A New Tone in Hungary?

Hungary’s parliamentary election on April 12 could mark a turning point in the country’s relationship with Brussels and Kyiv. A victory for opposition leader Péter Magyar and his Tisza party would likely signal a departure from the confrontational foreign policy pursued by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, even if some challenges and political limitations are clear. Magyar has carefully calibrated his campaign rhetoric to avoid alienating voters wary of foreign influence, but his leadership could gradually move Budapest toward a more cooperative stance with Western partners on most issues.

No More No

Outside Hungary, the most immediate impact of a Tisza victory would be felt in Brussels. For most of the past 16 years he has been in power, Orbán has repeatedly wielded veto power in the EU to delay or dilute actions related to Ukraine. He has blocked the country’s accession process, financial aid packages, and sanctions on Russia. Magyar has signaled that he would pursue a more cooperative relationship with Brussels, particularly because unlocking the roughly €18 billion in EU funds frozen over rule-of-law and corruption concerns is a main campaign promise.

Hungary under Magyar could become a more predictable partner in the bloc’s decision-making, though a shift in tone would not necessarily translate into dramatically increased direct support for Ukraine, particularly in the military sphere. The opposition leader has consistently condemned Russia’s invasion and emphasized Ukraine’s right to defend its sovereignty, but he has also maintained that Hungary should avoid direct involvement in the war. He opposes the deployment of Hungarian troops and the transfer of weapons to Ukraine from Hungarian territory.

A member of the European Parliament (MEP), Magyar, like others from his party in the legislature, has adopted a nuanced and often contradictory position on Ukraine-related matters. They frequently diverge from their parliamentary group, the European People's Party (EPP), on sensitive issues. Tisza representatives in Brussels generally oppose the Orbán government's pro-Russian narrative, but they have tactically aligned with the prime minister’s Fidesz party on certain Ukraine-related votes, occasionally abstaining to balance policy stances with domestic Hungarian public opinion. Whether this strategy stems from Tisza’s genuine positions or from a strategic effort to mitigate Fidesz’s political attacks in the run-up to the election is unclear.

Magyar’s views on Ukraine’s future EU membership are also cautious, and he has argued against fast-tracking the country’s EU accession. He proposes putting the issue to a vote in anational referendum, an approach that suggests a less disruptive Hungarian government would be wary of endorsing Ukraine’s integration without strong domestic political backing.

Better Behavior

A Magyar government may differ most starkly from Orbán’s in its rhetoric and diplomatic posture toward Russia. The Tisza leader has signaled that Hungary should align more closely with its European partners and be less sympathetic toward the Kremlin. This could mean fewer public disputes with Brussels over sanctions policy and more consistent alignment with the EU’s broader strategy of isolating Russia.

Energy policy, however, a decisive factor in Hungary’s foreign policy, would be among the greatest challenges for a Magyar government. The country’s dependence on Russian energy imports has been a determining factor in its cautious approach to issues involving Moscow. Orbán’s government has opposed EU sanctions that restrict Russian energy purchases, which are viewed as a “national security necessity”. Magyar has indicated that he would seek to reduce the dependence over time, but it would take years to do that. An abrupt shift away from Russian energy would threaten the Hungarian economy, a situation he seemed to acknowledge in an interview with RFE/RL’s Hungarian Service. His goal, he said, is to end Russian fossil fuel imports by 2035, well beyond the EU’s 2027 target.

New leadership in Budapest, therefore, would not mean friction-free relations with Kyiv. Magyar has even publicly clashed with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy while campaigning, demanding an apology from him for threatening remarks against Orbán. The episode added to the long-standing tensions between the two countries that harken back to the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine’s Transcarpathia region.

The implications of a Tisza victory may be significant, but they would also be nuanced. The party would only gradually reorient Hungarian foreign policy, not overhaul it. Magyar has been clear about his intention to rebuild trust with Western allies, particularly the EU and NATO, a marked shift from Orbán’s pivot to the East. Still, the challenger would maintainpragmatic, national interest-driven relationships. That would allow greater alignment with the Western consensus on Ukraine, even if progress comes slowly and cautiously. For Kyiv, that alone would be meaningful.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.