Will Washington Lose a Model Ally in Europe?

The Trump administration continuously hails Poland as a model ally and an example for other countries in Europe. From its perspective, Warsaw does not need to be coaxed into getting defense spending to the NATO goal of 5% of GDP and its emergence as a key European security actor is welcome. In addition, cultural conservatives in the administration and Washington see Poland as a country sharing their societal values and views on threats, as laid out in speeches by Vice President JD Vance and in the National Security Strategy, including criticism of the EU, which President Karol Nawrocki shares. The Polish-US relationship is rooted in a history of supporting each other’s fights for independence, whether Polish support for America’s Revolutionary War starting in 1776 or US support for Poland to break free from communism in the 1980s. 

For Polish politicians, being “pro-American” was a given after the fall of communism, regardless of who was in power in Warsaw or Washington. However, that is now being tested by the Trump administration’s confrontational approach to Europe and its broader disruptive foreign policy decisions. President Donald Trump’s rhetoric and efforts at personal diplomacy with President Vladimir Putin are particularly difficult to understand in Warsaw. Today, even Poland is not immune to a rise in anti-American sentiment, as recent polls show. And, reflecting that skepticism, its politicians are understatedly and carefully shifting toward “more Europe” in their strategic thinking. This raises a fundamental question: Is the United States losing its closest ally in Europe?

Poland Is Turning Away 

Since the start of the Trump administration, trust in US leadership has dropped sharply in Poland and political rhetoric in support of the relationship has become muted. As a result, the government has started looking beyond Washington for ways to secure Poland’s interests. 

The loss of trust has been stark in a country once so enamored with the transatlantic relationship. A poll published in July 2025 showed a 40 percentage-point year-on-year decline in confidence that the US president would do the right thing in world affairs. In a January 2026 poll, 53.2% of Polish respondents said they no longer saw the United States as a reliable ally, while 29.9% said they did.

This popular opinion is reflected in political rhetoric, which now can even be confrontational, something rarely seen before in the mainstream. Trump’s disparaging comments in January 2026 about the role of European NATO soldiers in Afghanistan particularly stung. At the same time, a row erupted when the speaker of Poland’s lower house of parliament, Włodzimierz Czarzasty, publicly laid out his reasons for declining to support the awarding of the Nobel Peace to Trump, following a request from the speaker of the US House of Representatives, Mike Johnson. US ambassador Tom Rose, a political appointee, announced that he would cut off relations with Czarzasty. Poland’s politicians were compelled to take sides. Prime Minister Donald Tusk, whose governing coalition includes the speaker’s New Left party, defended him, saying that “allies should respect, not lecture, each other.” Opposition leaders laid the blame on Czarzasty, accusing him of unnecessarily scoring political points against Poland’s most important ally and souring relations in the process. 

In April 2026, Nawrocki’s chief foreign policy advisor, Marcin Przydacz, commented following Washington’s request for assistance in reopening the Strait of Hormuz that “a minimum of respect would require consultation on these matters in advance, not when problems arise.”  

A new irritant is the case of former justice minister Zbigniew Ziobro, who is wanted in Poland on criminal charges and arrived in the United States earlier this month on a journalist visa. Ziobro earlier had been granted political asylum in Hungary by the government of Viktor Orbán. Poland’s government has sought answers from Washington on how this could have happened and for what purpose. Tusk has said the granting of a visa to Ziobro was “outrageous”. Yet Warsaw hopes that the issue can be dealt with quietly, and it will try not to put this front and center. As long the matter remains unresolved, it will add a strain on the relationship.

It took longer for broad skepticism toward the United States to emerge into the open in Polish politics than it did in other European countries, but that taboo has been broken. Polish politicians are no longer in lockstep on what was seen as a sacrosanct relationship.

European Options

Poland has been strategically balancing its strong, yet increasingly prudent relationship with the United States with its growing voice in the calls to develop Europe’s capacity to act more independently. Because Washington is no longer a leading supporter of Ukraine in its war against Russia, because Poland has borders with Ukraine and Russia, and because of the changing nature of the threat, it is only logical for Warsaw to look to enhance other partnerships in Europe and through the EU. For example, one emerging divergence in the relationship concerns the commitment to an international rules-based order in which might does not equal right—a principle that has been flaunted by Russia in Ukraine and by the Trump administration in Venezuela and Iran. 

Membership in NATO and reliance on the alliance for collective deterrence and defense remain at the core of Poland’s security. However—given the uncertainty regarding common values with the United States and its defense commitment, Washington’s vacillation on the war in Ukraine, and the current threats from Russia to Europe, including hybrid attacks on Polish soil—Warsaw is exploring ways to strengthen its security through European and regional cooperation. 

A political debate is emerging in Poland about preparations for a different nuclear deterrent, including an advanced dialogue with France, in the pursuit of as much autonomy as possible. In May 2026, Poland signed agreements to access loans of up to €43.7 billion under the EU’s Security Action for Europe instrument to accelerate its defense modernization (after the government bypassed an earlier presidential veto). More recently, as a result of the Iran war, the United States has notified its European allies of delays in the delivery of purchased US weapons, thereby further incentivizing Poland and others to look elsewhere, where possible. The Pentagon’s sudden decision to halt a deployment of US troops to Poland earlier this month further rattled the relationship.

In an example of parallel regional cooperation, Poland is using its current presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States to strengthen the organization’s focus on regional security by addressing hybrid threats and protecting critical infrastructure against Russian aggression. Key priorities include countering Moscow’s “shadow fleet”, enhancing maritime safety, and fostering cooperation with NATO allies. Finally, given Germany’s and Poland’s commitment and ability to hit NATO’s defense spending goal, the bilateral defense agreement that is due to be signed this year will further European leadership in regional security. Beyond Europe, Poland has found a trusted defense-industrial partner in South Korea; it took 46% of the country’s defense exports in 2024. 

That leading Polish politicians see criticizing the United States or its president as a political option is a new phenomenon—one that could grow and lead to political disputes that distance Warsaw from Washington. Given the uncertainty stemming from the United States and Russia’s war on its border, Poland has acknowledged that the relationship has changed, and it is actively looking to hedge in the industrial, military, and strategic realms.

Old Loves Die Hard

Despite all of the above, the United States remains Poland’s strong ally and most important partner in military cooperation, as Tusk stated in April 2026. All major Polish political players acknowledge this. Tusk, who makes public his disagreements with Trump and does not want Poland to join the controversial Board of Peace, continuously reaffirms Warsaw’s commitment to the relationship. “Poland was, is, and will be a loyal, reliable, and predictable ally of the United States”, he said in February 2026. Meanwhile, Nawrocki, who enjoys warmer relations with the White House and is keen on Poland joining the Board of Peace, presents himself as the prime caretaker of relations with Trump, which still broadly plays well domestically.

The economic relationship is robust and there are new areas for long-term collaboration in energy and defense. The United States is Poland’s eighth-largest trading partner and the largest non-European one, with $12.6 billion in direct exports to the country in 2024. For example, in April 2025, Poland awarded a $51 billion contract to American firms to build the country’s first nuclear power plant over competing bids from South Korea and France. It is also keen on becoming a regional energy hub for US liquefied natural gas (LNG) to help countries wean themselves off of Russian energy sources. The United States is already the largest provider of LNG to Poland and is set to increase flows via a second terminal to be opened in 2028. 

On the defense-industrial side, Poland is heavily involved in partnerships with major US defense companies as it continues its effort to modernize its military, increase domestic production, and diversify suppliers. This includes Patriot air-defense batteries, ammunition, Abrams tanks, and F-35 fighter jets. As a result, US defense contractors and producers will continue to play a significant role, if a reduced one due to other diversification efforts.

The United States is also committed to Poland’s security through its significant military presence. The number of US soldiers based in the country is a constant source of political attention there, with a consensus that more is better. It has been a paramount signal of deterrence toward Russia and of assurance to the Polish people. The United States has approximately 10,000 troops in Poland and the decision in March 2024 to make the US Army presence at Camp Kościuszko in Poznań  “permanent” was a major development in the relationship. The camp is now the largest permanent US base on NATO’s eastern flank. The type of troops and capabilities stationed here also matter. They include the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System, heavy equipment as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve, and US leadership of the multinational NATO battle group in the country. Although the government would welcome a larger US troop presence in Poland, the current level allows for peace of mind, while a feared reduction such as the one that was made in Romania in October 2025, would change the domestic political calculus. Poland is still working to increase the number of US troops on its soil, even in light of the abovementioned recent decision regarding troop rotation. Trump’s announcement on May 21 about sending an additional 5,000 troops to Poland, although scant on details, was broadly applauded in Warsaw. It sent an important signal to Polish policymakers arguing for close relations with Washington.

For Poland, there is no simple and ready alternative to the relationship with the United States emerging. European countries could come together in different combinations to tackle various regional or topical issues, but Poland may be hampered in how far it can go in that direction by the fact that a large portion of its national security establishment is skeptical of exclusive European leadership in defense. What is more, operating in new European leadership formats inevitably (and rationally) involves close cooperation with Germany. But skepticism toward it in Polish society has risen to its highest levels since 2008, and this is often used as a political tool by the conservative opposition parties against the coalition government. Meanwhile, the political and security cooperation among the Nordic and Baltic countries is promising, but it is no substitute for NATO, nor is it intended to be. As of today the United States, acting within NATO, is the only ally that could significantly help Poland if Russia were to attack. This helps explain why Warsaw’s position on the Iran war has been muted. It has expressed slight concerns that the United States may delay deliveries of purchased military equipment while refusing to send one of its two Patriot systems to the region. 

Making Things Work for Now 

Poland’s historic, close relations with the United States are under pressure as the Trump administration seeks to implement its vision for the US role in the world and particularly in Europe. This puts Warsaw in a potentially dangerous bind. 

For now, Poland can use Nawrocki’s warm relations with the White House as a vital communication channel for protecting the country’s interests, even when this involves some divergence in Warsaw between the Tusk-led government and the president. That Nawrocki’s politics resemble MAGA’s is also a helpful backdrop and not deemed as a political liability yet. 

For its part, the government can absorb the Trump administration’s unpredictability and maintain its position as a promoter of strong ties with Washington, while also working to foster European leadership on security issues vital to Poland’s future. The efforts of Poland’s leadership to make progress at both levels have coexisted thus far, but it may be forced by events or US actions to choose one over the other in a more pronounced manner soon. As Deputy Prime Minister Radosław Sikorski put it in February 2026: “We have been and will continue to be a loyal ally of America. But we cannot be suckers.” 

What would cause Poland to consider itself a “sucker” in the relationship? If the Trump administration unequivocally reduces US support for NATO and military presence in Central Europe, or somehow rushes a reconciliation with Russia while its war against Ukraine continues, Warsaw could conclude that it has no choice but to turn away from Washington and fully throw in its lot with its European partners. 

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.