

**Summary:** In Europe, what started out three years ago as a sovereign debt crisis and then morphed into a euro currency crisis has by now triggered a full-blown crisis of public confidence: in the economy, in the future, and in the European project. To avoid the trap of self-fulfilling prophecies, policymakers, politicians, and analysts need to gauge the public mood as thoroughly and accurately as possible. This paper analyzes dozens of European surveys conducted over the past year on key issues relating to the euro crisis.

## What Europeans Think About the Eurocrisis *Doubts and Waning Faith in the European Project*

by Bruce Stokes

In Europe, what started out three years ago as a sovereign debt crisis and then morphed into a euro currency crisis has by now triggered a full-blown crisis of public confidence: in the economy, in the future, and in the European project. Populist politics are on the rise. Gloomy pundits on both sides of the Atlantic warn of the imminent breakup of the euro zone. In the face of this crisis, is all policymaking futile? Is failure inevitable? To avoid the trap of self-fulfilling prophecies, policymakers, politicians, and analysts need to gauge the public mood as thoroughly and accurately as possible.

What do Europeans really think about the crisis? How concerned are they about the impact of the economic downturn on their own situation? How much do they worry about their nation's economic health? Do they still want the euro, and do they still believe in the European Union? How has the crisis affected voters' support for leaders and their governments? And what do they want governments to do? Will anxious European electorates go along with ever-starker remedies for the European Union's cascading economic ills? Will voters support more bailouts of countries facing sovereign debt defaults? Would they accept euro bonds that require

provident nations to underwrite the borrowing of improvident economies? Are Europeans willing to have officials in Brussels look over their shoulders, second guessing them as they craft their national budgets? Is European solidarity, which has long been the driving force in the creation of an ever-more integrated Europe, now waning? And are self-preoccupied Europeans turning inward?

The best short-term answers to these pressing questions are to be found in public opinion polls. This paper analyzes dozens of European surveys conducted over the past year on key issues relating to the euro crisis (see Annex for sources). It relies heavily on cross-national polling data, such as that provided by Eurobarometer, the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Trends survey, the Pew Global Attitudes survey, and various Gallup polls. Such surveys permit a pulse-taking of the public's mood with regard to the same issues at roughly the same time across Europe. And, because these groups often ask the same questions every year, they afford the added advantage of comparing the evolution of public attitudes over time.

However, big pan-European surveys occur infrequently, often do not ask

the most topical questions, and can have long lag times before publication of their data. For these reasons, the analysis in this paper is supplemented by polling data from major national survey research firms in key European countries. Such data is often not comparable across borders because of differences in research methodology. But these polls do provide insights into national sentiment on newsworthy issues.

### Personal Despair and National Gloom

The persistence and the depth of the European economic downturn triggered by the euro crisis have had a profound adverse impact on most Europeans' attitudes toward their personal well-being, the condition of their national economies, and their future.

In the German Marshall Fund's 2011 Transatlantic Trends survey conducted in late May and early June 2011 before much of the Greek and Italian turmoil in the latter part of the year, 61% of the public in 12 EU member countries already said that they or their family had been personally affected by the economic crisis. This included 80% of the Portuguese, 71% of the Spanish, 70% of the British, 67% of the Italians, and 56% of the French.

The personal toll exacted by the crisis has exacerbated rapidly over a very short period of time. In the Netherlands in 2009, only 20% of the public complained that they had been affected. By 2011, 49% of the Dutch felt burdened by the economic downturn.

And the impact has been quite negative. Strong majorities of the French (56%), Italians (58%), Spanish (59%), and British (61%) said the financial situation of their household had gotten worse in the last 12 months, according to the early fall 2011 Transatlantic Trends: Immigration survey, also by the German Marshall Fund.

The economic downturn has put great stress on labor markets. This has led to a sharp rise in joblessness in the peripheral euro zone countries most hard hit by the sovereign debt crisis. At the same time, many northern Europeans have been shielded from a spike in unemployment by government safety nets.

Overall, nearly two-in-five (38%) Europeans claimed that someone they knew had lost their job as a direct result of the crisis, according to a September 2011 Eurobarometer poll.

## Overall, nearly two-in-five Europeans claimed that someone they knew had lost their job as a direct result of the crisis.

But this personal brush with joblessness varied widely across Europe. In Spain, 80% of those surveyed said they knew someone who had lost their job. In Italy it was 48%. But in Germany only 17% of the public reported that experience.

Other polls have measured corroborated these findings. In December 2011, 70% of the French said they had been personally touched by the crisis, according to a survey by TNS Sofres. And 76% said they were worried about their personal economic situation. The British are only slightly less concerned about the future. More than half (55%) in January 2012 said that they thought that the financial situation of their household would worsen over the next 12 months, according to a YouGov poll. In June 2007, before the crisis, only 38% told YouGov that their finances were headed in the wrong direction.

In Gallup surveys conducted in spring 2011, in most European countries more people believed that their standard of living was deteriorating than said it was improving. In some of the countries most hard hit by the crisis, a majority believed that their standard of living would deteriorate further, including the Greeks (71%), the Portuguese (61%), the Italians (47%), and the Spanish (45%).

In stark contrast, northern Europeans, in particular the Germans and the Swedes, stand out as remarkably untouched by the recent economic turmoil, so far. More than half the Germans (54%) and more than two-thirds of the Swedes (69%) said that they and their families had not been affected by the euro crisis, according to the spring Transatlantic Trends 2011 survey. Even by last December, 55% of Germans still felt that they had not been personally affected, according to an Infratest Dimap poll. And only 53% of Germans were worried about their personal economic situation, far less than the worry felt just across the Rhine in France.

With many Europeans personally devastated by the euro crisis, gloom about their country's economic well-being is not surprising. In 2007, prior to the financial meltdown that precipitated Europe's current troubles, economic sentiment was broadly positive in Europe. More than half (52%) the EU public judged their national economic situation to be good, according to a Eurobarometer survey. This included 74% of the Germans, 70% of the British, and 60% of the Spanish. But even then there were troubling signs of a two-speed Europe. The French (only 26% saw their economy as good), the Italians (36%), the Greeks (18%), and the Portuguese (10%) were already downcast.

By November 2011, only 28% of EU citizens thought their national economy was in good shape, according to Eurobarometer. This included just 1% of the Greeks, 7% of the Portuguese, 4% of the Spanish, 9% of the Italians, 12% of the French, and 15% of the British. The Germans (78%) alone remained upbeat.

But German sentiment has been particularly erratic. While attitudes in Britain, France, and Spain never recovered from the blow inflicted by the 2008 financial collapse, the German mood has fluctuated wildly. In recent months, it has worsened markedly. While in January 2011, nearly 56% of Germans believed that the German economy was improving or on the right track, that number dwindled to 19% in December 2011, according to a survey by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen.

Recent economic troubles have undermined Europeans' faith in the future. Already in the spring of 2011, a majority of the French (52%) and a plurality of the British (43%) and the Spanish (35%) thought economic conditions would worsen, according to the Pew Global Attitudes survey. Not surprisingly, optimism has been in particularly short supply in some of the nations most hard hit by the euro crisis. Only 2% of Greeks and 9% of Italians told Gallup pollsters in 2011 that they thought economic conditions in their city or local area were getting better. In Britain, 63% of the public thought the financial situation would get worse, according to a September 2011 survey by YouGov. Even in Germany, a December 2011 Infratest Dimap survey found that 84% of the public thought that the worst of the crisis was yet to come.

### **Eroding Support for Governments and Leaders**

A gloomy electorate generally spells trouble for national governments and elected leaders. The euro crisis has proved no exception. This lack of confidence threatens to undermine efforts to deal with the sovereign debt crisis, particularly in southern and Eastern Europe.

Spring 2011 surveys by Gallup found that only 36% of the EU public expressed confidence in their national government. Such faith was particularly low in Latvia (11%), Romania (12%), and Greece (18%). The Swedes (64%) and the Dutch (60%) were notably happy with their government's overall performance, possibly a reflection of the relative success of their national economies.


Publics are particularly critical of their government's management of the economy. More than half of the British (55%) told YouGov in mid-January 2012 that their coalition government was mishandling the economic crisis. That negative assessment is up from 30% in a YouGov poll in late June 2010.

And there is disturbingly little public belief that their governments can chart a way out of the current economic turbulence. Only 24% of the French and 54% of the Germans said they have confidence that government authorities can put an end to the crisis, according to a December TNS Sofres survey.

The crisis has indeed imperiled the careers of national politicians. Since the onset of Europe's sovereign debt woes, the leaders of Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Finland have all lost their jobs.

Others may soon follow. French voters go to the polls in late April and early May to elect a new president. An early January 2012 survey for the French magazine *Le Nouvel Observateur* found that two-thirds of the French (65%) had a negative opinion of incumbent French President Nicolas

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Sarkozy. British Prime Minister David Cameron is not faring much better. Half (48%) the British thought that David Cameron was doing a bad job as prime minister, according to a January 2012 YouGov survey. That negative assessment is up dramatically from May 2010, right after he was elected, when only 12% of Cameron's constituents told YouGov they thought he was doing a bad job. Fortunately for Cameron, unless circumstances force him to call an early election, he doesn't need to face his voters again until 2015.

Angela Merkel is one major European leader who has weathered the euro storm well. Two-thirds of Germans (66%) approved of the way she had handled the crisis to date in an early January poll for the television station network ZDF (see Figure 1).

And despite all the criticism leveled at Merkel for her lack of bold leadership in dealing with the euro crisis, she remains remarkably popular outside of Germany. In spring 2011, 80% of the French, 64% of the British, and 69% of the Spanish expressed confidence in her leadership, according to the Pew Global Attitudes survey, far more than the confidence expressed in Sarkozy, for example, even in France.

Italians also like what they see from their new prime minister, Mario Monti, who has introduced tough new austerity measures since


coming into office in November 2011. A January 2012 ISPO survey found that 56% of Italians approve of his efforts, up from 46% in December.

### Euro Ennui

The euro area's sovereign debt crisis has led to mounting skepticism about the euro, raising the specter of one or more countries being forced to abandon the common currency.

More than half (53%) of those surveyed in early summer 2011 by the German Marshall Fund thought that using the euro had been bad for their national economy. This included majorities of the Portuguese (58%), Spanish (54%), and French (54%) and nearly half the Germans (49%) (see Figure 2). And the euro's troubles convinced majorities in the United Kingdom (77%) and Poland (52%) that adopting the euro at this time would be a bad economic choice.

The Italians, in particular, blame the euro for aggravating current economic problems: two-thirds (65%) said its adoption had been more damaging than beneficial to the Italian economy, according to a January 2012 ISPO poll. Similarly, a majority (52%) of the French said that the euro had been a handicap in dealing with crisis, according to a December 2011 Ifop poll. That proportion was up from 34% in August 2010.



A broader question, asked by Eurobarometer in November 2011, which measured support for both European economic and monetary union and the euro, found more positive results. In that poll, 53% of Europeans favored a union with a single currency, but support was still down from 63% in spring 2007.

Nevertheless, there is little desire in France, Italy, or Estonia, the euro's newest member, to see a return to their national currency. In a late December 2011 Ifop survey, barely a third (36%) of the French wanted to revive the franc. While this was a slight increase from the 29% who wanted the franc back in June 2011, such nostalgia was little changed from the 38% who held such views in May 2010. Only 31% of Italians wanted to see the lira revived, according to a January 2012 ISPO poll. And just 37% of Estonians expressed a desire to return to their national currency in a late-September survey by Turu-Uuringute AS.

The Germans, however, draw different conclusions about the euro's track record. In a September 2011 Forsa poll, 54% of Germans expressed a desire for a return of the Deutsche mark.

There is shared skepticism, too, about the common currency's future. Only 53% of the Germans thought the euro would be a successful currency in the long term, according to a December 2011 ZDF survey. And 52% of the French thought it was certain or probable that the euro would break up, according to an Ifop poll in late November 2011.


### Slipping Support for the European Union and its Institutions

The euro crisis has done even more damage to the image of the European Union. In mid-2007, 57% of EU citizens thought that their country's membership had been a good thing, according to Eurobarometer. By mid-2011 only 47% held such positive views in a Eurobarometer poll (see Figure 3). The drop off in support for the European Union was particularly steep in the peripheral countries most affected by sovereign debt problems. Nearly three-quarters (73%) of the Spanish looked favorably on their EU membership in 2007. By 2011, just half (55%) saw their participation in a favorable light, a drop of 18 percentage points in just four years. Similarly, EU support fell 17 points in Greece, 16 points in Portugal, 13 points in Ireland, and 10 points in Italy. Now only two-in-five Greeks, Italians, and Portuguese think EU membership is a good thing.

In France, Eurobarometer-measured support for the EU has also slipped, from a high of 60% in mid-2007 to 46% in mid-2011. One reason may be that 79% of the French thought that the EU had been ineffective in dealing with the economic crisis, according to a late September 2011 Ifop survey. Thus it is hardly surprising that a December 2011 Ifop survey found that in the face of the economic crisis the French were evenly divided on whether they wanted more or less Europe, with 48% saying more and 49% saying less. Only a month earlier, 57% said they wanted more Europe.

In Germany, Eurobarometer found that backing for the EU had fallen from 65% in 2007 to 54% in 2011.

Euroscepticism has long been prevalent in the United Kingdom. The recent economic turmoil has only fueled those sentiments, with some political leaders calling for a referendum on continued participation in the single market. A late October 2011 survey by Ipsos/Mori found 49% of the British wanted their country to leave the EU; only 41% said they wanted to stay in. In September 2007, a similar Ipsos/Mori poll found 51% who supported continued U.K. membership in the EU and only 39% who called for withdrawal. Clearly this change of heart is due to the euro crisis. A



mid-December 2011 poll for the Independent on Sunday reported that a majority (52%) of the British thought that the euro crisis provided an ideal opportunity for Britain to leave the EU altogether.

But antipathy for the EU is not universal in Europe. In mid-January 2012, after more than two years of negative headlines about bumbling and fumbling in Brussels in the face of the euro crisis, Croatians still voted by two-to-one to join the EU in a national referendum.

### ...And for the ECB

While the European Union is the institutional face of the single market, the European Central Bank is at the center of the current public debate over dealing with the euro crisis. The institution's reputation has not fared well as Europe's sovereign debt problems have multiplied.

Across Europe, public trust in the ECB fell from 53% in mid-2007 to 40% in mid-2011, according to Eurobarometer. In Germany, where the public debate over the proper role of the central bank has been quite heated, support fell even further, from 65% to 47%. And in France, public trust has fallen to 33%, with a plurality (38%) of the public now actually distrusting the ECB.

The recent decline in support for the EU, the euro, and the ECB calls into question some of the pillar institutions of the European project. This waning trust undermines both their legitimacy and their symbolic importance.

### How Much Solidarity in the Eurozone?

A more immediate problem for Europe, however, lies in the differences in opinion of key European populations on the proper policy course dealing with the euro crisis.

Economic hard times have not eroded Europeans' sense of solidarity. In principle, they believe that they need to help other Europeans in distress. GMF's 2011 Transatlantic Trends survey found that a majority of the Spanish (55%) and the Germans (54%), as well as a plurality of the British (45%) and the French (43%) thought that their country should help other EU countries deal with their problems.

But this solidarity breaks down when it comes to specific measures to alleviate the burden of the euro crisis. It erodes

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particularly quickly in those countries that might have to foot the bill.

Three-in-five British said London should not contribute any money to help solve the euro debt crisis, according to a YouGov poll in September. A similar proportion of Estonians, in the Turu-Uuringute survey thought Tallin should not guarantee loans made by the European Financial Stability Facility.

Proposed euro bonds are an indirect method of helping to bail out nations in distress. They would effectively use the better credit rating of richer countries to help more troubled economies raise money. Not surprisingly, such debt sharing is popular in countries facing sovereign debt problems, according to a September 2011 Eurobarometer survey. A strong majority (72%) of Greeks knew about euro bonds and half (50%) of those supported them. While only 43% of Italians had heard of euro bonds, among those who had, 57% favored them. But in Germany, a country with a good credit rating and deep pockets, three-in-five (62%) people had heard about euro bonds, and of those 58% opposed them.

A similar reticence about the practical aspects of economic interdependence can be seen in people's attitudes toward common fiscal rules and mutual oversight of national budgets. But recent changes in those attitudes in some countries demonstrate the volatility of the public mood on these issues.

In early summer 2011, by a margin of 56 to 39 percent, publics in 12 European nations rejected the idea that the EU should have more authority over member states' economic and budgetary policies, according to the Transat-

Atlantic Trends 2011 survey. Only in Germany did a majority support such oversight.

But as Europe's sovereign debt woes worsened and the European Parliament moved to pass legislation instituting such budgetary oversight, the public mood changed. By September, according to a Eurobarometer poll, 67% of the EU public favored consultations between Brussels and national capitals during the drafting of national budgets. This included 70% of the Greeks and 73% of the Portuguese, residents of nations most likely to be subject to such loss of national budgetary sovereignty.

More recent surveys confirm this change in mood. A TNS Sofres poll in early December 2011 found that 80% of the Germans and 69% of French support European control over national budgets.

And over the last two years, despite strikes and protests against national budget-cutting in a number of countries, when European electorates have been asked to choose between candidates who advocate fiscal belt-tightening to cope with the debt crisis and candidates who favor expansionary policies, voters in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Latvia, and Greece have all chosen leaders who promised them austerity.

### **Nationalism, Protectionism, and Xenophobia**

Troubled economic times in Europe have in the past given rise to right- or left-wing political activism, chauvinism, inward-looking economics, and scapegoating of foreigners. There are indeed some signs that the euro crisis has fanned the flames of nationalism and protectionism, if not xenophobia.

Signs of a nascent political backlash sparked by the euro crisis are most evident in the strength of nativist political movements in a few European countries. In France, Marine Le Pen, leader of the right-wing National Front, opposes the euro and advocates a Europe that is a loose confederation of nation states. In a mid-January 2012 Ifop survey of voter intentions in the run up to the April 2012 French presidential election, Le Pen is supported by 20% of the French electorate. That represents a small increase in support since the fall of 2011. Her father, Jean Marie Le Pen, received 10% of the vote in the first round of the 2007 French presidential election.

In the Netherlands, the right-wing Party for Freedom received 15.5% of the vote in June 2010, giving it the third largest number of seats in the parliament. Its leader, Geert Wilders, advocates a stop to migration from Muslim countries and, recently, has opposed European bailout measures for Greece and urged that the Netherlands consider abandoning the euro and returning to the guilder.

In Finland, the populist and nationalist True Finn party received 19.1% of the vote in the April 2011 elections, up from just 4.1% in 2007, making it the third largest grouping in the parliament. Subsequent polling suggests that public support for the party has risen. Nevertheless, in the early 2012 Finnish presidential election, the eurosceptic candidate received only 17.5% of the vote in the first round, suggesting a ceiling to anti-EU sentiment.

In Austria, the right-wing, eurosceptic Freedom Party received 17.5% of the vote in the September 2008 legislative elections and 15.2% in the April 2010 presidential elections. This result is up from 10% in 2002 parliamentary elections. But it is still lower than support for the party in the 1990s.

And the April 2010 Hungarian parliamentary election led to the formation of a conservative government headed by Viktor Orbán, who in a coalition with the Christian Democratic People's party, controls two-thirds of the seats in the Hungarian parliament. This super majority has enabled Orbán to make nationalist and populist changes in the Hungarian constitution.

In each of these countries, euro-skeptical nationalism appeals to as many as one-in-five voters. And this support seems to have increased in recent years. Yet, there have been no strong right-wing or left-wing electoral backlashes in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and Italy, the European Union countries that have suffered the most since the onset of the euro crisis. To be sure, there have been widespread strikes and violent public demonstrations. But a coherent populist political opposition has not emerged. Moreover, the national parliaments in Europe with the largest proportion of right-wing populist representation are in Austria, Norway, and Switzerland, economies that have suffered far less from the crisis.

Nor are there signs of an increase in broader nationalist sentiment. Pew periodically asks Europeans whether they believe that while their people are not perfect, their culture

is superior to others. Only in Germany have such views increased in the last decade. In 2002, 40% of Germans agreed with that statement. In 2011, 47% agreed. In Britain, France, and Spain, such nationalist views have declined.

With the protectionism of the 1930s a stark memory, a rise in anti-globalization sentiment might be expected in the wake of the euro crisis. In fact, the European public's commitment to open markets remains as strong as ever, at least in principle. But there is evidence of support for discrete protectionist actions in practice. This dichotomy suggests that a rise in protectionism in the future is possible, but it should be noted that these contradictory public sentiments have existed side by side for some time. European publics, not unlike their U.S. cousins, have long been free traders in theory and protectionists in practice.

In 2011, overwhelming majorities of the British (87%), the French (83%), the Germans (95%), and the Spanish (96%) said that trade was good thing for their countries, according to the Pew Global Attitudes Survey. Contrary to what might have been expected, this support has gone up in most nations since the euro crisis began.

But when Europeans are asked whether trade with China and India, in particular, has been good for their country, support for such globalization plummets. Only 62% of the Germans, 55% of the Spanish, 51% of the British and Italians, and just 24% of the French said opening their borders to Chinese and Indian products is a good thing, according to a mid-2011 Ifop poll.

And there is public support for protectionist actions. In its mid-2011 survey, Ifop found that strong majorities in Spain (67%), France (65%), Germany (61%), and Italy (60%) and a plurality in Britain (45%) backed raising import duties on products imported from emerging markets. In France, half (52%) the population supports the purchase of goods "Made in France," according to a TNS Sofres survey in mid-December 2011. Such sentiment is probably not that new. A Harris internet survey at the same time found that only a third (34%) of the French said they would buy French-made goods most of the time, even if they cost more. Nevertheless, it is notable that the strongest backing for such consumer nationalism comes from supporters of right-wing presidential candidate Marine Le Pen.

The proportion of Europeans who said that immigration is a problem rather than an opportunity for their country has gone up since the crisis began, with a plurality of the public now holding that sentiment in France and a majority in Italy and the United Kingdom, according to the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Trends: Immigration survey, which was conducted in early fall 2011.

But public concern about immigration has gone down relative to other worries in the five European countries surveyed and people are far more concerned about unemployment and the economy than they are about immigration.

Moreover, despite their angst about joblessness during these economically troubled times, only a quarter of the French (25%) and the Germans (23%) and a third of the Italians (30%) and the Spanish (36%) believed that immigrants take jobs away from the native-born. Only the British (58%) blamed the foreign-born for unemployment. Despite the worsening of the euro crisis, these numbers have not changed much since 2008.

So while anti-immigrant rhetoric by some European politicians is at a fever pitch, the economic downturn caused by the euro crisis does not seem to have appreciably worsened xenophobic sentiment in Europe.

### **An Unsettled Mood**

In the wake of a euro sovereign debt crisis that shows no sign of abating, Europeans are downbeat about the economy, their economic prospects, the euro, and the European Union. People are frustrated with their governments' handling of the crisis, and elected leaders have lost their jobs as a result. There is public wariness about bail-outs and sharing responsibility for national debt. There is a growing polarization of attitudes about how best to deal with the crisis.

And divisions in attitudes have emerged between north and south, periphery and core, and relatively prosperous and indebted nations. Publics in Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands have, through surveys and at the polls, demonstrated reluctance to bail out the Greeks, the Portuguese, and other troubled fellow euro-area members. Publics in non-euro zone countries, such as Poland and the United Kingdom have no great desire to join the euro any time soon; although for the Poles it seems to be mostly

a matter of timing, whereas for the British it is a matter of principle.

These divisions in public opinion have policy consequences. They complicate government efforts to coordinate a response to the euro crisis. Relatively deep-pocketed governments can't simply write checks to indebted nations when their voters and taxpayers are reluctant. The Germans want the ECB to focus on controlling inflation. The French want it to focus on stimulating growth.

At the same time, Europe's divisions do not rule out forward movement. Estonia has joined the euro since the crisis began and Croatia has also voted to join the EU. Moreover, the vast majority of Europeans have not turned on each other nor against foreigners. And they seem to remain committed to a market economy and democratic norms.

Public opinion provides useful insights into the cumulated impact of recent developments on the European national psyche. It has the clarity and value of a snapshot. But the European public mood is a moving picture. It is rapidly evolving and in the months ahead it will be profoundly shaped by economic developments to come.

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#### About the Author

Bruce Stokes is a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund. He is a contributing editor for *National Journal*. He has written for *Foreign Policy*, *Foreign Affairs*, *The Financial Times*, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and the *International Herald Tribune*, and is the author or co-author of numerous books and reports, including GMF's 2009 Transatlantic Trends Survey. Mr. Stokes is a graduate of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and Johns Hopkins University's School for Advanced International Studies.

#### About The EuroFuture Project

The German Marshall Fund of the United States understands the twin crisis in Europe and the United States to be a defining moment that will shape the transatlantic partnership and its interactions with the wider world for the long term. GMF's EuroFuture Project therefore aims to understand and explore the economic, governance and geostrategic dimensions of the EuroCrisis from a transatlantic perspective. The Project addresses the impact, implications, and ripple effects of the crisis — in Europe, for the United States and the world.

GMF does this through a combination of initiatives on both sides of the Atlantic, including large and small convening, regional seminars, study tours, paper series, polling, briefings, and media interviews. The Project also integrates its work on the EuroCrisis into several of GMF's existing programs. The Project is led by Thomas Klein-Brockhoff, Senior Transatlantic Fellow and Senior Director for Strategy. The group of GMF experts involved in the project consists of several Transatlantic Fellows as well as program staff on both sides of the Atlantic.