Ukraine’s Corruption Scandal Part Two: How Zelenskyy Can Get Ahead of It

The corruption investigation rocking Kyiv this week is part two of the Ukrainian anti-corruption scandal that erupted in July, triggering the biggest protests in a decade and strident international pushback. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has a brief window to get ahead of this new phase of the crisis. So far, he is missing that opportunity by limiting his responses to incremental damage control. Ukraine’s foreign partners should also take a lesson from the summer and push now for a thorough, three-pronged response: accountability, energy governance reform, and broader corporate governance and law enforcement reform.

The high-level embezzlement was allegedly masterminded by Timur Mindich, who has long served as business partner and wallet for Zelenskyy as co-owner of his Kvartal 95 production company. Contractors of the state-owned nuclear energy company, Energoatom, were forced to pay kickbacks and bribes to Mindich’s criminal organization.

Energoatom manages the international aid used to harden Ukraine’s energy infrastructure against escalating Russian bombardment—which makes this scandal devastating for Ukrainians across the country as they endure daily blackouts and face another winter without reliable electricity and heating.

Instead of protecting Ukrainian energy, the proceeds of this corruption were funneled to Zelenskyy’s close ally, deputy prime minister Oleksii Chernyshov, who reportedly spent it building luxury homes for himself, Mindich,  and "the country's leadership".

Zelenskyy’s move in July to gut the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) appears to have been a response to their closing in on Chernyshov and Mindich. This week, the agencies charged Chernyshov with illicit enrichment. But Mindich was apparently tipped off, enabling him to flee the country hours before NABU and SAPO came for him.

An Insufficient Response

Zelenskyy is not currently backsliding by attacking the anti-corruption agencies, as he did in July. But his response is still inadequate, since it merely minimizes the scandal.

At first, Zelenskyy’s office tried to downplay Mindich’s role in the corruption case. But as more damning evidence came out, Zelenskyy relented and imposed sanctions on Mindich. When the justice minister and energy minister were implicated in the case, Zelenskyy first sought to place them on temporary leave. Only after public outcry for more accountability did Zelenskyy concede that they should resign, which they did on Wednesday.

What a Proportional Response Would Look Like

Zelenskyy must show that he is serious about restoring credibility and protecting the democracy under the rule of law for which Ukrainians are sacrificing every day. To do that, he must move beyond reactive measures to a comprehensive strategy that addresses this case specifically but also tackles systemic vulnerabilities. International partners—particularly the EU, the United States, and multilateral donors—should press Kyiv on three fronts:

First, enforce accountability against corrupt figures. Zelenskyy must shift from minimizing the current case to using it as an opportunity to thoroughly purge his inner circle of corrupt officials. He must guarantee NABU and SAPO complete independence and all support needed to deliver swift justice, following the facts and the law to whomever they incriminate. He should start by releasing Ruslan Mahamedrasulov, a NABU officer who was investigating the Energoatom case until he was arrested by a law enforcement agency controlled by the president, and closing the case against him. Accountability also includes giving NABU and SAPO all access, information, and authority needed to identify the person who leaked information enabling Mindich to flee, as well as deploying diplomatic and legal measures to extradite Mindich and repatriate any assets he controls back to Ukrainian jurisdiction. Ultimately, Zelenskyy must act decisively to eliminate corruption in and around the highest level of his government, including by firing a handful of ministers and members of the leadership of the Office of the President.

Second, implement targeted reforms at Energoatom. Ukraine should promptly and transparently reboot Energoatom’s supervisory board in close consultation with the country’s international partners, enable an independent audit of the company, install internal control systems aligned with EU law, and bring Energoatom’s governance into accordance with OECD standards. This, first and foremost, involves public disclosure of board composition and qualifications, open access to financial statements and beneficial ownership data, transparent financial oversight, robust conflict of interest and ethics frameworks, meaningful stakeholder engagement, and regular independent transparency audits.

Third, adopt broader structural reforms to prevent future abuses. Ukraine must finalize and fully implement the corporate governance reform that the country embarked on back in 2014. This entails harmonization of corporate governance standards with EU acquis and OECD guidelines. If finalized and duly implemented, this reform would strengthen the independence of state-owned enterprises through professional and autonomous supervisory boards empowered to appoint and dismiss managers, improve vetting of candidates for heads of state-owned companies and their supervisory boards, enable transparent disclosures with credible performance targets, and ensure clear separation of executive and supervisory functions.

To enable impartial implementation of these laws, equally important is restoring the  capacity of the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) to conduct independent and effective oversight of state-owned enterprises, including by exercising its control function over executive bodies and the use of budget funds, as well as through special temporary investigative commissions.

Finally, reforming the politically controlled law enforcement agencies that apparently were covering up this organized criminal activity and countering NABU’s investigation of Mindich must be a top priority for the year ahead. The first concrete steps towards depoliticizing law enforcement would be to remove the current prosecutor general—who has been used by the Office of the President to undermine NABU and SAPO—and shift from presidential appointment for this position to holding an open and transparent competition. None of these required steps is new on international partners’ conditionality for Ukraine’s democratic transformation.

Notably, the latest EU enlargement report released on November 4, 2025 reiterated the EU’s call for Ukraine to implement these corporate governance, law enforcement, and parliamentary reforms and listed respective targets.

Anti-Corruption Investigators Are Asking for Help

NABU and SAPO had to go public with their investigation because they would not have been allowed to continue otherwise. Every step in their investigation has been surveilled and countered by law enforcement agencies controlled by the Office of the President. This week’s disclosures should be regarded as a signal flare to the Ukrainian public and international partners to firmly stand by these agencies, making the demand for reform central to engagement with the Ukrainian government.

The EU should make full use of the respective reform benchmarks provided by Ukraine’s EU accession framework and imbed this conditionality in macro-financial assistance, including the planned €140 billion reparations loan backed by frozen Russian assets. At the same time, US lawmakers can use both direct communication with the Ukrainian leadership and amendments to forthcoming legislation on Russia to signal that continued bipartisan Congressional support depends on visible progress. Multilateral institutions including the IMF, World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development should coordinate their messaging around governance standards for state enterprises. Most critically, G7 leaders—including German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and French President Emmanuel Macron—must make clear in direct conversations with President Zelensky that Ukraine’s partnership with the West depends upon accountability in this case, reforms to Energoatom, and broader corporate governance and law enforcement reforms. The trust between the Ukrainian government and its international partners was fundamentally shaken by the July crackdown on the country’s independent anti-corruption agencies, and now it is facing another critical test—but one that Kyiv can still pass. Restoring this trust will take no less than immediate and comprehensive measures from the very top of Ukraine’s political leadership.

Valeriia Ivanova and Ayleen Cameron contributed to this analysis.