EU Enlargement and Democracy

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has put enlargement back at the top of the EU agenda. After a long hiatus—Croatia was the last country to join in 2013—the enlargement process is now being revived. Albania and North Macedonia finally opened accession negotiations in 2022, but only after a long wait. That same year, Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted candidate status, and Kosovo, Moldova, and Ukraine submitted applications for membership. The latter two have since started accession talks.

Geopolitics is clearly the main driver behind the momentum and is one reason behind member states’ new support for enlargement, at least in principle. Only a short time ago, many national governments expressed reservations, particularly regarding the EU’s “absorption capacity”. The prevailing logic today, given the return of strategic rivalry and conflict, is that EU enlargement can help anchor unstable Western Balkan and Eastern European countries that could otherwise fall under Russian or Chinese influence. A December 18 European Council statement clearly noted that enlargement is “a geostrategic investment”.

Prioritizing such considerations, however, means that traditional economic arguments take a back seat. The same trend increasingly applies to concerns about meaningful political and societal transformation in candidate states. But this is a mistake that needs to be addressed now to avoid more serious problems later.

EU Interest in Democracy

Democratization has long been a central theme of EU enlargement, well before geopolitical competition and norm contestation came to define 21st-century multipolarity. The ambition to extend the European democratic community, and not merely the common market, to countries of the former Eastern bloc drove the two waves of enlargement in the 2000s. Even the Cold War-era expansion that brought in Greece, Portugal, and Spain took place in the context of democratic transition. Prior NATO membership and a westward orientation were not deemed sufficient for EU accession until these three countries were through with authoritarian rule.

Framing today’s geopolitical case for enlargement so that it continues to include democratization should therefore be understood as a strategic choice, not just a matter of principle. The EU, founded as a peace project and an economic community, is the world’s largest grouping of democracies. Over time, Europe’s geopolitical identity has become inseparable from the application of democratic and rule-of-law standards at home and the promotion of these principles abroad. This role has grown more important as Washington appears increasingly reluctant to act as the “leader of the free world” under an “America First” agenda.

Placing democracy at the heart of the geopolitical argument for enlargement requires fully recognizing the link between democracy and security, rather than treating them as separate priorities. It also entails a stronger focus on civil-society development and participation as key components of the now-central concept of “resilience”. But is this happening?

Not Just for Show

A series of international gatherings, from EU–Western Balkans summits and meetings of the European Political Community to the first-ever Enlargement Forum, suggests that high-level engagement is the primary force behind current enlargement momentum. The process formally remains a highly codified and merit-based one, but the emphasis on summitry supports an approach centered on what individual leaders of accession countries can deliver. Some may be keen to capitalize on highly visible displays of political and strategic alignment. But this risks sidelining, if not sacrificing, civil society participation and broader societal ownership of the enlargement process in the name of centralization and speed.

Unfortunately, this dynamic appears to affect even frontrunner countries that have made notable progress on EU-mandated reforms. Albania offers a telling example. Alongside Montenegro, it is widely viewed as having one of the strongest chances of joining the EU, possibly as early as 2030. Under the strongly pro-EU leadership of Prime Minister Edi Rama, Albania opened all six negotiation clusters in just over a year, between 2024 and 2025, which is an exceptionally rapid pace by historical and comparative standards.

Yet local civil society actors report that civic space is shrinking, in part due to legislation adopted to counter anti-democratic forces and external interference. Moreover, while more than 90% of Albania’s roughly 2.7 million citizens support EU membership, trust in domestic public institutions remains low, even amid far-reaching reforms. As in other enlargement countries, many young people continue to emigrate, suggesting that the prospect of EU accession has yet to significantly alter underlying social and economic dynamics.

Be Civil

It is essential to reaffirm that effective democratization and verifiable societal transformation are not secondary but indispensable components of EU enlargement. This is especially true if candidate countries are to be integrated meaningfully and sustainably into the EU’s geopolitical strategy. Without sustained civil society involvement and vigilance, transitions risk being incomplete or reversible. The EU already faces serious challenges from democratic backsliding within its own ranks, including in Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia, where illiberal and pro-Russian tendencies are gaining ground. Brussels cannot afford to create more problems through enlargement.

Reforms in candidate countries must formally and substantively meet the “Copenhagen criteria”, political and governance standards that the EU has long considered as foundational. This requires renewed attention to civil society engagement so that new norms are adopted and implemented through inclusive processes. Recent initiatives such as the European Democracy Shield and the EU Strategy for Civil Society are encouraging. These tools should now be fully mobilized in enlargement countries, where democratic transformation remains fragile.

Even as defense spending takes priority, the bloc should allocate as many resources as possible under its resilience agenda to civil society development. This implies, for enlargement, expanding support beyond existing initiatives such as the Instrument for Pre-Accession and the Civil Society Facility, especially as other international funding sources, including USAID, become less reliable.

Recent developments offer a warning and a source of inspiration. In Serbia and Georgia, mass protests have erupted in response to democratic backsliding and closer ties to Moscow and Beijing. In Ukraine, public backlash followed missteps against anti-corruption bodies. These movements, led largely by young people and civil society actors, embody the very European values the EU expects candidate countries to uphold. A more narrowly defined strategic agenda would endanger these values.

Ultimately, enlargement must remain a broad-based democratic transformation process that cannot be overly centralized or compressed. A truly merit-based approach must account for grassroots dynamics alongside institutional reforms. Without a clear link between democratization and accession, the geopolitical case for enlargement will fail to deliver greater security or strategic leverage for Europe.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.