Beijing Wrote the Script

US President Donald Trump’s much-anticipated meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on May 14-15 yielded, in the words of the White House, a series of “historic deals”. But whether there were actual agreements or merely expressions of aspirational targets subject to negotiations remains unclear. China’s readouts and extensive coverage of the summit made no reference to concrete purchase commitments. Beijing instead emphasized something else of potentially greater import: Xi’s reframing of US-China ties as a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” and how that phrase should be understood.

Not coincidentally, the same wording appeared in the White House’s statement: “President Trump and President Xi agreed that the United States and China should build a constructive relationship of strategic stability on the basis of fairness and reciprocity.” The phrase, however, has little concrete meaning to an American public beyond vague reassurance while it has weight in the Chinese political context. By echoing it, the White House hands Beijing a significant diplomatic win that has extensive symbolical value. The Chinese side will use that victory to try to police US behavior in areas it considers its core interests.

The advantage that China has gained is reflected in the way political language functions in the country. The Communist Party governs through institutions and also through fixed phrases, known in Chinese as “tifa”. These formulations are carefully negotiated and designed internally at the highest levels and then propagated through official documents, speeches, press briefings, and state media. Tifa set policy direction and carry precise political meaning. Their verbatim repetition throughout the Chinese bureaucracy signals loyalty and submission to the top leadership. 

This is mostly a domestic political ritual, but Beijing consistently tries to get foreigners to parrot its formulations, just as it has worked hard to get its specific political language and initiatives embedded in UN documents. This language can then be used domestically as evidence of international acceptance of Chinese positions and internationally to create a record of agreement with China that the country later exploits.

This is not the first time China has tried to impose its framing of Sino-American relations on the United States. In February 2012, months before he became China’s leader, Xi proposed a “new model of major-power relations” during a visit to Washington. The Obama administration considered but never accepted that formulation. “Constructive relationship of strategic stability” is the updated version of the “new model”, but it represents the same underlying objective of defining the bilateral relationship on China’s terms. Beijing appears to have had more success this time.

Like any other tifa, the phrase itself was clearly deliberated and fleshed out for months before the Trump-Xi summit. The rapid rollout in Chinese media after the meeting of an interpretive framework underscores the effort. The formulation has recently appeared prominently in the Chinese Communist Party’s mouthpiece, People’s Daily, and in diplomatic briefingsand Xinhua commentary. 

The new tifa is being propagated through official channels as the authoritative description of the US-China relationship for the next three years and beyond. China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, made this patently clear when, in an interview, he described “constructive strategic stability” as “the most important political consensus” coming out of the meeting. 

Wang Yi provided insight into the campaign’s practical implications when he went on to say that Taiwan is “the most important issue in US-China relations”. He framed peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as the “greatest common denominator” between the two great powers, thereby linking Taiwan directly to broader global stability.

In addition to signalling that China is strong enough to define the terms of its relationship with the United States, the adoption of the language creates a ready-made pressure tool. Future American actions on Taiwan, such as arms sales, which are mandated by US law but now subject to a Trump administration delay, can be portrayed as violations of the “constructive strategic stability” relationship that the White House itself endorsed. 

But the consequences go further. Ultimately, they include shifting the goalposts in China’s favor in any arena of the country’s choosing. Future US actions that China sees as encroaching on its ever-expanding core interests are likely to be judged against the “constructive relationship of strategic stability”. Any move that Beijing dislikes can simply be framed as inconsistent with it. 

The pushback will not be limited to the rhetorical. It is likely to be accompanied by threats, retaliation, and escalation, all while Beijing asserts that Washington is destabilizing the relationship. The result, paradoxically, may be not more stability but less.

It is unclear how exactly the phrase ended up in the White House readout, but it must be assumed that China pushed the United States to include it. What did the Trump White House think it was agreeing to? Most likely, it saw the request to use the phrase as just diplomatic boilerplate to accompany a trade package and maintain a cooperative tone. 

But the gap in interpretation is key. Chinese diplomatic language often embeds precise political meaning in phrases that sound innocuous in English. The White House may have thought it was announcing a trade win. Beijing concluded that Washington had accepted China’s script.

The United States can still resist the “new consensus” that China has declared and the White House, likely unwittingly, has endorsed. But effectively pushing back, especially on Taiwan and other issues Beijing defines as core interests, requires a clear understanding of China’s playbook.

The inclusion of the phrase in the White House readout suggests that such understanding is lacking among Washington’s highest officials. That could be damaging. Stability in Sino-American relations is a worthwhile and much-needed goal, but it should not come at the cost of accepting a framework defined on China’s terms.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.