A TRIPP Toward Peace Through Armenia’s Highlands?

On August 8, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev agreed in Washington on a breakthrough in the conflict-resolution process between their countries. Now, further diplomacy and mutual goodwill are needed to turn it into a lasting and sustainable peace for both countries

The joint declaration Aliyev and Pashinyan signed commits them to “continue further actions” toward signing a final peace agreement. On August 11, the two governments published its draft, which they also initialed in Washington.

The most immediate outcome will be the dismantling of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Minsk Group, created in 1992 to seek a resolution to the conflict. Azerbaijan has sidelined it since 2020 and it has effectively been defunct since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This removes a key element of diplomatic leverage for Armenia. Yerevan had tied the group’s termination to the signing of a peace agreement, but dropped this to incentivize Baku to sign the joint declaration and to initial the agreement’s draft.

The declaration calls for the opening communications and the border, on the basis of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdiction of both countries. It cites the 1991 Almaty Declaration— of particular importance for Armenia as it reaffirms Soviet-era borders. Azerbaijan long resisted this while continuing to occupy over 250 square kilometers of Armenian territory. Border demarcation, however, will be a separate process.

Such ambiguity and the need to pin down every detail could delay the finalization of the peace deal.

Azerbaijan inserted the term “unimpeded” in the declaration in reference to its desired link to its Nakhichevan exclave, to be accompanied by “reciprocal benefits” for Armenia. The implication is that it would gain access to Nakhichevan through the Meghri highlands region in Armenia’s Syunik province, but the route would remain under Armenian jurisdiction. (Baku refers to the route as the “Zangezur corridor”, which Yerevan rejects as implying a historical territorial claim on its territory.) The reciprocal benefit for Armenia would be quicker road and rail access via Nakhichevan to Syunik and to Iran, and potentially via Azerbaijan to Russia.

The arrangement is not fully reciprocal. The Meghri route—branded the Trump Route for Peace & Prosperity (TRIPP)—would be leased and managed by US and other international contractors, while Armenia’s access to Nakhichevan would likely remain under Azerbaijan’s full jurisdiction with no third-party presence. This structure also gives Yerevan few guarantees of reciprocity regarding the TRIPP’s completion and security. And the term “unimpeded” is vague, implying that the route’s operator would deal directly with Azerbaijani travelers and only report to Armenian authorities backstage.

Such ambiguity and the need to pin down every detail could delay the finalization of the peace deal or become a source of pressure on Armenia to make more concessions.

Acute Concerns

Despite the progress toward the signature of the final peace agreement, several acute concerns remain.

There is a trust deficit between the two countries, given Azerbaijan’s record of breaking or reinterpreting agreements through force. The operational terms of the TRIPP are yet to be agreed and this risks becoming a bargaining tool against Yerevan.

What is more, Aliyev has said he will withhold his signature until Armenia adopts a new constitution to remove any seeming territorial claim. This would be a lengthy, complicated, high-risk process with a far-from-guaranteed result—and humiliating for Armenia.

Baku’s insistence on this reveals its political aims: to delay peace, to exert pressure on Yerevan, to consolidate Aliyev’s domestic legitimacy by portraying this as a victory for him, and to retain a legal pretext for future aggression should a referendum fail. Considering Aliyev’s demands and waning domestic trust in Pashinyan, it is not hard to imagine a referendum failing. This issue is a lurking potential disaster for the long term.

There is a trust deficit between the two countries, given Azerbaijan’s record of breaking or reinterpreting agreements through force.

The United States would take on a role that is primarily commercial as well as political, but it has not offered any security guarantees. What is more, it reportedly intends to repeal or waive a decades-old restriction on aid to Azerbaijan, even as the latter continues to occupy Armenian land and to pursue aggressive policies.

Finally, if Armenian prisoners of war remain in Azerbaijani custody even at this “historic” moment, the prospects for their release remain even gloomier going ahead.

Nevertheless, not only Aliyev but also Pashinyan are framing the outcome of the Washington meeting domestically as a triumph.

Aliyev will present it as securing access to Nakhichevan and a peace agreement on Azerbaijani terms. The text reflects Armenian concessions, such as the removal of third-party monitoring on the border (notably EU observers), the dropping of international legal cases (undermining Armenia’s to the International Court of Justice to hold Azerbaijani war criminals accountable), and the omission of provisions on Karabakh refugees and cultural heritage.

Pashinyan describes the joint declaration as a historic success, portraying it as safeguarding Armenia’s sovereignty over the Meghri route, a step toward reducing dependency on Russia, and an opening to peace.

The Iran and Russia Factors

The joint declaration effectively replaces the part of the 2020 ceasefire agreement that called for putting the route under Russian control and pushes Moscow further away from the mediating process, one of its few remaining or potential hard-power levers for insuring its interests in the new regional order. Russia’s Foreign Ministry has reacted ambivalently, welcoming the latest development but issuing a warning.

Russia’s interests could still be served if the TRIPP integrates or connects with Armenia’s railway infrastructure, which is owned and operated by a subsidiary of Russia’s state railway. Moscow could also use the route—even if US-operated—to gain overland access to Türkiye via Azerbaijan and Armenia. In a call with President Vladimir Putin, Pashinyan seems to have emphasized this in an attempt to build as wide of a coalition as possible around the project. 

If Russia decides to undermine the TRIPP, it could target Azerbaijan through escalated tensions, destabilization of its energy sector, and strikes on Azerbaijani-linked oil and gas infrastructure in Ukraine as has already happened in recent weeks. Moscow also has extensive economic and social leverage to use against Yerevan, such as trade (including Armenia’s imports of Russian wheat and substantial agricultural exports to Russia), energy supplies, migrant labor flows, and diaspora ties. It can also exploit Yerevan’s customs obligations as a member of the Eurasian Economic Union.

The TRIPP agreement reflects Armenia’s delicate balance between Iran and the United States. While Tehran opposes any arrangement that will cut it off from a neighbor that is a gateway to the Black Sea region and Europe, it is in favor of regional links that consider its interests. Judging from some initial cautiously positive reactions, it will not oppose the project as long as its the operational details ensure its security and connection with Armenia. Sharper Iranian statements, especially from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s close circle, should be read as grievances toward Russia, which Tehran believes has abandoned its stance and commitments in the Caucasus.

What was agreed in last week’s White House meeting will support the de-escalation momentum between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the short-to-medium term. However, it fails to address injustices and violations of human rights. It reflects a victor’s peace by force, and goes against the rules-based order. It comes at the high price of unilateral concessions by Yerevan. The price of any errors in the coming months will only be higher.

Narek Sukiasyan is a consultant on Armenia for GMF’s Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation.