The Israel-Iran Conflict

The Transatlantic Impact: Reshaping Security Plans

By Dr. Ian O. Lesser

Israel’s strikes against Iran’s nuclear and defense installations and top command structure, Tehran’s retaliatory strikes, and the potential for further escalation have significant implications for transatlantic strategy while war continues to rage in Europe’s east. The crisis is sure to figure prominently on the agenda of this week’s G7 summit in Canada, a gathering meant to focus on Ukraine, sanctions on Russia, and trade. But war in the Middle East is likely to have even more significant implications for NATO’s upcoming summit in The Hague. Some scenarios for escalation could reshape the US and European approach to defense at a time of flux in security priorities and alliance relations. An early assessment suggests four notable implications.

First, the current crisis puts the Middle East back on the security agenda in a way that events in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria have not. The idea that the region could comfortably tolerate progressive American—and European—security disengagement now seems illusory. Investment, arms sales, and, in Europe’s case, support for democracy, development, and civil society, have proved to be insufficient. The Iran crisis is a reminder that the Middle East remains at base a hard power theater. This has consequences for the American military presence in and around Europe. As the continent rearms, the United States may reduce its force posture there. But a substantial air and naval presence in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf may remain, serving deterrence and defense across multiple theaters.

Second, ongoing events will greatly reinforce concerns about air and missile defense, already high on the allied agenda in light of Ukraine’s experience and previous Middle East conflicts. The rapid proliferation of long-range strike technologies, including the covert introduction of drone swarms, puts the exposure of civilian populations at the center of defense debates. The Trump administration’s Golden Dome initiative will surely get a boost. And, as large parts of southern Europe, and American forces in that area, are within range of Iranian ballistic missiles, it makes sense that much of NATO’s existing missile defense capability is afloat in the Mediterranean or ashore in adjacent regions. Even with more primitive technologies, missile attacks against population centers have been a feature of Middle Eastern conflict since the 1980s (e.g., the “battle of the cities” during the Iran-Iraq war) due to a high degree of urbanization and short distances to targets. These conditions are also characteristic of the European theater.

Third, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic need to revisit their commitments to maritime security and the protection of infrastructure more generally. The closure of the Red Sea route and the virtual collapse of traffic through the Suez Canal due to Houthi attacks on shipping are relatively minor disruptions compared to a closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Some 20% of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas trade passes through this critical choke point, which Iran has threatened to close, a move that would affect Asian and Western energy security. It is inconceivable that the United States and other actors with regional economic stakes and a military presence—including France, India, Türkiye, and even China— would not react. Could it prompt a NATO operation? More broadly, the enthusiasm around fashionable new connectivity projects such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, will also demand the means and willingness to protect lines of communication and reassure investors in such initiatives.

Fourth, the ongoing strikes against Iran are progressively degrading the country’s capacity for a conventional response against Israel or others. But in Tehran’s view, the campaign is likely to produce a long-term open account with Israel and its Western partners. Under these conditions, Iran may well rely on a new round of asymmetrical warfare via proxies and terrorism. At a time of planning for massive new investments in conventional defense, Europe and the United States need to contend with this risk.

As allies look to the upcoming NATO summit, defense burden-sharing will top the agenda. But events in the Middle East and the prospect of escalation may reshape the debate about priorities and missions beyond increased defense spending and planning for large-scale conventional contingencies in Europe.

Israel: Needing Allies More Than Ever

By Gabriel Mitchell

Successive Israeli governments have sounded the alarm over the looming threat of a nuclear-armed Iran for decades. They lobbied Washington and European capitals, delivered dramatic addresses at the UN, and cultivated alliances with states that also viewed Tehran as a destabilizing regional force. These efforts yielded uneven results. Western-led nuclear negotiations with Iran consistently fell short of addressing Israel’s core security concerns and rarely touched on Tehran’s parallel campaign to arm regional proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas.

Israel’s preemptive strikes on June 13, which intelligence suggesting Iranian scientists had begun weaponizing nuclear material prompted, aim to shift the long-standing status quo. By eliminating senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders and Iran’s nuclear scientists, hitting key infrastructure and above-ground facilities, and degrading Iranian air defenses, Israel is laying the groundwork for a potentially transformative moment in regional and global geopolitics. 

But turning early military gains into a lasting political outcome will require support from Israel’s allies. After nearly two years of war in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, during which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government have often dismissed friendly advice, Israel’s appeals for backing have been met with sympathetic but largely noncommittal responses. The Gulf states are not disappointed to see the Iranian regime brought down a notch, but they increasingly see Israel’s approach as at odds with their own priorities of regional connectivity and economic integration. European leaders, meanwhile, are preoccupied with the war in Ukraine and frustrated by Israel’s handling of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

That leaves the US President Donald Trump, who just weeks ago in Riyadh pledged to end Western intervention in the Middle East and continues to extend an olive branch to Tehran. Regardless of Israel’s endgame—whether regime change, a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program, or coercing the Islamic Republic into accepting a stricter, time-limited agreement—success is impossible without American leadership.

And time is of the essence. Israel will continue its aerial campaign to dismantle Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure as long as weapons stockpiles allow, and as long as Iranian missile and drone attacks fail to inflict serious damage on the home front. But without a complementary diplomatic strategy, Israel risks alienating its partners, accelerating Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, and ending up in a dangerous regional stalemate.

Türkiye: Pursuing Cautious Diplomacy

By Özgur Ünlühisarcıklı

Türkiye views Iran as a destabilizing regional actor and strategic competitor but not an outright adversary. Ankara and Tehran have pursued different visions for the Middle East and have engaged in proxy conflicts in the South Caucasus and the Levant, but no major bilateral disputes exist. Their relationship is underpinned by approximately $5.5 billion in annual trade, largely driven by Turkish industrial exports to and oil imports from Iran.

In contrast, Türkiye sees Israel as a source of regional instability and, increasingly, a national security concern. Bilateral relations have been spiralling downward since Israel’s operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009 and, more notably, the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010. Ongoing violence in Gaza has led Türkiye to impose a trade ban on Israel, and the fall of the Assad regime has racheted up tensions even further given the two countries’ overlapping security interests in Syria.

Türkiye opposes the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as this could provoke a regional arms race and unpredictably shift the strategic balance in the area. But Ankara prefers diplomacy over military action to prevent all this given economic interdependence with Iran and the risk of regional instability if conflict escalates.

Three scenarios are particularly troubling for Ankara. First, a sudden collapse of the Iranian regime—a possibility that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently raised—would leave Türkiye facing the fallout of chaos in a neighboring country that has significant Turkish and Kurdish minorities. This could lead to an influx of refugees, border insecurity, and the rise of non-state actors in a potential power vacuum. Second, should Iran conclude that all conventional deterrents have failed, it may fast-track its nuclear program. Third, a decisive Israeli victory that neutralizes Iran could result in a regional imbalance. In such a case, Türkiye and others may feel compelled to seek new forms of strategic counterweights to Israel’s dominance, further complicating regional dynamics.

Ankara is expected to act cautiously despite the high stakes. With recent signs of rapprochement and Washington, it is likely to coordinate efforts with the United States and work to stabilize the region without becoming entangled in any conflict. Such careful balancing reflects a broader strategic calculus. Türkiye seeks to avoid escalation while maintaining influence in a volatile neighborhood.

The Geopolitical Impact: Intertwined Layers of Influence

By Kristina Kausch

As observers rush to make sense of the escalation between Israel and Iran, disentangling the roots and implications of this crisis at the intertwined levels of national, regional, and global politics is key for sound policymaking. 

The governments of both countries are under great domestic stress. They need to show strength and have little wiggle room for concessions. Their futures are likely inextricably linked to the outcome of their confrontation. Failure for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing coalition government could see them fall. The same could be said for Iran’s theocratic regime, which would probably lead to the country’s immediate destabilization and an uncertain long-term future. 

Regionally, Iran has been weakened significantly in recent years, while Israel has been emboldened. Its operations have degraded Tehran’s proxies, notably Hezbollah, which has been a key vehicle for projecting Iranian power. Their leadership and capabilities have been diminished. Many in Israel consequently view the moment as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to eliminate the existential Iranian threat for good.

Regime change in Tehran would constitute a tectonic shift in the Middle East’s balance of power. It would have far-reaching yet unpredictable consequences. It is worth remembering the major turning point that constituted the 2003 fall of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime in Iraq. The ensuing power vacuum there led to destabilization and structural changes, including the rise of the Islamic State jihadist group, the ascendance of Iranian proxy power, the spread of sectarian violence, and a stronger Russian and Chinese regional presence.

The present crisis also has potentially wider implications for global governance, most notably the survival of the international regime enshrined in the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which both the United States and Iran are parties. Denying Iran its NPT-enshrined right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes would undermine the pact by challenging its fundamental stipulation: a pledge by nuclear powers to assist with disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear technology in return for a commitment to refrain from developing nuclear weapons. A dismantling of this regime could spur more countries to develop such weapons to ensure deterrence.

At the great-power level, the United States, Israel’s security patron and Iran’s prime adversary, seems to have been convinced that an Israeli attack will help bring hawkish American demands in recent nuclear talks with Tehran to fruition. Initially, US President Donald Trump had been focused on integrating a solution for Palestine/Gaza into a wider Abraham Accords deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia. But Trump has become increasingly disengaged from the Israel-Palestine conflict as Netanyahu has shown himself resistant to US pressure. 

Trump’s tendency to approach international diplomacy in package deals, often disregarding sustainable local-conflict resolution as collateral damage, suggests that he sees the current crisis at the great-power level. His suggestion that Russian President Vladimir Putin serve as a conflict mediator may herald another cross-theater connection, making Iran another component of Washington’s geopolitical bazaar with Moscow.