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TRANSATLANTIC FRAGMENTATIONS AND POLICY ADAPTATION

The Security of Europe in 2025

ROSA BALFOUR, MATTHEW BRYZA, JAMIE SHEA

Please direct inquiries to:

The German Marshall Fund of the United States
1744 R Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
T 1 202 683 2650
F 1 202 265 1662
E info@gmfus.org

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About the Authors

Rosa Balfour is a senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States based in the Brussels office. This paper is inspired by the group discussion held at the Transatlantic Security Task Force meeting on December 8, 2016 in Paris and draws on ideas discussed in that context. The author is most grateful to all members of the group, but takes responsibility for the arguments put forward in this paper.

Jamie Shea is deputy assistant secretary general for NATO's Emerging Security Challenges division This paper is inspired by the group discussion held at the Transatlantic Security Task Force meeting on December 8, 2016 in Paris and draws on ideas discussed in that context. The author is most grateful to all members of the group, but takes responsibility for the arguments put forward in this paper. The content of this paper does not represent an official position of NATO.

Matthew Bryza is a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council's Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center and Global Energy Center. He is the director of the International Center for Defense studies in Tallinn, Estonia and resides in Istanbul, where he also works as a business consultant and board member of several private companies. Ambassador Bryza previously served as U.S. deputy secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia and most recently as U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan.

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Introduction

The 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw was designed around the concept of *strategic adaptation*. The security environment in which the NATO allies operate has indeed experienced major transformations in recent years, some of which was caused by transatlantic partners themselves. The lessons learned from the recent strategic surprises and wake-up calls may be contradictory in nature. One lesson is that more humility is in order, as the strategic community can seldom pretend to be able to anticipate — and even less predict — forthcoming events and crises. At the same time, recent surprises have reaffirmed the necessity for policymakers to better prepare for unexpected strategic changes, in order to use future disruptions to their advantage. Faced with a multiplicity of security challenges in the European neighborhoods, transatlantic partners have often failed to be proactive, and political leaders have been reluctant to choose either intervention or non-intervention.

Looking at three different trends and their possible evolutions until 2025, The German Marshall Fund of the United States developed a scenario-exercise, involving U.S. and European policymakers, experts, and private sector representatives, aimed at presenting a credible vision for the future of transatlantic security cooperation. After the shocks of the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump, and in the midst of a crucial electoral year in Europe, the terms of the transatlantic partnership are indeed put into question. For Europeans, the key idea is now to consider the *trade-offs* that they will have to accept in order to preserve their core interests in this new context. In the United States, the main issue concerns the attitude toward the *liberal international order* and the way Washington will support the norms and values on which the order has been built since the end of World War II. On both sides of the Atlantic, the political landscape is defined by an acute feeling of uncertainty, and many share the idea that the current period constitutes a turning point in the history of the transatlantic partnership. The following three themes have been used to consider the various strategic developments that will frame transatlantic cooperation in 2025.

> *"On both sides of the Atlantic, the political landscape is defined by an acute feeling of uncertainty."*

Central to the evolution of the transatlantic relationship, the articulation of domestic politics and foreign policy in the European realm is the first issue studied in the scenario exercise. Will the European Union be able to weather the current storm? While populist and revisionist parties increase their influence at the domestic level in many countries around the continent, the potential implications for the European project and for the role of Europe in the Alliance cannot be underestimated.

The "Russian Test" is the second theme of this vision for 2025. After the intervention in Georgia in 2008, and more intensively after the Ukraine and Syrian crises, rising tensions between Moscow and transatlantic allies led to a situation unknown since the Cold War. The election of Donald Trump may have changed significantly the terms of this relationship, which will continue to be decisive for the future of the Alliance.

Finally, the future of transatlantic military interventions is the third issue of this study. The lessons learned from recent operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, and Syria will define the way transatlantic partners — both within NATO and through ad hoc coalitions — will consider military interventions in coming years, and more generally the tools that policymakers will be able to use in order to address forthcoming out-of-area crises.

Refusing the general sense of pessimism, however, these scenarios focus on "the most positive and realistic feasible vision" for the next years. Around a series of transatlantic, European, and external variables, the following pieces develop original perspectives on possible political, economic, military, and environmental dynamics that will affect transatlantic cooperation and NATO. Read separately or as a comprehensive report, they provide insightful ideas on the challenges and opportunities ahead for transatlantic partners.

Europe Just Hanging On in 2025

ROSA BALFOUR

SENIOR FELLOW, THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES

In Brief: Success for the European Union in 2025 will mean that it has survived, still partially intact, and managing flexibly some cooperation. To do so, Europe must weather the many storms now threatening to sink it, and avoid ominous clouds on the horizon. Anything less will lead to a Europe that is irrelevant or simply past.

Some of the key factors that will determine which Europe exists in 2025 are mainly in Europe's hands, from the Brexit negotiations to avoiding the temptations of sovereign nationalism, and a new agreement on economic governance to finally stabilizing the eurozone. But other external variables, including negative U.S. policies and further economic upheaval, will also determine Europe's fate. Should these hurdles be overcome, the time will be ripe for European leaders to rethink the strengths, assets, and value of working together and to devise something different from the EU of 2017.

Security in Europe in 2025 will rest upon the ability of the continent's governments, institutions, and societies to cooperate with each other and govern their level of integration. Europe's resilience has been rattled by successive financial, economic, and political crises; negotiating the departure of the U.K. during 2017–2019 while dealing with an increasingly hostile international environment (the Russian threat and an emerging U.S. policy that could divide the EU), could unhinge stability. It is most likely that Trump will destabilize Europe and global security, but a black swan too could be imagined to swing Europe toward a constructive and game-changing reaction which could unfold after 2020 and reap benefits after 2025.

Among the possible scenarios for Europe in 2025 — the cooperation and integration carried out mostly but not exclusively through the European Union — the most optimistic one is of the EU "hanging in there." Europe manages to get over the hurdles of 2017–2019 and maintains a more or less shared policy agenda that keeps the EU alive through two- or multi-tier cooperation projects. The risks of other scenarios, such as Europe becoming irrelevant or descending into chaos due to the return of "balance of power politics," are just about avoided by muddling through. European integration does not have a new *raison d'etre*, but by 2025 political and social forces have the potential to think through a possible new deal for Europe, the EU and its citizens.

Three scenarios for 2025

Writing in early 2017, Europe in 2025 is beyond the horizon. For most observers, the 2017–2019 season is as cloudy and uncertain as can be, starting from elections in France in April–June, followed by Germany, Czech Republic, Italy, to name the first, and ending in 2019 with the European Parliament elections and new legislature in the EU. Crossing these short-term hurdles and the possible entry or confirmation into government or parliament of new actors, most with radical agendas, will be a roller-coaster.[1] While struggling through these electoral campaigns, Europe is also working through banking failures, bailout deals, budget deficits and, more generally, to prevent a break-up of the eurozone, which has been a spectre haunting Europe since 2010, unsolved due to a deep ideological cleavage on the principles of economic governance and solidarity.

Hanging-in there Europe

In the best-case realistic scenario, Europe survives the storms of 2017–19 but the EU will still look very different in 2025. There will be progress in cooperating in some fields only, driven by groups of member states, coalescing differently depending on the policy field with the aim of weathering some of the challenges posed by a difficult European and global context. Those countries less paralyzed by populist parties will cooperate on security and defense, many will agree on externalizing migration policy and strengthening the external border and may manage to weather another influx of refugees provided the numbers are not too large. Even if economic governance is not reformed due to divergent positions within the core of the EU, some of the initiatives already agreed upon manage to keep the Union floating, backed by European Central Bank interventionism.

> *"If Europeans reign in the consequences of global instability of Trump's tenure, there is hope after 2025."*

Modest buy-in from the member states, enduring nationalism and lukewarm attachment to the EU from its citizens make this progress possible through intergovernmental agreements. The institutional set-up, accountability and legitimacy of the EU will be messy, non-transparent, and undemocratic with much power in the hands of the heads of government and insufficient democratic checks and balances on the part of national or European democratic institutions.

By the early 2020s the limitations of a two- or multi-tier Europe with a messy core, a demoralized habit of cooperation, a less dynamic single market, and without its own logic of integration become more clear. Two- or multi-tier can only work if the core is governed by a quasi-federalist logic of integration, and if it is attractive and strong enough to project stability through variable arrangements with neighbors.

Frustrations at the complexity of the EU institutional architecture, the growing evidence of relative global decline, the likely failure of some populist-nationalist recipes tested through government, and the painful experience of Brexit could together create some political space for a more ambitious agenda for integration and for the empowerment of a new generation of actors committed to driving change. If Europeans rein in the consequences of global instability of Trump's tenure in office, there is hope for after 2025.

Irrelevant Europe

Europe does not collapse thanks to a fortuitous turn of events, with China intervening to prop it up, and the United States and Russia recognizing that, while a politically and economically weak Europe is in their interests, a conflict-ridden Europe is against them. Even in the niches where the EU did perform well, the institutions are hollowed out of their legitimacy. Scapegoated as the cause of the rise of populism and anti-globalism, European states have long stopped supporting the project of integration on the continent, and cooperate only when seen as meeting narrow national prerogatives. Without its own resources, and enfeebled by the British departure, the institutions retrench in roles of gatherers of proposals or technical agencies.

The EU stops shaping continental politics and policy. To many this would not be a loss. Providing NATO continues to exist, Europe will be safe. Having failed to mobilize the hearts and minds of Europeans, the EU became an elite project of the past with no recipe for the future. In 2025, Europe has two choices: become a "museum Europe," a tourist attraction for rising Asians, or the impoverishment of the continent plunges it into the "end of Europe scenario."

1 In the Dutch elections, Geert Wilders, the populist anti-EU leader of the Freedom Party gained five seats but did not manage to become, as predicted, the first party in the country.

The end of Europe

The return to balance of power politics thanks to the populist and nationalist-sovereigntist forces unleashed by Brexit and Trump brings about the dismantling of the institutional architecture governing Europe. Even Germany, the continent's largest economy, cannot withstand the challenge of the new global trends, with trade deals coming to a standstill and the euro weakened by some members defaulting. Europe is greatly impoverished, rapidly loses its status as the world's largest economy, bringing a fundamental challenge to the lifestyle of Europeans, the most educated of whom emigrate to Asia. The continent becomes divided by foreign powers, and the implosion of large neighboring countries causes massive population movements from East and South in the border countries in Central, Southeast, and Mediterranean Europe.

It soon becomes clear that fragmentation is not the reversal of integration and that the Brexit negotiations do not provide a blueprint for the departure of eurozone and Schengen members. Once states start to default and/or erect borders within Schengen it becomes clear that an orderly fragmentation is not possible, that the single market is substantially disrupted, and with the consequence of further economic dislocation.

European Variables

Against the backdrop of the numerous current challenges mentioned above, including potential banking failures, contentious bailouts, and sharp disagreements over norms of economic governance that keep the eurozone in crisis, the EU will invest much political energy in the negotiations with London for Brexit. Even without fast-forwarding to the future relationship between the U.K. and the EU, these could cause new fractures among continental Europeans, diplomatic acrimony between the two sides which could have ripple effects on their ability to cooperate in the future, and could undermine the EU financially and economically (its own resources as much as its real economy), complicating the negotiations on the EU's financial framework 2020-2027.

These upcoming events will continue to test the ability of Europe's political leadership to weather successive close-to-the-brink politics. These would be more manageable if they did not occur on a backdrop of systemic challenges that continue to erode the institutions and the consensus built up through seventy years of peace and prosperity. The populist challenge is no longer confined to a few albeit stronger anti-establishment far right parties entering government and parliaments. Mainstream political parties are increasingly tempted to embrace sovereign nationalism, drawing on a mixture of preoccupations about cultural identity, security, economic nationalism, and social welfarism.

In itself, this is undermining longstanding principles upon which the postwar Western order was built: democracy, economic liberalism, and international cooperation. The perceived risks of globalisation are giving way to a hybrid oxymoron between neoliberalism, dramatically widening the inequality gap, and a neo-nationalist political rhetoric, which, however, is not necessarily connected with the national ability to pursue public policy. Related to this is the risk of a deconsolidation of liberal democracy through the weakening of the legitimacy of the institutions supposed to represent it, media freedom undermined by law or by the market, the rights of minorities and migrants disrespected, and accompanied by trends of lesser attachment to liberal democratic values as a whole. Even if the majority of European citizens are not embracing populist nationalism, their political and social participation is no longer manifested through the traditional channels of political parties and/or trade-unionism, enfeebling their voice. Though it is difficult to imagine either a European or an EU answer to these challenges in the next few years, the EU will only be able to "hang in there" if European mainstream parties soon manage to shore up the legitimacy of their institutions and avoid the electoral temptations of Trumpism.

> *"Mainstream political parties are increasingly tempted to embrace sovereign nationalism."*

Economically, even if the eurozone does not break up, a continuing resistance to forge a new agreement on economic governance could lead to low-to-zero growth, even if some countries will do better than others, making the continent unable to compete with the rising powers and new technologies. This makes Europe as a whole vulnerable to challenges that may originate elsewhere, but that could unfold inside. The eurozone may just manage to hang together despite ten more years of low growth, but it seems more likely that a better compromise will need to be found to avoid a split and end-of-Europe or irrelevant Europe in 2025.

Transatlantic Variables

How Europe will respond and realign to the emerging U.S. divisive policy toward the continent is yet to be seen. The impact of Trump on Europe will feature in its direct policy toward the EU and its individual member states, in the consequences of its policies toward the European neighborhood, and in the reverberations of its global choices.

At the start, the new U.S. administration seemed set to tear the EU apart, by cajoling the U.K. and other Eurosceptic and/or nationalist countries to embrace a new world of competing sovereign nations, by speaking of undermining NATO and European security directly, by allowing the far right anti-EU populist parties — in line to score unprecedentedly well in the upcoming election season and to further undermine Europe from within — to imagine a global extremist movement inspired by Donald Trump.[2] Should some European states embrace Trumpism, with whatever enthusiasm, the continent would return to balance of power politics, which will ultimately destroy it, possibly through conflict.

> *"Any halting of global trade will undermine Europe's economic growth."*

Even if this scenario were not to materialize, Trump's relationships with Europe's neighbors could have far reaching consequences on Europe's unity and security. Should the United States end sanctions against Russia, EU policy on Russia will fall apart, putting Eastern and Central Europe under direct Russian threat, with ramifications on Europe's energy security, not to speak of the catastrophe for international law. A U.S.–Russia reset will also change the pattern of instability in the Middle East and North Africa, and is likely to cause a surge in refugee flows, which are already shifting toward the Central Mediterranean route where chaos in Libya is being exploited by external actors.

2 See, for example, Kate Connolly, "After the U.S., far right says 2017 will be the year Europe wakes up," *The Observer*, January 22, 2017.

Trump's policies further afield will also affect Europe. As the EU remains the world's largest trading bloc, any halting of global trade will undermine Europe's economic growth. Mounting diplomatic spats may deteriorate into forms of confrontation, for instance between the United States and North Korea, China, or Iran, or even jeopardize security in Asia (a South China Sea conflict), and Europe may be asked to take sides.

External Variables

Even assuming that Trump's administration will not endure eight years, the longer-term global trends are not without risk. Climate change is already causing natural disasters and its acceleration could provoke economic havoc in the continent or in neighboring countries, causing population movements toward Europe. Having lost a major ally in the United States, the EU may not be able to lead the environmental agenda. Demographic trends will shape migration patterns, with half the world's population growth expected to occur in Africa between 2015 and 2050 (1.3 billion people),[3] the European population shrinking after a 2025 peak, in parallel to an ongoing decrease in the share of working population and a strong increase in the average age of Europeans.[4]

These trends could have an explosive political impact as much as feed into a downward economic trend, further exacerbated by the social impact of automation and robotics, and the risk that dwindling national budgets will prevent governments from investing in research, technology and welfare sufficiently to compete with the rapid impact of technological growth and ensuing social change.

Security will continue to undermine Europe. Terrorism is unlikely to subside soon; security cooperation among European states and security agencies may increase but is likely to pose challenges to the balance between security and fundamental rights. Legislation and governance will struggle to keep up with rapid technological development, making cyber-security and defense from hybrid warfare another challenging field.

3 United Nations, "World Population Prospects," The 2015 Revision, 2015.

4 European Commission, "People in the EU — Population Projections," Eurostat Statistics Explained, June 2015. According to this data, by 2050 the U.K. will have the largest population in Europe, followed by France and Germany.

The volatile neighborhood of the European Union will continue to be made more fragile by Europe's shrinking ability to project stability. Alongside open conflicts in Eastern Europe, Turkey, and the Middle East, the space for creeping collisions in the Balkans and between the EU and Turkey is getting wider. Large countries could implode under socio-demographic pressure, for instance Russia, Egypt, Algeria, with far reaching consequences on Europe, while competition for resources is set to increase in the Artic.

The global trend toward militarization may be seized upon by the European armaments industry, possibly as part of an effort to invest in national industrial production as a means for economic recovery, with the potential side-effect of causing destabilizing arms races and vicious circles of militarization and conflict.[5]

A Decade of Muddling

As much as one can map out many of the crucial challenges, Europe of 2025 is indeed beyond the horizon. The muddling through successive crises for close to a decade has only made the scale and scope of the challenges of 2017 more interconnected and intractable. Europe's soft power, normative authoritativeness, and global attraction are being eroded by its own inability to rejuvenate itself. As the variables outlined here indicate, Europe's leaders cannot afford to miss any further opportunities to prevent worse. A failure in the Brexit negotiations, the eurozone, or managing security and relations with its neighbors could break Europe apart.

All this being said, the European project has no rivals in terms of overall success. While there is plenty of evidence of the need to rethink how European integration is carried out, the champions of why the EU should continue its experiment need to come out and drive such change.

5 Of the top ten countries that have most militarized in relation to their GDP, seven are in Europe and the Middle East. Max M. Mutschler (2016), Global Militarization Index, Bonn: Bonn International Centre for Conversion.

Russia and the West

MATTHEW BRYZA

NON-RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, ATLANTIC COUNCIL'S DINU PATRICIU EURASIA CENTER AND GLOBAL ENERGY CENTER

In Brief: How soon and how pugnaciously President Trump responds to President Putin's non-linear war against the United States an its European Allies is a key factor that will determine the picture of 2025. Trump's "Russia Reset" will likey begin in Syria, in the fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State group. European solidarity on energy security is essential to providing the geopolitical space for the optimistic 2025 scenario to emerge. But we cannot forget about Turkey and its geographic convergence of Putin's effort to reassert Russia's influence in Ukraine, Syria, and the South Caucasus.

If the transatlantic community can remain unified and steadfast in reducing opportunities and raising costs for a revanchist Russia to undermine the world's liberal-democratic system, it may be able to convince Putin and his allies and/or successor that a more cooperative approach to the West is more likely to deliver the economic growth required to preserve their hold on power than is non-linear war.

As the Trump administration dawns, it is difficult to foresee an optimistic scenario involving transatlantic relations and Russia. U.S. retrenchment under former U.S. President Barak Obama bequeathed the Trump administration and its European Allies a pair of crises in Syria and Ukraine, which Russian President Vladimir Putin is exploiting to undermine the post-World War II international order led by the United States. President Trump seems to be serving as Putin's unwitting accomplice, convinced he alone holds the key to establishing a new era in U.S.–Russia relations, which will begin with a deal on Ukraine (cut above the heads of the Ukrainians) and cooperation against Islamist extremism, especially in Syria. Rather than embracing Trump's desire for a strategic shift, however, Putin will exploit it, using temporary rapprochement with the United States as a tactical tool of an unchanging strategic approach that designates — and requires — the United States as Russia's primary enemy.

Once he realizes Putin has tried to manipulate him, Trump will react with fury and seek to impose serious costs on Russia. At this point, the transatlantic community could enter a period of peril, with the United States and Russia potentially stumbling into armed conflict through miscalculations and Europe becoming alienated from a pugnacious Washington. On the other hand, if the United States and its European Allies can maintain solidarity and then weather a period of acute tension with Russia, the leader of Russia (e.g., Putin or a successor) may be compelled to change strategic course and seek a more collaborative approach with the transatlantic community as a matter of both economic necessity and political survival.

What Success in 2025 Looks Like

In the optimistic scenario, miscalculations were avoided and the transatlantic community's relationship with Russia could be defined by the following factors in 2025:

- The Ukraine crisis has de-escalated following a deal cut between Trump and Putin early in the Trump administration — Moscow formally recognizes Donbass as part of Ukraine and Washington acquiesces to Russia's annexation of Crimea;

- Transatlantic unity is restored and reinvigorated in response to Putin's aggressive effort to exploit Trump's desire for cooperation following the Ukraine deal;

- Russia has been deterred from posing an imminent military threat to the Baltic states but continues meddling in regional business and politics;

- The Kremlin is unable to use natural gas as a political tool to divide Europe and intimidate EU member states, thanks to a combination of the EU's successful implementation of its Third Energy Package and the emergence of liquid natural gas (LNG) as a competitor to piped gas;

- Moscow's influence in Syria is limited, though Assad remains in power and ISIS is defeated, given Russia's economic weakness and lack of experience in stabilizing and rebuilding war-torn countries, as well as Turkey's "safe zone" in northern Syria, which hems in Russia's military presence.

Though theoretically plausible, this scenario for 2025 seems highly optimistic in 2017, and requires major developments to fall into place in the United States, Europe, and outside the narrow transatlantic community (in Russia, and in Turkey). The opportunities for missteps and miscalculations are numerous, but four factors will be key to reach these achievements in the next ten years. Washington's response to Putin's hybrid aggressions will need to come soon enough and be strong enough (but not too strong). Europe will have to find a unified strategic vision toward Moscow. In addition, Western "success" also depends on managing Turkey's drift and on Russia itself, in particular its investment needs.

The Transatlantic Variable

The key transatlantic determining factor is how soon and how pugnaciously President Trump responds to Russian President Putin's non-linear war against the United States an its European Allies.

The first months of the Trump administration have not manifested a discernable policy toward Russia, which is likely complicated by the scandals surrounding Russia's involvement in Trump's election. Even in the best of circumstances, some missteps and shifts will be unavoidable. However, the positive scenario in 2025 will depend on Washington shifting to a clear and firm position toward Moscow within the next few years. One can imagine, however, a meandering path to this point, one that begins with some attempts at deal making.

"With Moscow and Washington working together, ISIS will be defeated on the battlefield and its caliphate will collapse"

Like his three immediate predecessors, Trump will initially find common ground with his Russian counterpart, believing he is the great communicator who can generate an historic breakthrough in U.S.–Russia relations. Trump's "Russia Reset" will begin in Syria, proceeding from his prioritization of the fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State group and Islamist terrorism above all other foreign policy objectives. Putin will welcome Trump's transactional approach to international relations devoid of the high moral principles historically at the core of U.S. foreign policy, and recognize the opportunity it affords him to achieve his objectives in Syria: prevent a popular uprising from ousting an authoritarian leader; de-isolate Russia following its invasion of Ukraine; and bolster Moscow's renewed geopolitical influence in the Middle East.

With Moscow and Washington working together, ISIS will be defeated on the battlefield and its caliphate will collapse early in the Trump administration. The United States and Russia will agree on a managed political transition in Syria according to which Assad remains in place long enough for Putin to claim regime change was not an outcome of an unconstitutional political process.

Putin may then seek to parlay his improved geopolitical standing in Syria into a face-saving way to stand down in Ukraine. It has been clear since mid-2014 that the Moscow-supported separatist movement in eastern Ukraine's Donbass region did not receive the wave of popular support among local residents that Putin expected. Putin has recognized that Donbass's integration into Russia is politically, militarily, and economically infeasible. Meanwhile in the early months of his administration, President Trump is likely to accept a face-saving deal with Putin on Ukraine. Since mid-2016, Trump has suggested his possible acceptance of a bilateral accord to which Washington would recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea and lift Crimea-related sanctions in exchange for unspecified concessions by Moscow. If that concession was Russia's ending of its support for rebels in eastern Ukraine, both Trump and Putin could declare victory.

After the New Partnership Sours

The Trump–Putin partnership, however, will be relatively short-lived. In Syria, even after the United States and Russia successfully cooperate to defeat ISIS, the Islamic State's remnants and successor groups will sustain a campaign of terror and insurgency. Lacking political legitimacy, Assad will fail to re-establish his authority beyond Damascus and northwest Syria, (where Russia's military bases are located); and Moscow will prove to be an unwilling and unworthy partner in stabilizing and reconstructing Syria, given Russia's economic weakness and lack of experience in quashing instability except when relying on brute military and economic force. Hence, Syria will remain in disarray, and the Trump-Putin partnership will fray, leading to mutual finger-pointing and distrust.

Beyond Syria, Putin will inevitably overplay his hand, misinterpreting Trump's goodwill as a sign the new U.S. President is naïve and exploitable. This is how Putin reacted to Obama's "Russia Reset" policy, taking advantage of the show of goodwill by the United States during 2009–2014 to conduct perhaps the largest offensive military buildup[1] in northwest Russia in peacetime history. Post Obama-reset Moscow developed additional capabilities that allow it to carry out a conventional forces assault against the Baltic states and Poland with virtually no warning; deny NATO access to the airspace required to reply to an assault on a fellow Alliance member in the region; and hit strategic targets from southern Poland to central Finland. Putin will similarly misinterpret a deal on Ukraine as a sign of Trump's exploitability and will pocket a Ukraine agreement as a major gain in the "hybrid" or "non-linear" war Russia has been waging against the United States and its European Allies.

> ***"The 2025 picture will depend, as well, on how Washington adapts to this unconventional warfare."***

The 2025 picture will depend, as well, on how Washington adapts to this unconventional warfare. Russia's national security doctrine proceeds from its designation of the United States as Russia's "main enemy," who heads a liberal-democratic order that runs counter to the interests of Putin's illiberal regime. In its January 9 unclassified version of its report[2] on Russia's hacking of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the U.S. intelligence community thus concluded,

> "In trying to influence the U.S. election, we assess the Kremlin sought to advance its longstanding desire to undermine the U.S.-led liberal democratic order, the promotion of which Putin and other senior Russian leaders view as a thereat to Russia and Putin's regime."

The set of tactics Russia is employing to pursue this strategic objective is "non-linear war." This concept[3] was explained by Russia's top military officer, Chief of the General Staff of General Valery Gerasimov in the February 27, 2013 edition of the Russian journal Military-Industrial Courier. Gerasimov postualtes,

1 Kaarel Kaas, "Russian Armed Forces in the Baltic Sea," *Diplomaatia*, June/July 2014.

2 U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Background to "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections": The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution*, January 6, 2017.

3 Mark Galeotti, "The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russia Non-Linear War," *In Moscow's Shadows*, February, 2013.

"In the 21st century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template."

Russia's invasion of Georgia seven and a half years earlier could be seen as the launch of non-linear war. That military operation followed nearly five years of informational warfare operations aimed at undermining Georgia's authority over its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; a cyber attack followed in the days immediately preceding Russia's kinetic attack. Drawing on this experience in Georgia, Gerasimov explains, "The very 'rules of war' have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness…." He thus calls for

> *"Russia's top soldier has thus laid out the playbook for Russia's tactics in pursuit of undermining the U.S.-led liberal-democratic order."*

"… the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures — applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population … [and] … supplemented by military means of a concealed character … with the open use of forces often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation … primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict."

Russia's top soldier has thus laid out the playbook for Russia's tactics in pursuit of undermining the U.S.-led liberal-democratic order. The hacking of the 2016 U.S. presidential election is one element of this struggle, as will be similar efforts to effect upcoming elections in the Netherlands, France, and Germany. In addition to cyber attacks, Russia will employ "fake news" and propaganda on its state-run television stations RT and Sputnik. Gerasimov and Putin are fighting this non-linear war to win, and will not alter their strategic objectives even if Presidents Trump and Putin establish a positive personal relationship. In 2017, an adequate response and defense seems far off, but this will need to change before 2020.

At some point during the first few years of the Trump administration, Putin will push too far in his conduct of non-linear war, just as he did with President Obama during the "Russia Reset." Trump's response will be characteristically pugnacious, perhaps more than Putin may anticipate. This could lead to an action-reaction escalatory cycle of tension, which, if left unchecked, could devolve into economic, political, and even military conflict.

At the same time, Trump's harsh reaction to Putin's attempt to exploit U.S. goodwill risks undermining transatlantic solidarity should it come too late or too belligerently. If it takes too long for Trump to appreciate the strategic value of NATO and the EU, Trump risks undermining the credibility of Western deterrence, which will embolden Russia and thus increase the risk of military confrontation. And, an overly emotional response by Trump could alienate NATO member states like Italy, Hungary, Slovakia, Turkey, France, and even a post-Merkel Germany, which favor a softer line toward Russia. It is therefore essential for Trump to evolve similarly to the way Obama did following the failure his "Russia Reset" policy: in a sober spirit, Trump will need to rebuild a transatlantic consensus to impose political, economic, and military costs on a revanchist Russia.

The European Variable

A positive 2025 outcome will not be possible without transatlantic consensus, but consensus within Europe is equally essential. This key European variable to achieving the above scenario is that that Europe maintains its unity of strategic vision and action to counter Russia's non-linear warfare.

For years, Putin has been encouraging the forces of political fragmentation in Europe, relying on webs of business and financial ties, especially natural gas supplies, to create exploitable dependencies among European business and political leaders (witness Russian oligarchs' use of the City of London to safeguard their licit and illicit finances and former German Chancellor Schroeder's employment by Gazprom and the Nordstream pipeline, and the loan offered to Marine Le Pen's National Front). Money has thus become an element of Russia's information warfare.

Simultaneously, Putin has used military intimidation in Europe's north and south to try to break Europe's strategic resolve. Russia's approach, dubbed "anti-access, area denial" (A2AD), aims to project a sense of military superiority on NATO's flanks to make key regions appear indefensible against a determined Russian adversary. Such military posturing is a key element at the heart of non-linear war. In the north, Russia is striving to develop A2AD in the Baltic Sea region by deploying the offensive military capabilities noted above, repeatedly violating the airspace of NATO members and partners, and even simulating nuclear attacks on Stockholm and Warsaw. These actions are probes of NATO's resolve to resist Russian aggression. Left unchecked, Putin might at some point feel tempted to test NATO's Article 5 pledge of collective security by fomenting a political-military crisis in eastern Estonia or Latvia, likely including ambiguous and limited military operations (e.g., seizing a few communications and transportation nodes) by unidentified troops against the backdrop of political turmoil fomented by Moscow.

> *"European solidarity on energy security is essential to providing the geopolitical space for the optimistic 2025 scenario to emerge."*

If the government of one of these NATO member states invoked Article 5, several other NATO members may balk at going to war — potentially on a nuclear level — with Russia. If this were to occur, NATO's credibility would be destroyed. Fortunately, NATO's troop deployments to the Baltic States and Poland approved at the Warsaw summit sent a clear signal to the Kremlin that the Alliance's commitment to collective defense remains steadfast. NATO must now go further, in an unbending spirit of transatlantic unity, to re-examine its nuclear deterrence doctrine in light of Russia's declared doctrine of "escalate to de-escalate," (e.g., to employ nuclear weapons early in a military conflict to compel NATO to back down). This Alliance approach must also be coordinated with the national nuclear forces of France and the U.K. And, NATO's European members must deter Russian aggression in Europe's information space — especially during national elections — by developing offensive cyber security capabilities.

European solidarity on energy security is also essential to providing the geopolitical space for the optimistic 2025 scenario to emerge. During much of the past decade, the EU has made significant progress in protecting itself against Russia's use of natural gas supplies to intimidate or co-opt individual member states in a divide-and-conquer approach. EU member states must now fully implement the Third Energy Package to bolster commercial competition, increase the inter-connectivity of Europe's natural gas pipelines, fully integrate the Baltic States into the EU's natural gas and electricity networks, and eventually establish a single and unified European energy market. The European Commission can also encourage voluntary regional coalitions of large natural gas purchasers, both state owned and private, to pool their negotiating leverage to secure long-term and low-cost supplies of liquid natural gas; this approach will help them develop a more balanced and therefore productive long-term relationship with Russia, which in turn will reinforce the EU's broader effort to establish a single and unified European energy market. Finally, it will also be important for EU member states to maintain solidarity with each other by opposing both the Nordstream 2 and Turkish Stream natural gas pipelines (just as the EU blocked Gazprom's analogous South Stream pipeline in 2015), which aim to perpetuate Gazprom's dwindling monopoly power in Europe.

Do Not Forget Turkey

Turkey sits at the geographic convergence of Putin's effort to reassert Russia's influence in Ukraine, Syria, and the South Caucasus. Thus, Turkey is another crucial variable in determining the state of Russia and Europe in 2025.

For the next several years, Moscow will continue the effort it launched during in 2014 to peel Turkey away from the transatlantic community. This effort included facilitation of large-scale imports of Turkish agricultural products to replace EU products the Kremlin banished in retaliation for the EU's Ukraine-related sanctions; it has also included promotion of the Turkish Stream pipeline to bypass Ukraine and obstruct full realization of the EU's Southern Corridor, which will deliver an alternative supply of natural gas to the EU from Azerbaijan. The period of turbulence that followed Turkey's downing of the Russian Su-24 fighter in November 2015 has now passed, and Moscow is again courting Ankara on Turkish Stream as well as an alternative peace process for Syria that initially excluded both the United States and the UN.

The Kremlin is also using information warfare to split Turkey from its transatlantic Allies. This includes "fake news" stories about how the U.S supposedly knew about the July 15 coup attempt and could have stopped it, but that Russian intelligence saved the day by delivering crucial information to Turkish counterparts as coup operations were underway. And, all this is occurring at a moment when the EU's ties with Turkey are fraying over the Turkish Government's extensive political purge following the attempted coup of July 15.

"Such a safe zone, defended by NATO, would also help limit Russia's military influence in Syria to the country's northwest."

Keeping Turkey firmly anchored in NATO and in sync with the EU's strategic objectives on Syria, Ukraine, and energy security will be essential to eliminating temptations for Putin (or his successor) to succeed in their non-linear war and make the 2025 optimistic scenario would be unrealizable. This will require Europe to look beyond its concerns about President Erdogan's growing accumulation of power, which will likely continue as long as he is on the political scene, and embrace Turkey as a strategic partner.

A key starting point would be accepting Ankara's longstanding proposal to establish a safe zone in northern Syria, which would provide a location for Syrian refugees to rebuild their lives inside Syria while preventing Kurdish militants affiliated with the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) from establishing a political entity that could become contiguous with analogous state-lets in Iraq and eventually even in Turkey. Such a safe zone, defended by NATO, would also help limit Russia's military influence in Syria to the country's northwest, where its naval base at Tartus and airbase at Latakia are located. This sort of containment of Russia in the Middle East will reverberate throughout the transatlantic space, making it easier to channel Moscow's ambitions toward the optimistic 2025 scenario.

With Turkey and NATO and circumscribing Moscow's room to make military mischief in Syria, and gas supplies no longer available to Russia as a geopolitical tool, Turkey and Russia might be able to work together to counter ISIS and its successor groups, perhaps together with the United States.

The Russian Determinant

If the transatlantic community successfully weathers Trump's harsh response after awakening to Putin's non-linear war, energy supplies could become a non-military and non-ideological way for Russia and the West to compete, and to cooperate as well, with U.S. and other international oil companies providing Russian counterparts access to the technology they need to develop the vast hydrocarbon reserves in Russia's Arctic region. Such a collaborative outcome would depend on a key external variable: whether the Russian leadership seeks Western technology and investment to modernize Russia's economy.

Today, President Putin continues to claim Western sanctions — including restrictions on exports of Western technology to Russia — are having no discernible impact on the Russian economy. But, this is untrue. Russian oil companies urgently need the technology developed by their U.S. and European counterparts to unlock the enormous volumes of hydrocarbons in Russia's Arctic region. And, the Kremlin's effort to decree technological innovation at the high-tech center of Skolkovo outside Moscow is a failure.

In reality, Vladimir Putin realizes his regime is unable to sustain the improvements in living standards that have earned the Russian people's acquiescence to his authoritarian and kleptocratic rule. As Russian economic growth has slowed under the weight of low oil prices and Western sanctions, Putin has had to rely on Great Russian nationalism and grandiose gestures such as annexing Crimea to sustain his grip on power. Presumably, Putin understands that he cannot rely indefinitely on national chauvinism alone to sustain his rule. And this, in turn, will require Western investment and technology.

In conclusion, if the transatlantic community can remain unified and steadfast in reducing opportunities and raising costs for a revanchist Russia to undermine the world's liberal-democratic system, it may be able to convince Putin and his allies and/or successor that a more cooperative approach to the West is more likely to deliver the economic growth required to preserve their hold on power than is non-linear war.

The Future of Interventions

JAMIE SHEA

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL, EMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES, NATO

In Brief: To condemn interventions as an exercise in futility is too facile. The debate does not seem to be one of "to intervene or not to intervene" but how to do so. Many of NATO's southern Allies would like a better balance between defense in the East and defense vis-à-vis the South. Whether transatlantic mini-interventions can find success, will depend on how well they employ diplomatic tools.

The Allies will have to manage to use flexible formats and not try to use NATO or the EU for everything, especially where this could damage these institutions and divert them from their essential tasks. NATO and the EU will need to work more closely together and in the same places, to make any new intervention strategy effective. After a decade in which interventions have been too conveniently dismissed as wars of choice, we need again to convince our publics that they are wars of necessity.

Interventions have had a bad press of late. President Trump has declared that the United States intervention in Iraq in 2003 was a "catastrophe," and British public opinion has recently learned the results of the multi-year Chilcot enquiry into the decision of Prime Minister Blair to take the U.K. into the same Iraq conflict. This investigation exonerated Blair from acting illegally but was still highly critical of the decision-making surrounding the British intervention and the fraudulent basis on which the Iraq campaign was sold to public opinion. Iraq and Afghanistan have become bi-words for the futility of interventions: a sense that thousands of soldiers' lives and billions of dollars have been wasted in the elusive quest for nation-building. Court cases against individual soldiers for acting illegally and regular reports by government inspectors, such as the U.S. SIGAR agency, into mismanagement and corruption in reconstruction projects, have contributed to the mood of cynicism, as has the way that Iraqi and Afghan forces have failed to overcome greatly inferior Taliban or ISIL forces, despite billions of dollars in training and equipment.

Yet to condemn interventions as an exercise in futility is too facile. For one thing, it ignores a previous record of relative success of interventions in the 1990s. Those by NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo or by the United Nations in El Salvador, Mozambique, or Cambodia really did achieve good results. They were not perfect or free of collateral damage, as no intervention can ever be; but they did help to stop the violence and bring the conflicting parties to the table to map out viable political frameworks. Academic studies, for instance by the U.K. think tank Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), have demonstrated that over 60 percent of interventions can be classified as relatively successful and UN research has shown that three out of five countries that have experienced UN Blue Helmet operations do not relapse into violence. At the same time, Syria has brutally underscored that a refusal to intervene by Europe or North America can make the violence massively worse, with nearly half a million dead and 14 million displaced persons; and this conflict has also produced a migration crisis into Europe which can destabilize the foundations of the European Union. The vacuum has been filled by others, notably Russia and Iran, with no vocation to achieve an equitable political outcome for all the parties concerned and making the prospect of long-term violence more likely. Moreover, if we allow Russia to throw its weight around in Syria with impunity, what consequences will this have for Russia's behavior in Europe or more globally? Not intervening does not seem much of an option either. In truth, Europe and North America have no choice but to be involved on the ground in some way or another to support the forces that represent our interests. Thus, President Obama left office with 15,000 U.S. troops still in the Middle East, nearly five thousand of them in Iraq and even 500 in Syria, together with an active campaign of air and drone strikes against ISIL and Al Qaeda, stretching from Libya to Yemen. Consequently, the debate does not seem to be one of "to intervene or not to intervene" but how to do so. If we have heard a lot from the many critics of Iraq and Afghanistan, are these critics being truly fair and is there such a thing as a smart intervention which would allow us to achieve a better return on investment in the future?

There are three possible scenarios for North America and Europe:

1. The first is isolationism. At first sight this may appear the strongest, as it corresponds to the current mood of disenchantment with interventions and the sense that NATO's armed forces should be focused first and foremost on collective defence at home, given the urgency of deterring Russia in Eastern Europe following Putin's illegal annexation of Crimea. If Europe in particular is to rebuild its heavy armor and state-to-state warfare capabilities, it should not, in this view, squander precious resources on out-of-area deployments. This scenario also corresponds to a zeitgeist that calculates much more precisely and narrowly the national interest, before engaging military forces, and seeks to shift the burden as far as possible on to others, rather than take the lead oneself. President Trump's invocation of "America First" has its followers in Europe too, particularly among the populist parties who tend to conceive security in terms of building barriers and keeping people out, rather than intervening overseas to solve problems at their source.

2. A second scenario could foresee a return to the golden age of interventions in the 1990s and first decade of this century. Although this may seem unlikely at first sight, the pendulum in international relations does tend to go from one end to the other, as today we are focussing more on the consequences of not intervening. As building walls and keeping people out are seen not to protect us from threats which will find a way of getting through, and we understand that there is no alternative to helping the countries of North Africa and the Middle East to stabilize internally if we are to prevent constant flows of migrants across the Mediterranean, public opinion could once again accept the need for more overseas troop deployments and even the sacrifices these will bring. In his first week in office, President Trump carried out his first operation using Special Forces in Yemen in which a U.S. soldier was killed. In early April, he launched 59 cruise missiles against an air base in Syria to punish Assad for again using Sarin nerve gas against civilians — this time in Idlib province; and he has also dispatched a carrier strike force to the eastern Pacific to take up station off the coast of North Korea. It is also impossible for Western leaders to allow ISIL or Al-Qaeda to establish unmolested caliphates from which they can plan and direct terrorist operations against Europe and North America, as well as terrorize the local populations. So "never say never" as it were.

3. Whenever two opposing scenarios are discussed, there is always a third that emerges, which is something in between. Thus a third scenario could be one of selective interventions — and this may be the most optimistic but also realistic scenario. Russia has demonstrated, albeit in a negative and destructive way, that significant results could be achieved from even a very limited use of force in Syria, especially when Russia has no pretension to rebuild the country or achieve a lasting political settlement. But Russia's air campaign in favor of President Assad has certainly given the lie to the theory that force could not achieve results. Equally, the NATO countries have already mapped out a kind of half-way house

interventionism in the form of defence capacity-building operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, and most likely Libya in the near future. Where specific threats have emerged to individual countries, such as Mali and the Sahel to France, or Kurdish extremism to Turkey in Northern Iraq, they have not hesitated to intervene and with a lasting commitment. Moreover, President Obama left office having carried out four times as many drone strikes and in a larger number of countries than his predecessor George W. Bush. Decapitation strikes are no lasting solution as leaders are always replaced; but they certainly help to keep our terrorist adversaries off balance. The shift may now be on training local forces to maintain order and fight insurgents, more than on the NATO countries taking sole responsibility themselves; but North Americans and Europeans have also learned that these local forces cannot be created overnight and often will not fight effectively unless mentored and accompanied on the battlefield by Western personnel. Where they fail, such as the Afghan army losing control of Kunduz, Westerners have no choice but to step in and do the job themselves. They also recognize that success will require a long-term commitment to the country by the West in order for the local forces to be motivated to perform well. So even if major interventions are unlikely, we are likely to see more of this mini interventionism in more places and building up step-by-step in the years to come. None of the instabilities in North Africa and the Middle East will resolve themselves in our favour if we stand aside and watch wars burn, or by leaving it to Russia, Iran, and their proxies to do the job for us.

"The shift may now be on training local forces to maintain order and fight insurgents, more than on the NATO countries taking sole responsibility themselves."

Although President Trump has expressed caution regarding more U.S. boots on the ground in Muslim countries, he has also committed to destroying ISIL and eradicating Islamist terrorism in general. This aim seems hardly feasible without more U.S. commitments in the Middle East, although we are still waiting to see if these can be done in cooperation with Russia. This would require Russia to play a much more overt role against ISIL than it has shown so far and also to distance itself from Iran which has been its objective ally in Syria and in the recapture of Aleppo. After the U.S. cruise missile strike, such U.S.–Russia cooperation looks far less likely, the price being U.S. acceptance of the continuation of the Assad regime, and no doubt desisting from further strikes. At the same time, President Trump is calling on NATO to do more in fighting terrorism if the Alliance is not to be "obsolete." At the time of writing, it is still not clear exactly what the United States will ask NATO to do beyond the current training and defense capacity-building missions or perhaps more Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACs) support for the anti-ISIL coalition, but NATO is reviewing the options so as to be ready to respond at least in part.

European Variable

Many of NATO's southern Allies would like a better balance between defense in the East and defense vis-à-vis the South. A smart mini-intervention strategy will entail European countries to commit to the South, as well as the East, not just in rhetoric but with similar military levels of engagement and resources. In return for committing their forces to NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence in the East, they expect Poland, the Baltic States, and other Allies to send their aircraft, Special Forces, and trainers to EU-led missions and the anti-ISIL Coalition in the South. They have asked NATO to develop a framework for the South, which was presented at the Defense Ministers meeting in February and this includes the proposal to establish a hub in NATO's new command structure, to be located in Naples, which will work on situational awareness and contingency planning for NATO operations in the region. The Alliance has already established Operation Sea Guardian to increase its maritime presence in the Mediterranean and to link up better with the riparian countries. NATO is working with Frontex, the EU border agency, to monitor flows of migrants across the Aegean between Turkey and Greece and is supporting the EU's Operation Sofia off the coast of Libya. It has also offered to support the EU and Libya with coastguard training and can play a larger role if Libya would allow NATO and the EU to operate in its territorial waters. There are plans too to help Libya on the ground in revamping its armed forces, controlling its borders, and rebuilding its Ministry of Defense. The request to both organizations has now been sent by Libyan Prime Minister Sarraj but no concrete planning for a mission or indication of scope and timelines has so far emerged in Brussels.

Transatlantic Willingness

All of this suggests that NATO cannot see its engagement with North Africa and the Middle East purely as a partnership arrangement but will have to involve its military command structure much more in long-term training and capacity-building missions, and also better utilize the political will and resources of local partners as well. For instance, a training center has recently been established in Kuwait and the Alliance is re-establishing a training presence for the Iraqi armed forces in Bagdad.

The obvious questions are whether the Allies will be prepared to devote sufficient manpower and resources to making these capacity-building missions successful, particularly at a time when they are under pressure to establish four armored battalions in Eastern Europe and spend resources on re-equipment, infrastructure, and modernization. Also, will NATO and the EU, who agreed at the Warsaw Summit on a Joint Declaration to cooperate on security challenges in and around Europe, be able to establish a real dialogue on how they can divide up tasks and achieve more synergy in their respective capacity-building missions across the region? Finally, will President Trump be content to have NATO focus essentially on training projects, or will he want the Alliance to take on a more kinetic role in combating ISIL and other terrorist groups, for instance through the use of special forces commanded by NATO or the establishment of NATO military headquarters as planning and operation hubs in North Africa and the Middle East? So far the contribution of the Alliance to the counter-ISIL coalition has been limited to AWACS aircraft flying from Turkey.

Longer Term Factors

There are a number of broader considerations that will determine the success of a mini-intervention scenario. The Allies will have to manage to use flexible formats and not try to use NATO or the EU for everything, especially where this could damage these institutions and divert them from their essential tasks. There will always be groups or countries that share a greater interest than others in dealing with a particular region. NATO can often be the tool box whose procedures and interoperability can help these coalitions of the willing to act together, as with the air operations currently underway in Iraq as part of the anti-ISIL coalition. Coalitions, like alliances, depend on good bilateral relationships and in this respect France and the United States will need to continue their cooperation in the Sahel or Djibouti, and the U.K. and France will need to continue to work on expeditionary forces after Brexit.

A second factor is more diplomacy and more influence on local politics. Whether transatlantic mini-interventions can find success, will depend on how well they employ diplomatic tools. The interventions in the Balkans worked well because NATO did not only deploy forces on the ground but also was constantly negotiating with the local leaders to persuade them to cooperate and to take the decisions to make their new institutions work. Arguably, there was too little political pressure in Iraq and Afghanistan and this is one of the reasons why stabilization moved so slowly. Of course, diplomacy is not always pleasant or clean and we will have to accept less than optimal outcomes, dealing with people we do not particularly like. But these agreements conserve our interests and they are better than the alternative: chaos and violence. Equally, we may have to try to contain conflicts in the first instance before we can try later on to pacify them.

> ***"Whether transatlantic mini-interventions can find success, will depend on how well they employ diplomatic tools."***

NATO and the EU will need to work more closely together and in the same places, to make a new intervention strategy effective. A decade ago, we had different priorities; NATO in Afghanistan and the EU more in North Africa, with the result that we dissipated our efforts. Now it is more important that we consult regularly and work together in places like Libya, Iraq, or Jordan. The comparative advantages of each have to be brought together. Moreover, given that the military aspect of intervening is always the most risky, we need to look more at interventions which have mainly an economic or social focus and to see how we can get much more value from the development community.

Finally, we need to get a better handle on prevention and to develop a long-term strategy for North Africa and the Middle East. It is possible to stop a state from failing but almost impossible to re-build one after a conflict. The World Bank has estimated that it will cost at least $150 billion to rebuild Syria and we have not reached the bottom there yet. If we react too late and rush from crisis to crisis, we will again waste all the resources that a clear set of priorities and a more proactive strategy could use to better effect. But this will require political salesmanship in making the case for early action. After a decade in which interventions have been too conveniently dismissed as wars of choice, we need again to convince our publics that they are wars of necessity. Yet with a greater knowledge of what we are getting into, a focus on more modest but achievable goals, and a better balance between those objectives and the forces we are willing to commit.

A Smart Intervention Future

If the third option is the most probable and desirable, it will only work if North America and Europe are committed to it and to sharing the burdens equitably. A European attempt to stabilize North Africa and the Middle East will not work by itself any more than it did in Bosnia in the mid-1990s. Yet the current unpredictability of the United States is not only a risk for Europe but also an opportunity to build a truly credible common foreign and defense policy that will allow Europeans to project power to the South and to protect their vital interests in those cases where the United States is unable or unwilling to intervene. Achieving an entente cordiale between a transatlantic capability and approach and a more autonomously European one will be perhaps the most fundamental challenge for the interventions of the future.

At the same time, President Trump has been pushed by his first major foreign policy crisis — Syria — to define in action, if not yet in theory, his own concept of smart intervention. The President's hand has been forced by his own repeated criticism of former President Obama for not acting resolutely in Syria and enforcing his own "red line" over Assad's use of chemical weapons. So when Assad used these yet again, Trump was clearly obliged to act to demonstrate the difference with the previous administration and to show the United States as a strong power. Yet it is not yet clear if one salvo of cruise missiles, no matter how spectacular, or the threat of the United States going it alone over North Korea, will add up to a viable, long-term strategy to end the dictatorships in both countries, or at least persuade them to refrain from major provocations, such as chemical use or nuclear testing. Smart intervention needs the viable threat of the use of force combined with agile diplomacy and the building of international coalitions. The solution in Syria requires working with Russia and in North Korea with China. Carrots to incentivize good behavior are as important as economic or military sticks with enforceable red lines and military containment and defensive measures.

> *"After a decade in which interventions have been too conveniently dismissed as wars of choice, we need again to convince our publics that they are wars of necessity."*

Finally, a negotiating framework needs to outline shared objectives for all the parties involved to aim at. It is good that President Trump has signalled that he does not seek an isolationist America, allowing outrageous acts to go unsanctioned; but going from this to a true practice of "smart" (and successful) intervention is and will be the test for the next four years.

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