Germany’s Strategic Reckoning: Finally Ready to Assume Leadership
This article was originally published by the European Policy Center.
Germany is undergoing a profound strategic transformation. Long associated with military restraint, fiscal discipline, and a reliance on the United States for its security guarantees, the country is now departing from its post-Cold War posture. At the heart of this transformation is not only a change of government but a broader political awakening to the realities of a more dangerous world – and to the fragility of the transatlantic relationship.
A new government with bold ambitions
The centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), led by Friedrich Merz, won Germany’s federal elections on 23 February 2025. A coalition agreement with the Social Democrats was reached in early April, but under Germany’s procedural norms, the government was only sworn in on 6 May.
In the interim, the outgoing administration continued to manage daily affairs, but the incoming leadership has already begun shaping the country’s strategic direction, with key decisions being made. In a move that would have been unimaginable even a year ago, Germany passed a constitutional amendment to loosen its strict debt limits and permit massive defence and security spending. That such a far-reaching decision was made by the outgoing parliament and supported by the interim government only underscores the urgency felt across the political spectrum.
Dismantling a fiscal taboo – building new governance structures
Germany’s “debt brake,” enshrined in the constitution by the Conservatives in 2009, has long symbolised the country’s commitment to fiscal austerity. In late March 2025, this constraint was partially suspended, with the aim to exclude from debt calculations defence spending beyond 1% of GDP. This opens the door to large- scale military investment. Up to €600 billion over the next 14 years is needed on top of the current defence budget to meet NATO targets and to compensate for a US drop-out. Remarkable here is that Germany did not commit to a specific spending goal – for instance, 3% of GDP – but stated that defence spending will be determined by what is needed. What comes on top is a €500 billion special fund for infrastructure that is largely driven by security needs.
What is extraordinary is not only the scale of the shift, but the speed with which the new government and old parliament together made it happen. The constitutional change was pushed through within two to three weeks in both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, the chamber of the 16 federal states, including with votes from the future opposition in the Bundestag – a political feat unprecedented in modern Germany. It signals a clear consensus about the urgency with which greater spending on defence is required – and that the status quo no longer provides the tools necessary for national and European security.
This consensus, however, was not made transparent during the election campaign. Chancellor Merz avoided disclosing the full extent of his defence spending ambitions to avoid alienating fiscally conservative voters and party members. Post-election polls show that the public supports the new course, but there is evident frustration at the way it was introduced, with many citizens feeling they were not fully informed before casting their votes. This adds to the political polarisation in Germany, where right- and left-wing populists increasingly steer the political debate. In fact, while there is support for the overall course, a majority of Germans lack confidence in the incoming government’s capacity to solve the country’s problems.
In addition to creating the financial room for manoeuvre, the new government has also sought to adapt structures and processes to enable it to act in the quickly changing, and challenging, environment. Foreign policy in particular will be consolidated in the chancellery. A National Security Council and a crisis response headquarters will be set up within the Chancellor’s office to better coordinate government security policy and crisis response. For the first time since the 1960s, the chancellery and the foreign ministry will be run by the same party, with the conservative Johann Wadephul taking over the MFA. In the military realm, several initiatives are planned to simplify and speed up procurement. Additionally, the government intends to better use Germany’s defence industrial potential, for instance by considering entering into key defence industries if the ownership structure would put them at risk of foreign control.
A double strategic shock
Germany’s political class did not arrive at this turning point by accident. Two external shocks – one from Russia and one from the United States – have structurally altered the strategic environment for Berlin.
The first, and more familiar one, is the ongoing war in Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, and the subsequent erosion of European deterrence credibility, laid bare Europe’s – and especially Germany’s – lack of military readiness. Despite its pledges, the country struggled to deliver on the air defence systems, ammunition, logistical support, and the fighting forces it promised to NATO. This experience has underlined how dangerously dependent Europe has become on US military capabilities, and how slowly the EU’s largest economy responded to a major war on the continent.
The second shock has been less kinetic, but no less impactful. Under Donald Trump’s second administration, the US has increasingly treated Europe not as a partner but as a strategic irritant. This has been across all key areas of transatlantic relations, from trade to defence. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2025, Vice President JD Vance described Europeans as ideological adversaries; during the infamous Oval Office meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy, Trump pressured Ukraine to end the war on Russian terms. Trump’s tariffs then dealt a further blow to the alliance. All of these led to German policymakers being confronted with the possibility that Washington may no longer be the ally it once was.
This realisation is particularly daunting for Germany, a country whose postwar identity is tightly interwoven with its relationship to the US. American leadership enabled German reintegration into the international system, guaranteed its security, underpinned its economic rise and supported European integration to embed Germany. To now see that relationship unravelling, or at least becoming conditional, did not only lead to a conceptual rethink but had an emotional impact in Berlin’s foreign policy circles. Moreover, it is remarkable how quickly the now governing Conservatives in particular have come to question their once-strong transatlantic compass.
A new kind of leadership
Faced with this dual shock, Germany is rethinking its entire strategic posture. The incoming government is operating on the premise that Europe must assume far more responsibility for its own defence, and that Germany, given its size and economic capacity, cannot avoid a leadership role. This feeling is captured in Chancellor Merz’s call for Germany to move from a sleeping middle power to a leading middle power.
Crucially, this leadership is not envisioned as unilateral. Instead, Berlin is pivoting toward “minilateralism” – a pragmatic mix of smaller cooperation formats that complement broader EU and NATO structures. These include the E3 format (Germany, France, UK), E3+ (adding Poland and Italy), and the Weimar Triangle (France, Germany, Poland) for strategic planning and industrial coordination; and new, flexible cooperation tracks with both EU and non-EU allies. This includes the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, launched by France and the UK after the Munich Security Conference in February 2025, to uphold a potential ceasefire in Ukraine.
What sets this moment apart is that Germany now has both the political will and the financial means to drive defence initiatives (as well as the support and encouragement of its European partners). Unlike many European partners constrained by debt burdens or domestic opposition, Germany’s constitutional flexibility gives it unique capacity to invest and scale.
But political will must translate into capability. The government now faces the daunting task of rebuilding its armed forces – not just in terms of equipment, but in readiness, logistics, and sustainability. The biggest challenge is the recruitment and retention of personnel. The recently adopted “Swedish model” of voluntary military service will not be enough.
Defence minister Boris Pistorius, who also served in the previous administration, sparked a vivid debate in the last legislative period when calling for Germany to become “able for war” (“kriegstüchtig”). It irritated the German public but helped to develop awareness about the triple necessity of Germany’s adaptation: to be able to credibly defend itself, Germany needs ready forces, a defence industry that can deliver under war conditions, and a resilient public that understands the necessity of defence and supports it. It’s about being able to fight in order to not be forced to fight.
Ukraine and the limits of European readiness
The first real test of this new posture may come in Ukraine. If the US imposes an end to the war on Russian conditions, thereby rewarding Russian aggression, engages in a normalisation of ties with Russia, and leaves post-war security and reconstruction questions to Europe, Europeans will face a dilemma they are poorly equipped to handle: either accept a bad deal that legitimises aggression and potentially increases the risk of a new war in Europe, or resist it – without having the tools to enforce a better outcome.
Europeans are trying to offer a European alternative via the ‘Coalition of the Willing’. Yet even such a limited mission would strain existing forces. Many of the key enablers of European countries – such as air defence, cyber capabilities, or strategic intelligence – depend heavily on the US. There is also the problem of force availability: most of Europe’s deployable units are committed to NATO plans. Supporting Ukraine might mean taking troops away from NATO’s eastern flank.
Europe’s current military posture, in short, cannot simultaneously deter Russia, defend European territory, and backstop Ukraine. The danger is not just failure – it is being blamed for failing. Failure would increase the likelihood of another war in Europe – which Europeans might need to fight without US support.
Nuclear deterrence: European insecurity and domestic uncertainty
As the transatlantic bond frays, an old and sensitive topic is resurfacing: nuclear deterrence. For decades, Germany has relied on NATO’s nuclear umbrella, particularly the US contribution. So far, the US has questioned its conventional role, but not yet nuclear deterrence. But what happens if Washington were no longer to guarantee extended deterrence?
France and the UK both maintain nuclear arsenals that contribute to NATO’s deterrence, but both have been conceived to operate as a supplement to NATO’s overall umbrella – in other words, neither is currently structured to provide protection beyond their own territories. France in particular has rejected the idea of extended deterrence in principle, and its nuclear doctrine is (at least so far) designed to primarily protect national – not European – vital interests. While President Macron has hinted in recent speeches at a greater openness to discussing France’s role in European deterrence and to potentially protect European sovereignty, such a shift would require fundamental doctrinal and posture changes not only for France, but also the conventional allies.
At least France’s nuclear deterrent is industrially and technically autonomous, as the country produces the aircrafts and submarines from which the nuclear weapons will be launched, as well as the weapons themselves. The UK, however, depends on US cooperation for nuclear capability because the US leases the delivery vehicles – the Trident missiles.
Clearly, a change from a transatlantic intercontinental deterrence with the US to a regional European one would fundamentally destabilise Europe’s security order. Germany, for its part, has almost no institutional capacity for nuclear planning, and the public debate remains emotionally and politically fraught. Nevertheless, politicians in Berlin are beginning to speak about the need for a “European solution” to concerns over deterrence, as Merz repeated in his inaugural visit to Paris on 7 May. It is not yet clear what form this might take, but it signals a dramatic shift in mindset. The very fact that strategic thinkers are now modelling what deterrence without the US might look like is itself a sign that Europe is entering a new era.
Outlook: Ambition without euphoria
Germany’s awakening is neither triumphalist nor revolutionary. It is shaped by anxiety – about Russia’s assertiveness, America’s unreliability, and Europe’s own vulnerabilities. But out of that anxiety has come action. In a matter of weeks, Germany has overturned its own constitutional dogmas and embraced a leadership role it once rejected.
Whether this marks the beginning of a durable transformation depends on more than just Berlin. France, the UK and other European states must align their own capabilities and ambitions with Germany’s new direction. And Germany itself must do more than allocate money – it must reform its own settings, deliver results, rebuild credibility, and foster a culture of strategic seriousness.
Europe’s security order is being re-shaped, not by grand designs, but by necessity. In this fragile transition, Germany’s decisions will matter more than they have in decades. A strong Germany enables a strong Europe, and a strong European defence. An indecisive, weak Germany meanwhile enfeebles the rest of Europe. The country is no longer on strategic holiday. It is moving – slowly, cautiously – toward responsibility. The rest of Europe would be wise to support it, and keep pace.