The World According to Andrej Babiš

According to all polls and expectations, Andrej Babiš and his ANO party will come out of Czechia’s October 3–4 parliamentary elections as the most important political force for the next four years, though he will likely need to form a coalition to head the government. ANO published its electoral program earlier this month and, while heavily focused on domestic matters, it contains pointers to what kind of foreign policy his government could pursue.

Already before that, the former prime minister and ANO candidates had put forward many different ideas while campaigning, often testing the public’s reactions. This has been a common practice for Babiš, who has called ANO a catch-all party. For example, in 2023 he swiftly backtracked after saying said that he would not send “Czech children” to war even if Russia attacked Poland and the Baltic states,

For most observers, ANO has always been about promising almost everything to everybody in domestic politics. But when it comes to foreign affairs, it is more restrained. The chapters in its program dealing with foreign affairs and defense are basically framed in opposition to the outgoing government’s policies. The main message is “no”—to an activist foreign policy, to illegal migration and the EU Migration Pact, to the EU’s Green Deal, to adopting the euro, and to the EU’s Digital Services Act.

Membership in NATO, transatlantic ties, and the Visegrad Group (which brings the country together with Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) are presented as Czechia’s main anchors in the world. While emphasizing national interests and the sovereigntist positions of the Patriots for Europe, ANO’s political group in the European Parliament, the program calls for pragmatism in foreign affairs and in the EU.

Babiš and ANO should not be expected to propose leaving the EU, which key party representatives have called a red line. The program says EU membership should “not be questioned”. However, ANO is also calling for the ability to hold referendums, which is not explicitly included in Czech law, on key issues. This could be used eventually for challenging EU or NATO membership.

The chapter on defense and security calls for establishing a hybrid force to cope with new types of hybrid challenges, a more robust approach to cybersecurity, and a more holistic approach to security with more efficient collaboration between the ministries of defense and interior. The focus is also on Czechia remaining a trustworthy ally in NATO and modernizing its technological and physical infrastructure.

The program states that ANO stands for a diplomatic solution to the war in Ukraine and calls for minimizing the risk of bringing the war closer to the rest of Europe. However, it does not contain any mention of Russia. The above and a general warning about smuggling and organized crime that might follow the end of the war are the only mentions of Ukraine in the 37-pages document.

This rather ambivalent position on the most significant security challenge for Czechia has to do with the split on Ukraine among ANO’s electorate and membership.

This rather ambivalent position on the most significant security challenge for Czechia has to do with the split on Ukraine among ANO’s electorate and membership. These include harsh critics of Ukraine and its refugees among the more anti-system elements as well as those who are more centrist and largely supports the country.

ANO has also distanced itself from the outgoing government’s ammunition initiative, which has been Czechia’s most significant contribution to Ukraine’s defense. Babiš has criticized the owners of private defense companies involved in the initiative and denounced making money from the war, proposing to move the whole framework to the NATO level. The party’s program also calls for increasing the transparency of investments in defense and security as well as military procurement.

Judging by its program, should ANO lead the next government, there will most likely be more continuity than change in foreign policy, even if there is a different tone and a greater focus on NATO than on the EU.

At the level of EU politics, the other member states would have to find a modus vivendi with a new government in Prague that might look quite a lot like the one in Italy or the previous one in Poland.

It is hard to imagine that an ANO government would break ranks with other EU and especially transatlantic leaders on key questions, but fewer initiatives and solutions should be expected from Prague. This is going to be important since there are big decisions to be made at these levels in the coming months, not least regarding the sending of European soldiers to Ukraine.

Babiš apparently wants to signal that he will make Czechia a credible ally ready for different crisis situations and somehow invest in deterrence and defense, but also that it will act with restraint and cautiously coordinate with other partners inside NATO and the EU.

However, Babiš and ANO are very unlikely to be able to form a new government on their own, and it is far from clear which political constellation might prevail for forming one. They might need to make compromises that could negatively affect Czechia’s foreign, EU, and security stance, especially if they have to rely on the anti-system and anti-West far-left or far-right forces of Stačilo! (Enough!) or Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD).

Both parties are strongly revisionist when it comes to the post-1989 order and, in many respects, would welcome a normalization of relations with Russia. In the past, the alliance of ANO with the communists (which are now part of Stačilo!) threatened to prevent Czechia’s involvement in NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic states, which could only go ahead with the support of the then opposition.

In that context, Czechia’s EU and NATO partners must be prepared to deal with a Babiš-led government in a way that helps keep it aligned with the country’s traditional foreign policy toward both institutions, which might at times be difficult politically. The EU and NATO are going through many challenges and need Prague to remain a committed member.

Pavel Havlicek is a ReThink.CEE Fellow 2019 of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.