The Erdoğan-Trump Meeting: Help Me Help You

The meeting between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and US President Donald Trump at the White House on September 25, 2025, was crafted as a public relations exercise—and by that measure, it was successful. Their personal rapport, long noted by observers, was once again on display. Both leaders signaled a preference for cooperation and a desire to avoid friction over longstanding disagreements. 

The press appearance preceding their closed-door talks highlighted one of the meeting’s central dynamics: Trump’s effort to rehabilitate Erdoğan’s image within Washington. Thomas Barrack, serving as US ambassador to Türkiye and special envoy for Syria, foreshadowed this approach at the 2025 Concordia Annual Summit when he remarked that “President Trump says … let’s give them what they need … legitimacy.” This legitimacy, clearly, is less about Turkish domestic politics and more about Erdoğan’s standing in US political circles. Trump, in effect, is helping Erdoğan help him in turn. The United States could indeed benefit from Türkiye’s support in a wide geography ranging from the Black Sea to the Middle East and the Balkans to Central Asia. 

Erdoğan reciprocated with gestures designed to ease bilateral tensions. Ahead of the meeting, Ankara signaled a willingness to reduce tariffs on US goods, floated potential Boeing purchases, and discussed renewed defense and trade cooperation. During the press appearance, Erdoğan spoke sparingly, allowing Trump to dominate the stage. Yet when Trump raised the long-sensitive issue of reopening the Halki Seminary—a Greek Orthodox theological school in Istanbul closed since 1971—Erdoğan replied that Türkiye was “ready to do whatever is necessary”. Such a move would resonate well in Congress, where religious freedom is a bipartisan concern. 

Trump, for his part, praised Erdoğan warmly and projected optimism about resetting bilateral ties. He even suggested rapid progress on sensitive issues such as Türkiye’s return to the F-35 fighter jet program and lifting of sanctions—though in reality, both require congressional accommodation and are far from guaranteed. 

Persistent obstacles remain. Washington and Ankara continue to clash over the US partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces, as well as over policy toward Gaza and Israel’s regional posture. One cordial White House meeting cannot resolve these entrenched disputes. Still, it may mark the first step toward putting the US–Türkiye relationship back on steadier ground. 

Still missing, however, is sustained interparliamentary engagement. Without rebuilding trust and dialogue at the legislative level, even presidential goodwill will not be enough to sustainably revive the relationship. Strong executive ties must be complemented by equally robust parliamentary diplomacy.