Democracy as Security

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine placed the Black Sea region at Europe’s security vanguard. Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Romania are now the fault lines for an intense geopolitical competition that places their governments and institutions under sustained pressure. Through brazen election interference campaigns, authoritarian adversaries have already taken aim at the societal cohesion and resilience of these four states. The assaults highlight the vital importance of democracy for the continued security of the region and the entire European continent. Instability in the Black Sea does not stay there. It impacts the EU’s security, democratic resilience, and energy and trade routes.

Authoritarians’ election meddling also seeks to erode information integrity and institutional robustness. The EU, as a central actor in the four frontline states’ democratic aspirations, assists them as they counter the attacks. The quartet may differ in their level of integration into the EU and NATO, but they share the same strategic reality: Russia is using them to test the boundaries of Europe’s influence. Any successful effort to push back, however, requires more than engagement with the four countries’ governments. A whole-of-society approach is needed.

Civil society, independent journalists, and watchdog organizations are often the first to detect and expose foreign interference, and bolster public trust, when democratic institutions are under pressure. Yet, too often, these critical sectors operate on unstable, short-term grants that limit their ability to invest in long-term resilience, build expertise, or counter sustained hybrid threats. In a region where authoritarians have deep pockets and long horizons, underfunding democratic actors is a security risk. The EU should rectify that.

Democracy Under Pressure: Four Cases, One Vulnerability

Armenia is trying to continue governance reforms under the shadow of existential security threats. The Civil Contract party that has ruled the country since 2018 still enjoys good relations with civil society. Media freedom is slowly improving. However, the war with Azerbaijan severely damaged the ruling party’s popularity, without benefiting any alternative political force. As a result, disillusionment has turned more than half of the country’s population into abstentionists. At a time when Yerevan seeks to recalibrate its foreign policy and distance itself from Russia, Moscow is exploiting the disillusionment by spreading divisive narratives to destabilize Armenia’s fledgling democracy.

Georgia represents the opposite dynamic. Its government, led by the Georgian Dream party, is drifting away from a Euro-Atlantic trajectory despite an overwhelmingly pro-EU and pro-NATO population. Tbilisi has introduced several restrictive NGO laws, put pressure on independent media, and systematically intimidated activists, all of which contribute to a deliberate narrowing of civic space. The government, bankrolled by a man whom the United States has sanctioned due to his Kremlin ties, insists that the EU poses the greatest national threat. Meanwhile, Russia still occupies around 20% of Georgia.

Moldova shows that authoritarian encroachment can be fought and pushed back with sufficient resources and resolve. In recent years, Chisinau experienced a barrage of Russian hybrid operations, culminating in a campaign that cost the Kremlin, according to one conservative estimate, about €100 million. The campaign combined voter bribery, cyberattacks, and artificial intelligence (AI)-driven information manipulation to rig the country’s 2024 and 2025 elections. The EU rose to the occasion, and its financial support was pivotal in developing a robust civil-society response that protected the country’s Euro-Atlantic trajectory.
 

Romania serves as a reminder that being an EU member state does not guarantee resilience. The country’s December 2024 presidential election was marred by the meteoric, TikTok-fueled ascent of anti-NATO and anti-EU forces. A crisis of legitimacy triggered by suspected Russian interference contributed to postponing the vote, but anti-democratic forces were ultimately thwarted at the ballot box. Romanian society remains deeply polarized to this day. Local civil society organizations and independent journalists have been playing key roles in trying to bridge societal divides, but both groups’ resources are overstretched.

These four countries share a goal. Their peoples aspire to live in open, democratic societies and partake in the economic opportunities that come with free markets overseen by governments constrained by the rule of law. All four also face the same antagonist. A revisionist Russia is willing to deploy its kleptocratic regime’s destabilizing tools to fortify authoritarian forces and extinguish neighboring countries’ legitimate aspirations to freedom and prosperity.

With Russia now waging a hybrid war on the EU, Brussels cannot afford to waver in its support for the Black Sea region. The bloc already undertakes great efforts with national governments by supporting vital reforms in justice, administration, and the economy. But meaningful and lasting change requires a deeper buy-in from societies and institutions that cannot be obtained from mere top-level agreements. It demands NGOs, independent journalists, and civic groups that maintain pressure on fledgling institutions, explain policies to citizens, and expose corruption.

Supporting Civil Society is Supporting Security

The hybrid tactics deployed by Russia and other anti-democratic actors in the Black Sea region target societies at large. Elite capture aims at corrupting decision-makers, but information manipulation campaigns leverage social media and AI tools to reach and influence wide swathes of electorates. The EU’s pro-democracy response must be equally all-encompassing. Governments change, and ministers come and go. But civil society endures through election cycles and insulates democracies from adversaries’ long-term strategies.

The war in Ukraine has made Russia’s expansionist ambitions clear to the EU. Brussels has already demonstrated its understanding of the strategic significance of Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Romania in stemming the Kremlin’s westward push, most recently through the publication of its Strategic Approach to the Black Sea region. Now, the EU needs to link its stated ambition of “countering hybrid threats” with the most cost-effective and sustainable way to achieve that objective. That involves treating support for civil society not as development aid but as upstream security policy. It involves investing meaningfully and lastingly in the foot soldiers who man the Black Sea’s democratic frontline.

This text draws on discussions from the Democracy Workshop held on November 20–21, 2025, organized by GMF, the McCain Institute, and the Platform for Security and Defense Initiatives. It also draws on the Moldova Security Forum held on November 18–19, 2025, which was supported by GMF. The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs funded both events.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.