Politicial scientist Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer: 'The United States Grapples with Strategic Saturation'
This article was originally published in Le Monde in French on July 5 and in English on July 6, 2026. GMF President Dr. Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer was interviewed by Piotr Smolar, a Washington correspondent for Le Monde.
The NATO summit, which will be taking place in Ankara on July 7 and 8, will be held amid strained relations between the US and European allies, against the backdrop of wars in Iran and Ukraine. Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, president of the German Marshall Fund – a think tank deeply involved in transatlantic relations – explains the US strategy for withdrawing from the continent's security.
In June 2025, at the NATO summit in The Hague, Netherlands, the member states committed to raising their security spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. But transatlantic relations have steadily deteriorated, particularly due to US claims in Greenland and the war in Iran.
We are witnessing a renegotiation of the transatlantic contract. Washington is sending a clear message to Europeans: The era of burden sharing is over and now comes the era of burden shifting. One year after the 5% target was set, the Trump administration judges the progress to be insufficient. European allies and Canada increased their defense spending by 20% in real terms in 2025, reaching $574 billion. All now meet the threshold of 2% of GDP, but the White House is urging Europe to move faster.
On the European side, a shift has taken place. US claims over Greenland and the war [waged alongside Israel] against Iran have confirmed that the United States is pursuing a unilateral strategic agenda, even when European interests are directly at stake. In response, Europeans have multiplied their initiatives outside the American framework. They have come to understand that betting on a reversal from a future US administration would be an illusion. The Europeanization of NATO is now seen as a long-term process. This explains the current paradox: a political divergence, a crisis of trust, but also a form of strategic convergence, with Europe now expected to take on greater responsibility for the defense of its continent, with less involvement from the United States.
Why is the US in such a hurry?
Washington is pursuing a strategy of strategic saturation, which the Pentagon refers to as "simultaneity:" The US is simultaneously engaged in Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, which is putting significant pressure on the American defense industrial base. Production lead times have been increasing, which has been evident in delivery delays to Germany and the Baltic states. The message is clear: Even in the absence of political disagreements, the US is no longer able to guarantee the same level of military support to Europe.
This constraint has fueled a logic of "geopolitical outsourcing." Washington has organized a global burden-sharing arrangement: to Europe, the security of the continent; to Gulf allies, the stabilization of the Middle East; to Indo-Pacific partners, the joint management of China's rise. This shift has required allies to assume greater responsibilities, at the risk, if coordination is insufficient, of an even more fragmented collective security.
What does Ukraine represent for the current US administration? Is it a source of irritation? A burden?
Above all, it is a case that needs to be closed. For Donald Trump, the war in Ukraine has been an expensive distraction – more than $188 billion committed since 2022 – that has diverted resources from the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific.
The dissonance with Europe is clear. For Europeans, Ukraine represents an existential issue; at stake is the continent's long-term security architecture. In Washington, priorities lie elsewhere: stabilizing and ending the conflict, even if that means accepting a peace plan that could freeze the front line, rather than fully restoring Ukrainian sovereignty.
This is at the heart of the transatlantic divide ahead of the Ankara summit. Europe is playing the long game, while Washington is looking for a way out. In that context, the center of gravity for support to Ukraine has shifted towards Europe. The EU is now the leading contributor, with more than $226 billion committed since 2022, including $86 billion in military aid.
At the end of May, the US informed its allies in Brussels that it would significantly reduce its participation in what is known as NATO's "Force Model" – that is, the capabilities mobilized in the event of a security crisis in Europe. What do you think of the way this is being handled?
The situation has shifted from statements to concrete action: Allies were informed but not consulted. The US plans to halve the availability of its strategic bombers, reduce its fighter jets by one third, withdraw all its submarines from NATO crisis operations and scale back other critical assets, notably refueling aircraft. That creates immediate vulnerabilities in areas where Europe still relies heavily on the US.
We're about to get down to the hard part. The main topic of the Ankara summit is whether European industries can step in to fill the gap. Part of the answer lies in Ukraine, which has now become a co-architect of European security. Partnerships between European and Ukrainian manufacturers – such as MBDA working with the Ukrainian Flamingo cruise missile – illustrate this shift toward the co-production of technologies that have already been tested in combat.
Filling these capability gaps represents an enormous effort for Europeans, with required investments estimated between €800 billion and €1 trillion over 10 years, just to replace conventional American capabilities. This implies a cultural shift; European manufacturers and political leaders must rethink weapons procurement processes, accelerate production rates and learn from the wars in Ukraine and Iran. Should they continue to focus on heavy equipment, or invest more in agile capabilities such as drones, artificial intelligence and integrated systems? The challenge is not so much to spend more, but to spend differently and more quickly.
The German Marshall Fund has stepped outside the traditional role of a think tank by becoming actively involved in organizing dialogue.
In my view, this is what a think tank should be doing today. When official channels stall and political trust erodes, informal spaces become the only venues where frank conversations can still take place. We launched the European Defense Roadmap initiative in Washington in May to structure the transatlantic dialogue and align the American and European timelines, to avoid a capability gap. The goal is to put forward a credible, politically acceptable joint roadmap. For six months, we are bringing together governments, defense industries and tech stakeholders from both sides of the Atlantic, with stops in London, Paris, Brussels, Berlin, Warsaw, Rome, as well as in the Baltic and Nordic countries.
The goal is twofold: to map out the critical capabilities that should be prioritized and to define a shared "transition curve." Which areas of conventional defense can Europe realistically take over as early as 2027? Which ones will only be feasible by 2030, with residual US guarantees to bridge the gaps? Next, European coalitions of willing partners need to organize around key sectors (long-range missiles, drones, air defense, cyber), and then this roadmap should be presented in Washington at the beginning of 2027, with senior European officials, the US administration and Congress all in attendance.
How does the US administration view this six-month discussion period?
Washington wants to give priority to countries capable of meeting investment targets, while others will be pushed to the background. The administration has emphasized the need to monitor investments made so that they truly address the needs identified by NATO. The US is also concerned about the United Kingdom and France, two key strategic allies who are weighed down by debt and deficits and are unable to allocate the necessary funds to defense. Finally, US officials have remained irritated by preferential European measures such as SAFE [Security Action for Europe], wanting American industries to be able to benefit from those funds. Washington needs to change its stance and recognize that Europe has embarked on three complementary paths: strengthening its own industrial capabilities, continuing cooperation with American industries and developing strategic partnerships with other countries.
Is Europe ready to meet the challenge?
Most of the work will have to be carried out by Europeans themselves. The domestic political situation in the E3 countries (Germany, the United Kingdom and France) complicates matters, but it also encourages these countries to open up to other partnerships or alliances within the European Union, as well as outside it (with South Korea, India and Japan). The strategic culture of many European countries is undergoing deep changes. The rhetoric usually associated with France about strategic autonomy has now become largely Europeanized.
But caution is needed. Domestic political developments in Europe could also slow this momentum for cooperation in the coming years. If political polarization prevents joint industrial, technological and military projects from emerging, the transition to a new security order would unfold in a fragmented and inefficient manner. Europe could then find itself facing another scenario in which the US encourages it to become stronger, while Europe itself becomes divided and turns inward. That would risk missing the historic opportunity for its strategic maturation.