TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AND THE FUTURE OF NATO SERIES

IMPROVING TRANSATLANTIC STRATEGIC BURDEN-SHARING

Working Session
June 11-12, 2015, Berlin

GMF The German Marshall Fund of the United States STRENGTHENING TRANSatlantic COOPERATION
# Improving Transatlantic Strategic Burden-Sharing

## Transatlantic Security and the Future of NATO Series

**Working Session**  
**June 11-12, Berlin**  
**September 2015**

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About the Transatlantic Security and the Future of NATO Program

The Aim

The Transatlantic Security and the Future of NATO project is developing concrete and focused policy recommendations on transatlantic security issues. It has the overarching goal of reaching out to a wide transatlantic audience about the future of transatlantic security cooperation and providing policymakers and experts with fresh perspectives and understandings of the global geopolitical challenges that unite the transatlantic partners and structure future policies of and towards NATO.

Three times a year, this program brings together a group of 25 to 30 high-level U.S. and European security experts, strategic thinkers, senior policymakers, and private sector representatives to explore the security priorities for transatlantic cooperation in the years to come and serve as a forum to stimulate much-needed transatlantic security dialogue on looming threats and possibilities for cooperation. Held under the Chatham House rule, each session attempts to highlight the areas where transatlantic cooperation should be improved and strengthened, with regards to specific challenges and taking into consideration the latest issues on the international agenda. The program ensures that we create the right discussion format to look at both broader and more narrowly focused issues and topics.

In addition, GMF convenes ambassadors to the United States from NATO member countries once a year, with appropriate representation from the U.S. government, to complement the three workshops. This unique platform provides an ideal opportunity for discussing current and future policies, identifying potential divides among member states that could lead to suboptimal policies, and working toward common policies.

Such a group also fills a clear void in Washington. EU ambassadors meet on a regular basis, but there is no other similar meeting that reflects the relevance of NATO in today’s world and works to build a deeper understanding of the debates and discussions that exist among Europeans and across the Atlantic, which is central to, among other things, continued U.S. engagement in European security policy. Ambassadors from European members and Canada also report the relevant insights from these engagements back to their respective capitals to inform the policy debate at home.

This ambassadorial roundtable (also held under the Chatham House rule) is convened after the second high-level workshop of each cycle, to help serve as a steering group to set the terms of the forthcoming workshop’s debates, and to gather valuable comments on the deliverables of previous workshops.

The Context

The format and the objectives of the program fit an increasing European and U.S. demand to strengthen transatlantic understanding and cooperation in the security field. Indeed, the political consensus between both sides of the Atlantic can no longer be guaranteed when confronting new international challenges. The economic crisis has more specifically affected the development of concrete policy cooperation, as both sides of the Atlantic wish to redefine their military and diplomatic engagements in the world.

Consequently, this context has created a strong need for a high-level discussion among national security and defense strategists on emerging and potential security issues that Europeans and Americans will need to address in the future. These include both issues of grand strategy (i.e. the shifting military balance, the future of transatlantic burden sharing and of common
procurement programs, the future of the use of military force) as well as very specific challenges (e.g. maritime security, energy security, Arctic issues, the rise of new military powers, the future of NATO). Any of these challenges could alter the dynamics of the transatlantic conversation and even the shape of the alliance. That these challenges are not singular snapshots in time but extend and often overlap, converge, and reinforce one another is reason for greater urgency in reinvigorating the transatlantic security dialogue.

The NATO Summit in Wales served as a crucial transition point, one that structures the ambitions that transatlantic partners have for the organization, and sets the parameters for the roadmap for the new secretary general. The Transatlantic Security and the Future of NATO project will develop fresh perspectives on the main points that were discussed in Wales while also looking to provide insightful analyses and recommendations about topics that will structure the mandate of the new secretary general in the run-up to the 2016 Warsaw Summit and beyond, such as the ever-important link between security and economics (whether it concerns trade policy, industrial cooperation, or the future of programs such as Smart Defense), the evolution of the NATO-European Union relationship, the future of the enlargement policy, or the efforts that NATO will need to engage in terms of public diplomacy. More specific issues encompass NATO’s ambitions and priorities in specific regions of the world from the Mediterranean to the Arctic. The working groups look at these issues through the prism of the Alliance’s engagement with other foreign policy actors, such as the European Union or individual countries, and discuss the shape of the Alliance’s competences in devising efficient answers to complex 21st century challenges, while reaffirming its unique and central status. GMF also makes use of its office network to monitor the latest developments that affect the future of the Alliance, and uses this to ensure that the sessions are relevant to all the transatlantic stakeholders.

The Method

GMF has developed this convening and research project to include three cycles of workshops over 36 months, with two signature high-level workshops per calendar year, accompanied by one meeting of NATO-member state ambassadors who maintain a representation in Washington, DC, and followed by a smaller, high-level concluding workshop that serves as a scenario-planning exercise. The agenda of program is shaped by a core group of recognized experts in transatlantic security cooperation and European and U.S. officials, who decide collectively during the concluding session on the key security issues that should be discussed in the working groups.

Each high-level workshop is organized over a day and a half to allow for an in-depth, frank discussion about topics that are of interest to the global security policy community, more particularly the member states and partners of NATO, to develop concrete and actionable policy recommendations. GMF ensures that the conclusions are appropriately disseminated to various stakeholders of the transatlantic relationship and are further discussed and debated in the other forums organized by GMF, such as, for example, Brussels Forum, The Atlantic Dialogues, or other convening formats.

The GMF Paris office serves as the organizational platform for programming.

The dates of the 2015 working groups are:

- **April 16-17 (Paris): Assessing Leadership in the Transatlantic Security Cooperation**
• **June 11-12** (Berlin): Improving Transatlantic Strategic Burden-Sharing

• **October 9** (Washington, DC): NATO Ambassadorial Roundtable

• **December 4** (Paris): Rethinking Transatlantic Active Solidarity

### The Paper Series

For each session, a report of the results of the discussions and a series of analytical papers produced by the participants are published. The papers are published both as single papers and as a coherent collection dedicated to one major issue of transatlantic security cooperation. The publications and the wide audience they are circulated to ensure that workshop conclusions receive maximum, yet targeted, coverage and influence policy formulation.

### Project Leader/Contact

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Thursday, June 11, 2015
7:15-9:30 pm Transatlantic Dinner
Location: Ellington Hotel
Nürnbergstraße 50-55, 10789 Berlin,

Keynote speaker: Jürgen Hardt, Member of Parliament, Coordinator of Transatlantic Cooperation, German Federal Foreign Office.

Friday, June 12, 2015
9:00-10:45 am Session I: Fostering a Rapprochement in Transatlantic Defense Economy: Challenges and Levers
Has the economic crisis provided transatlantic partners with additional incentives to collaborate on common procurement plans? Are informal regional security arrangements or NATO policies such as Framework Nation Concept an answer to these issues? It seems that the deteriorating situations in Europe’s eastern and southern neighborhoods have not created the conditions for certain countries to reverse decreasing defense spending trends: what are the levers that exist to reverse these trends, and to what extent do they harm transatlantic solidarity? How do these trends affect transatlantic ability to project power in the South and East of Europe, and also in Asia? What are the issues that continue to afflict the transatlantic relationship on defense economics, and what role do the EU and NATO have to play in making sure challenges can be met? What are the levers that the EU has to facilitate investment in defense? Shall these issues be a part of discussions in the months leading up to the Warsaw NATO summit?

11:00-12:45 pm Session II: The Prospects and Limits of a Transatlantic Division of Security Responsibilities
While Europeans are more willing to accept the fact that U.S. engagement will remain limited for the foreseeable future, this has also reshuffled the distribution of power and influence within Europe itself. How does this affect the way Europe conducts a united foreign policy and its abilities to influence events in its neighborhood? To what extent does the Alliance’s current strategic and military adaptation affect Germany’s role as a security actor? Can and should German strategic responsibilities balance its economic power at the transatlantic level? And how would enhancing Berlin’s role in foreign policy and strategic issues influence the transatlantic approach to security challenges? To what extent do European and U.S. strategic interests overlap? Can we infer from these a clear burden-sharing policy between Europe and the United States? Is such a division of labor a desirable state of play for transatlantic security cooperation? What does this mean in terms of capabilities, and how does it affect the way NATO and the EU work on new strategic frameworks? How does this influence the balance between southern and eastern-oriented members of NATO?

2:30-4:15 pm Session III: From Afghanistan to Ukraine: Assessing the Necessary Transatlantic Capabilities in the Contemporary Strategic Environment
It is a vital challenge for the transatlantic partnership to be able to design force structures that correspond to the challenges at hand, something that has become increasingly complex given the varying needs in the south and in the east of Europe. How can NATO and its member states develop a toolbox to respond efficiently to the fight against terrorism and ISIS in the south, while maintaining strong deterrents against Russian hybrid warfare on its eastern flank? How can NATO organize its forces in order to answer these simultaneous challenges, and how should NATO coordinate with member states and willing regional clusters in doing so? What are the existing limits in NATO’s force structure that
can hurt its ability to respond, and what needs to be done to improve its readiness and deterrence? Can we imagine that NATO’s force structure will prioritize one threat over the other? Does Russian hybrid warfare and Europe’s vulnerability to it signify the need for an overhaul of NATO force structure? Who would be the main drivers of this process on the European side, and how does the planned U.S. force structure integrate itself in this planning?

4:15-5:30 pm
Prospective Analyses and Concrete Recommendations for the Future of Transatlantic Security Cooperation
Session I: Fostering a Rapprochement in Transatlantic Defense Economy: Challenges and Levers

Has the economic crisis provided transatlantic partners with additional incentives to collaborate on common procurement plans? Are informal regional security arrangements or NATO policies such as Framework Nation Concept an answer to these issues? It seems that the deteriorating situations in Europe’s eastern and southern neighborhoods have not created the conditions for certain countries to reverse decreasing defense spending trends: what are the levers that exist to reverse these trends, and to what extent do they harm transatlantic solidarity? How do these trends affect transatlantic ability to project power in the South and East of Europe, and also in Asia? What are the issues that continue to afflict the transatlantic relationship on defense economics, and what role do the EU and NATO have to play in making sure challenges can be met? What are the levers that the EU has to facilitate investment in defense? Shall these issues be a part of discussions in the months leading up to the Warsaw NATO summit?

Scene-Setting Paper

Key Insights: A fundamental change in the transatlantic mindset on defense issues is necessary to engage in a serious process of rationalization and coordination of security efforts at the transatlantic level.

Being Realistic About Transatlantic Defense Spending and the Need for Specialization

The credibility and relevance of the transatlantic security partnership greatly depend on its unique defense and military capacities. However, the future of transatlantic defense economy is put to the test as investment in defense continues to decline. Despite significant discrepancies between transatlantic partners, the general trend remains for the reduction of defense budgets and capabilities. NATO’s 2 percent spending target seems, more than ever, to be an unrealistic objective for most European powers, and due to the natural inflation of defense expenses, countries that have committed to maintain their defense budget at a pre-economic crisis level have in fact seen their capabilities decrease. Moreover, the lack of regional and European cooperation in explaining how these cuts would affect abilities to operate has damaged European power projection. It seems that inefficient national planning has guided political decisions regardless of the actual capability needs of the Alliance.

The transatlantic defense economy has been framed by national political interests. In recent years, this political agenda has failed to assess the concrete implications of budget cuts on transatlantic security, and notably on transatlantic sovereignty. Governments have often denied the reality of their financial constraints and continued to aim for full spectrum forces. This lack of coordination and mutualization has led to duplication of forces and suboptimal outcomes. For instance, while all European powers possess fighter jets, only six countries maintain the complete chain of capabilities necessary to run air operations. Due to irrational objectives, investments in the defense sector are eventually largely inefficient in terms of capabilities and ability to deploy forces where and when transatlantic interests are at stake. Every state chooses to specialize in the area they can afford because they lack the concept of military burden-sharing that would frame these developments. Expensive equipment like aircraft, helicopters, and satellites are becoming less and less available. As a result, concrete opportunities for transatlantic, and European, defense cooperation are decreasing and EU member states are more dependent on each other than ever. Transatlantic partners have a reduced number of compatible and collective capabilities to share, which will make the implementation
of the Framework Nations Concept even more challenging. Those states that are not able to keep up their military development are losing the capacity to take part in multilateral actions and joint EU and NATO operations. This could result in a solidarity gap: many states can only make marginal contributions, which in turn reduces their ability to shape and implement common defense policies.

This lack of coordination, at both the European and transatlantic levels, on defense spending and procurement stems from different political constraints. First, military procurement is often based on a rather excessive concern about security of supply. National governments want to favor their defense industry, which has led to protectionist measures. For instance, the U.S. market remains particularly difficult to access for European defense projects. In Europe, the deepening of the common market and European economic integration left aside the defense industries, with the noticeable exception of air defense policies. Second, mutualization of defense capabilities is still too often perceived as political suicide and makes joint projects harder to sell at all levels of their design. Indeed, any rearrangement of the transatlantic defense industrial base would have challenging implications in terms of unemployment, and therefore could entail severe political costs at the local level that risk superseding any strategic incentive. Finally, since defense economic coordination was perceived as naturally following defense policy cooperation, the difficulties of defining common strategic interests at the political level have reduced the prospects for a transatlantic organization of defense procurement issues.

Both governments and populations need to understand the sovereignty dilemma that transatlantic powers face. They can choose to be autonomous on paper and prioritize national interests over deeper integration and cooperation with like-minded partners, with the likelihood that they may ultimately be incapable of acting efficiently; on the other hand, the option of lesser autonomy coupled with enhanced capability to act, by tying national planning with active coordination with transatlantic partners on defense issues, represents a potentially attractive, if not necessary, model. Put in simple terms, the sovereignty dilemma makes a renewed case for specialization. The idea of strategic autonomy as defined in the 20th century is no longer sustainable given the current trends in the way defense budgets are structured, and may run counter to successful cooperation.

NATO and the European Union hold key roles in a future rapprochement on transatlantic defense economy. First, these institutions should focus on the quality of transatlantic defense investments rather than their quantity. New global actors such as China and India are not only increasing their defense spending, they are also getting closer to transatlantic standards in terms of capability output. In order to address this issue, transatlantic powers need to engage in a less input-oriented approach to defense spending, and increase efforts not only to reverse the trend of defense spending, but also the capabilities actually delivered by new expenditures. Second, transatlantic institutions should engage in an honest assessment of transatlantic capabilities today and those expected in ten years, and work to prevent a dramatic decline during this period. The EU could support the creation of a sustainability fund to compensate for the inflation rate of defense expenses while NATO and the EU should cooperate to implement the Framework Nations Concept that will foster transatlantic defense specialization and burden-sharing. Both organizations should also work together to further promote the integration of Sweden and Finland in transatlantic defense cooperation in the coming decade, as both countries will be critical in designing NATO's
new reassurance policy. Finally, the development of the transatlantic defense industrial base should be a priority for EU-U.S. relations. More rational procurement policies and less protectionism in national defense markets would improve the general efficiency of defense spending on both sides of the Atlantic. The current fragmentation of contracts only increases the capability gap between partners, and reduces the prospects for transatlantic mutualization of forces in the future.

**Changing the Transatlantic Mindset on Defense and Security Issues**

The Alliance is currently confronted with two existential challenges. First, its credibility and ability to respond efficiently to the Russian revisionist agenda in Ukraine will deeply influence the future of the transatlantic partnership. Second, transatlantic partners continue to reduce their defense spending despite the multiplicity of security threats in the European neighborhood. These challenges have not led NATO member-states to significantly reinvest materially and politically in their foreign and security policy. The question remains as to what would trigger a real change in the transatlantic mindset on defense issues.

The reactions to rising instability in Eastern Europe illustrate the reluctance of both the United States and European partners to fundamentally rethink their policies. Despite alarming reports, the 2008 Russo-Georgian war did not help transatlantic powers realize Russia’s ability to threaten the transatlantic community, and more specifically to the European project. This conflict did not provide the much needed lessons-learned on the risks of Putin’s chasse-gardée mindset and great power vision for Russia. Transatlantic diplomacy failed to convey a strong message to Moscow, which may have reasserted dedication to European security and stability after the war in Georgia. As a result, the use of military force in Ukraine remained a viable option for the Russian leadership, and the transatlantic partnership was eventually not able to deter the escalation of the conflict.

The question of the transatlantic mindset towards defense issues also highlights a division between the strategic community and the general public. Transatlantic leaders and publics often perceive the level of threat differently and therefore do not prioritize security matters the same way. While the Russian threat to liberal norms and the European project is generally condemned by Western societies, the transatlantic strategic community struggles to foster public support for potential solutions. Increasing defense spending and encouraging market and procurement integration would strengthen transatlantic unity and credibility vis-à-vis revisionist actions. Yet public consent for these policies remains elusive, as Euro-skepticism and hesitations to engage in what is perceived as a distant conflict have affected levels of popular support. These divisions weaken the credibility of the transatlantic security partnership and provide opportunities for revisionist powers to challenge transatlantic solidarity, notably by promoting alternative narratives inside transatlantic societies. The apparent gap between transatlantic leaders and their populations may well enable Russia to test the potential ambiguity of NATO’s Article 5 in case of hybrid warfare tactics against a NATO member state. While governments have strongly reaffirmed their commitment to collective defense principles, the credibility of such statements is openly questioned if they cannot guarantee the safety of their people. Political leaders have a lot to do before the Warsaw summit to convince the public of the need to prepare for, deter, and if necessary, respond to a Russian attack.

After a quarter century in which NATO worried little about defending its territory against Russia, this complete change of mindset, discourse, and set of capabilities will take time. The
United States has a particular role to play by showing leadership at the transatlantic level and encouraging European leaders to prioritize security issues in political debates. Putin’s recent actions in Ukraine have increased public interest in such questions and can help the European strategic community raise awareness on the threats and risks facing transatlantic powers today.

Although the Ukrainian crisis may not have triggered a long-term change in the transatlantic security mindset, the actions that have been taken to increase transatlantic military pressure in Eastern Europe should not be underestimated. Transatlantic unity has successfully passed Putin’s test; both the U.S. and European powers must sustain the sanctions and transform reassurance measures into long-term deterrence. For example, the U.S. “symbolic” military presence in the Baltic States has sent an important message and such operations should be maintained in the future. Economic and diplomatic pressures on Moscow should be increased in order to avoid being trapped in a perpetual state of negotiations, the normalization of a frozen conflict at the European border. In parallel, non-NATO members such as Sweden and Finland have a role to play in the future of the transatlantic relations with Russia. The renewed debates within Swedish and Finnish societies regarding their integration into NATO are interesting signs of the strengthening of transatlantic unity around collective defense. Finally, transatlantic partners should show solidarity with countries that are directly threatened by Russia’s strategic vision. Recent experiences have proven that soft diplomacy cannot deter Russia’s revisionist policies. Stability and security in Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia will also depend on the transatlantic powers’ ability to engage in more assertive foreign and defense policies.
While Europeans are more willing to accept the fact that U.S. engagement will remain limited for the foreseeable future, this has also reshuffled the distribution of power and influence within Europe itself. How does this affect the way Europe conducts a united foreign policy and its abilities to influence events in its neighborhood? To what extent does the Alliance’s current strategic and military adaptation affect Germany’s role as a security actor? Can and should German strategic responsibilities balance its economic power at the transatlantic level? And how would enhancing Berlin’s role in foreign policy and strategic issues influence the transatlantic approach to security challenges? To what extent do European and U.S. strategic interests overlap? Can we infer from these a clear burden-sharing policy between Europe and the United States? Is such a division of labor a desirable state of play for transatlantic security cooperation? What does this mean in terms of capabilities, and how does it affect the way NATO and the EU work on new strategic frameworks? How does this influence the balance between southern and eastern-oriented members of NATO?

Scene-Setting Papers

“What are the Prospects for a Transatlantic Division of Security Responsibilities?,” Christopher Chivvis, RAND Corporation

“Europe to Planet America: Stay With Us, But Don’t Stampede Us,” Constanze Stelzenmueller, Brookings Institution

Key Insights: Europeans need to reaffirm their strategic relevance to their U.S. allies and build the case for enhanced transatlantic cooperation in the European neighborhoods.

Explaining Ourselves to Ourselves: Europe’s Strategic Relevance to U.S. Interests

In a changing security environment, the strategic role and interests of each partner must be regularly redefined. While Europe continues to struggle with slow economic growth, the rise of populism, and general budget cuts, U.S. interests in enhancing transatlantic cooperation are called into question. The challenges and internal tensions that are faced by European powers and the EU are often misunderstood by Washington, and it is essential to reassert the mutual benefits of the transatlantic partnership.

The first misunderstanding stems from EU political fragmentation and the vulnerabilities it has created. The United States seems to have never fully comprehended the complex mechanisms framing the European project, and naturally blames European structural weaknesses for most of the continent’s lack of unity. The absence of clear European leadership also complicates the relationship with Washington, which thus perceives cooperation with the EU as often inefficient and too process-oriented. The second misunderstanding stems from the U.S. strategic community’s multiple and opposing views of Europe. The White House has shown renewed appreciation for the EU sanctions on Russia and acknowledges the European — and especially German and French — efforts for leadership, while the State and Defense Departments have constructive transactional relations with their European partners based on a shared sense of urgency. On the other hand, other actors in the relationship, notably in Congress and the think tank community, are desperate to see Europe assume more security responsibilities and question the short-term benefits of investing
in the transatlantic partnership. With the different agencies that influence U.S. foreign policy therefore expressing various levels of frustration, it is the role of all transatlantic organizations, including think tanks, to explain the strategic importance of Europe.

The successful promotion of Europe's strategic relevance in Washington also determines the issue of transatlantic division of labor. The United States considers East Asia its key strategic region in the 21st century, largely for economic reasons. The increase of U.S. diplomatic, financial, and military investments, symbolized by the so-called “rebalancing toward Asia” strategy, were designed as a geographic division of labor: while the United States focuses on its interests in the Pacific, its European partners were expected to take more responsibilities in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This simplistic vision is dangerous for the future of the transatlantic partnership for two reasons. First, the European powers need U.S. support and leadership to address the dramatic security issues in the Middle East and North Africa, and second, the United States needs a strong European presence in Asia to engage with China in the long term. Indeed, Washington should not address the question of China's emerging power at a bilateral level, but rather include its allies to discuss the integration of China in the international order.

The Need for a Transatlantic Wake-Up Call to Address Common Vulnerabilities

A successful transatlantic division of security labor requires a shared understanding of the security environment among partners. Unfortunately, both transatlantic leaders and populations have shown signs of delusion in recent years, not facing the consequences of the defense and foreign policy budget cuts and downplaying the threats that they face. The need for a transatlantic “wake-up call” concerns three issues in particular: transatlantic responsibility over their neighbors’ security, the resilience of transatlantic societies, and the lack of a long-term transatlantic vision for the European neighborhoods.

The international order is being challenged by a multiplicity of revisionisms, which are attempting to change its rules and norms. The growing tensions in the European neighborhoods and in Eastern Asia are often the concrete expressions of a deeper opposition to the international order, and should not be reduced to just local security crises. The outcome of the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East will have important implications for the future of the international balance of power. The vulnerabilities of the transatlantic partnership are therefore deeply linked to vulnerabilities of the transatlantic powers' neighbors. The Russian threat to the
security of the Eastern European countries should be seen as a threat to the entire European project, and although the United States and its European partners should work to avoid any military escalation, transatlantic partners cannot afford to underestimate the seriousness of the situation. Moreover, the discussion about Russia should not be simply framed around the question of reassurance, as it could be detrimental to transatlantic solidarity. Indeed, limiting the transatlantic response to reassuring Baltic and Eastern European countries would imply that the transatlantic partnership is divided among security consumers, who are actually threatened by Moscow's foreign policy, and security providers, whose security interests are not directly at stake.

The second wake-up call concerns the vulnerabilities of the liberal system. The future of the European project is put at risk by the lasting economic difficulties and the political fragmentation inside and among European societies. These difficulties could ultimately jeopardize the transatlantic strategic partnership due to the interconnection of transatlantic economies. Similarly, the risks of Grexit and Brexit, as well as the heated debates about German leadership in European affairs weaken the credibility of the EU as a global actor. Transatlantic partners need to recognize these issues as sources of potential defense and security problems. Structural reforms to strengthen economies and the energy market and improve the functioning of the social contract should be the first stage in enhancing the resilience and deterrence power of the transatlantic partnership. A new momentum toward more unity is necessary in order to reaffirm the transatlantic political and economic model. The integration of Sweden, Finland, and Montenegro in NATO and Norway in the EU, as well as the passage of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership could also help reinforce cohesion and send a strong message to revisionist powers.

Finally, transatlantic partners need to overcome the divergence of strategic priorities in the Eastern and the Southern European neighborhoods. The transatlantic division of labor is directly affected by the lack of common vision, especially in the case of the MENA region. Different historical perceptions of Russia and national interests have complicated coordination on the Ukraine crisis. The division between countries promoting a more assertive foreign and security policy such as Poland, Romania, and the Baltic States, who want a more permanent NATO presence, and countries such as Hungary, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, who feel less threatened by Russia and whose defense budgets are decreasing, is widening. This gap can help explain the varied efficiency of regional formats of cooperation, such as the Visegrad 4, where hard military issues make it very difficult for actionable cooperation to take place at the NATO level. Gaps also exist in the implementation of the Readiness Action Plan, with certain allies being strongly in favor of a reinforcement of its measures, leading to the permanent positioning of forces on the Eastern flank, while others desire the politically acceptable version decided on at the Wales Summit to constitute the upper limit of allied engagement. The successful implementation of the decisions taken at the Wales Summit will be crucial to bringing together diverging threat perceptions. However, the lack of transatlantic coordination is even more dramatic in the case of the MENA region. While the crisis in the Eastern neighborhood has, at least in part, united transatlantic partners around the notion of collective defense, the transactional and crisis management questions of the Middle East have remained largely unanswered. Transatlantic powers have failed to offer a comprehensive and coherent strategy to address the Syrian civil war, the rise of ISIS, the failed state in Libya, and the
spread of Islamic terrorism in the Sahel region. The United States has not been able or willing to effectively take the lead on these issues, and it is unlikely that Washington will engage more actively in the region before the 2016 elections. If the United States decides to remain on a “strategic holiday” until then, or even later, it is clear that Europeans will have to find the means to get comfortable with a different level of U.S. leadership.
It is a vital challenge for the transatlantic partnership to be able to design force structures that correspond to the challenges at hand, something that has become increasingly complex given the varying needs in the south and in the east of Europe. How can NATO and its member states develop a toolbox to respond efficiently to the fight against terrorism and ISIS in the south, while maintaining strong deterrents against Russian hybrid warfare on its eastern flank? How can NATO organize its forces in order to answer these simultaneous challenges, and how should NATO coordinate with member states and willing regional clusters in doing so? What are the existing limits in NATO’s force structure that can hurt its ability to respond, and what needs to be done to improve its readiness and deterrence? Can we imagine that NATO’s force structure will prioritize one threat over the other? Does Russian hybrid warfare and Europe’s vulnerability to it signify the need for an overhaul of NATO force structure? Who would be the main drivers of this process on the European side, and how does the planned U.S. force structure integrate itself in this planning?

Scene-Setting Paper
“Local Capacity Is the First Line of Defense Against the Hybrid Threat,” Janine Davidson, Council on Foreign Relations

Key Insights: Revisionist powers are increasingly using unconventional tactics to destabilize the transatlantic partnership, and NATO should rethink its force structure in order to adapt to contemporary threats

Enhancing Transatlantic Strategic Readiness and Anticipating Future Crises

While paradigms from the Cold War and “War on Terror” continue to frame the transatlantic understanding of the current strategic environment, the United States and its European partners need to update their strategic lenses and improve their strategic readiness in order to respond to new security challenges.

The experience of recent operations is particularly useful in highlighting the assets and drawbacks of the transatlantic security partnership, and in improving the strategic preparation of transatlantic powers for future conflicts. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission — the longest in the Alliance’s history — ended in 2014 and has provided valuable lessons-learned. The nature of this mission has given members of the coalition unique training in crisis management. Despite the renewed focus on collective security in the context of the Russian threat in Eastern Europe, the concrete practice of crisis management operations will undoubtedly benefit member states’ military in the years to come. Moreover, the outstanding combat experience of a decade-long ground operations constitutes an incomparable advantage for future transatlantic use of force. It is crucial to continue to plan real exercises in order not to lose the knowledge and interoperability gained during the ISAF mission. In parallel, NATO needs a better mechanism to collect the feedback from exercises and apply it to combat situations. Finally, transatlantic partners must also look beyond the Afghan legacy; actively studying other countries’ operational experience, especially in Africa and the Middle East, should be a priority in order to prepare any future assistance missions.

Transatlantic powers also need to invest in contingency planning in order to improve their ability to anticipate the next crises and design appropriate responses. Operational and force planning are essential tools in answering future capability and strategic needs, and in imagining the new forms that security challenges will take in the short and middle-term. Failing to develop regular scenario planning to create more predictability can hinder transatlantic strategic readiness and weaken the credibility of
the transatlantic military. Such planning should not be limited to defense issues, but on the contrary, should include political and economic dimensions. As recent operations have shown, transatlantic strategy cannot be based on multiple rapid military engagements and disengagements. It is therefore crucial to improve the sustainability of transatlantic military actions and to take into account the political costs of the use of force in democratic societies.

Finally, the tensions in Eastern Europe have highlighted the necessity for NATO to define a clear set of parameters on what constitutes military escalation and how to respond to it. For instance, the definition of what constitutes early warning can be particularly difficult in the case of hybrid warfare tactics. Transatlantic partners should be prepared for the possibility of hostile non-military actions against a NATO member, and assess situations where the use of force is pertinent. Consequently, they also need to define the situations where NATO should not be employed as a primary response. By outlining clear rules for the use of NATO's capabilities, transatlantic partners would reduce the risk of NATO-EU duplication and the multiplication of frameworks. In addition, it would help design comprehensive deterrence and reassurance policies, and sustain cooperation between non-military and military instruments.

The Evolution of NATO Force Structure to Face New Unconventional Threats

NATO is the greatest conventional force in the world and it is unlikely that a country or alliance would be able to match its military power in the near future. Enemies therefore rely on unconventional tactics such as hybrid warfare and terrorism in order to overcome their strategic disadvantage. As a result, the nature of the simultaneous threats currently faced in the European neighborhood require a reassessment of NATO's capabilities and force structure.

The use of hybrid warfare tactics often blurs definitions, and any law enforcement crisis could easily be confused with an open conflict. Improving transatlantic reactions to an unconventional attack therefore requires better police training and a strong judicial system, in parallel to enhanced military capabilities. Similarly, the struggle against corruption and human rights violations improves the resilience of our societies and prevents civil crises from emerging. Reinforcing coordination with police forces and civil defense should be a priority for NATO. Private IT security companies are likely to be the first to notice a cyberattack, and should therefore have a mechanism to alert state and NATO forces. The role of the media should also be taken into account, as hybrid warfare includes the massive use of propaganda, especially through new technologies and social media. NATO’s strategic communication needs to be more assertive in order to minimize the effects of the enemy’s propaganda and offer another narrative. The increasing impact of non-military means in strategic thinking will create new incentives for NATO to work closely with the EU.

The use of new technologies and hybrid tactics shines a spotlight on urban warfare. The distinction between homeland security and defense has become increasingly blurry, and NATO needs to intensify its training for urban operations. It also needs to clearly redefine the role of the police in case of a civilian crisis. The militarization of police forces already taking place in the United States cannot be considered a sustainable solution for transatlantic partners, and a better division of labor with military forces is necessary. Moreover, hybrid warfare should not be answered by overinvesting in technology. Better organization and better use of human capital are the keys to the unconventional threats that NATO faces today, especially in the case of urban operations.
Finally, the disaggregated nature of the conflicts in the MENA region requires a global response. NATO should acknowledge that it cannot achieve most of its objectives on its own, and stress the need for international cooperation. This requires building trust both among member states and with partners in order to avoid the multiplication of alternative frameworks. The Alliance currently suffers from a perception deficit: transatlantic populations as well as revisionist powers underestimate the political, diplomatic, and military power of the transatlantic security partnership. Strong U.S. leadership at the global level and increased transparency in NATO’s decision-making process are essential to address this issue. In parallel, transatlantic powers should be ready to think outside the framework of NATO when necessary. Recent operations such as the French-led intervention in Mali and the coalition against ISIS have illustrated the strategic interest of creating original forms of cooperation. The MENA region’s complex security environment and the difficulty of agreeing on transatlantic common objectives may reduce the added value of NATO. The Alliance can have a role to play in training local forces in the fight against Islamic terrorism, but the multitude of non-state actors involved and the unclear strategic goals of the transatlantic partnership in the region limit the scope of action for NATO there.
Prospective Analyses and Concrete Recommendations for the Future of Transatlantic Security Cooperation

All partners should acknowledge that the Russian revisionist agenda not only threatens Eastern European countries, but also the entire European project and the international order. Similarly, the lasting crises in the MENA region could lead to the political destabilization of southern European countries, and requires enhanced cooperation at the transatlantic level.

Investing more in software (routine training, exercises) would hasten the transition from peace to war if necessary and would therefore serve as a deterrent factor. In addition to these soft tools, NATO should move from reassuring allies though the deployment of tripwires to “deterrence by denial” by bolstering the denial capabilities of frontline allies, from Eastern Europe to the Western Pacific, i.e. limit options for easy revisions and increase immediate cost and difficulty of grabbing and holding territory.

Transatlantic powers should not narrow their strategic ambitions, despite the multiplicity of challenges. The U.S. and its European partners should keep the broadest possible perspective, and continue to engage with security issues in the Eastern European neighborhood, in the MENA region, and in Eastern Asia. Different levels of priorities can be agreed upon, but a strict geographic division of labor would ultimately undermine transatlantic unity and credibility. Political and financial constraints define the framework in which the United States and European powers can effectively operate, but the transatlantic partnership cannot afford to be limited in purpose and vision. The values and norms promoted by transatlantic powers at the global level can still be attractive for other societies, and encourage change in totalitarian regimes.

The difficulty in uniting European partners on common functional and geographical visions reduces the prospect for a coordinated European strategy and therefore the emergence of Europe as a credible security actor. However, these divisions should not be considered solely a European problem; the United States also has an important leadership role to play in fostering dialogue and compromise between European partners.

Anticipating potential crises with Russia requires thinking beyond President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy and focusing on the long-term evolution of Russia’s strategic interests and fears. Transatlantic partners may be more affected by the implications of a decline of Moscow’s authority than by a reaffirmation of Russia’s power on the international stage. The geopolitical stability of the Eurasian space, and ultimately the success of the transatlantic engagement with China, will largely depend on the future of U.S. and European ability to deal with a revanchist Russia. The Warsaw summit should take a broader view of deterrence, factoring in all its dimensions, from non-conventional threats, including cyber, to nuclear deterrence. The summit should also take a closer look at the Black and Baltic Seas and design regional responses, including Sweden and Finland politically.

The issue of strategic communication constitutes a perfect opportunity to enhance EU-NATO cooperation. Such discussions could be led by High Representative Federica Mogherini and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the personal level in order to build a credible tool against revisionist communication.

1 In contrast to deterrence by punishment, which threatens to inflict costs through retaliation after an attack, denial strategies dissuade a potential attacker by convincing them that the effort will not succeed and they will not achieve the benefits they hope to obtain.
Weather Reports, Defense Budgets, and Military Power

Christian Mölling

Budget Weather Reports

Since NATO allies committed to spending 2 percent of their GDP on defense, freshly released budget figures have been scrutinized and commented upon. Such daily budget weather reports are convenient to engage in “talking defense.” The 2 percent benchmark is snappy and plausible, and reminding governments to adhere to it has the pleasant taste of arguing in favor of fair burden sharing.

Unfortunately, in reality, the size of defense budgets does not say much about future military power or the defense policy choices an individual country or NATO is facing. Debating defense through budgets implies that there is a direct link between what we spend and how much military power we have. Yet it is common knowledge that defense is a money-burning activity. The story of almost every bigger procurement program is that of cost overruns, underperforming equipment, and corruption.

Thus simply spending more and hoping that, by the action of an invisible hand, money will find its way into capabilities is wishful thinking at best. As new threats and challenges are foreseen, it may even be irresponsible to limit the assessment of transatlantic defense policy to a specific figure.

The debate needs to turn from policies that follow these figures to figures that follow policies. Spending more may be necessary. Yet because resources are scarce, the essential condition is to spend effectively and efficiently, which means linking input to output.

A “Retro” Debate: The Politics of Figures

Astoundingly, discussions around defense budgets seem to be stuck along the lines of those used in the 1960s. Back then, even among defense economists, defense was considered independent from political or economic concerns, reflecting only national strategic interests. Therefore, only the budget input mattered. The historical observation during the Cold War that greater defense expenditures produce visible increases in capability added to the prevalence of such an approach. However, this is only partly true. It mainly applied to those countries in which armies and defense industries represent a significant portion of GDP (such as Germany, France, or Britain). If that portion is large enough, greater investments combined with economies of scale result in improved military capability. This logic continues to be true for the United States, which benefits from the world’s biggest internal market and the largest share of defense exports.

However, as defense has become more intertwined with other domestic affairs, defense budgets increasingly reflect the balance between three domestic factors: strategic interest, political will, and economic viability. Defense thus needs to be put in perspective. The Ukraine crisis matters as a risk, but tangible threats exist beyond military ones that Europe cannot ignore.

Moreover, the old economic argument that investment in defense contributes to national welfare is no longer true. The defence sector simply no longer represents a large enough force in national economies. Since the end of the Cold War, European armed forces and defense industries have been shrinking, and economies of scale have been replaced by steadily increasing costs for ever smaller productions lots.

Budgetary Distortions

The harsh truth is that defense budgets as such tell almost nothing about military power. Moreover, budgets can hardly be compared across time and countries. Thus, many budget assessments deliver only a distorted picture that
is of very limited use to the debate over military power or capabilities.

Indeed, NATO’s 26 European members define their national budget and accounting systems very differently, and change their systems over time. There are also many other effects that blur the picture of governments’ actual spending on defense. In some countries, defense research and procurement are partly financed from a budget other than defense, e.g. the ministry of economics. Costs for personnel can be shifted to other parts of the national budget, hiding the fact that necessary reforms in the area have not yet been implemented. Pensions are sometimes included, e.g. if the budget needs to increase, and then excluded again, such as in Germany. The defense budget can be used to subsidize other state functions. Since the Charlie Hebdo attacks in early 2015, France has deployed 10,000 additional soldiers at home to assure domestic security duties that police would normally conduct. While this has led to an increase of the budget by about €2 billion, it does not contribute to the military power of the country.

Moreover, the effectiveness of defense spending varies significantly across Europe. While there is a golden formula for spending on personnel and maintenance/procurement — a 50-50 percent split — in reality, personnel costs range from 30 to 80 percent. Especially since the end of the Cold War, defense budgets from Romania to Italy have become more important for social policy than for defense. Inflated defense personnel budgets serve primarily to generate employment in a nation’s armed forces and defense administration, instead of delivering needed capabilities.

Budgetary Realities

What matters more than daily budget weather reports is the look into longer-term budgetary realities. They identify mechanisms in, structural changes for, and future challenges to the appropriate resourcing of defense, although on very general levels.

The defense budget has to reflect economic realities; Europe still and will for the next decade suffer from the effects of the fiscal and euro crisis. Moreover, security and economy have become closely interlinked. Europe’s debts and the cascading effects of a new euro crisis could be perceived as the biggest threat to European security and global stability. How could one expect governments to increase public debt when it is identified as the greatest risk?

Estimates regarding future budgets highlight that NATO’s 2 percent target is an illusion. While some countries have announced they will spend more and a few will likely meet the 2 percent benchmark, Europe as a whole will hardly be able to increase its defense budgets by €50 billion annually to reach the 2 percent mark by 2024. These announcements have to be seen from a long-term perspective. While some countries have indeed constantly increased their budget (Poland) since 2008, there has been an overall increasing tendency among European countries to spend less. Newly announced increases are starting from low baselines (Estonia, Sweden).

Some states matter more than others: Britain, France, and Germany. They may choose different paths in 2015: either decrease defense spending and fall below 2 percent (Britain, with a projected budget of €44 billion), try to stay right on 2 percent but probably fail (France, €39 billion), or increase the budget slightly but still stay clearly below 2 percent (Germany, €33 billion). Nonetheless, these countries represent about 60 percent of European capabilities. Other Europeans who will probably spend more percentage-wise — such as Estonia — unfortunately do not matter much in military terms. To reach 2 percent of Estonia’s 2013 GDP, the government has to invest about €0.5 billion —
quite a lot for such a small country but a limited amount in terms of buying power.

Unfortunately, minimal increases matter little when confronted with yet another long-term trend called “defense inflation.” For the last 100 years, costs for defense equipment have increased by 5-10 percent annually. This marks an annual decrease of buying power that may well eat up more than the short-term budgets increases can offer.

Design to budget has become a transatlantic reality. Given the overall economic outlook, and unless there is a serious shift in prioritizing security over welfare, defense planning has to identify how much security can be offered through available resources. This is also the new reality for the United States. Sequestration means that for the foreseeable future, that country has to adapt its military forces to the given budget. This implies that the gap the United States has already left in European security may widen in the future, and that betting on the United States to fill the gap of missing EU capabilities may become ever more problematic.

**Budgets and Military Capability: A Delicate Balance, Long Term**

The close link between defense budgets and military capability only becomes visible when looking at input and output over a longer period of time. This more appropriate view is slightly more complicated, and requires a look into programs and long-term efforts to maintain forces’ readiness and assess their suitability.

There is a correlation between medium-term investment in defense and military capability. A multi-annual perspective of current and future programs and their changing costs reveals the extent to which future budgets are already bound to operate existing programs or keep up the readiness of forces.

Moreover, two important characteristics become apparent. First, procurements imply low costs in the early years, but outlays increase once the delivery takes off, followed by expenses for operation, maintenance, and upgrades. These lifecycle costs can last 30 to 50 years. Second, the costs of purchase vs. operation oscillate between 40/60 and 20/80, as a rule of thumb. Not taking these dynamics into account leads to budget overruns and cancellation of needed projects.

It is therefore difficult to define an annual budget as being too high or too low. Defense budgets are always composed of various sub-budgets, most of which feed long-planned projects and activities. Sharp increases and decreases in the overall budget are difficult to absorb and often lead to wasted money. It is neither possible to set up a meaningful procurement project overnight, nor can money be trimmed easily at any given moment.

On the contrary, hasty budget decisions create extra costs. Capabilities often involve a combination of platforms and systems. An air force is the combination of fighter aircraft, surface to air missiles, pilots, ground staff, and airfields. The challenge for military commanders is to find the most capable solution to ground enemy aircraft at minimum cost by assessing alternative mixes of platforms and systems. Once the solution is found and contracted out, any change in one element of the capability will have cascading downside effects on the others. Procurement becomes disproportionally more expensive per unit. A 5 percent cut in costs may end up meaning a 10 percent or more cut in capability terms. The same is true for budget cuts in force-multiplying elements of equipment — which is often very costly — like tankers for jet fighters. Moreover, the effect that budget cuts have on capabilities comes with considerable delay. While Germany cut the maintenance of its Eurofighters in 2010, the effects only became apparent in 2014.
Where Does Europe Put the Money?

The alternative perspective on the link between budgets and capabilities, especially in the case of NATO, consists of looking at how allies actually spend their money and examining where resources may be spent more efficiently. The future of European armed forces lies with multilateral operations, making a European view of their own capabilities necessary. Leaving the United States out of these examinations makes sense because Washington has a different level of ambition for what it aims to achieve with its armed forces, while U.S. military dominance would mitigate the marginal contributions European allies can make.

Europe suffers from capability redundancies and gaps because it is deeply fragmented. European states run many similar equipment programs and platforms in parallel. Almost every single country has its own type of armored fighting vehicle and, on average, two different types of armored personnel carriers. These capabilities are costly not only due to the production of smaller lots compared with joint procurement, but also because individual types of equipment often come with a specific supply and logistics chain, inflating the life-cycle costs.

At the same time, European allies already depend on each other. While almost every country has fighter jets, only a few have the necessary tankers to keep the jets up in the air for an extended period of time and even fewer have the electronic warfare platforms that both allow for jamming enemy air defenses and offer command and control to operations. Apart from six countries, all European powers are dependent on others in one or another area if they want to operate their planes in wartime. These dependencies will rise as we near the 2030 horizon.

Looking into European forces capability profiles, redundancies and ongoing critical specialization gaps are a costly fact of life. Freeing resources to close the gaps that NATO’s European allies show collectively can be achieved through reduction of redundancies and coordinated specializations.

Spending More, Cleverly

Spending more may well be a necessary requirement to maintain the current level of European capabilities, yet it is not sufficient. The money needs to be spent in the right areas, especially because resources will remain limited. Currently, Europeans tend to prioritize immediate spending over efficient spending. But with a missing value-for-money approach, the available level of capabilities may well be reduced over decades, compared to what can be achieved with potential extra resources.

NATO’s 2 percent target is here to stay in the political debate. However, those interested in capabilities should include the issue of efficiency in the discussions. Countries feeling especially exposed to new threats should have an existential interest in their allies not misappropriating defense budget lines. Southern and central European NATO allies should therefore lead an efficiency campaign within NATO.

Output: Deployability of Forces, Sustainability of Capabilities

Output could act as an alternative or addition to NATO’s 2 percent input goal, in order to better channel national efforts. Criteria should assess two types of output: deployability of forces and sustainability of capabilities. The two elements are linked. Deployability is about the short-term ability of allies to support common interest with forces and encompasses almost the whole bandwidth of capabilities that are required for typical NATO missions. Indeed, deterrence, defense, and crisis management all require, to a certain extent, different capabilities. Yet they all need as a basic condition the ability to deploy beyond national territory.
Having deployable forces tomorrow means not only caring about politically high-profile formations like the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, NATO Response Force, etc. but also about the capabilities these formations will consist of in the future. Only an alliance that remains capable is able to effectively share the burden of defense.

Transatlantic partners need not to reinvent the wheel. NATO already assesses deployability. Moreover, the 2014 Readiness Action Plan points to areas where short-term engagement is needed and can be successful. The important information has to become publicly available to allow policymakers and taxpayers to debate alternative choices.

On capabilities, some criteria are available. The alliance’s 16 key shortfall areas defined in 2014 offer pointers where states should direct their efforts. However, these are too complex for political communication and they do not encourage a reallocation of defense resources in the interest of the alliance. They should be translated into political criteria as easily communicable as the NATO 2 percent goal. Two suggestions are outlined below.

1. European allies should commit to increase their contribution to European capabilities in EU and NATO by 2 percent annually over the next decade. Such a commitment could take various forms. States could provide certain equipment, such as enablers, or increase the readiness of troops. This gives allies the freedom to determine how to best acquire and keep capabilities. In order to encourage efficiency, allies should also independently decide on the amount of resources they will spend on their capability contribution.

A successful implementation would improve capabilities by 20 percent over the next 10 years. This rather modest contribution by every European ally could ensure that they deliver constantly, reverse the trend of declining military power, and link national choices to the needs of EU and NATO. Moreover, such a long-term perspective takes into account that efficiency savings do not occur overnight.

2. NATO could publicly value contributions that prevent deficiencies from reaching critically low levels by establishing a public list of the top ten contributors. Some countries have gaps and deficiencies in their capabilities, while others possess considerable surpluses. Both should be compiled in a “Criticality Ranking.” A point system could honor contributions to scarce capabilities in particular. High surpluses, which indirectly signal wasted resources, would earn negative points. This would reward smaller armed forces for engaging in the specialization of important specific capabilities.

The ranking should offer a sustainability bonus to states that make an explicit commitment and designate 5-10 percent of their defense investment to compensate for the traditionally high inflation rate in this sector, thereby ensuring that their capabilities would still be available in ten years.

A European Defense Review would be the necessary starting point for such an efficiency drive. It would offer a sober assessment of the current and future European defense landscape, including opportunities for cooperation. This would foster a public debate on the defense that Europe can have and its contribution to NATO grounded in reality rather than pipedreams as well as provide indications of where already existing resources can have the most positive impact on capabilities.

While European allies have to make the main effort, the United States should not be standing
on the sidelines. Most Europeans want the United States on board. Instead of being trapped in bilateral defense relations, the United States should initiate and lead European cooperation efforts for short periods of time in view of enabling allies to substitute for specific U.S. capabilities.

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What are the Prospects for a Transatlantic Division of Security Responsibilities?

Christopher Chivvis

In the last quarter-century, the United States and its European allies have had fairly clear security priorities. In the first decade after the Cold War, Europe and the United States focused on enlarging and strengthening the sphere of democracies to build a Europe whole free and at peace. After 9/11, the United States embarked on a far-reaching global campaign against al Qaeda, which many European nations joined.

Recently, however, the task of clarifying priorities has become much more difficult. Europe and the United States both face an unprecedented array of pressing security threats that are not easily prioritized. From a U.S. perspective, the world’s three critical regions — Asia, the Middle East, and Europe — all pose major security challenges. In Asia, the United States faces a rising, nationalist China that is at once an indispensable economic partner and an implacable military rival. In the Middle East, multiple overlapping conflicts — whether Shia-Sunni, Arab-Israeli, Arab-Iranian, democratic-authoritarian, or jihadist — are creating chaos and human suffering on an unprecedented regional scale. In Europe, Russia under President Vladimir Putin has proven willing to use its still growing military strength to revise the post-Cold War settlement to conform to its own vision of Russia’s historical place and destiny, thereby creating a renewed threat to NATO and Europe’s political and economic prosperity.

Under these circumstances, the U.S. ideal division of transatlantic labor when it comes to security cooperation is straightforward: Europe should take care of its southern and eastern flank, and leave Asia to the United States. In this ideal, European states, drawing on their long experience with North Africa and the Middle East, would develop a hard-hitting strategy that combines diplomatic skill, political realism, and military coercion to set the region back on a course away from extremism and toward state-based order in which the rule of law and even respect for human rights were the norm. Simultaneously, European states would arrive at a common analysis of the Russia problem and join forces to manipulate the many levers of power and influence they hold over the Kremlin, while simultaneously bolstering the military defenses of the EU’s frontline members in ways that reassured them yet did not exacerbate a Kremlin apoplectic about the eastward spread of European democracy.

Indeed, if Europe could cover the South and the East, the United States could then do what it has been longing to do for years: focus on Asia and figure out what to do about China’s rise. Relieved of the burden of having to worry about the Middle East, North Africa, and conflict in Eastern Europe, the United States would have clear priorities. Developing a coherent national strategy would be much less contentious. A singular focus on Asia might even allow for fewer tradeoffs between bread and butter, the chance to pay for things many citizens need domestically without having to raise taxes or resort to inflationary financing.

Of course, we all know that Europe’s current state of division — even fragmentation — over the future of the European project, immigration, economics, and even the value of liberal democracy itself will prevent it from taking on any such responsibility. For Europe, accomplishing these tasks would require, at a minimum, much higher levels of military spending in addition to more adequate means of coordinating that spending; evolution of more power to Brussels and especially to the European External Action Service; far greater cooperation, collaboration, and capabilities in the intelligence field; and the underlying resources and political will to sustain this dual front war beyond the next decade.

Despite Asia’s gravitational pull, then, the United States has no choice but to work with its European allies in devising and implementing strategies to deal with the South and the East. If Europe is weakened by the anti-liberal, revisionist
forces of the 21st century, the United States cannot but grow weaker too. That is a truth at the core of the transatlantic relationship.

But how much can the United States actually handle? In Central and Eastern Europe, Washington will be hard-pressed to deploy even a few brigades to reinforce the defenses of exposed allies in the Baltics. In North Africa, U.S. intelligence assets, refueling aircraft, and special operations ground teams may be critical enablers in dealing with the long-standing problem posed by al Qaeda in the Maghreb, not to mention the self-proclaimed Islamic State group, but the United States is hardly ready to deploy ground or air combat forces in any significant number there.

Transatlantic burden sharing when it comes to the East and the South is thus the only real option. To the East, Europe will need to continue to deploy its political and economic power in a coordinated and unified manner. It would also help if Germany would deploy defensive forces of some kind to Poland and the Baltic states. German leadership on economic and political matters is helpful, but without a demonstrated willingness to connect those forms of influence to military measures, Germany — and hence Europe — may never obtain the dominance that it seeks over its difficult Eastern neighbor. Germany should be prepared to match any permanent or persistent U.S. deployments to the region. For example, if the United States contributes a brigade of combat forces to the defense of its eastern neighbors, Germany should do the same.

To the South, France has commendable ambitions to lead, but risks major capabilities shortfalls if it is forced to tackle the region’s problems alone. The United States is very unlikely to support any French operations that smack of neo-imperial ambition, but in operations on the Mali and Libya models, where U.S. interests are implicated, U.S. logistical support can again enable a French (or EU) lead.

When it comes to Iraq and Syria, the primary challenge today is one of strategy development — and perhaps timing — more than capabilities, but this will eventually change. Then European allies, including especially the U.K., which is sadly poised to further reduce funding for its dilapidated military, will need to be prepared to contribute not only with airpower, but with special operations teams, trainers, and other ground forces in significant numbers over a long term. Germany, France, Italy, the Visegrad region, and other countries must also contribute to this effort preferably through NATO, but perhaps through the EU.

In Europe itself, enhanced cooperation between U.S. and European (and within European) intelligence agencies is needed to combat both the rising soft influence of the Kremlin and the rising hard threat of foreign fighters.

These measures will not themselves be adequate. Addressing security to the East and South is a necessary but not sufficient condition for remedying these problems over the medium term. The European Union will ultimately need to reinvigorate its own state-building efforts on its periphery. Only with stronger states and more just societies can the problems that have reared their heads in the last two years reconcile with the transatlantic project, and tranquility — or something like it — be restored.

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As the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign gears up, and conflicts on the other side of the Atlantic multiply, two opposing views of what the United States should do about European security are competing for airspace in the U.S. public debate:

- **“Let’s Get Out of There”:** The United States no longer has any business being engaged in Europe’s security. It should let the (mild expletive deleted) Europeans deal with their own problems and focus on more urgent concerns elsewhere.

- **“We Have to Get Back in There”:** Europe will collapse/implode/be invaded by polite green men/the self-proclaimed Islamic State group/migrants, unless the U.S. of A takes the reins again, rides to the front, and saves the day.

Both of these prescriptions are off base. They do not even accurately describe the state of the current transatlantic division of labor.

In reality, the United States and European governments have not worked so closely together on key security issues, nor so successfully, in quite a while. After Ukraine's Euromaidan uprising in February 2014, Washington together with Berlin, Paris, Warsaw and other capitals on the continent hammered out a consensus on sanctions against Russia. Those sanctions remain in place. They had a substantial effect on the markets, and they came as a highly unpleasant surprise to the government of President Vladimir Putin. Meanwhile, NATO — the military arm of the transatlantic alliance — is ramping up its capabilities. Several European governments (including Germany) are increasing their defense budgets, sometimes to their own astonishment.

More recently, July's Iran deal concluded more than a decade of tense negotiations, after some near-disastrous failures, dead-ends, and dangerous brinksmanship. U.S., British, French, German, and Russian negotiators managed to bridge very different interests, attitudes, and expectations, and ended up playing as a tightly coordinated diplomatic tag team — a fact that did not fail to impress the government in Teheran.

Neither the current stalemate in Ukraine nor the Iran deal are perfect outcomes; far from it. But it is safe to say that in both cases, a concerted effort at transatlantic diplomacy averted war. European governments — contrary to popular misconception, at least in the United States — played significant roles, and even took the lead. Indeed, the administration of President Barack Obama gave them the space to do so. Ukraine and Iran are excellent examples of what close transatlantic security cooperation can achieve when the United States and Europe share a sense of threat. But that is also the bad news: it took the very real risk of a major conflagration involving states with nuclear weapons, and possibly willing to use them, to force the allies to focus and work together.

On the “machine room” level of policy implementation and transactional diplomacy, the state of transatlantic cooperation is actually pretty good. It is mostly pragmatic, constructive, and based on a broad set of shared interests and values. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the United States and the European Union have been developing a new appreciation for each other. Europeans have been watching with some admiration as Obama ticks off his foreign policy legacy list (Iran and Cuba recently, but Guantanamo is still work in progress), at the same time finding a much more relaxed and confident voice to talk about domestic concerns such as race. The fact that the U.S. Supreme Court rescued the administration’s healthcare legislation and acknowledged the right to same-sex marriage within a week thrilled many on the other side of the Atlantic. Feelings in the United...
States about Europe are perhaps a bit more mixed; criticism of our handling of the Greek crisis has been mostly scathing. But European governments’ unexpected readiness to stand up to Russia has left a favorable impression in Washington. As for the Iran deal, it took the United States to get it clinched — but Europeans (and a German initiative) brought it to the table in the first place.

Absent imminent disaster, however, the transatlantic record of cooperation on security risks and threats is a lot less impressive. We are flailing in the fight against ISIS, and seem powerless to stop the disastrous civil war in Syria, or sectarian conflict in Iraq. We are rooted to the ground watching a multi-tentacled Chinese foreign policy that ranges from island-building in East Asian seas to laying transport lines across Eurasia to gobbling up textile factories in Italy and the U.S. South. A Russia crumbling under its own inability to modernize and adapt to globalization is surely a daunting prospect, but one for which we appear unprepared. Our track record in shoring up states and their societies against the risk of disintegration and helping them to transform (Tunisia, say, or Ukraine) is dismal. As for the West’s most noble achievement after ending the last world war in 1945 — building and maintaining the norms and institutions that supported a liberal and open international order for 70 years — we seem today to be doing almost no building and little maintenance.

Our strategic situations are also very different. The United States, with its global remit, has no lack of urgent concerns — but none of those currently threaten its primacy in the international order, much less its existence. Europeans, in contrast, are facing a dizzying array of domestic and external security threats, the worst since the Cold War order collapsed a generation ago. The sovereign debt crisis continues to grip the continent. It has produced a festering North-South divide, with slow growth, high levels of youth unemployment, and badly managed immigration feeding a toxic compound of anti-globalization, anti-EU, and anti-foreigner populist sentiment. Russia is stoking war in Ukraine, intimidating its neighbors from Belarus to the Caucasus, and insistently probing the vulnerabilities of EU members great and small. In Northern Africa and the Middle East, the postwar regional order is crumbling, producing a mass outpouring of refugees. To quote Sweden’s former prime minister,Carl Bildt, Europe appears to be surrounded by a ring of fire. And it is not just the neighborhood, but the European project itself that is under threat.

Under the circumstances, it is hard not to have some sympathy for the Let’s Get Out of Here camp. Americans have every right to expect Europeans to do more to tackle their own problems and those of their neighborhood after providing a security umbrella for the democratic nations (and some undemocratic, but non-Communist ones) of the continent for the better part of a century. The United States has legitimate security concerns elsewhere on the globe, the largest but by no means the only one being the rise of China. Ordinary Americans are understandably tired of war, and wary of new entanglements.

Still, there are compelling reasons for the United States to stay engaged in and with Europe. Executive Summary for the Nervous, Part One: Most of our concerns are your concerns, too. Here are some examples:

- Shale gas exploitation has made the United States far less dependent on the Middle East’s oil. But Israel’s security remains a paramount interest, as does containing Iran’s hegemonic ambitions. The United States needs a stable Egypt and Saudi Arabia as allies. For all this, Europe’s diplomatic heft, its trade power,
and, yes, the weapons it supplies to allies, are critical.

- Russia's cooperation remains important for dealing with burning U.S. regional and global concerns (Afghanistan, Syria, Iran, counterterrorism). According to U.S. “realists” like John Mearsheimer or Stephen Walt, Ukraine (Russia's victim) is at best a second-order problem for the transatlantic relationship. But Moscow has violated principles — territorial sovereignty, the right to choose alliances — that go to the heart of what the West, and particularly the United States, stand for. Sacrificing these on the altar of expediency is unlikely to gain Putin's respect, or make him a more amenable partner. Sanctions, on the other hand, have (together with falling oil prices and a declining Russian economy) sent an unambiguous Western message of condemnation and increased the cost of Russia's aggression. They would be meaningless without European support, which, by the way, comes at a much higher price.

- The United States' and Europe's economies have become deeply integrated through mutual trade and investment, creating a lot of wealth and jobs. As the financial crisis showed, it also made us more vulnerable to disruptions and contagion on either side of the Atlantic. Europe's inability to resolve its sovereign debt crisis would be highly damaging for U.S. business interests, and the U.S. economy. It would also undercut any effort by Europe to carry a greater share of the transatlantic security burden.

- Last but not least, Europe shares many U.S. values and its fundamental preference for a liberal international order. Its support provides legitimacy and leverage to what otherwise would often appear as U.S. unilateralism. The United States would be strong enough to deal with a belligerent Russia and a Middle East in flames on its own. But that would be lonely, costly, and wearying. Sharing the burden is cheaper.

But the We Have To Get Back in There faction does not have it right either — notwithstanding the numerous Eastern Europeans clamoring for the United States to bring back Cold-War levels of troops and armaments to Europe. Executive Summary for the Nervous, Part Two: We need the United States to stick with us, but not to stampede us. These are the arguments:

- In case of a war in Europe, we would need massive U.S. help, and it is hard to imagine that the United States would not come to the rescue. But — like a deliberate, “Article V”-type attack against a NATO member state — it is the least likely thing to happen. Fixating on this scenario is dangerous, because it prevents preparation, and cooperation, for much more likely risks, such as the accidental escalation of a minor conflict.

- Short of major war, we have to assume the United States will not bring tank divisions back to Europe. Not only that, Europeans must come to grips with the fact that their ally might need its assets for more urgent purposes elsewhere. And even if that were not the case, they might face a reluctant or inward-looking administration, Congress, or public opinion. In sum, Europeans should not presume that the United States will continue to supply the backbone of Europe's defense in all contingencies.
• There can be no question that Europe’s states need to improve their defense and deterrence — particularly if they can no longer free-ride on U.S. capabilities. This requires, among other things, increased defense budgets and a renewed focus on hard power. The United States has a role to play by stopping harping on the 2 percent (defense expenditures relative to GDP) benchmark; simply spending more does not solve problems.

• Instead, the United States should help Europeans figure out how to develop their capabilities, use their budgets more intelligently, and how to create more common European assets and forces. That, and only that, will allow them to deter threats and defend themselves. It will also make them better allies.

• The United States should help Europeans improve the software for their hard power: intelligence, analysis, foresight, doctrines, planning, coordination. It should also help them think through how to create resilience at the national and the EU level. And, yes, Europeans have some governance and leadership problems to resolve in the EU; the United States is not helping them deal with those if it plays its bilateral relationships in Europe against each other. That is one thing one can safely leave to the Russians.

• Europeans (some of them, anyway) understand why some in the United States might want to deliver arms to the Ukrainian government. Ukrainians have a right to defend themselves against aggression. But consider that the impact of such an action will be felt by the Ukrainians and their European neighbors long before the United States ever notices it. Consult with the Europeans, and listen to them: will that scenario create more stability, or escalation?

One thing is certain: Only if Europe resolves its own security dilemmas will it ever be able to join the United States in providing stability and security on a more global level.

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Local Capacity is the First Line of Defense Against the Hybrid Threat
Janine Davidson

Introduction
The March 18, 2014 annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation was not something that could happen in 21st century Europe—until it did. Through the strategy of hybrid war, alternately called “non-linear war” or “war in the gray zone,” Russian leaders have found an effective means of attack that also frustrates conventional response. Through the combined use of military, economic, diplomatic, and criminal instruments, sheathed in a layer of fierce denial and political obfuscation, Russia has sustained an effective, year-long offensive against Ukraine. These operations have led to the contestation and seizure of roughly 35,500 square kilometers of territory across Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

In response, NATO planners have taken significant measures to improve European defenses in the East and bolster the alliance’s crisis response. While these are positive steps intended to deter Russia by demonstrating NATO’s continuing military superiority, the focus has been on conventional military capabilities and concepts of operations, which are not optimized for the types of hybrid threats Russia is presenting. NATO countries must adapt to face this threat. But adapting does not mean simply trading conventional capacity for a new force structure optimized for hybrid war. That Russia has been forced to adopt these unconventional, or hybrid methods, is testament to the power of NATO’s conventional deterrent. To remain effective in the 21st century, the world’s premier military alliance must maintain this strong conventional deterrent while simultaneously developing competence and capacity for non-traditional threats.

Understanding the Threat
That a full-scale military invasion of a NATO country is practically inconceivable is evidence of the clear over-match of NATO’s conventional military forces, which, along with the United States’ nuclear arsenal and sustained forward posture have provided the teeth of the alliance’s Article Five guarantee. Maintaining this deterrent via the pledged 2 percent of GDP military investment by all members should not be considered an option. A modern, interoperable conventional NATO force structure will remain essential, but will also drive adversaries toward other strategies to achieve their objectives. Events from Georgia and Ukraine, combined with lessons learned from NATO’s decade in Afghanistan, provide the foundation for scenario-based planning to address these emerging threats.

Early stages of Russian hybrid war have seen clandestine infiltration by Russian special forces hiding among the population to foment violence by fanning the flames of existing political grievances. Early Russian actions in Crimea focused on “bottling up” Ukrainian security in the port city of Sevastopol while simultaneously overwhelming them with anti-Euromaidan protests. The creeping invasion of eastern Ukraine, like Georgia in 2008 and Estonia in 2007, also included cyber-attacks on government and private sector networks. When Russia began its operations in Crimea, a region with 2.5 million residents and considerable Ukrainian garrisons, some analysts predicted a “second Chechnya.” The result was instead a swift, relatively bloodless victory, aided by the swift erosion of Ukrainian civil defenses and full annexation of the territory.

Improving Transatlantic Strategic Burden-Sharing

Ukrainian unpreparedness), this same stratagem could be easily employed against other countries. Baltic states such as Estonia and Latvia, where discontented Russian minorities and weak police and civil defense institutions could be exploited to achieve rapid infiltration, are particularly at risk.

NATO has initiated a number of improvements to force structure and authorities in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, including the establishment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, or “Spearhead Force” (VJTF), and creation of NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU) in six at-risk nations. While these initiatives demonstrate resolve and unity, they will only come into play once NATO leadership has made the crucial decision to respond to a crisis militarily. Given the creeping, hard-to-attribute nature of these types of infiltrations, by the time a crisis is declared and a decision is made to deploy the NATO VJTF, the political situation and the facts on the ground will have shifted considerably.

The first line of defense against such “little green men” hybrid infiltrations will likely not be traditional military forces, but rather local police, paramilitary forces, and potentially information technology workers in the targeted nation’s private sector.

**NATO’s Role in Strengthening Front Line Capacity**

The first task for NATO is to deter by denial. This means having credible conventional forces physically postured forward and in enough quantity to present a very tough fight. This is in contrast to forces stationed or garrisoned in the West, where logistical challenges ensure much longer response times — especially when combined with NATO’s decision-making process. This might have been sufficient during the Cold War, but given how today’s first battles are likely to unfold, such a force laydown ensures NATO forces will be too late to the fight. Posturing forward to defend territory, and ideally deterring attack, is preferable to having to retake lost ground, or ceding it to the enemy.

Deterring by denial means Western NATO European members and the United States need to commit fully to prepositioning equipment and forces, or at a minimum to continuously rotating forces in order to shorten the time required to respond to attack in the East. The U.S. European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), which authorized $1 billion to enhance U.S. military presence in Europe, is a positive step, but the program is funded through the temporary one-year overseas contingency operations budget, not the “base” budget. While this seems like a small bureaucratic issue, such political red tape reflects a mindset about the threat that must be overcome in all NATO capitals in order to adequately deter worst-case scenarios.

While deterring conventional attack is necessary, it also shifts a determined adversary toward a sneaky, hybrid approach. Addressing the hybrid threat requires adjustment to NATO’s capability portfolio, including an emphasis on special operations forces, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), information fusion, urban warfare, and cyber competencies. But perhaps even more critical will be the adjustments required to NATO’s mindset, its paradigms about its proper role, and its coordinating processes and policies. Given the way in which the hybrid threat evolves, starting with civil unrest and infiltration, the gap between civil police and traditional military forces must be bridged. This requires coordination, planning, and training by all sides to better integrate the civil-military missions.

NATO’s comparative advantage in such scenarios is in its conventional military edge, which can keep the conflict from escalating into a “hot” conventional war. Tactically, this is important, but from a strategic and political perspective, it may not be good enough. If adversaries
are allowed — as Russia has been in Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine — to foment unrest, sustain deniability, and change the facts on the ground by overwhelming civil security units while remaining below the line where the NATO alliance becomes activated, then NATO must contemplate how to move this line.

Moving this line means not only addressing NATO’s frustrating decision-making processes and response timelines, but also focusing on the gap between law enforcement and the military. Traditional police institutions are even less trained and ready for this threat than are our militaries. Western democracies, in response to the threat of terrorism, have chosen to enhance the tactical capabilities of their police, as the United States seems to be doing,3 or to use military forces when law enforcement is overwhelmed, as the French did after the Charlie Hebdo attacks.4 Unique among the NATO allies, Lithuania established a combined arms Domestic Support Force (DSF) in 2009, intended to “conduct domestic support operations in the territory of the Lithuanian Republic and to react to…possible threats and provocations.”5 The roughly 950-strong DSF is modeled on the NATO Response Force (NRF) and in light of the Ukrainian crisis seems quite prescient. Still, the gap between law enforcement and the military in Western societies, which is the gap that hybrid warfare exploits, is not easily closed without accepting various civil-military and democratic tradeoffs.

At a minimum, NATO should take steps now to complement its large-scale conventional preparedness with a new focus on enhancing and integrating police capability and building local security capacity. Much of this can be accomplished by pairing NATO forces with paramilitary and police units cross-nationally. This training and information exchange should focus on continuity of communications (especially under cyber-attack), information sharing across different components of civil defense, urban operations, and scenario-based planning and exercises. The integration of cheap, unmanned aerial surveillance should be explored for local policing, as should proper procedures for use of elements of the military in times of domestic crisis. Large, conventional military exercises should be intermixed with small, quick-tempo policing drills that much more accurately reflect the real threat environment and, importantly, that help develop common operating practices among various civil security institutions for responding to these threats and integrating with military forces.

Civil defense and police capacity have not traditionally been a focus of NATO, a military alliance formed nearly 70 years ago to provide a strong conventional counterweight to the Soviet Union. Yet times have changed. Hybrid threats and unconventional actors are now the principle challenges to transatlantic security, and such threats manifest in ways that circumvent traditional military advantages. Even Russia has largely ceded conventional superiority to NATO in order to invest in sophisticated hybrid capabilities. Paradoxically, because civil defense institutions provide the strongest bulwark against hybrid attack, strengthening them and integrating their practices into NATO response plans is the best way to preserve a strong deterrent and

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prevent escalation into conventional military confrontation.

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