Ishiba skipping NATO summit exposes gaps in Japan's Europe engagement

This article was originally published on Japan Wire by Kyodo.

Since a Japanese prime minister first attended a NATO summit in 2022, Japan has sent its highest-level representative to the event for three consecutive years. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a key catalyst for Tokyo's decision to attend that year, and the 2025 summit in The Hague would have marked the fourth consecutive appearance by a Japanese leader. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba was expected to meet with like-minded NATO partners to deepen cooperation amid the security challenges that link the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters. However, his participation was abruptly canceled, with Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya attending in his place. The decision not to attend personally represents a missed opportunity to strengthen ties with Europe at a time when Japan's strategic thinking is increasingly turning toward this region.

Ishiba's glaring absence comes at a sensitive moment for Japan, as it confronts growing Chinese assertiveness while managing a more unpredictable United States. While previous U.S. administrations invested significant diplomatic and political capital in promoting cross-regional cooperation between NATO and its Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) partners, the current Trump administration has shown far less interest in advancing such efforts. In fact, President Donald Trump announced he would not attend a meeting between NATO and the IP4 partners during the summit in The Hague -- a move that likely prompted three of the four Indo-Pacific countries to cancel their leaders' attendance. Trump's emphasis on narrow, transactional negotiations over defense spending within allies' respective regions has broken the momentum for cross-regional cooperation built over the past three years. In this context, Ishiba's decision to skip the summit reflects Tokyo's desire to avoid confrontation with Trump over contentious issues such as defense expenditures and trade. These topics remain especially sensitive given the Japanese government's fragile approval ratings and the upcoming upper house elections in July. Ishiba's absence may have been an effort to preserve strategic flexibility in an increasingly unpredictable environment, but it risks halting the progress that Tokyo is making in advancing defense industrial ties with European NATO partners at a critical juncture.

As geopolitical competition intensifies, defense technology innovation and a robust defense industrial base have emerged as indispensable strategic assets. Yet, this is an area where Japan has traditionally lagged, due to the longstanding constraints on its defense industry and heavy reliance on U.S. procurements. The tide, however, appears to be shifting. In its 2022 strategic documents, Tokyo identified reinforcing its defense production and technology base as a national priority. Since 2023, Japan has eased its export controls, allowing the licensed export of domestically produced defense equipment, including lethal systems, to boost competitiveness through economies of scale and access to overseas markets. At the same time, Tokyo seeks to diversify its defense procurement and development partnerships beyond the United States, increasingly turning towards European partners.

As Japan carefully balances its security and economic relations with its ally, concerns over U.S. unpredictability have indeed elevated the importance of European partners for Tokyo's foreign and defense policy. Europe now features prominently in Japanese strategic thinking, with Tokyo expanding security cooperation with several European states at the bilateral and multilateral levels, through mechanisms like NATO IP4 and the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). GCAP, a new Japan-Italy-U.K. partnership for the development of a sixth-generation fighter jet, has been described as a "new alliance" since the multilayered cooperation between the three governments, militaries, and industries will inevitably strengthen security ties among the three nations.

Japan's extensive and asymmetric dependence on U.S. defense collaboration and procurement has long been a source of frustration for Japanese officials and defense companies. According to a defense expert interviewed in July 2024, Tokyo maintains a "painful memory" of its co-development with the U.S. on the F-2 fighter program in the 1980s, which continues to shape Japanese perceptions. U.S. restrictions on the sharing of confidential technical information, coupled with the inability to freely modify procured systems without U.S. approval, have complicated both co-development programs like the F-2 and procurement of F-35s. An expert on Japan's defense industrial policy, also interviewed in July 2024, observed that the U.S. Foreign Military Sales system remains fundamentally "asymmetrical" since "the Japanese government cannot acquire necessary or valuable technological information." This lack of technological freedom creates persistent challenges for Japan's defense autonomy.

In reaction to these concerns, Japan is diversifying defense industrial collaboration. Beyond GCAP, Japan is partnering with the U.K. on Joint New Air-to-Air Missiles (JNAAM) and a universal radio frequency sensor technology (JAGUAR), while collaborating with France on mine countermeasures, and trilaterally with France and Germany on railgun technologies. Reflecting this trend, the Financial Times reported on a notable increase in the presence of European defense companies at Japan's 2025 Defense and Security Equipment International (DSEI) expo. Moreover, in November 2024, Japan and the EU issued the "Japan-EU Security and Defence Partnership," their first-ever document outlining concrete cooperation initiatives in maritime security, space, cybersecurity, and hybrid threats. These efforts have gained urgency with Trump's return to the White House, as his administration's transactional approach to alliances raises new uncertainties for all allies.

While these initiatives do not indicate a pivot away from the United States, they mark the growing significance of European partners for Japan. According to the Financial Times, Tokyo canceled the annual "two-plus-two" security dialogue scheduled in Washington after the U.S. suddenly asked its ally to boost defense spending to 3.5 percent -- higher than its previous request of 3 percent. Whether the cancellation was due to Washington's latest demand or a simple scheduling conflict, there is no denying that the two allies will need to face some difficult conversations in the coming months.

Lack of technological freedom and overreliance on the U.S. for defense technology risk making Japan a captive of its own alliance, as the U.S. president has shown little hesitation in demanding higher purchases of American weapon systems, including offering the new F-47 to Japan as a bargaining chip in tariff negotiations. As Washington increasingly treats arms sales and security guarantees as transactional tools for managing trade imbalances, Japan, like Europe, faces the challenge of balancing U.S. demands while seeking diversification for its security partnerships.

Ishiba's absence from this year's NATO summit, while shielding Japan from potentially difficult discussions with Washington in the short term, is therefore a missed opportunity for advancing ties with NATO partners at a critical moment. One of the objectives of the newly established Mission of Japan to NATO is to enhance European understanding of Japan and the Indo-Pacific. Ishiba's decision not to attend following the cancellations by other IP4 leaders may show a lack of leadership in the region, but it also risks sending the signal to Europeans that the Indo-Pacific is, after all, not as important as when former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida used to repeat "Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow."

Ishiba, who replaced Kishida in October 2024, has yet to visit Europe, despite the fact that relations with European countries have taken on increasing importance in recent years. His personal engagement with European leaders would have signaled Japan's commitment to deepening these strategic partnerships -- a gesture increasingly valuable as both Japan and its European partners navigate the uncertainties of managing their respective alliances in the coming years.

Sayuri Romei is a Washington-based senior fellow in the German Marshall Fund's Indo-Pacific program. Her research focuses on U.S.-Japan relations and security issues in the Indo-Pacific region.

Alice Dell'Era is an assistant professor at the Security Studies and International Affairs Department in the Florida-based Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.