Europe Can Achieve Strategic Autonomy in the Coming 10-15 Years

The following is a translation from German of an interview first published in the Austrian newspaper Die Presse on May 28, 2026.

“The transatlantic relationship is in a phase of transition”

Die Presse: As head of the German Marshall Fund, you are a key voice in promoting transatlantic relations. Be honest: What is the current state of these relations?

Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer: Transatlantic relations are currently being redefined, but the new terms of this transatlantic pact have not yet been fully articulated. We are in a transitional phase; Europe is in a kind of transformation limbo. The United States is rethinking its priorities—and also its demands on its allies. At the same time, Europeans are recalibrating their relationship with the United States. Trump can’t move fast enough; Europe needs more time. That’s not ideal. But this upheaval also opens up space for Europe to contribute its own ideas and coordinate better.

Where should the priorities lie?

In defense. Here, too, there is a massive speed problem. The United States is signaling that it wants to reduce its military presence and its contributions to NATO. This puts enormous pressure on Europe.

Many debates revolve around defense spending as measured against GDP. Does this still make sense?

No. We need to move beyond this traditional debate on burden-sharing. It’s not just about how much money is spent, but what it’s spent on. What capabilities are Europeans actually building? In which areas can they complement the United States? I would therefore prefer to speak of strategic complementarity rather than strategic autonomy. Europe needs new partnerships to achieve strategic autonomy in the coming 10 to 15 years. Europe can develop capabilities that are crucial in a new transatlantic division of labor.

Do we in Europe sometimes make it too easy on ourselves when we point a finger at America and say: That’s the crazy man in the White House?

Yes. Many of Trump’s policy approaches reflect deeper trends in the United States. There is continuity between Democratic and Republican administrations. Trump did not invent the tensions in transatlantic relations. However, he often exacerbates them. Above all, the tariffs harm Americans themselves. At the same time, they undermine trust among transatlantic partners. And trust is the foundation of any alliance. The Trump administration, however, also uses tariffs to build pressure and force concessions in other areas. This shows very clearly that an economic tool can also be a security policy tool, one that forces Europe to address its own problems, which it has long put off.

What problems do you mean?

Defense, energy, and digitalization. These are the three key areas that will determine whether Europe remains a capable entity. It is precisely in these three areas that Europe is particularly dependent—on the United States, on China, or on other players. If Europe fails to find solutions here, it will continue to lose ground strategically.

Austrian exports to the United States have plummeted by a fifth in 2025. Would you attribute that directly to Trump’s tariffs?

That is part of a larger political context. A relationship is based on two things: trust and predictability. Both are currently being tested. But one must not view the United States solely through the lens of Washington. I’ve traveled extensively across America in recent months—California, Colorado, Ohio, and soon Texas. At the state, city, and corporate levels, I see a great deal of transatlantic cooperation. Even though tensions at the highest political level are significant, some very concrete collaborations are emerging beneath the surface.

What does this mean for Austrian companies?

They should adopt a more decentralized approach. There are many examples of business-to-business collaborations and joint industry projects—in aviation, pharmaceuticals, defense, and future technologies. Colorado, for instance, recently signed an agreement with Finland covering quantum computing, aviation, and pharmaceuticals. These forms of state and city diplomacy keep the transatlantic relationship alive.

Can this local level really compensate for the loss of trust at the highest level?

I strongly believe in these connections. The business community, in particular, must bring its influence to bear in these discussions. My advice to Austrian companies would be: Seek out these connections. They can help redefine transatlantic trade and industrial cooperation.

Europe’s already faltering economy is suffering from the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, primarily in the form of rising energy costs. Should European countries become more strongly involved in resolving the conflict in their own economic interests?

European countries cannot pretend that the war in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have nothing to do with them. Of course, I expect EU countries to credibly represent their interests there as well, just as all other actors do.

Asia remains even more dependent on Iranian oil for certain fuels. Nevertheless, China is increasingly setting the tone in trade policy and making other countries dependent on it, for example when it comes to rare earths. How can Europe break free from this imbalance in the medium term?

The relationship with China is much more complex than we often think. We must cooperate with China on certain issues and protect ourselves against dependency on others. On issues such as Ukraine, Iran, or other conflict mediation, China will be at the table. Europeans and Americans must accept this. But acceptance does not mean naivety. So the crucial question is: What is more expensive? The additional costs incurred when Europe does more on its own and builds new partnerships? Or the costs of hyper-dependence on China? My answer is clear: Dependence on China is much more expensive for us. And it’s not just about financial costs. It’s also about political costs and strategic vulnerability.

That may be true in the long run. If we want to reduce our dependence on China—for example, when it comes to critical raw materials or electric vehicles—prices will rise in the short term. After all, that’s the most important currency for policymakers.

You’re right about that. As with defense issues, we face a problem of timing and pace here as well. In the short term, Europeans lack many critical capabilities. That’s why it’s high time we started building them up now. We must not get stuck in a cycle of constant crisis management. Companies and governments often react only to the next crisis. But we must ask: Where do we want to be in five or 10 years—and what will it take to get there? Europe needs to think less traditionally and much more creatively. This requires more industrial cooperation and more political resolve. Geopolitical events are forcing us to innovate. Europe must not miss this opportunity.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.