The EU-India Summit: A Turning Point in Bilateral Relations?

This interview was originally published in Italian by Geopolitica.info on April 8, 2026.

The EU–India summit took place at the end of January 2026 and delivered significant results after years of difficult negotiations. We discuss the outcomes and what they mean for the broader context of EU-India relations with Gunnar Wiegand, former managing director for the Asia-Pacific at the European External Action Service and visiting professor at the College of Europe, now visiting distinguished fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

What issues did the leaders discuss at the summit and what were the results of the meeting?

The summit produced more substantial results than what many would have believed to be possible. The [EU-India] free trade agreement represents the most substantial outcome, and there will also soon be two related agreements coming up this or next year on investment protection and geographical indications. The two sides also agreed on a security and defense partnership thatcovers areas including cyber and maritime security, counterterrorism, and hybrid challenges, and opens the possibility for joining defense industry initiatives. Cooperation with the Indian navy and among defense industries is expected to increase significantly. The two sides also agreed on a new strategic agenda through 2030 and, unprecedently, a mobility framework with a European Legal Gateway office, the European approach to attract Indian professionals to EU companies. Furthermore, the two sides are negotiating a security and information agreement to allow the sharing of classified information and are working on Indian association to Horizon Europe, which would allow Indian universities and research organisations to participate in EU research programs as South Korea does.

What made the EU and India overcome previous disagreements and agree to ink these deals now?

It always takes time for big players such as the EU and India to tango. Free trade agreementnegotiations began in 2007 but were suspended in 2013 and resumed only in 2023. Yet both sides always perceived the potential in their relationship. It is not a coincidence that the EU and Indiasigned a strategic partnership already in 2004 and that the Indians showed great enthusiasm in 2020 when the EU developed a strategic agenda to further strengthen the partnership. The breakthrough certainly concerns the shared belief that the international order should be based on international law and common rules. While the EU and India believe the world is becoming more multipolar, they also share the firm conviction that might should not make right and that multipolar should go together with multilateral. Both sides have felt acutely the consequences of the use of force and economic coercion. Disagreements exist, most notably on Russia, but the commonality of interests clearly outweigh them.

The EU-India s1ummit was so substantial since international factors allowed leaders to overcome existing objections and reach a compromise. The summit underscores how there can be unintended consequences from other people’s decisions, a formulation often used in New Delhi when referring to the unilateral imposition of protectionist tariffs.

Scholars and policymakers often argue in favor of investing in the relationship with New Delhi given its economic and geopolitical weight. What can this partnership realistically deliver for the EU? Can it help to strengthen the EU’s position in the Indo-Pacific and/or assist with diversifying EU trade flows?

India is the world’s most populous state, and it has a steadily growing population and economy. It has a high degree of specialization in key industries of the future, especially digital and renewableenergy, possessing talent and industrial capacity. Such complementarity can enhance flows. Different from the EU’s regulatory approach, India’s is development-oriented. Its developmental logic has traditionally been protectionist but now is turning more open. Also, there is a new commonality: The EU and India now have troubling relations with their neighbors. That makes them want to hedge against risks. Diversification may not replace former partners but certainly can provide a wider range of offers, reducing vulnerabilities and dependencies. I would expect synergies in technology development and in the management of certain risks.

Annual EU exports to India are expected to double over the next 5-10 years. That has been a key incentive because the EU needs more access to growing markets. Despite advanced technology, industrial capacity is more expensive in Europe, while it is possible to produce faster and cheaper in India. That is certainly part of Indian calculation. The point is well illustrated by recent armament deals. India agreed to the purchase of 114 French Rafale fighter airplanes and six German submarines, but certain stages of production will be carried out on Indian territory.

The EU and India often refer to each other as like-minded partners. Yet disagreements persist on many issues, including Russia and multilateralism. Moving forward, how can the EU deal with these challenges in the bilateral relationship while maximising its strategic upsides?

The term “like-minded” was not used in the summit statement, but core like-mindedness elements were mentioned—“growing closeness”, “joint commitments”, “shared values and principles, including democracy and rule of law”. While the EU and Japan, Australia, or Canada comfortablyuse the like-minded label, this is less obvious and frequent in EU-India relations because of the differences in the organization of their political systems, and in their history and related sensitivities. The EU and India can have some differences when it comes to specific decisions on human rights or other issues to which India is most sensitive, such as Kashmir. But this should not be seen as diminishing the value of the strategic partnership.

India certainly does not appreciate when the EU points its fingers and tells New Delhi what to do on human rights and minorities. In the past, the EU has been perceived as too arrogant a teacher andintervening too strongly in Indian affairs. Yet today the commonality of EU-India basic principles, interests, and international positions are very high. The EU and India are strongly committed to enhancing their partnership and that allows differences to be openly discussed.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.