China’s Next Technology Push

China's 15th Five-Year Plan, released March 12, sets out an ambitious roadmap for harnessing emerging technologies, termed “new quality productive forces”, and making them powerful drivers of economic growth and geopolitical leverage. As Chinese technologies grow increasingly competitive worldwide, the plan sends important signals that US and EU decision-makers should treat as warnings and calls to action.

Three takeaways from the plan stand out:

Technology Diffusion: The focus is on boosting artificial intelligence (AI) use and adoption across the Chinese economy. Beijing is prioritizing the broad deployment of practical applications and treating AI as a general-purpose technology rather than focusing exclusively on frontier innovation. The plan highlights implementation of the Chinese “AI+” initiative, a policy launched in August 2025 and aimed at accelerating AI adoption. It also advocates for faster rollout of smart terminals and AI agents, and large-scale commercial use of AI in key sectors, including manufacturing, logistics,transportation, and public health. 

Emerging Technology Intersections: Chinese policymakers are already thinking about where emerging technologies will merge, and how to exploit that for economic gain. The Five-Year Plan lays out support for “emerging industries” (such as intelligent connected electric vehicles (EVs)) and nascent “future industries” including earth-to-space quantum communications networks, brain-computer interfaces, and embodied intelligence applications that combine AI with physical agents such as robots or drones. Each of these industries draws on distinct but interlocking technologies to build novel capabilities and generate new sources of economic growth. 

Becoming a Global Leader: The 15th Five-Year Plan reflects a China that sees itself not as a rising power navigating the international system but as one shaping it. The latest plan is the third to reveal an escalation in the way China is positioning itself in global economic governance. The 13th plan (2016) called for the country to “participate in” such governance, and the 14th plan (2021) upgraded this to “active participation” (积极参与). The 15th completes the process by making “lead (引领) global economic governance” a goal. This includes “propos[ing] Chinese solutions for international rules in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence, the digital economy, green and low-carbon development, and outer space”. Language opposing “hegemonic, domineering, and bullying practices”, implicitly contrasting China with the United States, reinforces the more assertive posture.

If Washington and European capitals want to remain competitive, they must treat domestic and global technology diffusion as a strategic priority and coordinate more effectively on developing “future industries”. Success will depend not just on innovation, but on scaling adoption, shaping global standards, and offering a credible alternative model to Chinese technological leadership.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.