Greenland Is Strategic: But It Is Not a Pawn

Greenland is back in the headlines, and the stakes for US national security and transatlantic stability could not be higher. President Donald Trump is right about one thing: The world’s biggest island is strategic. But the way Washington talks about Greenland, threatening purchase or coercion, misses the mark by undermining US interests, alienating allies, and playing straight into the hands of adversaries.

Greenland’s strategic importance is undeniable. Its Arctic location makes it a critical vantage point for monitoring civil and military developments in the air, at sea, and in space. For decades, the United States has relied on Greenland as part of its continental defense posture and NATO’s deterrence strategy. During World War II, Washington established a military presence there, and the Pituffik Space Base remains to this day a cornerstone of US missile warning and space surveillance.

The collaboration, however, is not new. In 1916, the United States paid Denmark $25 million in gold for the Danish West Indies (now the US Virgin Islands) and, in return, recognized Denmark’s sovereignty over Greenland. That agreement set the stage for a century of partnership. A bilateral defense agreement signed in 1951 and amended in 2004 continues to guarantee American military access to Greenland. In other words, the United States already has the trusted ally and functioning legal framework that it needs to secure the security interests of all concerned parties.

Why does this matter now? Because the Arctic is warming nearly four times faster than the rest of the globe. The region has been transformed from a frozen frontier to a theater of strategic competition. Russia has modernized its Arctic bases while China, not an Arctic nation, is expanding scientific and commercial activities that could translate into strategic leverage in the future. Moscow and Beijing are probing for influence in an area where geography equals power.

Greenland sits at the center of this chessboard. Its location offers unparalleled advantages for surveillance and early warning systems. As Arctic shipping routes open and resource competition intensifies, Greenland’s role will only grow. That is why Washington’s interest in the island is justified even if its tactics are undercutting success.

Talk of “buying” Greenland or seizing it by force is an own-goal. Such rhetoric alienates Greenlanders, who have been steadfast partners to the United States. It also undermines trust that has taken decades to build. In a rare show of unity, all five parties in Greenland’s parliament declared on January 9: “We emphasize once again our desire for the U.S. contempt for our country to end. … We do not want to be Americans, we do not want to be Danes, we want to be Greenlanders.” Several days later, the island’s prime minister went even further, stating that “if we have to choose between the United States and Denmark here and now, we choose Denmark. We choose NATO. We choose the Kingdom of Denmark. We choose the EU.”

Greenland is not a blank space on a map. It is home to 56,000 people, most of them Inuit, with a distinct culture and a long-standing aspiration for greater autonomy. Self-determination is not a footnote. It is the headline. Any US approach that ignores this principle will face resistance and challenges.

At the same time, Washington’s interest in Greenland is not just military. The island’s mineral wealth and potential for data centers have attracted attention, especially as the United States seeks independence from China in critical sectors. Rare-earth elements, essential for advanced technologies, lie beneath Greenland’s ice. But the reality is more complex. Extraction is costly, environmentally challenging, and politically sensitive. GMF’s Arctic Geopolitics Task Force has examined these issues in depth, and the verdict is clear: Investment is possible but far from simple. It requires incentives, capital, sustained political commitment, and, above all, time.

Greenland is open for business but not for exploitation. Attempts to fast-track economic projects without local buy-in will backfire. Rising awareness in Greenland and Europe of risks tied to Chinese infrastructure investment has already reduced Beijing’s chances of gaining a foothold. Washington should build on this momentum through transparent, mutually beneficial partnerships, not coercion. US interests in Greenland can be secured under existing arrangements. There is no need for threats, ultimatums, or fantasies of annexation. The future lies in cooperation, not ownership.

Washington, therefore, should pursue policies that respect Greenlandic autonomy and Inuit culture, and deepen engagement through joint research and infrastructure investment. Sustained dialogue with partners to ensure Arctic governance remains focused on current threats would also be beneficial.

This is not just about morality; it is about strategy. Trust is a force multiplier. If Washington wants to maintain its edge in the Arctic, it must strengthen, not fracture, ties with Greenland. That means listening to Greenlanders, addressing their priorities, and offering tangible benefits that align with their vision for their future.

In the Arctic, as elsewhere, power without legitimacy is brittle. On the Arctic chess board, the winning play is not conquest. It is collaboration.