over an hour, and the aim is to make this into a brainstorming. You want to talk about it, particularly after what's happened in Ukraine and Crimea. And I would urge you to see it as a brainstorming, and to use your Q&A on your iPad, whether it's yours or whether it belongs to others, to try and give me ideas of where you see soft and hard power at the moment.

Indeed, should we be comfortable at all with that kind of description? And I think we have to be quite

questioning about it. After all, Joe and I defined it 10 years ago. Is it still relevant? Is it hard and soft power? Is it smart power? Or could it be that by lunch time today we'll get a whole new concept which is emerging of new classification, new language, which could help us understand the challenge to essentially normative thinking? Because normative thinking has discussed hard and soft power up till now.

So take it from Ukraine and Crimea, but let's look as well at the Horn of Africa. Let's look as well at the challenges in the South and East China Sea. This is a much broader issue than what we've just seen up in Ukraine and Crimea.

So I'd like to understand from you and certainly from the panelists, who are going to stimulate the debate, where the firewalls are between hard and soft. Now, I have high tech here, the best we could do. Soft and hard. I asked for a white board, but we couldn't find one on a Saturday night at midnight, so that's the best that we can do.

But I'm putting it up there because what we're going to do is try and define the different kinds of hard and soft power, where the fuzzy areas are. It'll be incomplete. It'll be very imperfect, but it'll help you visualize, including you over there--it'll be on the screens over here--where this spectrum is moving. It'll be imperfect, as I say, but please take it in the

spirit with which I suggested it, which is to try and help visualize and bring to life the challenges now where normative thinking will take our assumptions about the hard and soft power in the coming hour, in the coming days, in the coming weeks ahead.

And we have to ask as well how much naïveté there is in the assumption now about hard and soft power. How much soft and hard power is being used by al-Shabaab, by the Taliban as well? Who else is out there in this space? And how smart are they getting about using it? And that's what this panel will hopefully highlight for you. And how to deliver hard, soft, whatever power it is at the right time in the right place. I would encourage all those who are the next generation of GMF attendees, please see this as your chance to enter the discussion because it's after all your areas which are going to be affected by the new judgments on hard and soft power in the coming years.

So what I'm going to ask the panelists is how to define--how they define hard and soft power. And who do we have for you? You know them all anyway: General John Allen who was, until last year, the commander of ISAF, Gitte Lillelund Bech, who was the Danish defense minister, Masa Ishii, who is the director general of the foreign ministry of Japan, and also Alex Rondos, who's now the special representative for the European Union in the Horn of Africa.

So take that as a very clear cue to you that this is far beyond Crimea, even though there are going to have to be major switches in assumptions of hard and soft power because of what you've all been discussing for the last 48 hours and what we heard in even the last session as well. This is building on that spirit of discussion and concern.

So let me immediately just ask each of you for a quick definition. John Allen, is there a definition of hard and soft power? Help us begin to populate this spectrum.

General John Allen: Well, as I think Professor Nye sought to create the distinctions, the implication was that soft power was about influence. Hard power was about coercion. And so in many respects soft power relies on expressing values, one's culture, one's policy objectives in a manner that are acceptable to the target against whom or with whom you are expressing those outcomes.

So if we seek to achieve influence, it's by leveraging those aspects of our culture, those important immutable values that we stand for, and to wrap them in the right kinds of policy objectives ultimately to achieve the influence that you seek.

Hard power, on the hand, is not just military power. It's often misinterpreted that way. Hard power can be very much economic power as well. And the

challenge for us has been to, in the recent years, to combine the best of soft power and the most likely application of hard power into a comprehensive use of power overall.

Joe and I, in fact, would move on to a concept called smart power where he was concerned that the differentiation between hard and soft power had created too bright a distinction. So comprehensive employment of power in a strategic context, from a comprehensive policy approach, coherent policy approach clearly expressed through strategic communications is the best way, from my perspective, to take advantage of the influence of soft power and ultimately, if necessary, the coercive effects of hard power.

Mr. Nik Gowing: And quickly, do you think hard and soft is the right way of explaining the dilemma now and the options?

General John Allen: I think it was at a point it was a useful distinction in order to explain broad categories of capabilities. But I think that distinction can create a bright line between the two that differentiates communities that can bring to bear hard and soft power. And if all the stakeholders are not part of the policy process, then, by creating those distinctions, we lose the opportunity to blend the two at the right moment and in the right place to achieve the policy objectives that we seek. So it played a

purpose, but it may--we may in fact have moved on past those bright lines and the bright distinctions.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Okay. Well, help us populate that later with the changes and the modifications we need then if you like the military mind, if I can put it that way, John.

First, let's move on to Gitte now with the political approach, as someone who has been responsible for defense, but how much broader is soft power and hard power to you?

Ms. Gitte Lilleund Bech: Well, if I can come up with two examples, soft power to me is when I have an Afghan village asking my soldiers, can you help us find a teacher because we want a school so our kids, not just the boys, but also the girls, can go to school? That's actually soft power.

Hard power, of course you have the military part. But hard power is also--well, if we look into what happened in Estonia years ago with the cyberattack, cyberattack is use of hard power. But we not only--well, I agree with General Allen that most people think hard power is just about, well, it's a question of deployment of military. And that's not the case anymore.

But I would also agree with General Allen that we don't--in political terms, we don't talk about soft power and hard power anymore. What we have done in

Denmark is, well, we've discussing the comprehensive approach because you need to combine your soft power and your hard power whenever you go into theater. Whenever you're dealing with politics, it's not just about one or the other. You have to combine it.

Mr. Nik Gowing: John, do you agree cyber is hard power?

General John Allen: It certainly can be, yes.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Okay. Just help us, Gitte, with populating this area. What other things can we put in at this point to help us understand what's in the mushy middle ground? Think about it.

Ms. Gitte Lilleund Bech: Yeah. Okay.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Okay. Masa, let's move to your framing in Tokyo at the moment of hard and soft power, particularly with the major dilemmas now being confronted by you and your government given what has happened and what precedent is now being set in Crimea.

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: Thank you, Nik. And I simply don't know why I'm here. But maybe--

Mr. Nik Gowing: We're delighted to see you.

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: Maybe I--because I am soft help or something.

Mr. Nik Gowing: You took a long flight here to Brussels, and we'd like to hear about Tokyo's position.

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: Before taking up few examples, let me talk about two things. Number one, I think it's

impossible to draw a clear line between soft and hard. Number two, I think soft power without the backing of hard power, it's too soft to be a power. So it has to be a combination of it.

So having said all this, let me give you two or three examples, right? One, at this moment, three Chinese border controlling agencies' ship are floating within 24 nautical miles of the Senkaku Islands. And the (inaudible) number of Japanese ships are just saying, you know, side by side and telling them, we love you, but don't go--go away. This is our territory. And that's what I call hard power.

Now, second example, ODA, Official Development Assistance, that sounds like very soft power. But if we use that for giving Coast Guard ship to Indonesia, letting the Philippine Coast Guard to buy 10 brand-new Coast Guard ships, is it still a soft power?

Third example, rulemaking. Whenever we have an accidental conflict on sea, normally these are triggers by the crash among fishermen, right? So it's always good to have a basic fishery agreement. We haven't had that with Taiwan for years. Now that the tension in that area is getting a little bit higher, we have decided to conclude it. And then we have done that.

So concluding fishery agreement sounds like a very soft power approach, but this is to prevent the accidental conflict. So is it the soft power, hard

power? That brought me back to the first premise. We can't draw a clear line.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Is there reassessment having to be made in Tokyo at the moment of how hard power and soft power work, given the challenge you now face in the islands? And you have to assume that Beijing is looking at what happened in Crimea and what Russia did in a rather interesting way.

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: Well, to--as a start, I think we and Chinese share the same perspective in relation to Crimea. No, you cannot change the status quo by force. When it comes to the rule of law, we may be--the assessment or the--what we mean by rule of law can be different between Japan and China. But I guess by watching that happening in Crimea, we cannot help but to think about the possibility of strengthening our hard power just for the sake of the terrorists and that's what we've been working on.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Alex, Horn of Africa, Somalia, Al-Shabaab, piracy off the coast. Hard and soft power; your definition at the moment.

Mr. Alexandros Rondos: Well, I think we're using both. First of all, I think that that distinction, the dichotomy is a false one is my own view. And I also think it's an anachronism now in the way both the nature of the challenges and threats we have, but also in the way we're operating. Take the European Union. We

have the comprehensive approach, we call it. In other words, it's about mustering all the necessary instruments, hard and softer, so-to-speak, to arrive at the right place at the right time.

Now, I think two or three of the challenges we have here, first of all, the European Union, for example, let me put it in shorthand, is doing defense, diplomacy, development. And the point is to try to synchronize all of those at the same time in a place like Somalia.

In a broader context, I think we also need to be careful here that we don't sort of fall victim of caricatures here, meaning that the Europeans are sort of the wooly socks-and-sandals brigade who turn up, you know, to do all these nice, soft, mushy things. You know, happy-clappy stuff, and then someone else does the killing.

Mr. Nik Gowing: These are your descriptions.

Gowing Alexandros Rondos: Yeah, they're entirely my descriptions. Entirely mine.

Mr. Nik Gowing: If I said that to you, you'd be deeply offended.

Mr. Alexandros Rondos: Not in the least. Not in the least. But, I mean, let's be clear here that we don't become victim of a lot of caricatures, so what--

Mr. Nik Gowing: I should ask, is there any happy-clappies with sandals in the audience who might want to respond to that?

Mr. Alexandros Rondos: Please do. I'll take it on right away. So what are we trying to get at here? In Somalia right now, we have a naval force offshore and I heard reference in the previous panel, too, both Ocean Shield, which is NATO, and we have Atlanta E.U. NAVFOR, which is the European naval force offshore, which has managed to deter piracy. The European Union is financing, with the United States, primarily, AMISOM, which is the African force which is fighting, and actually, as we speak, conducting operations against Shabaab in Somalia.

At the same time, we have ready a lot of money to invest and, if you will, consolidating a piece. But I think there's a message here. We've got to understand clearly--and I'm talking about my own responsibilities in the Horn. You cannot have development if you don't have security and that is why we've got to start breaking down, in my view, some of the firewalls, as you mentioned, that have emerged between two communities; those who do security, those who do development, and discover that somehow we've got to all work together using similar resources, meaning money, and work out the financial arrangements for how we can bring what we're calling now the softer and the harder

to bear at the right place at the right time. That is the challenge.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Point of clarification. Which budget does your support for 20,000 African union troops come out of?

Mr. Alexandros Rondos: Development. ODA and--

Mr. Nik Gowing: So where does that come on this spectrum?

Mr. Alexandros Rondos: Well, no one's defined but it should be squarely in the middle when we have redefined the fact--redefined what comprehensive strategy means in parts of the world which are deeply fragile, in other words, places which are failing or emerging from failure.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Secondly, where would you put Al-Shabaab in this in terms of their capability to do soft and hard power, given what you're facing with them both on land and off the coast?

Mr. Alexandros Rondos: It's both. I mean, outfits like Shabaab walk into spaces that are ungoverned. This is the biggest threat we have. You look at the globe, it's full of ungoverned spaces and that is where the vultures descend. They can be ideological vultures, financial vultures, but they manipulate. It's like a host area for a virus. So they will use hard justice to claim that they're establishing new law in their

communities. But their notion of hard justice is to cut off hands and stone women.

You have Shabaab, which is a fairly effective military force, but when confronted by a larger force, melts away into asymmetric tactics. So I put them squarely in the middle. It's for all of us. When we say comprehensive, it's about rethinking, breaking down all the walls that exist both conceptually and in practice.

Mr. Nik Gowing: And how well does Shabaab do when it comes to information and the information space in the Horn of Africa? Are they effective on soft power?

Mr. Alexandros Rondos: Absolutely. They control the airwaves. And I think one of the things that we all need to think of--and it's a very delicate exercise because if we are all mainly westerners sitting in this room, who are we to be telling Muslims how they should think? And what we're dealing with, in my part of Africa is the degree to which a particularly and very hard-lined definition of Islam has drowned out the voice of traditional African Islam, which is a very tolerant version of its own particular faith.

Mr. Nik Gowing: All right. Gitte, I'm going to come to you in a moment with your thoughts on where to populate this. But, John, on the Taliban, who you were, after all, working against for three years, where would you define them? How do they use, at the moment, soft and hard power, like Shabaab?

General John Allen: Well, I think that they would say--and really, the only area where they could compete with us was in jurisprudence, the delivery of justice, in their context. So their sense was that they delivered justice, Sharia justice, in a manner that was faster, fairer, more comprehensive than could the central government. That then would be an extension of their influence and an extension of their values, which, for them, would be providing order and justice to the society, which they would probably call soft power, in the context of how they see the universe.

The reality of that, of course, was very different. And the populations which lived and endured underneath the Taliban presence and endured the Sharia justice were frequently so disenfranchised by the operationalization of that justice, that it had a hard-power effect, even though it was a soft-power intention.

Mr. Nik Gowing: So do the Taliban move at all into the soft area?

Commander John Allen: Well, they do. They--

Mr. Nik Gowing: Halfway?

Commander John Allen: --move in the information domain, as well, and have used social media ultimately to get their story out first, and are in competition with those of us who must tell the truth as we get our story out. They're able to paint their picture and

their narrative more quickly than we can. So they have moved into an area which is relatively high-tech in the context of using social media. It has accelerated their ability to make their case.

But the operationalization of their case, when the population labors underneath their presence in a community, typically has a hard-power outcome. That's why the population of Afghanistan, after all of these years, has moved away from a desire ultimately for the Taliban to be ascendant in the outcome of this conflict.

Mr. Nik Gowing: All right, Gitte, you've had five minutes. Let me give you a chance to at least help me in this middle area, certainly from the Copenhagen perspective.

Ms. Gitte Lillelund Bech: Well, what I would say, well, on the soft power, you have written the influence part. I think that word actually, well, it holds a lot of things in it like the information, like the propaganda, like the way of affecting peoples' lives so they do what you want them to do, but they don't not necessarily realize that you have been affecting their lives.

So therefore, influence is actually a very good word for the soft power part. What I would say is--my experience about the Taliban was actually that the Taliban was very good at using soft power, as General

Allen said. What we saw in Afghanistan, and especially Helmand Province, where I've been several times, we saw that they were trying to--well, they told stories about the ISAF troops that weren't right. But if you have people--if you have villages where people are not educated, then they believe in the strong leaders, and if the strong leaders tell you that these ISAF troops, they are just bad, they don't follow their god, they do so and so and so, then people just believe them.

So Taliban, I would like for your arrow to go even further out to the soft part. What we saw in Afghanistan also was that Taliban, at certain places, they accepted that the girls could go to school. And one of the things that we'd been doing from the Danish side is supporting the educational system in Afghanistan, and especially this about having girls go to school. And we said, well, that's the difference between us and Taliban.

But when the Taliban accepted some places that the girls could go to school, then, well, that argument just--well, why should the Afghan people then support us or the ISAF instead of supporting Taliban, because Taliban was granting them the same rights?

Mr. Nik Gowing: Okay. Well, keep helping. I'm sorry it's slightly small lettering but you can see the practical challenge here. But I don't know how many

other ideas are going to come up but I hope we can at least get some capturing of what your thinking is.

Ms. Gitte Lillelund Bech: Nik, I would like to put a comment on what Alex said because what I always told my soldiers was that when they were deployed, they shouldn't just bring their military boots. They also had to bring their diplomatic shoes and if, you know, if I had female soldiers, I said, well, bring the high heels. And--

Mr. Nik Gowing: So how far did they move into this area then?

Ms. Gitte Lillelund Bech: Very much. And they should also bring the sandals because they should also be prepared to do part of development aid. So I think if we look into what's happening now--and I think I see that for most of the NATO troops, is that the military does not think of itself as just being a hard power. They are educated in dealing with soft power, as well. It's diplomacy, it's development aid.

Mr. Nik Gowing: What did you have in your headquarters, General, on the development side?

General John Allen: Yes, thank you, Nik. We had very close relationship with all of the development stakeholders, which is the very important point that was made a moment ago. When we have participants in the process of delivering influence or coercion that are outside the policy process, then you create the real

possibility of a discontinuity or chaos, frankly, in your policy. The advantage that we had in Afghanistan, and we still have that advantage, is that we have a campaign plan which integrates soft and hard power in the context of how we use that force.

So if you started on the far right, we had ISAF troops who were in combat operations every day against the Taliban to reduce the Taliban's ability to affect the ultimate outcome of the campaign.

Then if you shift it towards the center, we had elements of the force that were training Afghans to build capacity, both to fight as an army and police as a police force. And if you continue it on to the left, we were involved--the ISAF mission was involved in developing judicial capacity, supporting civil society, ensuring the rights of women, providing for education. They're not traditional military missions but the outcome in Afghanistan was not going to be decided by military operations alone. It was to create the security platform operating in the hard end of the hard-power spectrum that then permitted us to leverage those outcomes in governance, economic development and civil society, which was going to deliver the knockout blow to the Taliban.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Let's be clear. Could those you're talking about, could they double-hat or double-helmet?

Could they be war fighting in the morning and development in the afternoon? I'm being crude here.

General John Allen: Absolutely.

Ms. Gitte Lillelund Bech: Yes.

General John Allen: And often were, frankly.

Ms. Gitte Lillelund Bech: Yeah.

General John Allen: And often were. The key point was getting everyone in the room who had resources and authority--this is another issue. Ensuring that everyone who was involved in this, we understand things like budget cycles, legal authorities and resources so that we can maximize the interrelationships between the legal restrictions or the legal opportunities, maximize the application of resources in ways that achieve a conscious policy outcome, because everyone is in the room and everyone's put their assets on the table in a comprehensive and coordinated, integrative way.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Right. We've got about 35 minutes to run. Masa, you want to come in?

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: Yeah, I just want to give you a few more examples. Our self-defense force had a operation in Samara, in Iraq in the south. What they did was a single chapeau, that is to create road, purifying water so that the local community can drink it. So they establish the contact with the community leader and then did community relations job.

So that was the only thing. They didn't shoot even one bullet. That was their total 100 percent function.

Mr. Nik Gowing: But those are their orders, aren't they?

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: That's their orders.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Exactly.

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: Two. Let me expand that official re-agreement point a little bit more. In general, it's rule-making. I mean, whenever we have a rising power, you need to do something about the existing rules. Of course, the best thing is to have those rising powers swallow and accept the existing rules. But, you know, you may have to take into consideration some of their perspectives, so we have to change rules. So who is in charge? In what kind of context is the question? So if we are in charge in creating a set out to make rules, that's soft power. But outcome of that endeavor can create a lot of situation where there is less chance for using of hard power.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Alex, how would you define the ability of the A.U., for example, to use both hard and soft power in the same way that we've heard from General John, they can essentially--they could double-hat it in ISAF?

Mr. Alexandros Rondos: Look, the potential's there and we should be investing heavily in helping them to

do that. Right now, I think we have two challenges. One is just building up the capacity and helping the AU build the capacity. I mean I find it quite remarkable, and I think it's something those of us from the European Union, but also our colleagues from the United States, that there is a major military operation going on and has been going on which is slowly clearing up space. It's being done by the African Union we're supporting, and what we should be asking ourselves is to what extent do we assist them to become more systematic over the long run because we've got Congo, we've got the Central Africa, South Sudan went pear-shaped overnight. We've got Mali, and that's just Africa, one particular very interesting belt, which actually is the underbelly of the southern periphery of Europe. We have every reason to want to invest because it's not--I don't believe any member state is going to be devoting its own resources and men and women to put boots on the ground all over Africa. Africa has the capacity and has the desire. We've got to invest heavily in building that capacity up.

Second, I think there's another point which we're not really discussing yet.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Well, put it on the agenda now.

Mr. Alexander Rondos: Diplomacy. We need to realize that if--when I look at my area, whether it's Somalia or South Sudan, the people who've chosen to get engaged

and actually resolve these issues are the neighbors. For a long time, there's been--the idea has always been that neighbors should not be engaged in being guarantors of the peace in a country that's in crisis. In the instance of the Horn, the opposite is occurring. I happen to think that this is a very good thing. They have a vested interest in the security of their neighborhood, of their frontiers. It's delicate, but what we're engaged in--and this is part of that in between the soft and hard--is how do you in effect create and help create a capacity within a region to be able to do the work which frankly we're too busy and unable to do ourselves.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Right. Okay. We've got about 30 minutes to run, and what I'd like to do is somehow-- I'll come to you in a moment--get some takeaways from this. I've got a lot of ideas coming through here, so all of you, particularly practitioners, can help contribute on this. I just want to get clarification from all four of you on one thing that Alex said, talking about this as anachronistic and a false dichotomy. General John, do you agree?

General John Allen: I think it is now. I think we are in peril if we try to make clear distinctions between soft power and hard power. We should look for comprehensive power, what Joe Nye called smart power as

he later sought to combine the two to prevent the differentiation.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Gitte.

Ms. Gitte Lillelund Bech: Well, I agree with General Allen. I would say that--well, it's about the comprehensive approach--I think what we need to do now is to find out ways within the different countries or within the EU or NATO in dealing with the comprehensive approach because we certainly can be better to doing that.

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: I use smart power language and being able to use (inaudible) in a flexible way, that is the key.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Do you want to add anything more, Alex?

Mr. Alexander Rondos: Well, apart from agreeing with myself entirely, there is an implication.

Mr. Nik Gowing: That is smart.

General John Allen: Smart power.

Mr. Alexander Rondos: The implication is what we need to be looking at which is that at the moment we have not adapted our systems to be sufficiently integrated to be able to support a comprehensive strategy. We have stovepipes still, and this is globally. In the United States, you have endless interagency meetings. We have our variant of it, and it's about making sure the different financial

regulations--for example we rewrite the book so that accountability is met but flexibility exists. This is the key, and we're not there yet.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Right. Okay. If you grab a microphone, possession is the secret, and I'll come to as many as possible. Got a lot of ideas here. What I'd like you to do is be as brief as you can, please, and I will cut you off at your legs. It'll be hard power if you speak for too long, but I want you to feel this is a brainstorming.

And before we go any further, let me give you two or three ideas which come up here. Quote "Is lying soft power?" Now, I see that came in anonymously.

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: Is lying soft--that's good, very realistic.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Can economic plus political will harden power enough to obviate the need for military power? How Western and secular are the concepts of hard and soft power? How helpful really are these concepts to understanding conflicts with different cultures? Park those for the moment. Let's get as many other ideas. President?

Mr. Toomas Ilves: I think you left out the most effective form of soft power we've seen in the last week in the European Council, bribery. Where's bribery? From the Nord Stream, former Chancellor, head to countries that won't do--that will not sanction Russia

because they have too good a deal to paying provocateurs to go and take over buildings in Ukraine.

Mr. Nik Gowing: So where does that come on here?

Mr. Toomas Ilves: I think it's all over the place.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Alright. Keep going. I like this. Right. Okay, thank you. Xenia.

Ms. Xenia Dormandy: Xenia Domandy, Chatham House. It seems like we're not even covering half of the--

Mr. Nik Gowing: We've only been going 30 minutes.

Ms. Xenia Dormandy: --forces of power. It's all government here. It's all state power we've got up there. What about non-state power? What about the role of corporations? What about the role of NGOs, The Gates Foundation? What about the role of these kind of organizations? You have immense power if used right. Now, can it be led? Can it be guided by the government? Maybe not, but these are entities that have enormous power that--

Ms. Gitte Lillelund Bech: I'll agree.

Ms. Xenia Dormandy: --I think have to go up on your list there?

Mr. Nik Gowing: Okay, I'm putting it up as fast as you say it. Please, would anyone from a non-state, nongovernment organization like to come in at this point? Yes, please. Can I just get the microphone here to see if you're frustrated that too much of this is government and state to quote Xenia.

Dr. Bahadır Kaleağasi: Well, thank you very much. Kaleağasi from TÜSİAD, Turkish Business and Industrial Association. Well, exercising power is something, but generating it maybe can be tackled in a different angle. There are different sources which are certainly part of this table, like money, like finances, financial power, like the control of the energy resources or human capital or a country's brand availability. These are all sources of power. They generate power in the international relations. Whether they are part of an exercise in implementing power or not, it's up to the panel, of course, to answer.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Well, let me just ask the general. How often were you able to use money to achieve your military ends by having a fruitful and constructive dialogue with your adversaries and parting with a bit of money as you sat around drinking tea?

General John Allen: Right.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Is that hard power?

General John Allen: On a regular basis.

Mr. Nik Gowing: You're no longer serving, General.

General John Allen: On a regular basis.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Large amounts of money?

General John Allen: Yes, and--

Mr. Nik Gowing: Is that hard power or soft power?

General John Allen: Well, it's both. It's the soft power application of resources that takes the enemy off

the battlefield. Now, you know, some folks criticize that because they only know half the story. The intent of those kinds of plans, like the sons of Iraq and the Afghan local police, et cetera, wasn't that they were permanent situations, they would evolve into the creation of indigenous, organic economic opportunity that would permit you to not have to pay them eventually. They would ultimately reassimilate into the culture, so the idea is there's a soft power application of resources that takes battlefield fighters out of the conflict and reduces the hard power that you have to face. It's actually part of every counterinsurgency.

Mr. Nik Gowing: So it's a very cost-effective way of using hard power and moving towards soft?

General John Allen: But it has to be comprehensive. It can't just end with you handing money to the fighter that's come off the field. Ultimately, you've got to create the conditions through additional application of soft power, to create institutions of governance and economic opportunity so that individual is assimilated into the society and doesn't feel the necessity to go back out and fight.

Mr. Nik Gowing: As a minister, were you comfortable with that, Gitte?

Ms. Gitte Lillelund Bech: Well actually, I had some discussions about our efforts in Afghanistan,

especially about this, because what we saw from, I would say, mainly the U.S. was that well, we hire a lot of young fighters who had been affiliated with Taliban. Now we hire them to work for ISF or to work for the U.S. military. And we pay them, and therefore they are not putting IEDs--well, they're not hurting us anymore.

But when the ISF leave Afghanistan, if--when the U.S. leave Afghanistan what's left for these people? Well, Taliban will pick them again, and so therefore I had big discussions about this is not just about giving money to the people, or it's not about, you know, giving fish to the people. It's actually you have to teach them how to fish.

General John Allen: Again, the intention was, though, to create an outcome that didn't rely on you having to pay them off to keep them from shooting you or planting an IED. It created an outcome that permitted them to re-assimilate into their villages. The reason they had a weapon in the first place was they were dissimilated. There were difficulties that couldn't be resolved by governmental capacity or economic opportunity. So you get them off the battlefield, and you create the opportunity for them to stay off the battlefield. That was the fulfillment of that policy.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Alright. Let's get more ideas, please.

Mr. Alexander Rondos: Nik, may I? On this, I think is a critical issue. When we've got these crises, too often we don't go back to asking the basic question is this about grievance or is it about greed?

General John Allen: Yes.

Ms. Gitte Lillelund Bech: Yes.

Mr. Alexander Rondos: My own conclusion is in most instances it's about greed wrapped in the flag of national, religious, or other grievance, but it starts with greed. Two examples. South Sudan is a country that has collapsed, and 90 percent of its revenue comes from oil. Right now as we speak today, that government is getting almost 50 million a day coming in in revenue with which it's now on the market trying to buy helicopter gunships.

Now, in the meantime, we are committing tens of millions for humanitarian purposes. Something doesn't quite add up here. I'm going to be entirely--I'm sure I'm going beyond the bounds of what I should be allowed to say and contrary to all the rules of sovereignty. Take the cocaine off the table. If money is the cocaine of South Sudanese politics, the neighbors should be the first ones interested in saying let's create an international control of the revenue of that country. Point One.

Point two though, that I've heard about business. We forget how often solutions are actually found

through the private sector. They have a vested interest in stability or instability. They will go where they can make a profit. If you can work with the private sector in a place like Somalia where they're brilliant entrepreneurs get them to be the brokers with the politics and get them to finance good politics as opposed to nefarious politics. We who sit in governments often turn up our nose at this, and we're missing an essential component of how to move ahead in finding solutions.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Quickly, anyone else from business who wants to come in on that, where you might fit in? We've heard one voice from Turkey. Anyone else at the moment? Are you from business? Are you from business? No. Okay. Are you from business? Yes. Right. Let's--

Unidentified Man 2: I am actually teaching because I'm in business, in energy business now, but I used to be State Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Nik Gowing: That's why I could look at you and--
-

Unidentified Man 2: But now I've given the one (inaudible).

Mr. Nik Gowing: --that's why I looked at you and said--

Unidentified Man 2: I think--

Mr. Nik Gowing: You haven't jumped the queue, otherwise I'll cut your legs off with a bit of hard power.

Unidentified Man 2: But I've cut your legs off because I think there's some misunderstanding here. I don't want to put what's into Professor Nye's mouth, but I think that his whole point of his book was after 9/11--was that that was kind of a hard part power but Taliban was actually soft power. So the 21st century should be ruled by soft power. The point is after Crimea is that correct? I mean, should we--isn't the combination--

General John Allen: Yes.

Unidentified Man 2: --as you have said, for instance, if we decided that we should move in the direction of Ukraine being a member of NATO, is that hard power? I think it is, but on the other hand--and now I'm putting my energy hat on--if we decided more forcefully that the heads of state of government did the other day that we should turn the gas off in Europe from Russia then the Russian economy will collapse, and we can do that. I'm now taking, again, my energy hat off.

Mr. Nik Gowing: At that point, is it such a hard act that it moves into hard power even though it doesn't involve any bloodletting?

Unidentified Man 2: I think it does.

Ms. Gitte Lillelund Bech: Yeah.

General John Allen: It does.

Ms. Gitte Lillelund Bech: Yeah.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Okay. Good. We're getting.

Unidentified Man 2: Thank you.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Thank you. Right. Down here, please. And I'm looking towards the back as well at any point. Take the microphone, please. Have you got the microphone? No.

Unidentified Man 3: It's still not working. I can't--

Mr. Nik Gowing: I'll come back to you. I'll come back to you. Who's got the microphone? Please, yes. In the front, and we'll go over there as well. Please.

Dr. Willy Stevens: I believe that hard and soft power are only means. The objective is to serve interest, hard interest and soft interest. Hard interest being security, economic resources, and soft interest, values and principles. Should that not be incorporated in this discussion here?

Mr. Nik Gowing: Is the microphone working?

General John Allen: I'd contend that the interests need to be integrated as well and fulfilled, ultimately served by the right combination of hard and soft power.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Who's next? Who's got the microphone, a microphone that works, please?

Dr. İlter Turan: İlter Turan from Istanbul University. First, I have an offer that the word smart be banned from use because it seems that it's an escape category to evade substantial questions. Smart casual, smart defense, and now we have smart power, a self-congratulatory expression which does not give us any indication of where we should proceed.

But secondly, I think when we focus--when we conceptualize the problem as power, we run into this difficulty that we focus on the instruments of power rather than their use. And so then we end up saying hard and soft. And the fact is that there was an earlier word used by the General about coercion versus persuasion.

So I think if we start with the aim of what we're trying to do and go back, it would be easier because we fall into this trap. You get an instrument and you begin to debate as to whether it is hard and soft. But then it soon becomes apparent that what you're really talking about is how you use it rather than what it is. So I just offer to reconceptualize the whole thing.

General John Allen: Exactly.

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: Good point.

Mr. Nik Gowing: John, you're putting up your thumb in agreement.

General John Allen: Exactly. Again, the policy process has to be coherent. It has to start with your

decision of what the objectives need to be, and then you combine the means which are a combination of hard and soft power to both influence and if necessary to coerce, to achieve those policy objectives. So it's an integrated approach.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Anyone else want to come in?

Mr. Alexander Rondos: I agree.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Okay. I'm going to get as many of you to speak in the next 20 minutes as possible. So please just be patient, even if you have to put up your hand several times, please.

Mr. Halil (phonetic): Thank you. My name is Halil and I'm from the Jagiellonian University Krakow, graduate student. I want to use this opportunity. Soft power for me was this very small use of Taliban, the opportunity given in Qatar to actually promote their agenda, although if it was for a few hours or a few days or whenever it was. Using their banners and using their names, so it was not just soft power, it was smart power, I guess.

The use of money, General mentioned that I believe there were a few examples I could use that turned out to be disastrous because it was, intentionally it was soft power; but it turned out to be hard power. One was the local police, Afghan local police, that was given the guns, and it turned out disastrous; and the second one was DDR, actually implemented by the Japanese

government as a disarmament, demobilization, reintegration of the former armed forces. Which it did not really help, and at the same time the local police getting the guns. So basically kind of outdated the other program.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Okay. You've used the term, smart power. You said, don't use the term, smart power. Is there a consensus here about whether, if we're trying to somehow, you said it was highly anachronistic, whether we should be using the word smart? Anyone? Masa, yes or no?

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: Smart?

Ms. Gitte Lillelund Bech: Yep. I agree. Use smart. And I'm going to say that, in that in Denmark we went from being a small state to being a smart state. And therefore I, yeah, I vote for smart.

Mr. Alexander Rondos: You know, we'll get lost in the semantics here; just get it right is the issue, it seems to me.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Okay. That sounds like being smart, if you get it right.

Mr. Alexander Rondos: Absolutely. But let's get to the details.

General John Allen: The context is, it needs to be comprehensive. It needs to be comprehensive. It needs to include everything.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Is that smart?

General John Allen: Yes, I suppose it is. But I don't sit down on a policy or a strategy process and say I'm going to do smart power now. I'm going to start by doing hard power, and then I'm going to end with soft power. What we do is we, again, we determine what our outcome's going to be, what our objective is going to be; we bring everyone together who has a stake in the process; and we integrate their capabilities to achieve that outcome. Now that's a comprehensive approach.

If everyone feels better by being able to say we've got a little bit of soft power going on here and a little bit of hard power, and it all fits underneath smart power, if I can get the comprehensive approach because I approach it that way, I'm happy with that. But in the end it's about a comprehensive application of a policy process that leverages all the ways and means that are available to us in what are traditionally called hard and soft areas, to get us to a successful policy accomplishment.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Masa, I've got a question here on power and history. Isn't Japan significantly undermining its soft power by its handling of history?

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: I didn't know that this is about history, but--

Mr. Nik Gowing: Well, you could answer it whichever way you want, but I'm just telling you that that's been put on the agenda. If you want to just respond to that.

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: Okay. Yeah, the message I just want to spread out is that as the prime minister made quite clear a few days ago, we have no intention to change the history. We have no intention to change the assessment of the history. We accept the outcome of the history. So that is the intention and how the Prime Minister feels at this moment.

And, by the way, we had a discussion yesterday whether we can change the history or not. And the outcome was that you cannot change what happened, but you can change the interpretation of that. And what I'm saying is that the prime minister is not going to change the interpretation of what happened. So I think we have accepted history squarely and I think that has been, and will continue to be, the source of our strengths for persuasion.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Okay. Please.

Unidentified Man 3: Thank you very much. I do believe that there is probably hard power, soft power; but there is also not enough power. And from this point of view we're going to into a debate which has nothing to do with what we basically want in Crimea. In Crimea we simply believe that economic interdependence is not going to allow certain actors to do certain things.

They did it. And after they did it, we understand that economic interdependence is becoming a problem to respond to them.

This is part in my view of the crisis that we're talking about, and this is not about hard and soft power. And I do believe that this very debate, defining yourselves through hard or soft power, is changing the story because we don't know how to talk about power these days.

And this is my last point: Before, normally foreign policy was you're mobilizing domestic resources in order to give impact outside of your borders. Now we are trying to mobilize global resources in order to stabilize at home. Look at most foreign policy players, they're using their foreign policy to solve domestic problems, economic, political and others; and in my view this is changing the game, and not simply how we're going to define hard or soft powers.

Mr. Nik Gowing: But haven't we addressed it by saying this is anachronistic back in the beginning?

Unidentified Man 3: Listen. I'm living now in Vienna. And in Habsburg monarchy they have discovered soft power before us. It was the royal marriages. They said, we're not going to fight anybody because we have beautiful daughters. And if you like you can basically marry everybody, you don't need to fight. But it's

always basically a problem if you're going to come with a childless family and there is nobody to marry.

Mr. Nik Gowing: All right. Keep the messages coming. Keep the messages coming here. (Inaudible) as well, and Anton, please.

Mr. Mikheil Saakashvili: Well, when we talk about soft power, we forget one thing: the reforms. I mean, what happened in Georgia and how reforms are being responded. You know, the most popular book in Kyrgyzstan was put by a Russian author, How Georgia Made It. The same thing in Cairo; the same thing the other day in Miami at the bar, a Kenyan came to me and told me everything about Georgia reforms, even the things I didn't know. And that's what Facebook does.

And one thing should be realized: Georgia had made it to top ten among all the countries in terms of ease of doing business. Russia is 147th, now their trying to move it. Ukraine is 139th. We were, (inaudible) knows that, according to European Union studies, the safest country in Europe and one of the three least corrupt countries in Europe. Now--

Mr. Nik Gowing: But let me just press you, let me just press you. When you were president, how much were you anguishing over hard and soft power?

Mr. Mikheil Saakashvili: First, in 2005, Russia did full-blown energy embargo. And what it allowed us, to refurbish our sector, kill corruption, and now we're

energy self-sufficient. When we had full-blown economic embargo, and we had double-digits grow four years after that, which means that we refurbished our economy and again killed corruption and again liberalized it. So the way how we proceeded, the way Georgia proceeded, we created a soft power impact, including the Russia.

By 2008 when Russia attacked, what should we realize? By that moment, lots of Russian intellectuals and not only the press were asking, why can we not have policy like Georgia? Why can we not have economic growth like Georgia? Why cannot we have roads without Georgia? Georgia without having oil money? So what happened, really, now in the Georgian case, was that we basically overwhelmed it with our soft power, indeed made better, who officially was our enemy, said, well, by the way, I hate Saakashvili, but we should copy reforms from them. This was the guy who Putin promised to hang by balls.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Let me press you. Because I need to know your assessment now in 2014, on what is happening with hard and soft power. We can do about 2008, but things have moved on.

Mr. Mikheil Saakashvili: No, let's continue. When I go to Ukraine --.

Mr. Nik Gowing: No, no. I'd like you to answer that question about where hard and soft power are now, please.

Mr. Mikheil Saakashvili: I can't tell you what happened after that. Russia applied something that either is soft or hard, let judging what was mentioned by (inaudible). But, money. Georgia's economy, of GDP of less than 20 billion dollars. Russia poured into our last elections and we are a democracy, two billions. Two billions that it gave to Russian oligarch. They poured in two billions. And when you have economy of 20 billions, with still people living with diminished poverty from 50 percent down to 22 percent, people vote for such things. And people went for such things.

At the result what we got, mass scale crackdown on corruption, oh, I'm sorry, this time not on corruption, on opposition; a hundred more cases of arrests and indictment of opposition members; and we might, looks like, we might not have next normal elections at all anymore.

So what it really happens to this money, what was put with, whether we call it soft power or not, to kill the Georgia reforms that were brought all over the region including Russia, it was killed off, this time not by military force, which couldn't do this trick in 2008, they occupied our areas, but Georgia boomed after that for four years in a row.

What really happened was then they came after this boom with money, and basically they established a system that allow us now to kill all the things that

were not killed by energy embargo, by economic embargo, by provocations, by terrorist attacks, and then by the war.

And what happened? Then money came in, and money produced the trick. And that's what I'm scared for about, Ukraine and some other places. This aggression and, you know, military interventions immediate threat; but what will happen in six months from now? One year of now? Where will these Ukrainian oligarchs that depend upon Russian oligarchs be? If they don't implement this, even if they implement the reforms, because when I went to this square in Kiev one month ago, people were shouting, we want your reforms. I went to the university, you know? There were three thousand stands; they knew more about my reforms than most of my ministers. I mean that guy's here. And, but if they don't get it, then what will happen?

Another, well, in Ukraine's case it will be more billions coming in, but there is enough billions in Putin's. Well he buy their democracy? Will he kill their system? The way how he did in Georgia.

Mr. Nik Gowing: All right. So you've confirmed where bribery and money can move in that direction as hard power.

Mr. Mikheil Saakashvili: Yeah, well, bribery, and also electoral process. Electoral process. It's not only bribing some concrete officials.

Mr. Nik Gowing: What's it like in the Horn of Africa? The use of money?

Mr. Alexander Rondos: Oh, it's all over.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Is it hard power?

Mr. Alexander Rondos: Follow the money. It's both. Depends. If you've got black money and illicit goods, that's the way you buy off officials and governments, and convert a whole system. If you use it well, you actually redistribute. You've got a region. I'm responsible for a region where they're discovering hydropower and oil. There's going to be a bonanza coming. Now the issue is, is this money going to be used to bring people's level of life up? Or will it become a source of division and civil conflict? And that's the challenge.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Okay. Microphone there, please.

Unidentified Woman 1: Even in the Afghanistan context one of the things that we forget is the way the Taliban have used money, drug money, so while an attempt was made to use money to buy Taliban fighters, the Taliban have used it far more smartly.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Smartly? Would you call that hard power?

Unidentified Woman 1: I would call it hard power, because it's recruitment.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Okay. Good. Let's get more contributions like that. At the back, please, Anton

first, then the microphone in the back, please. Give the, the microphone will come to you, Anton.

Mr. Anton La Guardia: Anton La Guardia. Anton La Guardia from The Economist. I mean, first of all, on the semantic point, nobody ever calls it stupid power. So maybe we should get away from the idea of smart power. Secondly, we've tended to talk about ungoverned spaces inevitably in this conversation, Afghanistan, Somalia, parts of Africa. In a sense this conversation's also interesting in governed space. So, for example, on the use of cyber, the same tools that are used by criminals to steal passwords can also be used for espionage. The same tools that are used for DDOS, people who sort of, you know, take over the bots, can be used for a DDOS attack as we saw in Georgia. So, in a sense, you need to put cyber all the way down the line.

On (inaudible)'s point about oligarchs, it, it sort of also works the other way. I mean, one of the things that appears to have worked in Ukraine was economic pressure put by sanctions on Ukrainian oligarchs, and so to push and to move against Yanukovich.

And the third point is, I don't think that Western countries have quite understood what happens in governed space, let's say in Europe, when means sort of below military attack are used. For example, to undermine countries, for example, to use Russian

minorities, so we haven't thought about the response, what is the trigger for response when you start eating away and fragmenting countries that may be vulnerable? And I don't think we've thought hard enough about how that response works.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Okay. Please, at the back.

Unidentified Man 5: I would like to add the power of culture. Mr. Putin presides today over a traditional society wave, a culture of dependency, which influences the conservative movements, not only in Russia but throughout Europe and in many other places of the world. This is generated as a soft power, but it has direct hard power consequences that we are monitoring today.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Is it becoming harder, do you think now?

Unidentified Man 5: It's becoming hard. It's generated as soft, but it's becoming hard.

General John Allen: Great observation.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Anyone else, please? Yes, at the front.

Mr. Gian Gaicomo Migone: Gian Gaicomo Migone. I'm from Italy. I think it's important that we should get away from a division of labor between soft and hard power because we're in a multiple world. And to make an example, the European Union needs perhaps not more hard military power, but it should work better because we're

spending an immense budget, 50 percent almost of the U.S. budget. And we have a 10 percent more or less efficacy. On the other hand, I think the U.S. should improve its soft power. And I think we'd see the results, for instance, in Iraq. And Afghanistan is still doubtful.

My last point to--I'm looking at the ambassador--is that sometimes countries like Japan, Germany, and Italy have a lesson in their historical experience. You learn more from defeat than from victory. And perhaps our lesson is to lower in the general interest the military power.

Mr. Nik Gowing: All right. Thanks. General Allen--a particular question here from Sarah Wagner--what are the lessons learned from counterinsurgency as an effort to combine hard and soft power? Can you just answer that immediately?

General John Allen: Well, yes, it's an extraordinarily important question because, in the end, the security dimension of the counterinsurgency campaign isn't the end state. The security dimension of the counterinsurgency campaign creates the conditions where governance and economic opportunity can take root. That then is the outcome that you desire. It is the knockout blow, if you will, against the insurgent, is to ultimately address those issues of grievance that we've--that Alex talked about. And that is the lesson

learned from us is to ensure that you have an integrated approach to the employment of all of your capacity to create the security platform on which then credible governance and economic opportunity can emerge and then sustain it.

Mr. Nik Gowing: There's a question here from Jackson Janes, which I'd just like to give you notice of for the end of the session. What is the best illustration or case study of a useful effective mix of soft and hard power? Think about that as I get some more questions. And we're finishing in 10 minutes. Please, down here.

Ms. Ketevan Tsikhelashvili: Yep. Hello. My name is Ketevan Tsikhelashvili. I come from Georgia, Georgian government. One thing I want to mention is indeed unfortunately democracy's not killed in Georgia. We're trying our best actually to make a progress down the way. Now, very quickly, to address the semantics of hard and soft power and smart, I think any power could be used in a smart way or a non-smart way. Now, coming back to our topics of discussion, when we speak about Russia and Ukraine, I think what Mr. Putin unfortunately and quite smartly uses is a combination of the both.

Particularly, think about propaganda and ideology done by controlled media in Russia which gives Mr. Putin an immense support in public. He has never been

so popular as he's now in the background of the Ukraine events or Georgia events back in 2008. It's a continuation of the same story and how this feeds his hard powers. So I think there's something to add to this chart. Thank you.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Thank you. What executive power, presidential power almost?

Ms. Ketevan Tsikhelashvili: No, it's a power of ideology and propaganda.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Okay. Thank you. Please, over there, and then the microphone will go further back.

Ms. Bente Aika Scheller: Bente Scheller from the Beirut office of the Heinrich Böll Foundation. This acts pretty well what I wanted to say because the power of definition maybe or the power of information your talk all did briefly regarding Afghanistan where actually I saw exactly that happening. Who speaks first kind of really determines forever the narrative. And this is what happened in Syria.

So it has invented this narrative of it's me or the Islamists, has been speaking about terrorists before they were there, and then, like this, if we put it more onto the soft end, he has beefed it up of course by releasing Salafists from his prisons in order to make happen what he actually was announcing. How well are we prepared to deal with this? Since we have seen this problem and it has affected us really strongly in Iraq

and Afghanistan and it affects us in many other places, what can we do to deal with it? And maybe this also reaches into the cyber area that was mentioned by one of the speakers here.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Thank you. As the microphone moves, is anyone sitting there deeply frustrated by this conversation thinking we've got the wrong end of the stick, we've missed the point completely? Because we've got 10 minutes, and I'd like to hear your voice. Are you frustrated? All right. I'll come to you in a moment. Please, at the back. Thanks.

Mr. Matthew Bryza: Thanks. Matt Bryza, International Centre for Defense Studies in Estonia. One great example of comprehensive use of power is energy infrastructure and pipelines. If you have political will, as was the case in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey back in the late '90s to build a pipeline uniting the countries, that pipeline project, with commercial investment--if it's commercially viable--can actually redraw the strategic map in a positive way. And in fact it is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, South Caucasus gas pipeline that has guaranteed the independence of Azerbaijan and has deterred a lot of coercion by Russia against Azerbaijan.

Similar opportunities exist now in the Baltic States to connect them to the EU and in the Eastern Mediterranean where there's a way to bring Israel,

Turkey, and Cypress together on some cooperative energy infrastructure projects.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Thank you very much, indeed. Your frustrations, please, about this debate. I should tell you that I've just had one message from Kwanele Gumbi which is, I think, really rather useful. Obama is a perfect example of soft power. Putin is a perfect example of hard power. And I'm adding now, but which is the most effective?

Ms. Bagdana (phonetic): Yeah. I would like to add up on the frustration. What is missing here for me-- I'm--my name is Bagdana. I come from Ukraine. And what is missing here for me in this chart actually, it's not only about soft and hard power, but it's also about the responsibility and the ability of somebody to stand for soft and hard power.

So it's more kind of in dimensions, you know. And the frustration comes from the point, like, for example, if you're an ordinary citizen and you walk around Kiev and you have a ribbon like this and you see a police, you run away, you know, because you as a citizen are not able to stand against military power. And this is where the responsibility of the others come in.

And, secondly, also when this is about Ukraine, which gave up its nuclear powers, weapons, simply because of for the security guarantees. So the question

is, when does the responsibility come in of somebody who has also the power to protect country like Ukraine? Thank you.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Thank you. Okay. Let me get two more interventions. Who's got the microphone now, please?

Mr. Matthew Asada: Matthew from Washington. I'm a little bit frustrated by the conversation as well because of the starting point. You drew on the board here a linear diagram with two different camps. And I think that is not quite the picture that we're trying to transmit, that we'd eventually would like to upload and have millions of people, like, around the world. What we want to do is we want to have a picture composition that has different tools that we can use to paint this composition. We can then maybe apply a couple different filters to it using an Instagram example, cultural filter, time of day, time of season, perspective, wide angle, and, again, that will allow us to have a picture of the diplomatic solution that will be liked by as many people as possible.

Mr. Nik Gowing: All right. I do apologize. I haven't been able to do a three-dimensional morph diagram in the last 45 minutes. But I hope you understand we all have frailties. Please, who's got the microphone?

Mr. Keiro Kitagami: Yes. Keiro Kitagami from Japan. I agree with Mr. Ishii that the--on the prime minister's position on history. And I think historical revisionism would be a grave strategical mistake on Japan's part. But having said that, we are here talking about how to use soft power and hard power, but we should also understand, too, on the defensive side, there are countries who use soft power in order to hide what they're doing with hard power. And I would say that China is doing exactly that saying that--you know, going back to the values of the Second World War and propagating all these ideas, they are faking everyone out about what they're doing maritime aspect with hard power. So--

Mr. Nik Gowing: All right. Thank you. Which allows me, Masa, to ask you--and I realize that given that you represent the foreign ministry, this is not an easy question simply because the dynamic is so profound at the moment. But can you just give us an idea of what kind of reassessment is now having to be done in Tokyo because of what has happened in Crimea, particularly in the last 10 days, and particularly when you look at what's happening in the islands, and what you're looking--what you're hearing from Beijing, and also when you hear the concerns of your neighbors like Vietnam and the Philippines about what might happen by this ability to essentially achieve your aims by breach

of international law and what therefore Japan's options are? Quickly, if you can.

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: Yeah. I think we have created in a timely manner what we call NSC. We have now the better coordination among defense and the foreign policy. And this NSC is working perfectly in facing this Crimea case. And I think, as I mentioned several times, this is not your issue. This is our issue as well. And as you've said, the countries in the region feeling the same way.

So, as I said, first, every country has to do within their own authority to become stronger and to be ready for the same kind of happening. And number two is, I think, just to create a better coordination among likeminded countries who may face the same kind of situation. And--

Mr. Nik Gowing: Therefore, can we assume that in your minds you're having to think of moving right along this line towards harder power when it comes to Article Nine, the constitution?

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: Not necessarily. Well, the discussion has been going on whether we should change the interpretation of Article Nine so that we can use some part of the collective defense, right? But we haven't--no decision has been made yet. But I think, even if we do decide to do it, that only doesn't work. I mean, somebody talked about culture. Somebody talked

about history. I think we need to do something about history. And then we need to tell everybody what we've been doing since the end of the Second World War.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Right.

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: And we've been contributing a lot to the peace of the world. So I think together with those elements, we can get ourselves stronger.

Mr. Nik Gowing: But it's a new challenge for you in Tokyo, literally, normatively in the last few days.

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: It's a new challenge. Yeah.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Right. The last three or four minutes, please.

General John Allen: May I just very quickly?

Mr. Nike Gowing: Please, John.

General John Allen: To the point that Ishii was making, the 18 March editorial in The Global Times, which is a Chinese publication, said that there are two tasks that emerge from the Ukraine for the Chinese. One is to seek to be helpful in the bringing of order out of the chaos and prevent escalation. But the other point was very important, said the Chinese people should remember the final say in geopolitical competition is military strength. China should speed up its military modernization. So this has not been lost on all of those who are observing whether international order is a function of rules and international law or whether it's a function of pure military power.

Mr. Nik Gowing: And we know the political decision about strengthening the defense budget and defense spending in Moscow. The last three or four minutes, Alex, that question I put to you about whether there is one example, a good point we can put on to the table to say there's been a successful mix of soft and hard, smart, whatever you want to say. Is there a good example that anyone can follow as an object lesson in how it could be done from your experience?

Mr. Alexandros Rondos: Well, I would venture-- though I'm taking a real risk here--that in a couple of years' time we will be looking back on Somalia and say, this place that was considered sort of a permanent sort of occupant of the garbage bin of history and a total disaster has actually turned the corner and has become an example of how an absolute catastrophic situation is put together, the total collapse, and as a result of us, if you will, learning on the job and managing to do hard security, moving--getting the right type of diplomacy to get the right neighbors engaged, getting the proper type of softer money to promote business, to promote--giving pirates an alternative living, for example, getting al-Shabaab to have a better life--this is only part of it.

So I think what's happened in the last two or three years has been all a sort of convergence of these various strands. And I'd venture that in a short while,

we'll be able to look back and say, my goodness, this has worked.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Success. Good. Excellent. Okay. Well, you heard it here, the prediction. Right. Gitte, your thought about where there may be a positive model or an experience? Is there one in your mind?

Ms. Gitte Lillelund Bech: Yeah. Well, I've come back to the one that I took up in the beginning. Where I saw it work was at the patrol base line in Helmand where my troops were fighting Taliban in the morning. And in the evening, they were actually discussing with the older people in the village about education and school, and the older people asked, can you help us find a teacher so we can teach the kids?

Mr. Nik Gowing: We'll take that away, from boots to shoes and sandals.

Ms. Gitte Lillelund Bech: Exactly.

Mr. Nik Gowing: Masa, quickly, any great example in your mind, which you teach at your diplomatic school?

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: I must make a point about institution building. Institution building is the way to try to involve people, including new rising powers, and I think that the future of G7, future of G8, future of G20, future of some of the institutions to the having been built in Asia, like the East Asia Summit, will have a big impact on the behavior of all the main players. So that--

Mr. Nik Gowing: General Allen.

General John Allen: I was deeply involved in the South Asia tsunami in '04, '05, and it is one of the great examples, I think, of the massive application of the tools of hard power that played up in the rescue and the relief and the reconstruction for tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of people that were affected in this regard. It not only immediately had the effect in soft power context of saving people's lives, putting societies back on track. It was a large measure contributing factor in solving of the separatist movement in Aceh, in Sumatra. It also brought together states from all over the region that played a really critical role in the relief of the South Asian tsunami but then created relationships thereafter, which have endured beyond that. And, frankly, when our good friends that--the Chinese watched us in action, they immediately commented on the strategic outcome of the relationships that will have been created through the application of means of hard power to achieve decisive soft power outcomes.

Mr. Nik Gowing: John, Gitte, Masa, and also Alex, thank you very much indeed. We've got through an enormous amount in the last hour and 15 minutes. Thank you very much for all contributions. I know it's imperfect. It is a takeaway. You can roll it up. It might be a historic document for all you know, so you'd

better keep it. This may be the moment that the GFM Brussels Forum Initiative on hard, soft, smart, and the next gets remembered as an important takeoff point. But thank you all very much indeed for entering the spirit of the brainstorming.

Mr. Craig Kennedy: Nik, thank you. Thank you so much. We're actually going to call it the Gowing Project, I think. We're going to take a break now. Be back in 20 minutes. We'll have the final session and conclude this year's Brussels Forum.