Taiwan’s Growing Distrust of the United States

The Taiwan public’s historically favorable view of the United States is declining. Skepticism about Washington’s dependability temporarily spiked when the Biden administration opted not to send troops to help defend Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. But the sentiment returned and is now spreading. It is being fueled by doubts about President Donald Trump and concerns that Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC) expansion of production facilities to the United States weakens Taiwan’s strategic importance, potentially increasing the risk of an attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Trump’s reciprocal tariffs on Taiwan are also taking a toll on the US image. The president initially set a 32% rate for Taiwanese products but provisionally lowered that to 20%, still higher than the 15% imposed on goods from US allies Japan and South Korea.

Misgivings about the United States have historical roots, but the “US skepticism” narrative in Taiwan that portrays Washington as an unreliable partner is becoming more deeply entrenched. If left to fester, these doubts may harm American interests.

By the Numbers

Multiple public opinion polls confirm the Taiwan public’s growing negativity toward and distrust of the United States. Correspondingly, confidence in US support in the event of a Taiwan Strait conflict has also dropped.

A Brookings Institution report that looked at surveys conducted in Taiwan between February and April finds that 40.5% of respondents said they held a negative view of the United States, up from 24.2% in July 2024. The report also cites a 13.9 percentage point increase in respondents who believe the United States to be an untrustworthy ally. Similarly, the March 2025 American Portrait Survey finds that 59.6% of respondents do not consider the United States to be trustworthy, a near 10 percentage point increase from the previous year. In both surveys, more than 40% of respondents say they believe that the United States is unlikely to intervene or definitely will not intervene if war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait.

Trump’s “reciprocal” tariffs against Taiwan are likely a major factor for the hit to the US image. In a Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) public opinion poll from mid-April, 81.9% of respondents said the levies were unreasonable. Fully 86.4% believed that they would have a serious or moderate impact on Taiwan’s economy.

Trump himself is another driver of Washington’s eroding image. The Brookings report notes that 60.9% of respondents disagree with the statement that “Taiwan is safer than before with Trump as President.” And the TPOF poll reveals that 57.2% of respondents believe the United States is less dependable under the Trump administration. Similar patterns of distrust of the president can be found on social media in Taiwan. The dominant online narrative is that Trump is a businessman (“商人”) who cares only about profit. Many call him a bandit (“土匪”) and refer to US foreign policy as acts of robbery (“搶劫”) or bullying. This sentiment is especially evident in posts about tariff negotiations.

A widespread belief that the Trump administration is purposefully impairing Taiwan’s dominant position in global semiconductor production by pressuring TSMC to build six fabrication plants in the United States also dents Washington’s reputation. Polling conducted by Global Views Research in March shows that a majority of Taiwan’s citizens believe TSMC’s decision to manufacture advanced chips in the United States weakens a “silicon shield” that protects the island from a PRC attack. More than 80% of respondents believe that the investments are a result of US pressure, despite Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s claim to the contrary. The concern among Taiwan’s public is that such investments, which transfer a substantial portion of TSMC’s production of the most advanced chips to Arizona, removes a compelling US interest in defending Taiwan.

Advantage Beijing?

The shift in public opinion, if it endures or even worsens, could set back US interests. The rising uneasiness could induce despair about Taiwan’s future, providing the PRC with an opportunity to advance its long-term strategy of convincing Taiwan citizens that their best and perhaps only option is unification on Beijing’s terms. The dismay may also embolden the PRC to undertake riskier actions to compel unification, such as challenging Taiwan’s jurisdiction over nearby waters, implementing a quarantine or a blockade, or seizing one of Taiwan’s outlying islands. The United States has long opposed such coercive moves.

Relatedly, pessimism about US willingness to support and defend Taiwan is likely to weaken resolve among the island’s own citizens in case of an invasion by the PRC. Academic research attests that “will to fight” increases significantly when accompanied by a belief that external military assistance is forthcoming. Polls in Taiwan have identified this correlation with a potential US defense of the island. Public skepticism of American assistance, however, could erode support for a larger defense budget, military training, or civil defense measures.

Moreover, other regional partners, including Australia, Japan, and the Philippines, closely monitor US reliability regarding Taiwan. Those allies see it as a barometer for Washington’s security commitments to their own countries. If Taiwan’s public loses faith in the United States, these allies may begin to doubt US steadfastness. The PRC could amplify such disillusionment through domestic and global propaganda, reinforcing its narrative of Washington’s declining power and its unwillingness or inability to defend its friends.

Buck Up

To counter the growing skepticism in Taiwan and bolster its citizens’ resilience, Washington should:

• do no harm. Negotiations between the United States and the PRC should not lead to outcomes that jeopardize Taiwan’s security or prosperity.
• make clear that Taiwan matters to the United States. A high-profile presidential speech, for example, could also rally popular support in the United States for defending Taiwan in case of attack.
• approve and ensure timely delivery of asymmetric weapons to Taiwan, including by using presidential drawdown authority and foreign military financing.
• finalize the US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade. An initial agreement on five areas entered into force in December 2024. A second agreement, which has yet to be reached, would cover labor rights, environmental protections, and agriculture. The US Senate should also expedite approval of an agreement to avoid double taxation to remove investment barriers.
• facilitate, not hamper, transits of the United States by Taiwan’s presidents. Transits enable Taiwan’s leaders to travel abroad, which eases Taiwan’s citizens’ concerns about Beijing’s campaign to diplomatically isolate Taiwan. This is a long-standing practice that is officially provided by the United States for the “safety, comfort, convenience, and dignity” of the traveler and should be conducted according to precedent.
• continue to send Congressional delegations to Taiwan to reaffirm the United States’ commitment to Taiwan’s democracy, prosperity, and security.

Strengthening Taiwan’s trust in the United States promotes American interests in the Indo-Pacific by forging greater support for Taiwan’s investment in defense, economic security, and resilience. A more confident Taiwan will likely communicate closely with Washington, which enables effective coordination and reduces the possibility of surprises that could cause increased cross-Strait tensions. Bolstering Taiwan’s faith in the United States also sends two important signals. The first, to Washington’s other partners and allies in the region, is that the United States is not abandoning its friends. The second is that the preservation of Indo-Pacific peace and stability remains an American priority.